货币金融学（第十三版）课件 英文第18章 国际金融体系

TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarketsThirteenthEditionChapter18TheInternationalFinancialSystemCopyright©2022,2019,2016PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedPreviewThischapterexamineshowinternationalfinancialtransactionsandthestructureoftheinternationalfinancialsystemaffectmonetarypolicy.LearningObjectives(1of2)18.1UsegraphsandT-accountstoillustratethedistinctionsbetweentheeffectsofsterilizedandunsterilizedinterventionsonforeignexchangemarkets.18.2Interprettherelationshipsamongthecurrentaccount,thecapitalaccount,andofficialreservetransactionsbalance.18.3Identifythemechanismsformaintainingafixedexchangerateandassessthechallengesfacedbyfixedexchangerateregimes.18.4Summarizetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofcapitalcontrols.LearningObjectives(2of2)18.5AssesstheroleoftheI

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Fasaninternationallenderoflastresort.18.6Identifythewaysinwhichinternationalmonetarypolicyandexchangeratearrangementscanaffectdomesticmonetarypolicyoperations.18.7Summarizetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofexchange-ratetargeting.InsidetheFed:ADayattheF

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YForeignExchangeDeskAlthoughtheU.S.Treasuryholdsprimaryresponsibilityforforeignexchangepolicy,decisionstointerveneintheforeignexchangemarketaremadejointlybytheU.S.TreasuryandtheFederalReserve’sFederalOpenMarketCommittee.ThemanagerofforeignexchangeoperationsattheNewYorkFedsupervisesthetradersandanalysts,whofollowdevelopmentsintheforeignexchangemarket.InterventionintheForeignExchangeMarket(1of4)ForeignexchangeinterventionandthemoneysupplyFederalReserveSystemBlankBlankBlankAssetsBlankLiabilitiesBlankForeignAssetsnegative$1BCurrencyinCirculationnegative$1B(InternationalReserves)BlankBlankBlankFederalReserveSystemBlankBlankBlankAssetsBlankLiabilitiesBlankForeignAssetsnegative$1BDepositswiththeFednegative$1B(InternationalReserves)Blank(reserves)BlankInterventionintheForeignExchangeMarket(2of4)Acentralbank’spurchaseofdomesticcurrencyandcorrespondingsaleofforeignassetsintheforeignexchangemarketleadtoanequaldeclineinitsinternationalreservesandthemonetarybase.Acentralbank’ssaleofdomesticcurrencytopurchaseforeignassetsintheforeignexchangemarketresultsinanequalriseinitsinternationalreservesandthemonetarybase.InterventionintheForeignExchangeMarket(3of4)Unsterilizedforeignexchangeintervention:Anunsterilizedinterventioninwhichdomesticcurrencyissoldtopurchaseforeignassetsleadstoagainininternationalreserves,anincreaseinthemoneysupply,andadepreciationofthedomesticcurrency.Figure1EffectofanUnsterilizedPurchaseofDollarsandSaleofForeignAssetsInterventionintheForeignExchangeMarket(4of4)SterilizedforeignexchangeinterventionFederalReserveSystemBlankBlankBlankAssetsBlankLiabilitiesBlankForeignAssets(InternationalReserves)negative$1BMonetaryBase(reserves)0GovernmentBonds+$1BBlankBlankTocountertheeffectoftheforeignexchangeintervention,conductanoffsettingopenmarketoperation.Thereisnoeffectonthemonetarybaseandnoeffectontheexchangerate.BalanceofPaymentsCurrentAccountInternationaltransactionsthatinvolvecurrentlyproducedgoodsandservicesTradeBalanceCapitalAccountNetreceiptsfromcapitaltransactionsSumofthesetwoistheofficialreservetransactionsbalanceGlobal:ShouldWeWorryAbouttheLargeU.S.CurrentAccountDeficit?Persistenttradedeficitsareaconcernforseveralreasons.First,itindicatesthat,atcurrentexchangerates,foreigndemandforU.S.exportsisfarlessthantheU.S.demandforforeigngoods.Second,acurrentaccountdeficitmeansthatforeigners’claimonU.S.assetsisgrowing.ExchangeRateRegimesintheInternationalFinancialSystem

(1of3)FixedexchangerateregimeValueofacurrencyispeggedrelativetothevalueofoneothercurrency(anchorcurrency)FloatingexchangerateregimeValueofacurrencyisallowedtofluctuateagainstallothercurrenciesManagedfloatregime(dirtyfloat)AttempttoinfluenceexchangeratesbybuyingandsellingcurrenciesExchangeRateRegimesintheInternationalFinancialSystem

(2of3)GoldstandardFixedexchangeratesNocontrolovermonetarypolicyInfluencedheavilybyproductionofgoldandgolddiscoveriesBrettonWoodsSystemFixedexchangeratesusingU.S.dollarasreservecurrencyInternationalMonetaryFund(I

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F)ExchangeRateRegimesintheInternationalFinancialSystem

(3of3)BrettonWoodsSystem(cont’d)WorldBankGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(G

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T)WorldTradeOrganizationEuropeanMonetarySystemExchangeratemechanismHowtheBrettonWoodsSystemWorkedExchangeratesadjustedonlywhenexperiencinga“fundamentaldisequilibrium”(largepersistentdeficitsinbalanceofpayments)LoansfromI

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FtocoverlossininternationalreservesI

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FencouragedcontractionarymonetarypoliciesDevaluationonlyifI

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FloanswerenotsufficientNotoolsforsurpluscountriesU.S.couldnotdevaluecurrencyHowaFixedExchangeRateRegimeWorksWhenthedomesticcurrencyisovervalued,thecentralbankmust:Purchasedomesticcurrencytokeeptheexchangeratefixed(itlosesinternationalreserves),orConductadevaluationWhenthedomesticcurrencyisundervalued,thecentralbankmust:Selldomesticcurrencytokeeptheexchangeratefixed(itgainsinternationalreserves),orConductarevaluationTheimplicationsofperfectcapitalmobilityFigure2InterventionintheForeignExchangeMarketUnderaFixedExchangeRateRegimeSpeculativeAttacksunderaFixedExchangeRateEightmembersofE

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CfixedexchangerateswithoneanotherandfloatedagainsttheU.S.dollar.E

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UvaluewastiedtoabasketofspecifiedamountsofEuropeancurrencies.Fluctuatedwithinlimits.Ledtoforeignexchangecrisesinvolvingspeculativeattacks.Toillustrate,considerthemarketforBritishpoundsin1992.Figure3ForeignExchangeMarketforBritishPoundsin1992Figure4ThePolicyTrilemmaApplication:HowDidChinaAccumulate$4TrillionofInternationalReserves?By2014,Chinahadaccumulated$4trillionininternationalreserves.TheChinesecentralbankengagedinmassivepurchasesofU.S.dollarassetstomaintainthefixedrelationshipbetweentheChineseyuanandtheU.S.dollar.MonetaryUnionsAvariantofafixedexchangerateregimeisamonetary(orcurrency)union,inwhichagroupofcountriesdecidestoadoptacommoncurrency,therebyfixingthecountries’exchangeratesinrelationtoeachother.ManagedFloatHybridoffixedandflexibleSmalldailychangesinresponsetomarketInterventionstopreventlargefluctuationsAppreciationhurtsexportersandemploymentDepreciationhurtsimportsandstimulatesinflationSpecialdrawingrightsassubstituteforgoldGlobal:WilltheEuroSurvive?Theglobalfinancialcrisisof2007–2009ledtoeconomiccontractionthroughoutEurope,withthecountriesinthesouthernpartoftheEurozonehitespeciallyhard.This“straightjacket”effectoftheeurohasweakenedsupportfortheeurointhesoutherncountries,leadingtoincreasedtalkofabandoningtheeuro.CapitalControls

(1of2)Controlsoncapitaloutflows:PromotefinancialinstabilitybyforcingadevaluationSeldomeffectiveandmayincreasecapitalflightLeadtocorruptionLoseopportunitytoimprovetheeconomyControlsoncapitalinflows:Leadtoalendingboomandexcessiverisk-takingbyfinancialintermediariesCapitalControls

(2of2)Controlsoninflows(cont’d):ControlsmayblockfundsforproductionusesProducesubstantialdistortionandmisallocationLeadstocorruptionStrongcaseforimprovingbankregulationandsupervisionTheRoleoftheI

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FEmergingmarketcountrieswithpoorcentralbankcredibilityandshort-rundebtcontractsdenominatedinforeigncurrencieshavelimitedabilitytoengageinthisfunction.Maybeabletopreventcontagion.Thesafetynetmayleadtoexcessiverisk-taking(moralhazardproblem).ShouldtheI

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FActasanInternationalLenderofLastResort?Maynotbetoughenough.Austerityprogramsfocusontightmacroeconomicpoliciesratherthanfinancialreform.Tooslow,whichworsenscrisisandincreasescosts.CountrieswererestrictingborrowingfromtheI

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Funtiltherecentsubprimefinancialcrisis.InternationalConsiderationsandMonetaryPolicy

(1of2)Balanceofpaymentconsiderations:CurrentaccountdeficitsintheUnitedStatessuggestthatAmericanbusinessesmaybelosingabilitytocompetebecausethedollaristoostrong.U.S.deficitsmeansurplusesinothercountrieslargeincreasesintheirinternationalreserveholdingsworldinflation.InternationalConsiderationsandMonetaryPolicy

(2of2)Exchangerateconsiderations:Acontractionarymonetarypolicywillraisethedomesticinterestrateandstrengthenthecurrency.Anexpansionarymonetarypolicywilllowerinterestratesandweakencurrency.ToPegorNottoPeg:Exchange-RateTargetingasanAlternativeMonetaryPolicyStrategyAdvantagesofexchange-ratetargeting:ContributestokeepinginflationundercontrolAutomaticruleforconductofmonetarypolicySimplicityandclarityDisadvantagesofexchange-ratetargeting:CannotrespondtodomesticshocksandshockstoanchorcountryaretransmittedOpentospeculativeattacksoncurrencyWeakenstheaccountabilityofpolicymakersastheexchangeratelosesvalueassignalWhenIsExchange-RateTargetingDesirableforIndustrializedCountries?Exchange-ratetargetingforindustrializedcountriesisdesirableifDomesticmonetaryandpoliticalinstitutionsarenotconducivetogoodpolicymakingOtherimportantbenefitssuchasintegrationarisefromthisstrategyWhenIsExchange-RateTargetingDesirableforEmergingMarketCountries?Exchange-ratetargetingforemergingmarketcountriesisdesirableifPoliticalandmonetaryinstitutionsareweak(strategybecomesthestabilizationpolicyoflastresort).CurrencyBoardsSolutiontolackoftransparencyandcommitmenttotarget.Domesticcurrencyisbacked100%byaforeigncurrency.Noteissuingauthorityestablishesafixedexchangerateandstandsreadytoexchangecurrencyatthisrate.Moneysupplycanexpandonlywhenforeigncurrencyisexchangedfordomesticcurrency.Strongercommitmentbycentralbank.Lossofindependentmonetarypolicyandincreasedexposuretoshockfromanchorcountry.Lossofabilitytocreatemoneyandactaslenderoflastresort.Global:Argentina’sCurrencyBoardThecurrencyboardexperimentinArgentinawasinitiallyastunningsuccess,withinflationfalli