房地产税中英文对照外文翻译文献

PAGE1中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)ThedevelopmentofpropertytaxationinthenewdemocraciesofCentralandEasternEuropeThemainpurposeofthispaperistoinvestigateissuesrelatingtotheroleoflandandbuildingtaxesasamechanismtoprovideanautonomousrevenuesourceforthenewlyestablishedlocalauthorities.AsMalmeandYoungman(1997)suggest,thereisaneedtoseekfundsforstrengtheninglocalgovernment,withcountriesneedingtoadjusttheirtaxsystemstoaccountforemergingprivatemarketswithinlandandbuildings.RealestatetaxeshavebeendesignatedaslocalrevenuesourcesinmanycountriesinCentralandEasternEurope,includingArmenia,Estonia,Latvia,Hungary,CzechRepublic,SlovakRepublic,Bulgaria,Rumania,andtheRussianFederation.However,itshouldberecognisedthatthelevelsofrevenuecurrentlybeingraisedfromproperty-basedtaxesisverysmallandthereisonlyalimitedpotentialtoincreasetheyield.BertaudandRenaud(1994)suggestthatmanycountrieshaveinstigatedpropertyvaluation/taxationsystemsforthepurelyopportunisticaimofincreasinglocalrevenues,theyarguethatduetoitsimmovablenature,landissimplyseenasaneasytargetforfundraising.However,thisrathergeneralisticstatementneedstobeplacedinperspective.Realpropertytaxationisalegitimatesourceofpotentialrevenueforvarioustiersofgovernment.AsKelly(1994)suggests,propertytaxationisperhapsthemostuniversally-usedrevenuesourceforlocalgovernmentsthroughouttheworld.Itisthereforeoflittlesurprisethatthenewdemocracieshavebeeninvestigatingandimplementingvarioustypesofproperty-basedtaxes.Theinterplaybetweentaxpolicyandentrepreneurialactivityhasenjoyedaresurgenceintheempiricaleconomicsliterature.Mostoftherecentresearchhasfocusedonfederaltaxes,however,leavingstatetaxpoliciesrelativelyunexplored.Asstatescontinuetograpplewithdifficultissuesinbusinesstaxationanddevelopmentincentives,athoroughconsiderationoftheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonentrepreneurialactivitybecomesevenmoreimportant,especiallywhenconsideringthepossiblebenefitsthatcouldfollownewentrepreneurialventuresthrougheconomicgrowth,innovation,andthelike.Inthisreport,weexaminetherelationshipsbetweenstatetaxpolicyandentrepreneurshipusingalongitudinaldatabaseofdetailedinformationonstatetaxpoliciesforall50USstatesfrom1989through2002.Thisinvestigationiswarrantedforanumberofreasons.First,asaresultofthefocusonfederaltaxes,earlierresearchhasonlyconsideredasubsetofthetaxesfacingsmallbusinesses.Forexample,Clineetal.(2006)showthatthetotalstateandlocaltaxburdenforUSbusinessesincludesmuchmorethandirectbusinesstaxessuchascorporateincometaxesorstatefranchise,excise,orgrossreceiptstaxes.Businesses—especiallysmallbusinesses—alsopaysignificantamountsofpropertyandsalestaxes,alongwithagrowingmenuofmiscellaneouschargesandfees.Theexistingarrayofstatetaxstructuresprovidesavirtualcornucopiaofexogenouspolicyvariationthatcanbeusedtocleanlyidentifyentrepreneurialresponses.Asecondmotivationforourstudyistheobservationthatstategovernmentscontinuetodebateandenactthebulkofpro-entrepreneurshippolicyintheUSwithoutthebenefitofharddataontheeffectsofthosepoliciesonsmallbusinessdevelopmentandsuccess.Ononehand,highertaxesmightreduceentrepreneurialactivitybyloweringthereturns.Ontheotherhand,highertaxesincreasetherewardsfromtaxavoidanceorevasionandthusmighthavetheundesirableeffectofincreasingentrepreneurialactivity.Thesetwoimpactsmightalsooffseteachother,suchthathighertaxeshavenonoticeableimpactonentrepreneurialactivity.Theextenttowhichtaxpolicies—especiallystatetaxpolicies—actuallyinfluenceentrepreneurialactivityrequiresempiricalexploration.Iftaxesdonotaffectentrepreneurialactivity(i.e.,ifthereturnsandavoidanceeffectsareeitherbothsmallorcanceleachotherout),usingtaxpolicytoencourageinnovationorgrowththroughentrepreneurshipisnotlikelytobefruitful.Alternatively,ifanonzeroeffectcanbedetermined,theactualparameterestimatescanbeusedtomoreefficientlydesigntaxpolicytoachievedesiredchangesinentrepreneurship.Asstatedabove,ourpaperisoneofonlyafewtoinvestigatetherelationshipbetweenstatetaxpolicyandentrepreneurship,asthelargemajorityoftheliteraturehasfocusedonfederalpolicy.Weextendtheirlineofanalysisinthefollowinggeneralways,allofwhicharediscussedindetailbelow:(1)weconsiderabroaderarrayofstatetaxpolicyvariables,(2)weconsideranadditionalmeasureofentrepreneurialactivitydrawnfromtaxreturndata,(3)weconsidernotonlythestockofentrepreneurshipinastate,butalsoastate’sshareofnationalentrepreneurshipinordertoaddresslocationeffects,(4)weconsidernotonlytaxratesbutalsotaxsharesinstatetaxportfolios,(5)weconsidereffectivetaxratesasarobustnesscheckonourbaselineanalysisofstatutorytaxrates,(6)weconsideragriculturalentrepreneurshipinanotherrobustnesscheck,and(7)weanalyzealongertimeperiod.Twobroadareasofstudyintheearlierliteraturemotivatethisanalysis.Thefirstistheliteratureontheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonbusinesslocationdecisions.Theseresultsareimportantbecausebusinesslocationdecisionscanhaveimportantimpactsonmeasuredentrepreneurshiporself-employmentrates.Inhisoft-citedreviewofavastarrayofempiricalstudies,Wasylenko(1997)concludesthattaxeshavestatisticallysignificantbutquantitativelysmalleffectsoninterregionallocationbehavior.Inasimilarvein,Bartik(1991)concludesthathigherstateandlocaltaxesreducebusinessactivityinaregionwithanelasticityofabout-0.3,whilenotingsignificantdeviationfromthisaverageacrossstudies.3However,thisliteraturemaybeslightlylessrelevanttothepresentstudybecauseofitsfocusonlocationdecisionsamongfirms.Ifsmallerbusinessesarelessmobilethanlargerfirms(andtheymightnotbe),theyareperhapslesslikelytorespondtostatedifferencesintaxpolicies.Further,moststatedevelopmentincentivesaretargetedatlargermanufacturingfirmsratherthansmallbusinesses.Thesecondbroadareaofrelevantliteratureconsistsofempiricalstudiesoftaxationandentrepreneurship.Thenumberofstudiesinthisliteraturehasgrownsignificantlyinrecentyears,largelyduetogreateravailabilityofusefuldata.Timeseriesstudieshavefocusedonfederaltaxpoliciesandhavegenerallyconcludedthathigherfederalincomeorpayrolltaxratescausehigherratesofentrepreneurship,specificallydefinedasself-employment(Long1982;Blau1987;Parker1996;CowlingandMitchell1997;Robson1998).Explanationsoftenrestontheideathathightaxratesdriveworkersoutofpaidemployment,orwagejobs,intoentrepreneurialventureswheretheycanmoreeasilyavoidorevadetaxes.Despitetheconsistencyofthelargergroupoftimesseriesstudies,amorerecentandextensivetimeseriesanalysisinthisareabyBruceandMohsin(2006)showsthatthequestionofhowtaxesaffectentrepreneurshipisnotyetsettled.Inadditiontopersonalincomeandpayrolltaxes,BruceandMohsinconsidercorporateincometaxes,capitalgainstaxesandestatetaxes.Resultsgenerallyindicatethattaxeshavestatisticallysignificantbutverysmallandscatteredeffectsonentrepreneurshiprates.Consequently,theyarelikelytobeineffectiveingeneratingdesiredchangesinentrepreneurialactivity.Noneofthesestudiesconsidertheeffectsofstatetaxes.Severalotherstudieshaveexaminedcross-sectionalorpanelmicrodatatoexaminetheinfluenceoftaxpoliciesonindividualdecisionsaboutentrepreneurship.Resultsfromthesestudieshavealsobeeninconclusive(BruceandGurley2005;Bruce2000,2002;Carrolletal.2001;GentryandHubbard2000;Moore2003;Schuetze2000).Whilesomeofthesehaveindicatedthathighertaxratesonself-employmentincomehaveambiguouseffectsonself-employmentrates,agrowingconsensussuggeststhattaxrateincreasesreduceentrepreneurialentry,growth,hiring,investment,andsurvival.Statetaxeshavebeenconsideredinonlyaportionofthesestudies,however,andthenonlyasacomponentofacombinedfederalandstateincometaxrate.Afewstudieshaveanalyzedstate-leveltimeseriesorpaneldatatoexplicitlyexaminetheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonentrepreneurialactivityandarethereforemostrelevanttothecurrentpaper.Carlton(1979)findsnostrongevidencethatlocaltaxesinfluencethenumberoffirmbirths.Heusesratherroughproxiesfortaxvariables,however,andonlyconsidersthreeindustriesforalimitedtimeperiod.Bartik(1989)usesmoredetailedtaxinformationandabroaderarrayofindustriesandfindsthathigherpropertytaxes,corporatetaxes,andsalestaxesonequipmentnegativelyimpactsmallbusinessstartups.4Healsofindsthatpersonalincometaxesandgeneralsalestaxesarenotstatisticallysignificant,whilegovernmentspendinghasmixedeffectsdependingonthecategoryofspending.Hissurveyofearlierstudiesfindselasticitiesthataregenerallybelow0.5inabsolutevalue.ChenandWilliams(1999)examinebusinessfailureratesfrom1984through1993,estimatingpanelregressionsforeachofanumberofindustrycategories.Althoughtheirfocusisnotexclusivelyonsmallbusinesses,theyfindthathighersalestaxespercapitaincreasebusinessfailureratesforlow-techindustries,whilehighercorporateincometaxespercapitaleadtolowerfailureratesforhigh-techindustries.KreftandSobel(2003)findthattheexistenceofstateinheritancetaxesabovethefederallevelisassociatedwithlowerratesofgrowthinthenumberofsoleproprietorsbetween1996and2000.Acommoncriticismofvirtuallyallmeasuresofentrepreneurialorsmallbusinessactivityisthattheyincludepart-timeandso-calledpartialentrepreneurs.Noconsensushasarisenabouthowtoaddressthis,orevenwhattheconsequencesmightbeforempiricalresearch.9Further,forvirtuallyanymeasureofentrepreneurshipforwhichdataareavailable,therearequestionsabouttheextenttowhichitactuallymeasureswhatonemightconsidertobetrueentrepreneurship.Ratherthanfocusingonasinglemeasureorclaimingthateitherorbothofoursarebetterthanotheravailablemeasuresthen,wesimplypresentparalleltreatmentsoftwoalternativesinordergaugesensitivityofourresultstothedefinitionofentrepreneurship.Intheanalysisthatfollows,thesetwoentrepreneurialmeasuresareeachviewedintwodistinctways.Inourbaselinespecifications,weenterthestate-specificentrepreneurshipratesdirectlyasdescribedabove.Thesevaluesrepresentthestockofentrepreneurshipinastate,asdescribedabove,andmostcloselyrelatetotheself-employmentratesusedinmuchofthepriorliterature.Withthisapproachourfocusismoreheavilytowardthewithin-stateeffectsoftaxpolicyinsteadofonthecross-statelocationseffectsoftaxpolicyonentrepreneurship.Asourprimaryfocusisontheeffectsoftaxpolicyonthetendencytostartandmaintainasmallbusiness,thisapproachisparticularlyusefulbecausemanyentrepreneursareinvolvedonlyinsmalleroperationsthatdonotspanstateboundaries.Inthisstudy,wepresentanexaminationofstate-levelpaneldatafortheperiodfrom1989through2002tobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetweenstatetaxpoliciesandentrepreneurialactivity.Regressionanalysesindicatethattopmarginalstatetaxratesoncorporateincomeandstatesalestaxratesdonothavestatisticallysignificanteffectsonstateentrepreneurshiprates.Thissuggeststhatanydisincentiveeffectsofhighertaxrates(duetolowerreturnsfromentrepreneurialactivity)areoffsetbyincentiveeffectsduetothegreaterrewardsfromtaxavoidanceorevasion,orthatbotheffectsareindividuallysmallorinsignificant.Incontrast,highertopmarginalstatetaxratesonpersonalincometendtoreduceastate’sshareofthenationalentrepreneurialstock.Stateswithmoreaggressivecorporateincometaxes,specificationsthosethatincludecombinedreportingrequirements,tendtohavehigherentrepreneurshiprates.Paradoxically,stateswithmoreprogressiveindividualincometaxesalsotendtohavehigherentrepreneurshiprates.Higherweightsonthesalesfactorinthecorporateincometaxapportionmentformulaandtheexistenceofastate-levelestate,inheritance,orgifttaxabovethefederalestatetaxarebothassociatedwithlowerstatesharesofthenationalentrepreneurialstock.Alloftheseeffectsarequitesmallinmagnitude,however.Wefindnoevidenceofaneconomicallysignificanteffectofstatetaxportfoliosonentrepreneurialactivity.Theseresultsareimportantinthedesignofstatetaxpolicy,astheysuggestthattaxpolicychangeswillprobablynothavetheeffectsonsmallbusinessactivitythatpolicymakersmightbelieve.Ratherthanattempttotargettaxbreakstosmallbusinesses,then,statesshouldfocusontraditionaltaxreformsinvolvinglowertaxrates,broadertaxbases,andsimplertaxsystemsthatwillcreateamoreneutralandproductivetaxenvironmentforsmallbusinesses,largebusinesses,andindividualsalike.Theimplementationofalandedpropertytaxfromalmostfirstprinciplesrequirestheconsiderationofseveraldiversebutinterrelatedfactors.Kelly(1994)hassuggested,andrightlyso,thatifpropertytaxreformistobesuccessfulitmustbecomprehensiveinapplicationandnotjustfocusonanyoneelement.Thispapertakesthedebateonpropertytaxreformtothelevelwhichdemonstratestheintegralrelationshipsofthekeycomponentsoflocalgovernmentfinance,theroleoflocalauthorities,landinformationsystems,applicationofcadastres,thepropertymarket,valuationandassessment.Thepaperthenlooksattheexperiencesoftwocountries,namely,ArmeniaandtheCzechRepublicintheirendearvourstoundertakecomprehensivepropertytaxreform.LocalgovernmentstructuresThearrangementofthepublicsectorinanycountryishighlyinfluencebythecountry’spastdevelopment,historictraditionsreligiousandethnicdifferences,customs,andbyeconomicandpoliticalcircumstancesMostcountriesintransitionhavealreadyintroducedaprogrammeofdecentralizationwhichhasshiftedtheresponsibilityfromcentralgovernmenttolocalgovernment,andasaresulthasgiventhelocalgovernmentsafairlywidediscretionintermsoffiscalresponsibilitiesresultinginreducedintergovernmentaltransfers(AlmandBuckley,1994).AsBirdandWallich(1994)comment,politicaldecentralisationinallcountriesoftheregionhasbeenparalleledtosomeextentbythedecentralisationoffiscalresponsibilities.Generallyspeaking,countriestendtoassignmoreexpenditurefunctionstolocalgovernmentsthancanbefinancefromtherevenuesourcesallocatedtothosegovernments.Thismismatchoffunctionsandfinanceisoftenreferredtoas“verticalimbalance”,withtheresultthatlocalgovernmentbecomesmoredependentonhigherlevelsofcentralgovernmentgrant.Thisisclearlyaproblemwithseveralofthetransitioncountries,wherethecentreisdivestingitselftolocalgovernmentofcertainresponsibilities,i.e.movingtheproblemdownward.AsWallich(1992)commenteditwaspushingthedeficitdowninanattempttoshifttheburdenofresponsibility,bothintermsofserviceprovisionandbearingthecostofsuchprovision.Someformoflocalgovernmenthadexistedinmostofthetransitioneconomiesunderthesocialistregime(Kelly,1994).However,thefiscalsystemwasinessenceunitaryinpractice,withlocalgovernmentshavingarolewhichwasessentiallynomorethananadministrativeunitofthecentreandhavinglittle,ifany,independentfiscalorlegislativeresponsibilities.RevenuebaseoptionsHollis(1993)suggeststhatthedesignofthesystemoflocalgovernmentfinanceshouldreflecttheextenttowhichacountrywishestohaveacentralisedorlocalistlocalgovernment.Insimpleterms,ifacountrywantsacentralisedformoflocalgovernmentitshouldbelargelycentrallyfundedbygrantsandashareofstatetaxes.Ontheotherhand,ifalocalistformofgovernmentisdesired,itshouldbefundedthroughautonomouslocally-basedrevenuesources.Aslocalgovernmentbeginstomature,itisimportanttorecognisetherelationshipbetweenlocalgovernmentandcentralgovernmentandhowthisissupportedthroughanefficientsystemoffinancing.Withinthedevelopmentofafinancesystem,anumberoffactorsneedtobetakenintoaccount,includingtheextenttowhichthesystemsarereadilyunderstoodbycentralgovernment,localgovernmentandtheelectorate;theneedtopromoteefficiencythroughsystemsthatdonotdistortpersonaleconomicdecisionmaking;theneedforthesystemtogeneratesufficientincometofunditsshareoflocalgovernmentexpenditure;theextenttowhichthesystemisadministrativelypractical;theneedforthesystemtobefairandequitablebetweenbothindividualsandregionsandtheneedforstabilitytoenablelocalauthoritiestoplantheuseofresourcesovertime.Thepriorityofallthecountriesintransitionhasbeentoestablishaneffectivelocalgovernmentrevenuestructurecapableofsustainingthenewly-formedlocalgovernments(BirdandWallich,1994).Togivecredibilitytotheirstatusasautonomousentitieswithelectorateresponsibilities,localgovernmentsneedtohaveastrongsourceofdiscretionaryrevenues.AsKelly(1994)contends,fromaninternationalperspectivethereisawidediversityinthestructureandeffectivenessoflocalrevenuesystems.However,theoryandpracticewouldindicatethatpropertytaxesanduserchargesrepresentthemainsourcesforastablesourceoflocallyderivedrevenues(BahlandLinn,1992).Landinformationsystems.Overthelastcoupleofdecades,thetermlandinformationsystem(LIS)(seeFigure1)hasincreasinglybeenusedworldwidetodescribethemanagementofspatialdataofallformsinacontextofgovernmentadministration.ThereisaclearneedforthenewdemocraciestoestablishaLISwhichwouldintegrateanefficientlandmarketsystem,landregistrationandalandtransfersystem.Landpolicy,inessencerelatestotheequitabledistributionofabasicresource,i.e.land,andwouldpermitagreatertransparencyinthelandadministrationprocess.Landpolicyshouldideallyemanatefrompoliticalagreementarrivedatthroughanopendemocraticprocess.Theresultingpolicyshouldthenprovideageneralframeworkwithinwhichlandlawsandregulationsareformulated.TheLISwouldsupportandassisttheeventualimplementationofthesepolicies.Whilelandtenurecanbedefinedastheprocessesandrelationshipsassociatedwithlandandbuildingrights(Williamson,1994),thisincludesthenatureofexistinglandrights,thebalancebetweenstateandprivaterightsandthelandallocationandreallocationsystem.Clearly,thisaspectisoffundamentalimportanceandisofdirectrelevancewithinthecontextofpropertytaxation.Oneofthemajorchallengesfacingthenewly-createddemocraciesistheareaoflandadministrationandlandreform.Inadditiontheyhavebeenfacedwiththeproblemofhowtobegintheprocessesofestablishingpropertymarketsandtomaintainthemomentumofreform.CadastralreformCadastralsystemsinoneformoranotherhavebeencreatedinmostdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesduringthelastcoupleofcenturies.Theconceptofacadastralsysteminanycountryreflectsthehistorical,culturalandlegalframeworkofthatcountryorjurisdiction.Theyhaverepresentedthecentralcomponentinestablishingalandtenuresystem,andlandownershipsystem,insupportinglandmarketsandsupportingefficientlandadministrationingeneral.Awidelyaccepteddefinitionofcadastre,accordingtoWilliamson(1994,p.3),is:Acadastreisacompleteandup-to-dateofficialregisterorinventoryoflandparcelsinanystateorjurisdictioncontaininginformationabouttheparcelsregardingownership,valuation,locationarea,landuseandusuallybuildingsorstructuresthereon.WiththedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,thereisagreaturgencyfromthenewly-independentcountriestopromotetheprivatisationoflandownershipwithinaframeworkoflandreform.InJuly1991,theUnitedNationsCentreforHumanSettlements(HABITAT)publishedthestatement,“FutureCooperationwithTransitionCountriesofCentralandEasternEurope”fromwhichthefollowingextractistaken(1991,p.51):Taxationonproperty,however,canbeasignificantsourceofincomeforpublicauthoritieswithwhichtofinancetheirownoperationsandtoprovideessentialservices.Apartfromthephilosophicalobstaclestotheacceptanceoftheprinciplesoftheprivateownershipoflandandhousingwhichstilllingeroninsomecountries,thepracticalobstaclestotheestablishmentofatransparentsystemofpropertyownershiparemany;beginningwiththeestablishmentofasystemofpropertyregistryandtheceding(orsale)ofcommunallandtoindividuals.Apropertytaxsystemmustbeabletoidentifyandlinktaxablesubjects(taxpayers)andtaxableobjects.Generallyspeaking,thetaxsystemcanbeorganisedintwobroadways:first,byregisteringpropertyasdeclaredbytaxablesubjects,i.e.taxpayersandsecond,bycreatingafiscalcadastre.Duringthesocialistera,manycountrieshadextensiveexperiencewithoperatingperson-basedinformationsystems.Individualswererequiredtohavedomestic“passports”thatidentifiedtheirofficialplaceofresidence,andpersonregisterswerewellestablished.Inaddition,otherorganisationsandlegalentitieswerelikewiseregistered.Itwasnaturalfortaxadministrationsinthesecircumstancestoorganisepropertytaxsystemsalongsimilarlines.Thebasisofthesystemsrequiredtaxpayerstofilereturnsineachdistrictinwhichtheyheldassessableproperty.Thisparticularapproachrequiresthetaxpayertohaveadegreeofeducationandknowledgeregardingthesystem,andthepotentialexistedforunder-reportingorinaccuratereportingofinformation.Thedrawbacksofthisstyleofinformationrecordinghaveledmanydemocraciestoimplementintegratedlandinformationsystemswithafiscalandlegalcadastre.Landrestitutionandprivatisationprogrammesinthenewdemocracieshavecreatedanurgentneedtoestablishtransparentpubliccadastreswhichcanfacilitateamongotherthingslandtransactions,identifylandandpropertyrightsandthedelineationofparcelsconveyed(Homeetal.,1996).Propertytaxationrequiresclearanddefinitiveparcelidentificationshowinglegalboundariesaswellasparcelareas.Tomeetthedemandsfornationaldevelopment,cadastresareevolvingfromthemoretraditionalfiscal-basedtowhatarenowdescribedasmulti-purposecadastres.Thecadastreshouldgivepublicconfidencebecauseoftherigourandunbiasednatureofitsapplicationintermsofdatacollection,storage,maintenanceanddisseminationofinformation.Withinadevelopingrealestatemarket,itwouldbethemechanismtoguaranteethelegalstatusofrealpropertyandrights(RaitanenandTenkanen,1992).Inmanyoftheemergingdemocraciespriortothecommunisttakeovers,cadastralsystemswerewelladvanced.Thesubsequentsocialistgovernmentssawthelegalfunctionofthecadastreasbeingoflessimportancethansupplyingland-relatedinformationforcentraleconomicplanning.InLatvia,forexample,theprocessoflandreformandcadastralimplementationwasundertakenduringtheperiod1918-1940.WiththeSovietoccupationin1940,thecadastralsystemwaseffectivelydismantledasalllandwasnationalised.However,1990sawtheintroductionoflandreformandrestitutionwhichhasresultedinthedevelopmentofanautomatedmultipurposeinformationsystemforcadastralapplicationstoincludelandregistration,valuationandtaxation(EglitisandBalodis,1994).Czechoslovakia,aspartoftheAustro-HungarianEmpire,hadoneofthefirstmoderncadastres.Originallydevelopedforasystemofpropertytaxation,itrepresentedessentiallyafiscalcadastreandthenintegratedalegalcadastre.Thecadastrewasunfortunatelynotmaintainedduringthesocialistperiod.However,in1993,InBulgaria,thefirstcadastrallawwaspassedin1908whichhadasitsobjective:…equitabletaxation,introductionoflandbooks(forthesecuringofownershiprights)andforallactivitiesconnectedwithcountryplangeometryandaltimetry(Homeetal.,1996,p.21).In1941asecondcadastrallawwaspassed.However,aswithothercountriesintheregion,thecadastrefellintodisuseandbecameineffective.Theobjectiveofthereformistoreestablishthecadastrewhichbeganduringtheperiodofthefirstreformandalsotodealwiththecomplicatedissuesoflandrestitution.Onlybycreatingacadastrewithafiscalcomponent,whichorganiseslandandbuildingrecordsgeographically,canthetaxadministrationensurethatallassessableobjectsarediscoveredandcorrectlydescribed.Figure2illustratestheimportantlinkagesandbenefitsofanintegratedpropertytaxandcadastralsystem.PropertymarketsTheabsenceoflandmarketshashadaprofoundeffectontheinternalefficiencyproductivityandenvironmentalqualityofmanycitieswithinthenewly-formedcountries.Thereisclearlyaneedforthedevelopmentofurbanmarkets.However,suchmarketscannotoperateinaninstitutionalvacuum.Aninstitutionalapproachtothedevelopmentofclearandverifiablepropertyrightsisthecornerstoneofthedevelopmentofefficienturbanlandmarkets(BertaudandRenaud,1994).Whatisconsideredapriorityinlandtenurereformistounifylandandpropertytenureformsinordertosimplifythetradingofrealestate.Conventionalpropertymarketshaveyettobefullydevelopedinmostofthenewdemocracies.However,countriessuchasPoland,HungaryandCzechRepublichavebeenmakingtremendousprogressinthisarea.However,ithastobestatedthat,incommonwithmostcountriesatasimilarstageofdevelopment(asat1997),thereareinsufficienttransactionstobeabletoprovideadatabaseof