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WorkingPaper171
TaxTreatyNormsAmongLower-IncomeCountriesandtheRoleoftheUNModel:Past,PresentandPotential
MartinHearson,
FrederikHeitmüllerand
VincentArel-Bundock
August2023
ICTDWorkingPaper171
TaxTreatyNormsAmongLower-IncomeCountriesandtheRoleoftheUNModel:Past,PresentandPotential
MartinHearson,FrederikHeitmüllerandVincentArel-Bundock
August2023
2
TaxTreatyNormsAmongLower-IncomeCountriesandtheRoleoftheUNModel:Past,PresentandPotential
MartinHearson,FrederikHeitmüllerandVincentArel-Bundock
ICTDWORKINGPAPER171
FirstpublishedbytheInstituteofDevelopmentStudiesinAUGUST2023
©InstituteofDevelopmentStudies2023
ISBN:978-1-80470-144-7
DOI:
10.19088/ICTD.2023.045
ThisisanOpenAccesspaperdistributedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0Internationallicense(CCBY),whichpermitsunrestricteduse,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium,providedtheoriginalauthorsandsourcearecreditedandanymodificationsoradaptationsareindicated./licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
Availablefrom:
TheInternationalCentreforTaxandDevelopmentattheInstituteofDevelopmentStudies,BrightonBN19RE,UKTel:+44(0)1273606261
Email:info@ictd.ac
Web:www.ictd.ac/publication
Twitter:@ICTDTax
Facebook:/ICTDtax
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CharityRegistrationNumber306371
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3
TaxTreatyNormsAmongLower-IncomeCountriesandtheRoleoftheUNModel:Past,PresentandPotential
MartinHearson,FrederikHeitmüllerandVincentArel-Bundock
Summary
Bilateraltaxtreatiesdrawheavilyfrommodelconventionspublishedbyinternationalorganisations.InthispaperweinvestigatetheinfluenceoftheUNmodelontaxtreatiessignedbylower-incomecountries,aswellasthepotentialforspecificmodelprovisionstobemainstreamedinagreaternumberoftreaties.Despiteitsfocusontheinterestsoflower-incomecountries,theUNmodelisoftenassumedtoplayaminorrolecomparedtotheOECDmodel.DrawingfromanupdatedversionoftheICTDTaxTreatiesExplorerdataset,wefindthatasubsetofUNmodelprovisionscanalreadybeconsideredasthenormintreatiesconcludedbylower-incomecountries.AmongtheprovisionsnowuniquelyfoundintheUNmodel,thesearetheinclusionof‘supervisoryactivities’inarticle5(3)a,andthewholeofarticles5(3)(b)and14.TheprevalenceofmanyUNarticlesisincreasing,suggestingthatmoreprovisionscouldjointhesethree.TheinfluenceoftheUNmodelbecomesevenmoreapparentwhenwefocusontheamountofbilateralinvestmentintolower-incomecountriesthatistaxedaccordingtoUNmodelprovisions.
Toassesstheavenuesforfurtherchangewestudycountries’reservationstomodelconventions,aswellastheirrecentnegotiationhistory.Thisallowsustoidentifythoseprovisionsthataremostlikelytobestrongprioritiesforlower-incomecountries,andacceptabletoalargenumberofpartnercountries.Inparticular,UNarticles5(4)(b),5(6)and21(3)areallincreasinginprevalence,havestrongsupportfromlower-incomecountriesexpressedasobservationsontheOECDmodeltreaty,andshowsignificantrenegotiationpotentialfromrecentcountry-levelprecedent.Overall,wefindthatthereissignificantscopeforlower-incomecountriestorenegotiatetreatieswithaviewtoobtainmorerightstotaxincomeatsource.
Keywords:internationaltaxation;taxtreaties;UN;OECD;modelconvention;lower-incomecountries;foreigndirectinvestment;negotiations;reservations.
MartinHearsonisResearchDirectorattheInternationalCentreforTaxandDevelopmentattheInstituteofDevelopmentStudies.Heresearchesthepoliticsofinternationalbusinesstaxation,andinparticulartherelationshipbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.HewaspreviouslyafellowininternationalpoliticaleconomyattheLondonSchoolofEconomics,andworkedinthecharitysectorforadecade.
FrederikHeitmüllerisaResearchConsultantattheInternationalCentreforTaxandDevelopment(ICTD)andaLecturerandPhDCandidateatLeidenUniversity’sInstituteforTaxLawandEconomics.Hisresearchfocussesonpoliciesagainstcorporatetaxavoidance,theinfluenceofinternationalnormsintheGlobalSouth,andtaxpolicyfordevelopment.
VincentArel-BundockisapoliticalscientistattheUniversitédeMontréal,wherehereadsoncomparativeandinternationalpoliticaleconomy.Heisparticularlyinterestedinthepoliticsofinternationaltaxationandforeigndirectinvestment,buthasalsoworkedoneconomicvoting,monetarypolicy,foreignaidandresearchmethods.
4
Contents
Summary3
Acknowledgements6
Acronyms6
1Introduction7
2Literaturereview8
3Aboutthedataused10
4PastandpresentuseofUNmodel13
4.1EvolutionofnumberoftreatiesincludingUNmodelprovision13
4.2VolumeofinvestmentcoveredbyUNmodelprovision16
4.3ImportanceofUNmodeltext19
5PotentialforexpandedimpactoftheUNmodel21
5.1RevealedpreferencesforUNprovisionsthroughnegotiatinghistory22
5.1.1Preferencesofpartnercountries25
5.1.2Preferencesofsamplecountries25
5.1.3Comparisonofreservationsandobservationstomodel
treaties26
5.2Renegotiationindex27
6Conclusion28
Annexes31
References37
Tables
Table1TaxTreatiesExplorerdatasetfieldsandindexcomposition11
Table2PrevalenceofUNmodel-typeprovisionsandspecificUNmodel
wordingintreatiesinforce,202319
Table3Summaryperprovision(topuniqueUNprovisionsintermsof
prevalence)30
Table4Summaryperprovision(topsource-basedprovisionsthatarealso
partofOECDmodel)30
Table5numberoftreatiesthathavearenegotiationpotentialof0.67or31
higherforaspecificclausebycountry
Figures
Figure1Overalltrendsintreatycontent14
Figure2Negotiatingtrendsovertimebyprovision15
Figure3UNmodel-typeprovisionsasashareoftotalinwardinvestmentand
totaltreatiesofsamplecountries17
Figure4ShareofinwardinvestmentcoveredbyselectedUNmodel-type
provisions18
5
Figure5
Figure6
Figure7
Figure8
Figure9
ShareofnewtreatiessignedeachyearthatincludeselectedUNmodel-typeprovisionsandspecificUNmodelwording
Heatmapoftreatyclauseprevalencebypartnercountry,2000-2023Heatmapoftreatyclauseprevalencebysamplecountry,2000-2023Renegotiationpotentialcomparedtocurrentprevalenceinsamplecountries’treaties
Shareofnewtreatiessignedeachyearthatincludespecificphrases
20
23
24
28
36
6
Acknowledgements
WewouldliketothankOkankaOkangaforcontributingtotheupdateofthetaxtreatydataset,aswellastwoanonymousreviewerswhosecommentsgreatlyhelpedimprovethepaper.TheresearchandwritingbenefitedfromfundingbytheUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs.
Acronyms
ATAF
BEPS
FDI
IBFD
MLI
PE
OECD
UN
AfricanTaxAdministrationForum
Baseerosionandprofitshifting
Foreigndirectinvestment
InternationalBureauofFiscalDocumentation
G20/OECDMultilateralInstrumenttoImplementTaxTreatyRelatedMeasurestoPreventBEPS
Permanentestablishment
OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment
UnitedNations
7
1Introduction
Weoftentalkoftheinternationaltaxregime,whichisgenerallyunderstoodasthenetworkofthousandsofbilateraltreatiesthat‘allfollowoneoftwowidelyacceptedmodels(theOECDandUNmodeltreaties),whichthemselvesarequitesimilartoeachother’,andarebasedoncommonprinciples(Avi-Yonah2007:5).Fromtheperspectiveoflower-incomecountries,however,thereareclearchoicesbetweentheUnitedNations(UN)andOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)approachesoncertainaspectsofinternationaltaxation,especiallyintheareaofcross-borderservices.Thisisnotmerelyatechnicalmatter,butapoliticalstrugglebetweenwhatarecommonlydescribedas‘source’and‘residence’countries–importersandexportersofcapitalandservices–overtherighttotaxcross-bordereconomicactivity.Someofthesechoicesarereflectedinthemodelconventions,wherenotabledifferenceshaveemerged.Forexample,revisionstoarticle7oftheOECDmodelshiftthebalancefortaxingrightsawayfromcountriesinwhichmultinationalshavebranches,andtowardsthecountriesoftheirparentcompanies,andtheintroductionofnewarticles12Aand12BintheUNmodelallowsforgreatersourcetaxationoffeesfortechnicalandautomateddigitalservices,respectively.
Itisourcontentionthatthissituationisbetterunderstoodasa‘regimecomplex’,characterisedby‘thepresenceofinstitutionswhosemembershipsandmandatesoverlap’withoutaclearhierarchicalarrangementbetweenthem(AlterandRaustiala2018:330).TheUNmodelconventionisapowerfulfocalpointinaglobalecosystemthatincludestheOECDmodelandagrowingnumberofregionalmodeltreaties–andaworldinwhichlower-incomecountriesareincreasinglyactive,vocalandunitedinglobalandbilateralnegotiations(Hearsonetal.2022;Mason2020).RatherthanunderstandingglobaltaxgovernanceasanOECD-ledregimewithaminorrolefortheUNmodel,weshouldconsideritabipolarsystemcomprisingtwodistinctbutoverlappingregimes.
Tobetterunderstandthisregimecomplex,inthispaperwesetouttodeterminetheprevalentnormswithintheUN-ledregime.ThismeansstudyingthesubstantiveandgeographicalcontoursoftheUNmodel’sinfluenceonbilateraltreatiessignedbylower-incomecountries,asdistinctfromtheOECDmodel.WheredoweobservethestrongestuseofnormsembodiedintheUNmodel,andhowbroadanddeepisdifferentcountries’adoptionofthosenormsintheirtreaty-makingpractice?WealsowanttoknowwherethereisthegreatestpotentialtoconsolidateandexpandtheUN’sroleintheregimecomplex.ForprovisionsalreadyfoundintheexistingUNmodel,thisentailsstudyingthestrengthofsupportamonglower-incomecountries,aswellasthestrengthofanyoppositionfromtheirtreatypartners.WealsoincludesometentativeexplorationofthepotentialfortheUNtoadoptarticlesthathavebeguntospreadorganicallywithintreatiesoflower-incomecountries,principallyinrelationtotaxationofextractiveindustries.
WehavewrittenthispaperinresponsetotheDecember2022UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyresolutionon‘PromotionofinclusiveandeffectivetaxcooperationattheUnitedNations’.OuranalysisbuildsonpreviousworkconductedfortheUNCommitteeofExpertsonInternationalCooperationinTaxMattersanditspredecessorAdHocCommittee(WijnenanddeGoede2013;WijnenandMagenta1997).ItislargelybasedontheICTD’sTaxTreatiesExplorerdataset,whichisauniquepublicly-availabletoolforhigh-levelcomparisonoftaxtreaties.ItcodestheircontentinlinewithvariationsbetweentheUNandOECDmodels.Whereaspreviouslarge-scalestudiescountedtheprevalenceofUNmodelprovisionsintreatiesinOECDandnon-OECDcountries,wefocussolelyonlower-income
8
countries,anddrilldownintothedatatoseehowithaschangedovertime,andbetweencountries.
Weseektomaketwocontributions.First,wedemonstratethatthenormsrelatingtotaxingrightsfoundintheUNmodelalreadypredominateinmuchoftheworldbeyondtheOECD.Mostforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)intolower-incomecountriesisalreadytaxedaccordingtoUNnorms,thoughthisvariesfordifferentprovisions.Second,thereissignificantpotentialtoexpandtheroleoftheUNmodelbyupgradingexistingtreatiestobeconsistentwithitincertainclauses.Asweshow,relativelyfewpartnercountriesexhibit‘redlines’againstmostUNmodel-typeprovisions,andforsomecountriesthereissignificantpotentialtorenegotiate.
Thepaperbeginswithareviewofliteraturestudyingtheroleofthemodelconventionsandtheimpactofthedistributionoftaxingrights.Wemoveoninsection3todiscussthedatausedinthispaper.Section4thenanalysesthisdatatoconsiderthepastandpresentinfluenceoftheUNmodel–howwidelyareUNmodelprovisionsusedinbilateraltreaties,andhowhasthischangedovertime?ItshowsthattheUNmodel’sinfluenceonthetaxationofinvestmentintolower-incomecountriesisgreaterthanmightbeexpected.Section5isfocusedonthefuture–whatisthepotentialforgreateruseofUNmodelprovisions?Bystudyingtheimpliedandexplicitlystatedpreferencesoflower-incomecountriesandtheirtreatypartners,weidentifytheprovisionsthathavethestrongestsupportamongtheformer,andtheleastwidespreadoppositionamongthelatter.WhatemergesisapictureofseveraltreatyprovisionsthatalreadyrepresentthedistinctivenormativeunderpinningofaUN-ledinternationaltaxregime,orwhichhavethepotentialtodoso.
2Literaturereview
Thereisgrowingdebateaboutthecostsandbenefitsoftaxtreatiestolower-incomecountries(ActionAid2016;BeerandLoeprick2021;BrooksandKrever2015;Eyitayo-Oyesode2020;IMF2014;Kangave2009;LeducandMichielse2021;Pistone2010;Shepherd2013).Inpart,theargumentagainstthemrestsonthemisuseoftreatiestoobtainbenefitsnotintendedwhentheywereconcluded,principallythrough‘treatyshopping’viainvestmenthubs.Yetevenifthisissueweretoberesolved,thebalancebetweensourceandresidencetaxation–theextenttowhichtreatiescurbtaxingrightsovercapitalandserviceimports–posesachallengeforlower-incomecountriesthatareoverwhelminglyintheimportingposition.Theevidenceforaneffectoftaxtreatiesonthevolumeofinvestmentflowingintolower-incomecountriesisdecidedlymixed,whilethecostsfromreducedsourcetaxation–thoughhardtoquantify–arecertain.Asaresult,someauthorshavearguedthatthecurrenttaxtreatyparadigmisinherentlyproblematicforlower-incomecountries.OthersfocusonrebalancingtaxingrightstowardsthesettlementfoundintheUNmodel,ratherthanthatoftheOECD.AccordingtoEricZolt:
Whilethetraditionalfocushasbeenonwhetherdevelopingcountriesshouldenterintotaxtreatieswithdevelopedcountries,thebetterquestionsmaybewhatformthetreatiesshouldtakeandwithwhomdevelopingcountriesshouldenterintotreaties.(Zolt2018:147)
Themodeltreatiesthereforematteragreatdeal,becausetheyreflectdifferentpositionsonhowmuchthesourcestateshouldgiveupitstaxingrightsonenteringintoatreaty.Manylower-incomecountrieshavenegotiatedtreatiesoverdecadeswithouttheirownnational
9
policy.ThisleavestheUNmodelasthemainresourceonwhichtheycandraw,alongsideanyrelevantregionalmodels(Mutava2019).
SeveralstudieshavealreadybeenundertakenontheimportanceoftheimpactoftheUNmodel(comparedtotheOECDmodel)intaxtreatynegotiations.AfirstresearchprojectontheimportanceoftheUNmodelwasundertakenbyWijnenandMagenta(1997)attheInternationalBureauofFiscalDocumentation(IBFD),commissionedbytheAd-hocCommitteeofExpertsonTaxMattersattheUN.Thisanalysedtake-upofdistinctiveprovisionsoftheUNmodelintreatiesconcludedbetween1980and1997.Afollow-upresearchontreatiesconcludedbetween1997and2013wasconductedbyWijnenandDeGoede(2013).Thesestudiesfoundthat,unsurprisingly,theUNmodelwasmostinfluentialinnegotiationsbetweentwonon-OECDcountries,followedbynegotiationsbetweenanon-OECDandanOECDcountry,andleastinfluentialinnegotiationsamongOECDcountries–though‘UNclauses’haveevenbeenincludedinthelatter.Inthe2014study,theauthorsconcludedthat‘specificprovisionsoftheUNModelhaveunmistakablyobtainedasolidpositioninthenegotiationoftaxtreaties’.However,theyfoundgreatvarietyintheinfluenceofspecificclauses.Someenjoyedaparticularlyhighuptake,suchasthepermanentestablishment(PE)provisions,article14,andarticle13(4),whereasmostotherswerefoundlessfrequently.AneditedvolumebyLangetal(2012)investigatestheinfluenceofbothmodelsonnationalpractice.Inhisgeneralreport,PistoneshowsthatseveralUNmodelclauses(inparticularwithrespecttoarticles5,7,12and14)areveryimportantincountries’taxtreatypractice,includingthepracticeofsomeOECDmembercountries.
Severalotherstudieshavesystematicallyinvestigatedthepatternsofretentionoftaxingrightsacrosssmallersamplesoftreaties,oftenusingvariationsbetweentheUNandOECDmodelsastheiryardstick(Baistrocchi2008;Brooks2007;Daurer2014;DaurerandKrever2012;Li2012).Forexample,DaurerandKrever(2012)findgreaterretentionofsourcetaxingrightsinAsiancountries’treaties,comparedwiththoseofAfricancountrieswiththesamecounterparts.FalcãoandMichelrecentlyobservethattheUNarticle8Bonshippingiswidelyusedbyasmallgroupofcountries,mostlyinAsia(FalcãoandMichel2021).Hearson(2018)demonstratesthatpowerasymmetriesandlackofnegotiatingexperiencetranslateintogreaterrestrictionsonsourcetaxingrightswhenlookingatlesspoliticallysalientUNmodelprovisions,suchasthoseonpermanentestablishment.
AnarticlebyAshandMarian(2019)analysestheextentof‘transnationalconsensusonthelegallanguagecontrollinginternationaltaxmatters’,usingadatasetofover4,000bilateraltaxtreatiesand16modeltaxtreatiespublishedbytheUN,OECDandUS.TheyextractthetextintodifferenttopicsfollowingIBFDclassificationandprocessitusingnaturallanguageprocessingtechniques.Finally,theycalculatepairwisesimilaritybetweentreatiesinforceineachyearandmodeltreaties.Theyfindclearevidenceofconvergenceinthelanguageofbilateraltaxtreatiesovertime,whichismostpronouncedinareasrelatedtotransferpricing,taxationofbusinessincomeandmutualagreementprocedures.Thereislessconvergenceindefinitionalissues,doubletaxationreliefandtaxcollectionassistance.Theirfindingsontheroleofthetwomodelsareworthquotingatlength:
WefindtheOECDModeltobethemostinfluentialmodel.IntheyearsfollowingtheadoptionofanewOECDModelthereisacleartrendofconvergenceinnewlyadoptedbilateraltaxtreatiestowardsthelanguageofthenewOECDModel....WealsofindthatmodeltreatiespublishedbytheU.N.havehistoricallyhadlittleobservableeffectintheshort-tomedium-term.However,currenttreatypracticesseemtoalignthemselveswiththeU.N.Modelof2011morethanwiththeOECDModel.Itisthereforereasonable
10
toacceptanargumentaccordingtowhichU.N.taxpoliciesmayhavealong-termeffect,representingaslowshiftfromresidencetosource-basedtaxation,evenamongdevelopedcountries.
(AshandMarian2019:190)
Thisshiftmayalsobeunderstatedbytheanalysisoftextualsimilarity.Asweshowlater,theadoptionbytheOECDofaUNmodel-typeprovision–notably13(4)–mayreducetheuseofdistinctivetextfromtheUNmodel,whichbeliesasubstantiveshiftinglobalnormstowardsthosefirstintroducedbytheUN.
TherecentshiftinemphasistowardstheUNmodelreportedbyAshandMarianmayreflectlimitedtake-upoftherevisedarticle7oftheOECDmodeladoptedin2010,andmanycountries’preferencetoretainarticle14inspiteofitsdeletionfromtheOECDmodel.SinceAshandMarian’sstudy,thedegreeofsimilaritybetweentheUNandOECDmodelshasdecreasedoverall.Inparticular,the2017and2021updatesoftheUNModelConventionintroducedanumberofdistinctivefeatures,suchasarticles12A,12B,13(6)and13(7).
ThebodyofresearchatpresentdrawsconclusionsabouttheuptakeofUNmodelprovisionsintreatiesconcludedbycertaincountries,aswellasinaggregate.Yet,thereisawidevariationbetweencountries’treatynetworks,andacleardifferenceinpreferencebetweendifferentgroups,mostobviouslybetweenOECDmembersandothers.Ifweconsidertreatieswithinabipolarregimecomplex,weshouldstudytheinfluenceofthetwomajormodelsindependentlyinthetreatiesofcountriesmostdisposedtofolloweachofthem.TounderstandtheUN-ledtreatyregimewethereforeneedtofocusontreatiesconcludedbylower-incomecountries,whoseinterestsaregivenspecialconsiderationintheUNmodel.Further,weshoulddrilldownsystematicallyintothetrendsweobserve,tocombinesystem-levelobservationswiththepictureatcountrylevel,andstudyhowthisischangingovertime.
3Aboutthedataused
Whencountriesnegotiatetaxtreaties,theystartfrommodels.Whilesomecountrieshavetheirownmodels,thesearecloselyalignedto–andinmanycaseslargelyidenticalto–themodeltaxconventionsdevelopedbytheUNandOECD.Thisstandardisationgreatlyassistswithnegotiationandinterpretation.Italsomakestaxtreatiesverysuitableforlarge-scalecomparativeanalysis.Inmostcases,thepresenceorabsenceofaphraseorparagraphclearlyindicatesthepresenceorabsenceofthecorrespondingsourcetaxingright.Thecomparativestudiesoftreatycontentcitedabovearepredicatedonthisstandardisation.
TheICTDTaxTreatiesExplorerdataset,updatedinpreparationforthisreport,isthemostcomprehensiveattempttostandardiseandanalysethecontentoftaxtreaties.1Itcomprises2,615bilateraltaxtreaties,331bilateralamendinginstruments,andmodificationsthroughtheG20/OECDMultilateralInstrumenttoImplementTaxTreatyRelatedMeasurestoPreventBEPS(MLI),signedupto15March2023.2Asfaraspossible,thisincludesalltreatiessigned
1
2
Thedatasetwasupdatedforthispaper(toversion2.1.0)withsupportfromtheUNDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,whileitsoriginaldevelopmentwassupportedbytheWorldBank,IntergovernmentalGroupof24onInternationalMonetaryAffairsandDevelopment(G-24),andActionAidInternational.Itcanbeexploredonthefollowingwebsite:
https://www.treaties.tax/
.
Treatiessignedbeforetheindependenceofacountryfromacolonialpower,multilateraltreaties,andMLImodificationsareincludedinthedataset,buthavebeenexcludedforsomepartsoftheanalysis.
11
byasampleof118countriesdesignedtocoverasmanylow-andmiddle-incomecountriesaspossible,whileexcludingafewupper-middle-incomecountrieswithlargetreatynetworksthatwerebeyondcodingcapacity.Thesampleisthosethatareorwereuntilrecentlylow-andlower-middle-incomecountries,allcountriesinAfrica,andallmembersoftheG-24(samplecountries).3Mosthigh-income(andsomeupper-middle-income)countries,includingmostOECDcountries,arenotpartofthesample,buttheyappearintheanalysisascounterpartstothesamplecountries(partnercountries).ListsoftreatieswerecompiledfromtheIBFD,supplementedwithgovernments'ownlistspublishedonline.
UsingtheUNandOECDmodelsasitsstartingpoint,thedatasetcodesthecontentofeachtreatyaccordingtostandardisedvariationsbetweenthearticles.Eachofthefieldsinthisdataset,listedinTable1,isbasedonaprovisionofthemodeltreaties:adifferencebetweentheUNandOECDmodels,aclausethatisinbothmodelsbutdoesnotalwaysappearinnegotiatedtreaties,oravaluethatthemodelsleaveopentobilateralne
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