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OpenRAN
SecurityReport
May2023
Outcomefrom
Quad
CriticalandEmerging
Technology
WorkingGroup
1
TableofContents
Introduction
5
Background
5
Objectivesofthisresearchstudy
6
Summary
6
1Categorizingsecurityrisksof5Gnetworks
9
2Scopeandmethodofresearch
10
2.1Introduction
10
2.2Scopeandlimitations
10
2.3AssumptionsontheRadioAccessNetwork
11
2.3.1Deploymentassumptions
12
2.3.2Securityassumptions
14
2.4Riskanalysis
15
2.4.1Threatidentification
15
2.4.2Riskrating
17
2.4.3Riskmitigation
20
2.4.4Mitigationowners
20
2.5PreviouslypublishedviewsonOpenRANsecurity
21
2.5.1BSI–OpenRANRiskAnalysis(5GRANR)
21
2.5.2NISGroup–ReportonthecybersecurityofOpenRAN
21
2.5.3CISA–OpenRadioAccessNetworkSecurityConsiderations
22
2.5.4IFRI–“Open”TelecomNetworks(OpenRAN)
23
2.5.5NTTDocomo–5GOpenRANEcosystemWhitepaper
24
2.5.6Summaryofpreviouslypublishedviews
25
3ComparisonofOpenRANandtraditionalRAN
29
3.1SecurityrisksassociatedtoOpenRAN
29
3.1.1Resultofthethreatidentification
29
3.1.2Resultoftheriskrating
31
2
3.2PotentialOpenRANsecuritychallenges
37
3.3PotentialsecurityadvantagesofOpenRAN
40
4Riskmitigationmeasures
42
4.1MitigationmeasuresdefinedbyO-RANspecifications
42
4.1.1Specificationanalysis
42
4.1.2Analysisresults
46
4.1.3SummaryofO-RANdefinedmitigatingmeasures
50
4.2Supplementarymitigationmeasures
51
4.2.1Analysis&design
51
4.2.2Implementation&test
54
4.2.3Sourcing&procurement
56
4.2.4Integration&deployment
58
4.2.5Operations&maintenance
60
5LabVerificationandAnalysis
63
5.1PurposeofLabVerification
63
5.2Labverificationscopeandprocedure
63
5.2.1Scope
63
5.2.2Procedure
64
5.3Testscenarios
65
5.3.1OpenInterface
65
CharacteristicsofOpenInterface
65
OpenFronthaulTestScenario
67
OtherOpenInterfaceTestScenarios
69
5.3.2Virtualization
70
CharacteristicsofOpenInterface
70
Testscenarioforvirtualization
70
5.3.3Intelligence
71
TheCharacteristicsofIntelligence
71
3
IntelligenceTestingScenario
71
5.4TestEnvironment
73
5.5ValidationResults
74
5.5.1OpenInterface
74
Verificationitemsandprocedures
74
TestResults
79
Analysis
80
6Conclusion
82
6.1OpenRANsecurityrisksandmitigations
82
6.1.1Riskanalysisfindings
82
6.1.2Mitigatingmeasures
83
6.1.3ComparisontotraditionalRAN
84
6.1.4LabVerificationandAnalysis
85
6.2Openchallenges
85
6.2.1AI/MLpoisoning
85
6.2.2Privacyconsiderations
85
6.3Aspectsunrelatedtosecurity
86
6.3.1Lowerpricesforwirelesscommunicationequipment
86
6.3.2Optimizingenergyefficiencythroughintelligence(Energysaving)
86
6.3.3ImprovedmonitoringandmaintenancefunctionsbySMOs
86
7References
88
Appendix
91
A1DuplicatethreatsidentifiedintheO-RANThreatModelingandRemediation
Analysis
91
A2SecuritythreatsuniquetoOpenRAN
96
A3SecuritychecklistforOpenRAN
104
A3.1Objectiveofthischecklist
104
A3.2Descriptionofparametersinthischecklist
104
A3.3Supplementaryinformation
105
4
Introduction
Background
Mobilecommunicationsystemsandotherinformationandcommunicationinfrastructuresareanessentialpartofthesocialeconomyandpeople'slives.5Gnetworks,whicharecurrentlybeingdeployedglobally,differfromconventionalmobilecommunicationsystemsinthat,inadditiontoultra-highspeedandhighcapacity,theyareequippedwithrequirementssuchasultra-lowlatencyandmultiplesimultaneousconnections,andareexpectedtobeusedasaplatformforimprovingefficiencyandconvenienceinindustryandsocietyandcreatingnewaddedvalue.Theimportanceofthesesystemsinsocietyandtheeconomyisincreasing,anditisimportanttoensuretheirsecurity.Traditionally,basestationsnecessaryforthedeploymentofmobilecommunicationsystemsweredesignedbyvendorsusingtheirproprietarytechnologiesandstandardsandwereprovidedasasinglesolution.Therefore,ifatelecommunicationsoperatoradoptsacertainvendor'sbasestationandbuildsanetwork,itwillbeforcedtocontinuebuildingitsnetworkwiththatsamevendor'sbasestationfromthenon,resultinginso-calledvendorlock-in.Thishasmadeitdifficultfornewentrants,eventhosewithsuperiortechnology,toenterthebasestationmarket,leadingtomarketoligopolyandvendorlock-in,andtheglobalmarketformobilecommunicationsystembasestationshasbecomeanoligopolydominatedbyasmallnumberofvendors.Inaddition,ifthevendorlock-insituationpersistsforalongtime,itisassumedthatthespecificationsandoperationalmethodsofbasestationsmaybecomeincreasinglyblackboxed.Furthermore,astheprocurementofproductsisdependentonaspecificvendor,ifprocurementfromthatvendorstagnatesorisdisruptedforsomereason,thereisapotentialforso-calledsupplychainrisk,wheretheentireservicemaybecomeinoperable.
Inresponsetothissituation,worldwideeffortsareunderwaytoopenuptheinterfacesbetweenthedevicesthatmakeupthebasestation,beginningwithOpenRAN.TheOpenRadioAccessNetwork(O-RAN)Alliance,aninternationalassociationforopenandintelligentRadioAccessNetworks(RANs),waslaunchedin2018.AsofMay2023,nearly330carriersandvendorsbelongtothisorganization,whichhasgrownintoaglobalandlargeindustryassociation.
TheO-RANAllianceisdevelopingopentechnicalspecificationsforsignalinterfacesbetweenthedevicesthatmakeupthe5Gbasestation.Inaddition,studiesarebeingconductedonthecertificationandinteroperabilitytestingofOpenRANcomponentsandinterfacesthroughOpenTestingandIntegrationCentres(OTICs),whichareopenandneutralinteroperabilityverificationcentres.Currently,severalOTICsareestablishedinEurope,theUSAandAsia,includingJapan.OpenRANallowsforthefreechoiceoftheequipmentthatmakesupthebasestation,makingitpossibletodevelopahighlyscalableandflexiblebasestation.Vendorswillalsobeabletointroducehigh-demandanddifferentiatedproductstothemarketthatusetheirownspecialisttechnologies,andmobilenetworkoperators(MNOs)willbeabletoadoptbetterproductswithout
5
beinglockedintoexistingvendors.ThewidespreaduseofO-RANspecificationsisexpectedtobreakthetelecomsbasestationoligopoly,andmarketcompetitionbetweenvendorsisexpectedtoimprovetheperformanceofindividualdevicesandreducethecostofequipmentconsideringincreasedmarketcompetition.
Ontheotherhand,reportspublishedbygovernmentorganizationsinsomecountrieshavepointedoutthatOpenRANshavesecurityissuesduetotheinclusionofinterfacessuchasOpenfronthaulandcomponentssuchasO-Cloud,SMO(ServiceManagementandOrchestration)andRIC(RANIntelligentController).
Objectivesofthisresearchstudy
Giventheabovebackground,itisenvisagedthatinthefuture,vendorswillactivelydevelopO-RANequipment,numberof5GbasestationscompliantwiththeO-RANAlliancespecificationswillincrease,andnetworksconsistingofadiverserangeofbasestationsprovidedbyvariousvendorsareexpectedtobeformed.
Ontheotherhand,reportspublishedbygovernmentorganizationsinsomecountrieshavepointedoutthatOpenRANshavesecurityissues.
Inresponsetothesepoints,thisstudywillfirstlydevelopacategorizationofsecurityrisksfor5Gnetworks,reviewexistingexpertreports,andconsiderhowtosetconditionsinaneutralandnon-biasedmanner.AcomparativestudyofOpenRANandtraditionalverticallyintegratednetworksisthencarriedouttoidentifythesecurityadvantagesandchallengesofOpenRAN.FortheissuesidentifiedassecuritychallengesforOpenRAN,riskmitigationmeasuresarestudiedforeachissue,andlaboratoryexperimentsareconductedforitemsconsiderednecessaryorbeneficial.WithsuchattentiontosecurityinOpenRANs,itisnecessarytoassessissuespointedoutinthosereportsandpossibilitiesforthemitigationinanobjectivemanner.
Summary
5Gnetworkfacesmultifacetedriskssuchasmarketoligopolyofbasestations,therisingcostoffossilfuel-basedenergyresourcesandincreasedcomplexityassociatedwithtechnologicalevolution.Amongthem,inthisinvestigation,securityrisksfortypical5GnetworkarecategorizedandcomparedbetweentraditionalRANandOpenRAN.
ComparisonofOpenRANandtraditionalRAN
•SeveralfindingsarederivedfromtheSTRIDEThreatModelingandassociatedriskanalysisperformedonthebasisoftheO-RANspecifications
-Intotal,10O-RANcomponentsandinterfaceshavehigh-ratedsecurityrisksassociatedtothem.ThecomponentwiththehighestnumberofsecuritythreatsaccordingtotheanalysisistheO-Cloud
6
-However,itcanbeconsideredavirtualization-relatedsecuritythreatthatisnotlimitedtoOpenRAN.Atotalof4%oftheanalyzedsecuritythreatsareconsidereduniquetoOpenRAN
-Comparedtonon-disaggregated,non-virtualizedRAN,OpenRANhaspotential
securityadvantages,incl.openlyspecified,verifiablesecuritycontrolsandcapabilitiesassociatedtovirtualizationandcloudificationthatcanhelptoimproveoperationalsecuritytasks
•MitigationmeasuresbasedonO-RANspecificationsareevaluatedasfollows:
-AnalysisofthetechnicalspecificationsshowsthatdefinedsecuritycontrolsmainlyfocusontheAnalysis&designphaseoftheOpenRANlifecycle
-SupplementarymitigationmeasuresareprovidedtocovertheentireOpen
RAN
lifecyclebeyondAnalysis&design
-Analysis&design:OpenRANvendortoensurecompliancewithrelevanttechnicalspecifications(incl.O-RAN,3GPP)andfollowbestpracticesforsecuresolutiondesign
-Implementation&test:OpenRANvendortoenforcesecuredevelopmentpractices,performsecuritytesting,andconfirminteroperabilityusingO-RANtestspecifications
-Sourcing&procurement:MNO,OpenRANvendor,andotherinvolvedpartiestocontractuallyagreesecurityrequirements,rolesandresponsibilities,e.g.,bysigningSLAsandutilizingRFPs/RFQs/SBOMs
-Integration&deployment:Involvedpartiestoperformnetworkintegration,securityconfigurationandhardeningtasks
-Operations&maintenance:MNOtoleverageoperationalsecurityand
automationcapabilitiesofO-CloudandSMOtoenforceestablishedbestpracticesforidentifyingandmitigatingsecurityincidents
-AsecuritychecklistattachedasanAppendixtothisreportisalsobeneficialfor
mitigationofsecurityrisk
-Withthesemitigationmeasures,itispossibletoensureequivalentsecuritylevelcomparedtotraditionalRAN
LabVerificationandAnalysis
•Forlabverificationpurpose,OpenFronthaulisselectedasarepresentativeinterfaceasitincludesallCUS+M-Planecomponentsandwasthefirstinterfacetobeopenedup.Thisinterfaceisanappropriaterepresentativetestsubjectduetoitsmaturityandadvancedimplementation
•ThetestsconductedherewerebasedontheO-RANspecification,anditwasconfirmed
thattheriskofOpenFronthaulcanbeaddressedbyadheringtothestandardspecification
•Furthermore,OpenFronthaulincludestypicalconnectiontypes(EthernetL2connections,TCP/IPconnections)andsecuritycontrolsOpenFH,whichmeansthatitcanbeestimatedthattheriskofotherinterfacescanalsobereducedbyadheringtothestandardspecifications,leadingtosecurityassurance
Inaddition,fromaspectsunrelatedtosecurity,OpenRANcanbeexpectedtohavethefollowingeffects:
-Improvementoftheperformanceandreducingthecostofequipmentbystimulatingcompetitioninthebasestationmarket;
-Mitigatingsupplychainrisks(diversifyingsuppliers)accordingtothemulti-venderconfiguration;
-Optimizingenergyefficiencythroughintelligence(Energysaving);
-ImprovementofmonitoringandmaintenancefunctionsbySMOs.
So,in5Gnetworkdeployment,MNOswillbeabletomakecomprehensivedecisionsbasedontheseaspectsaswellassecurity.
Finally,AsecuritychecklistsummarizingthesecurityrequirementstobemetbyOpenRANisalsoattachedasanAppendixtothisreport.ThischecklistismainlyintendedtobeusedtocheckwhetherthesecuritymeasuresforOpenRANnetworksaresufficientinthefollowingtwosituations.
-ForMNOscurrentlyoperatingOpenRAN:usethechecklisttoassessifthecurrentOpenRANnetworkdeploymentmeetsthenecessarysecurityrequirements.
-ForMNOsconsideringnewOpenRANdeployments:usethechecklistasareferencetoevaluate,eliminateorreducesecurityconcernspriortodeployingOpenRANinthefuture.
8
Implementation
vulnerabilities
Misconfiguration
/Lackof
hardening
ytaeoceIinlnbr
tk
1Categorizingsecurityrisksof5Gnetworks
Mobilenetworksaresubjecttoaplethoraofsecurityrisksthroughouttheirlifetime.5GadoptsmanytechnologiesandarchitecturalconceptsfromthedomainofITandthus,itneedstotakethosepotentialrisksintoaccount,forexample,relatedtotheincreasedadoptionofcloudcomputingandAI.ThesedevelopmentsarenotjustconstrainedtotheCoreNetwork,butalsoaffecttheRadioAccessNetwork(RAN).
Forthepurposesofidentifyingandappropriatelymitigatingtheserisks,itisusefultocategorizethem.Oneapproachistodistinguishthelifecyclephaseinwhicheachriskcommonlyoccurs.Both5GdeploymentsandOpenRANdeploymentsshareasystemlifecyclethatistypicallycomprisedofthefollowingphases:
1.Analysis&design
2.Implementation&test
3.Sourcing&procurement
4.Integration&deployment
5.Operations&maintenance
Throughouttheselifecyclephases,differentsecuritythreatshavethepotentialtoaffectindividualnetworkcomponentsoreventheentirenetworkdeployment.Table1illustratesthedifferentcategoriesinrelationtothesystemlifecycleoutlinedabove.Intheremainderofthisreport,thesecategorieswillbeleveragedtoanalyzeOpenRANsecurityrisksfurtherandidentifyassociated
Supplychain/
dependencyvuln.
controls.
Analysis&design
●
Designflaw
●
●
●
●●
Implementation&test
Sourcing&procurement
Integration&deployment
Operations&maintenance
Table1:Categorizationofsecuritythreats
6
10
2Scopeandmethodofresearch
2.1Introduction
Globally,mobilenetworkconnectionshavecontinuedtoincreaseeversincemobilenetworkswereintroduced,andtheyareexpectedtoincreasefurther.Atthesametime,theusecasesformobilenetworksareexpectedtoexpandandmobilenetworkswillbecomeincreasinglyessentialfordailylife.
TheRadioAccessNetwork(RAN)isresponsibleforprovidingtheaccessstratum.Saiddifferently,theRAN’sprimarytaskwithinamobilenetworkistoprovidecoveragetomobiledevicesandusingthatcoverage,enabledatacommunicationsbetweenconnecteddevicesandthecorenetwork.Withinthatsystem,itisthecorenetwork’sresponsibilitytohandlethatdataandtorouteittoanexternalparty,eitherdirectlyorthroughtheinternet.
Duetoitsdistributednatureofdeployment,theRANaccountsforaconsiderablepartoftheinvestmentinmobilenetworkdeployments.Therefore,itisunderstandablethatmobilenetworkoperatorswouldliketounderstandwhatthesecurityrisksareassociatedwiththisinvestmentandhowthosesecurityriskscanbeaddressed.
ThischapterdescribesathreatmodelingandriskanalysisapproachtoOpenRAN.ItdefinesthescopeofOpenRAN,ourmethod,andthekeyassumptionsunderpinningtheassessment.Finally,itcontainsasummaryofreportspreviouslypublishedbythirdpartiesonthetopicofOpenRANsecurityandhowthepresentreportfurtherextendsonthiswork.
2.2Scopeandlimitations
ThefollowingchapterdescribesthethreatmodelingandriskanalysisperformedontheOpenRANsystem.ThistheoreticalexerciseisperformedtoassessthethreatsurfacepresentedbyOpenRANsystemcomponentsandderiveappropriatesecuritycontrols.
BasisfortheanalysisdescribedinthisdocumentarethetechnicalspecificationsdevelopedbytheO-RANAlliance.SincetheseO-RANspecificationsbuildontheworkdonebythe3rdGenerationPartnershipProject(3GPP),therelevantsecurityspecificationsforNextGenerationRadioAccessNetwork(NG-RAN)arealsotakenintoaccount.Hence,throughoutthisdocument,theterm“OpenRAN”isunderstoodtomean“OpenRANasperO-RANand3GPPNG-RANspecifications”.Frombothofthesesources,thelatestavailabledocumentversionsasofMarch2023areutilized.PartofthisanalysisisalsoacomparisonbetweensecurityrisksuniquetoOpenRANandthosethataffectRANdeploymentsingeneral,incl.traditionalRAN.ThisdistinctionisintendedtohelpmobilenetworkoperatorsidentifygenuinelynewthreatsthatneedtobemanagedwhentransitioningtoOpenRAN.Thehigh-levelarchitecturaldiagraminFigure1illustratesallnetworkcomponentsandinterfacesofOpenRANthatfallwithinthescopeofthisanalysis.Thisdiagram,whichiscreatedbasedon
11
thelogicalarchitecturediagramofO-RAN[1],providesahigh-leveloverviewofhowindividualcomponentsandinterfacesareconnectedwithintheRAN,aswellasspecifieswhichofthemaredefinedandstandardizedby3GPPandO-RAN.
•SecurityprotocolsbetweentheRANandthecorenetworkaredefinedby3GPP(3GPPTS33.501)
•SecuritysolutionsforsoftwaredefinedDUandCUareimplementedandintegratedbymultiplevendors
•OpeninterfacesbetweenRANcomponentsarestandardizedby
xApps
Open
Fronthaul
M-Plane
UE
Xn-c
NG-c
Airinterface
O-RUO-DU
•UserPlaneandControlPlaneareprotectedby3GPPsecurityof3GPPTS33.501
Backhaul
Legend
UserPlanetraffic
ControlPlanetraffic
3GPPdefinedinterface
O-RANinterface
Forfuturestudy
O-CU-CP
E1
O-CU-UP
CUS+M-Plane
F1-c
F1-u
Non-RTRIC
ORANAlliance
Fronthaul
Near-RTRIC
O-Cloud
Open
NG-u
Xn-u
AMF
UPF
SMO
the
rApps
O2
O1
A1
R1
E2
E2
...
RadioAccessNetwork
CoreNetwork
Figure1:High-levelarchitecturaldiagramofOpenRANdeployments
OutofscopeofthisanalysisaresystemcomponentsoutsideofNG-RAN(e.g.,eNB,5GCore,UserEquipment),systemcomponentsandinterfacesofpreviousmobilegenerations(e.g.,4G/LTE),andanyproprietarycomponentsoutsidethescopeof3GPPandO-RANspecifications(e.g.,specificcloudimplementations).
2.3AssumptionsontheRadioAccessNetwork
OpenRANdeploymentscanvarygreatlybetweenusecasesandtherefore,securitycontrolsdifferaswell.Theproblemthisposes,isthatthelikelihoodofariskwillbeaffectedbythetypeofdeploymentthatisselected.Forexample,thelikelihoodofanattackonanisolateddeploymentwithintheperimeterofafactoryisdifferentthanthelikelihoodofanattackonapublicnetworkthatleveragespubliccloudresources.Toaddressthatproblem,ariskassessmentforeachtypeofdeploymentwouldneedtobeperformed.Eventhen,thevariationbetweendeploymentswouldlimitthevalueofsuchariskassessment.
Assuch,thefirstunderlyingassumptionoftheriskassessmentinthisdocumentisasfollows.
1.TheOpenRANdeploymentisassumedtobepartofapublicmobilenetwork.
Anotherassumptionhasbeenmadeonthesecuritycontrolsalreadypresentinthenetwork.Specifically,itisassumedthatminimumsecuritycontrolsnecessaryarealreadyinplace.Examplesforminimumsecuritycontrolsincludesuchfundamentalcapabilitiessuchasasysteminventory,secretsmanagement,andpublickeyinfrastructure.Thereasonforthisassumptionisthatwithoutit,theriskassessmentwillratemanyrisksashigh,whereasinpractice,mitigatingmeasureswillbeinplace(andinsomecasesmitigatingmeasuresthemselvesaresubjecttoadditionalrisks).Assuch,theassumptionof‘reasonablesecurity’ismadetoavoidlonglistsofthreatsthatmaybetheoreticallyrelevant,butinpracticearealwaysmitigated.Thisassumptionisbasedonexpert
opinionsaswellaspublicdata,whereavailable.
2.MinimumsecuritycontrolsarealreadypresentinthemobilenetworkintegratingtheOpen RANdeployment.
Inthefollowing,itisdescribedinmoredetailwhattheseassumptionsmeanspecifically.
2.3.1Deploymentassumptions
Mobilenetworkoperatordeploymentsarefarfromhomogeneous,evenwithinonemobilenetwork.Forexample,shoppingmalls,tunnels,remoteareascanallhavedifferentdeploymentsdependingonthelocalsituation.Thisreportfocusesonpublicnetworkdeploymentsthatareexpectedtobemostcommonlyused.
DomainAssumption
O-RU
-deployedinphysicallyaccessiblelocations,suchasonpoles,oron
rooftops
-physicallyaccessiblebyanattackerbyrelativelysimplemeans
O-DU
-deployedinalocaldatacenter,suchasadedicatedbuildingstation
orinthebasementofabuilding
tt
-accesstolocaldatacentersrestricted,butsharedwithother
O-CU
-deployedinphysicallysecureddatacenters
-onlyauthorizedpersonnelcanaccesspremises
-datacenterassetsseparatedforeachclient
SMO
-deployedinlarge,physicallysecureddatacenters
Table2:DeploymentassumptionsofOpenRANcomponents
TheriskassessmentalsoincludesacomparisonbetweenOpenRANandtraditionalRAN.
Because12
13
Deploymentassumptionsoftraditionalcomponents
Table3:
RAN
theterm“traditionalRAN”isnotclearlydefined,itisassumedthattraditionalRANdeploymentsarecomprisedofBaseBandUnits(BBU)andRadioRemoteUnits(RRU),alsocalledRadioRemoteHeads(RRH).ThearchitecturaldiagraminFigure2illustratesthenetworkcomponentsintraditionalRANdeployments.Whilethistypeofdeploymentimplementsanon-disaggregatedRANasspecifiedby3GPP,individualRANcomponentsareoftenprovidedbyasinglevendor,tightlycoupled,andrelyonproprietarysecuritycontrols.
Figure2:High-levelarchitecturaldiagramoftraditionalRANdeployments
WithregardtotraditionalRANcomponents,thefollowingassumptionshavebeenmade.TraditionalRANinterfacespecificationisnotopenlypublished.So,thirdpartiesintheindustrycannotproactivelydiscoverandaddresssecurityissuesintheinterfacespecification.
DomainAssumption
BBU
-deployedinphysicallyaccessiblelocationsclosetotheradioantenna,suchasonpoles,oronrooftops
-connectedtotheBBUviaunsecuredEthernetorFiberlink
RRU/RRH
-deployedinphysicallyaccessiblelocations,suchasrooftopsorseparateroominsideabuilding
-physicallyaccessiblebyanattackerbyrelativelysimplemeans
14
2.3.2Securityassumptions
Both3GPPspecificationsandO-RANspecificationscomewithsecuritycontrolsthatoperatorscanchoosetoemploy.Thereasonbehindtheoptionalityisthatthestandardsneedtoworkacrossdifferentgeographies,includingthosethatmayprohibitorlimittheuseofencryptionorothercryptographicprotocols.Assuch,technicalspecificationsaredefinedinawaythatsecuritycanbeenabledordisabled,sothatstandardequipmentcanbeusedacrosstheglobe.Atthesametime,thisdoesnotmeanthateachoperatorwillalwaysenableallofthesecurityfunctionalityavailableinthe3GPPandO-RANspecifications.Operatorsmayopttonotincludesecurityfeaturesiftheyfindthatithampersperformanceorthatitmaynotmit
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