绩效审计与公共管理改革【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译译文原文PerformanceAuditandPublicManagementReformAuditisoneoftheoldestandmostvenerablestatefunctions.TheFrenchCourdesComptestracesitsoriginsbackto1318;theUKNationalAuditOfficecites1314asthedateofitsfirstmanifestation;theDutchAlgemeneRekenkamerfindsancestorsasrunningbackto1386.Stateauditthuslongprecededtheemergenceofmodernformsofdemocraticgovernment.Howeverstateauditofficeshavemademanyadaptationsinthecourseoftheirlonghistoryandduringthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiestheyfashionedacrucialroleforthemselveswithinthemachineryofdemocraticaccountability.Onthiskindofhistoricalscale,performanceauditisaveryrecentactivity.Althoughmoreorlessplausibleclaimscanbemadefortheexistenceofperformanceaudit-likeactivitiesbacktothe1960s—orevenconsiderablyearlier—performanceauditasalarge-scale,self-considerablydistinctpracticedatesmainlysincethelate1970s.Performanceauditrepresentsamodernvariantofaudit—nottheonlyonebut,aswellshalldemonstrate,achallengingandfascinatingone.Itisdistinctivetostateauditanddoesnothaveaclosecounterpartinprivate-sector,commercialaudit.Overalmostexactlythesameperiodasperformanceaudithasemergedasadistinctformofaudit,thegovernmentofWesternEurope,NorthAmerica,andAustralasiahaveembarkeduponextensiveprogramsofpublicmanagementreform.Thesehaveaimedatmodernizing,streamlining,andinsomecasesminimizingthewholeofthestateapparatus.Althoughthedetailsofthesereformprogramshavevariedconsiderablybetweenonecountryandanother,mostofthemhavegivenacentralplacetothethemesofdecentralizationandperformancemanagement.Thishasentailedawidespreadrethinkingofthebalancebetweentheautonomyandthecontrolofpublicorganizations.Ithasgeneratedasearchformechanismandincentiveswillhelprealizethesenewmanagementideasinpractice.Primafacie,itappearshighlyprobablethatthereisaconnectionbetweenthesetwophenomena:onthehandthegrowthofperformanceauditandontheotherthesearchforanewsolutiontotheancientgovernmentalproblemofgivingautonomyyetretainingcontrol.Yetthereseemstohavebeenlittlesystematicinvestigationofwhatthenatureofthisinteractionmightbe.Oneofourambitionsistofillthisgap.Webegin,inthenextchapter,bylookingattheboundariesanddefinitionsofperformanceaudit,andtheymovedirectlytodescribethepatternsofmanagementreforminthefivecountriesthatformthebasisforourcomparisons:France,Finland,theNetherlands,Sweden,andtheUK.Thisprovidesthecontextagainstwhichlaterchaptersandteaseouttheconnectionsbetweenthedevelopmentofperformanceauditandtheforcesofmanagementchange.Iftheofficialdescriptionsareanythingtogoby,performanceauditisnotjustatechnicaltool.Itdoesnotatallcorrespondtothetraditionalimageofauditingasaprocesscenteredon‘checkingthebooks’inordertoseethattheyhavebeenaccuratelyandproperlykept.Performanceaudithasamoreambitiousmanifesto.Itspractitionersdeclarethattheyareseekingtoestablishwhetherpublicpoliciesorprogramsorprojectsororganizationshavebeenconductedwithdueregardtoeconomy,efficiency,effectiveness,andgoodmanagementpractice.Itthusbringstogether,inapotentnewcombination,theoldertraditionof’’audit’withamuchmorerecentfocuson‘performance‘.Theexacttermswithinwhichauditbodiesundertakethisactivityvaryfromcountrytocountryandovertime.Soweshouldnotrushtosayexactlywhat‘it’isorisn’t,butrathershouldproblematizeandexploretheconcept.Inthatchapterwewillalsotakeabrieflookatsomeofthemanyotherusestowhichtheterm‘audit’hasrecentlybeenput,adiversificationofmeaningandpracticethatrecentlyledoneacademictowriteanambitioustextentitledTheAuditSociety.Forthemoment,however,itwillsufficetosaythatsetsofpracticestermed‘performanceaudit’orvalue-for-moneystudies’havebecomecentralactivitiesforanincreasinglypowerfulgroupoforganizations-SupremeAuditInstitutions.Inmostdemocraticcountries,theSAIislocatedneartheheartoftheapparatusofthestate.Potentially,therefore,performanceauditshouldbeofconsiderablepoliticalanddemocraticsignificance.Itispracticedbypowerful,independentinstitutionsandispresentedasamodeofinvestigationaimedatestablishingwhether,atwhatcost,andtowhatdegreethepolicies,programs,andprojectsofgovernmentareworking.Giventhesegeneralcharacteristics,onemightexpectthattheconsiderablecommunityofscholarsworkinginsubjectssuchaspoliticalscience,publicadministration,publicmanagement,andpublicfinanceandaccountancywouldhavegeneratedalargeliteratureaboutperformanceaudit.Surprisingly,thisisnotthecase.OnemayspeculateonthereasonswhySAIsand,withinthem,performanceaudithavesufferedrelativeneglectascomparedwith,say,variousaspectsofpublicmanagementreform.Severalreasonsfortheapparentdisparityofinterestinperformanceauditandpublicmanagementreformsuggestthemselves.Tobeginwith,publicmanagementreformhasbeenled—oratleastfronted—bypoliticians,forwhomitisnaturaltomakepublicclaimsthatwhattheyaredoingisinnovative,valuable,andsuccessful.Furthermore,suchchangehasgenerateditsownsupporting‘industry’,includingvariouskindsofconsultantwhohavetakeneveryopportunitytopropelsuchreformevenhigheruppoliticalandadministrativeagendas.Bycontrast,SAIsaresingleinstitutions—andgenerallyrathersoberones.Thebulkoftheirworkappearstobetechnicalanddetailedandtheytakesomepainstostandclearofpartypoliticalcontroversy.Typically,supremeauditinstitutionsarementionedbrieflyingeneraltextbookswhichdescribetheinstitutionsofgovernmentinagivencountry,butfewbooksorarticleshavebeenwrittenspecificallyaboutthem.TheUSA,thoughnotpartofthepresentstudy,wasperhapssomethingofanexceptiontothisgeneralneglect,withacertainamountofanalyticalliteraturefocusingupontheGeneralAccountingOffice.Onlyinthelastfewyearshasthetrickleofjournalarticlesandbookletsbeguntogathersomemomentum.Inthepast,SAIsseldomwentoutoftheirwaytopublicizethemselves—itisonlyinthelastdecadethatmostofthemhavebeguntoproducebookletsandbrochuresforpopularconsumption,ortodealproactivelywiththemassmedia.Somearestillcautiousintheserespects.Finally,thereis,ofcourse,adifferenceofscale.Publicmanagementreformhassweptacrossentirepublicsectors,affectingministries,executiveagencies,quangos,localauthorities,andotherkindsofpublicbody.SAIs,bycontrast,aresingleorganizations,seldomemployingmorethanafewhundredstaff.Thus,changesinwhatauditorsdosimplydonotappeartobeasimportantornewsworthyaschangesthataffecttheworkoftensorhundredsofthousandsofpublicofficials,andwhichmayimpactdirectlyoncitizens’useofpublicservices.Eveniftheaboveconsiderationsgosomewaytowardsexplainingtherelativelackofmediaandscholarlyattentiongiventothedevelopmentofperformanceaudit,thatdoesnotmeanthatsuchactivitiesareinsignificant.Onthecontrary—andasweshallshow--performanceaudithasbecomethelargestsingleactivityforsomeSAIsandanimportantpartoftheworkofalltheSAIsinthisstudy.Thisisarelativelyrecentdevelopment.Althoughthedefinitionofperformanceauditislessthanstraightforward,itisprobablyaccuratetosaythat,allowingforsomeearlier,partialprecedents,itsemergenceasadistinctandmainstreamactivitydatesmainlyfromthelate1970sand1980s.Thus,overthelasttwodecades,anumberofSAIshaveinvestedaconsiderableproportionoftheirresourcesindevelopingarelativelynewareaofactivity,onethatisdirectlyfocusedonthoseissuesofperformancethathavethemselvesbecomesuchacentralfocusofconcernformoderngovernments.Whilegovernmentshavedeclaredthemselvestobeintenselyconcernedwiththe‘threeEs’(economy,efficiency,andeffectiveness)atthesametimeasSAIshavebeendevelopingperformanceauditasawayofinvestigatingthosesamethreeEs,theconnectionbetweenthesetwolinesofactivityhasnotbeenasstraightforwardasmightatfirstappear.Ofcourse,someimpactsarefairlyobvious.Forexample,arecentUKNationalAuditOfficehandbookacknowledgesthatperformanceaudithashadtorespondtothefactthat:‘Twothirdsofgovernmentbusinessisnowcarriedoutbyagencies,outputsanddeliveryaremoreimportantthaninputs,andthereismuchgreaterinvolvementoftheprivatesectorinthedeliveryofpubliclyfundedprograms’.Thisisanexampleofadirectinfluence,runningfrompublicmanagementreformtoperformanceaudit.However,thewholepictureisconsiderablymorecomplicated,withdirectandindirectinfluencesrunninginbothdirections.Ouraimhasthereforebeentostudythepracticeofperformanceauditandrelateittocontemporarydevelopmentsinpublicmanagement.Wehaveinvestigatedthe‘stateoftheart’ofperformanceauditandexploreditslinkswiththeprocessesofmanagementreform.Inempiricalterms,wehavehadtwinfoci.First,wehavegatheredmaterialaboutpublicmanagementreformineachcountry—thisdescribesthecontextinwhichSAIshavedevelopedperformanceaudit.Muchofthishasnecessarilybeensecondarydata,thoughsomeofitderivesfromotherrecentworkbymembersofourteam.Second,inrelationtotheperformanceauditsideoftherelationship,wehaveconductedextensiveprimaryresearch.Ourmainfocushasbeenontheperformanceauditreportandontheprocessthatleadsuptothatreport.Someotherrecentwork,thoughconceptuallysophisticated,hasbeenlimitedbyitsrelianceonamoregeneraltypeofevidence.Wewouldcontendthattheacidtestofwhatperformanceaudit’is’,oriscapableof,mayliemoreinthebedrockofindividualauditsthaninthesuperstructureofwhatSAIssayaboutperformanceauditingeneral,althoughbothtypesofevidenceare,ofcourse,usefulintheirownright.Wehavethereforecounted,categorized,andreadalargenumberofauditreports.Inpracticalterms,theseseemedtheleastunsatisfactoryunitforcomparativeanalysis.Theyhadtheadvantageofbeingconcrete,discrete,andthebasisforanumberofrecordingsystemswithinSAIsthemselves.Unfortunately,however,theyalsocarriedsomedisadvantages.First,notallSAIsdistinguishbetweenperformanceauditreportsandothertypesofreport.Second,notallperformanceauditreportsareinthepublicdomain.Third,thereareotherimportantperformanceaudit‘products’apartfromindividualreports.Forexample,someperformanceauditworkbytheNAOtakestheformofunpublishedreportstodepartmentsratherthanreportstotheParliamentaryPublicAccountsCommittee.ThebulkoftheCour’sworkonbonnegestiontakesplaceintheformofunpublishedcommunicationswiththeauditedbodiesandtheministries,oftenatministeriallevel.Fourth,thereisveryconsiderablevariationbothbetweenandwithinperformanceauditreports.Theycomeindifferentshapesandsizesindifferentcountries,andevenwithinthecorpusofasingleSAIsuchreportsmaybelongorshort,expensiveorcheap,verybroadorquitenarrowinscope,etc.Indeed,thesevariationsareoneofthefeatureswedescribeandcommentupon.Finally,itshouldbepointedoutthatchoosingadifferentunitofanalysiswouldlikelyhaveyieldeddifferentinsights,butatthesametime,andbythesametoken,wouldprobablyhaveconcealedorobscuredsomeofthefeaturesthatourfocusonreportshasilluminated.Forexample,wehaveencounteredsomedifficultyinanalyzingthemethodsusedinperformanceaudit,partlybecausesomereportsuseavarietyofmethodswithinasinglestudywhileotherssayvirtuallynothingaboutwhichmethodsmayhavebeenadopted.Inconclusion,weshouldsaythat,althoughthisworkiscertainlynotintendedtobeprescriptive,wehaveneverthelessthoughtitappropriateinthefinalchapter,tosetoutanagendafordiscussion.Drawingfromourdescriptionsandanalyses,wehaveidentifiedanumberofissueslikelytoshapethefuturedevelopmentofperformanceaudit.Ineffect,theseconstituteasetofstrategicchoices,withsignificantimplicationsfortherolesofSAIs.Someoftheseissuescouldbeclarifiedbyfurtherresearch.Allofthemcouldbenefitfromwideranddeeperdebate.Justaspoliticsistooimportanttobelefttothepoliticians,theactivitiesofourSupremeAuditInstitutionsaretooimportanttobeleftexclusivelytoauditors.Source:ChristopherPollott,HikkaSumma.PerformanceAuditandPublicManagementReform[M],PerformanceorCompliance,2009.

译文绩效审计与公共管理改革审计是最古老且最庄严的国家职责之一，法国审计院的历史可以追溯到1318年。英国国家审计处将1314年作为首次审计的日期；荷兰总审计局的审计活动最早可以追溯到1386年。因此，国家审计早前是出现在民主政府的现代形式中的。然而，国家审计处在19世纪与20世纪这一漫长的历史过程中顺应形势，为自己塑造了一个在机构里至关重要的民主责任的角色。在历史的发展中，绩效审计是最近才开展起来的活动。尽管有点看似合理的声明就能够完全说明类似绩效审计活动的存在，可以追溯到20世纪60年代，甚至更早，绩效审计作为一个大规模自觉的独立实践的活动是在20世纪70年代后期确定下来的。绩效审计代表了一种现代的不同于传统的审计，虽然不是唯一的一个，就如我们所证明的，它具有挑战性并且具有吸引力。相对与国家审计，绩效审计的显著特点在于它不出现在私营部门和商业审计。几乎同时，绩效审计显示出了一种不同于一般财务审计的模式。在西欧，北美和澳大利亚政府已开始广泛的公共管理改革方案。这些都旨在现代化，精简化，以及在某些情况下最大限度地整合了整个国家机器的结构。尽管这些改革方案的细节在不同国家之间各异，但他们中的大部分都将分散集权和绩效管理放在了一个重要的位置。这包含了如何平衡自治权和公共组织控制两者之间关系的广泛思考。它产生了一个对激励机制的探索，将有助于在实践中寻找新的管理理念。表面上，似乎极有可能是有这两种现象之间的连接：一方面绩效审计的发展,另一方面寻找一个新的办法来解决依旧被政府控制的自治权这一古老的问题。但这看起来似乎是一种本质在相互作用的系统调查。我们企图之一便是填补这个空白。在下一章节,我们开始观察绩效审计的定义及范围,并用以描述法国、芬兰、荷兰、瑞典和英国这五个国家之间的以管理模式改革为基础的比较。为后面章节所提及的内容提供了背景,理出了绩效审计的发展和管理改革力量之间的关系。如果依据官方的解释,那么公共部门绩效审计不仅仅只是一种技术工具。它并不如传统印象中的审计只是一个能够准确地、适当地“核对资料”的处理过程而已。绩效审计会有更多的令人兴奋的声明。它的从业者声明,他们正在探求要对是否要建立起已充分考虑到经济性和效率性，效果性和良好的管理实践性的公开政策、程序、计划或组织。同时带来的是一个强有力的新组合：即传统观念中的审计和侧重绩效的现代审计相结合。随着时间的推移，审计主体中的确切条款在不同国家的审计活动间存在变化。所以我们应该不要急于明确“绩效审计”的准确定义,而是应该作为问题来深入探寻它的概念。这一章节里我们也将简要地看一看一些“审计”在目前定义下的别的用途,审计实施和意义上的多样化近年来引起了一个学者开始撰写一部名为《审计社会》的鸿篇巨著。然而，目前，它将足够表明那些被叫做“绩效审计”或者“一项物超所值的研究”的实践活动已经成为一个正在强大起来的机构组织——最高审计机关的中心活动。在大多数民主国家，最高审计机关是一个接近于国家机构中心的位置。因此,公共部门绩效审计潜在中应是具有相当大的政治与民主意义。它以强大的、独立的公共机构被人们所熟悉，并且以确定其是否应该被成立、代价多少、如何开展政府政策和计划为目的，以调查研究为形式被我们所认识。考虑到这些总体特征，我们可能会希望这些学者所组成的团体所涉及的学科是那些比如政治学、公共管理、公共财政和财务会计等一些会产生大量关于绩效审计文献的学科。令人惊讶的是,情况不是这样的。因此，为何我们在最高审计机关以及其内部中忽视了绩效审计与所谓的公共管理改革各方面对比的原因是可以推断出来的。绩效审计与公共管理改革的自我建议在表面上的不一致是存在很多原因的。首先，公共管理改革已经被引入或者至少被政客所提及，所以对他们来说，公开声称他们正在做的正是有所创新的、具有价值的以及可预见能成功的事情是很自然的。此外，这种改变已经产生了自己支持的“产业”，包括各种抓住任何机会把政治和行政推向更高层次的各种顾问。相比之下，最高审计机关是单一的、通常被认为是严肃的机构。他们大量的工作似乎是很有技术性且详细，并且还要认准自己的立场，分清各种政党政治的争议。通常，最高审计机关会在那些写关于一个国家的政府体系的教材上被简略提到，但很少被写入专门的书籍或文章。美国，虽然不是目前研究的一部分，或许是一个容易被忽视的例外，因为它将一定数量的分析性文字集中在总审计署上。在过去的几年里只有开始少量的收集期刊文章和小册子的势头。以前，最高审计机关很少用自己的方式宣传自己，他们中的大部分仅仅在过去的十年里才开始生产和普及消费那些小册子，或者通过媒体来积极应对。但始终有一部分对此持谨慎态度。当然，最后绩效审计的还存在规模上的差异。公共管理改革横扫整个政府资助企业、部门、行政代理、半公营机构、地方政府以及其他一些公共体制。相比之下，最高审计机构是个独立组织，很少会雇佣超过100人的员工。因此，审计人员的看似不重要且没有新闻价值的简单工作的一丁点变动反而会影响几