BigTech和货币政策传导：基于中国的微观经济层面证据

BISWorkingPapers

No1084

BigTechcreditand

monetarypolicytransmission:micro-levelevidencefromChina

byYipingHuang,XiangLi,HanQiuandChanghuaYu

MonetaryandEconomicDepartment

March2023

JELclassification:E52;G21;G23.

Keywords:Financialtechnology,banklending,monetarypolicytransmission.

ISSN1020-0959(print)

ISSN1682-7678(online)

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ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite().

©BankforInternationalSettlements2023.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybe

reproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated.

1

BigTechCreditandMonetaryPolicyTransmission:Micro-LevelEvidencefromChina*

YipingHuangtXiangLi主HanQiu§ChanghuaYu闻

Abstract

ThispaperstudiesmonetarypolicytransmissionthroughBigTechandtraditionalbanks.BycomparingbusinessloansmadebyaBigTechbankwiththosemadebytraditionalbanks,itfindsthatBigTechcreditamplifiesmonetarypolicytransmissionmainlythroughtheex-tensivemargin.Specifically,theBigTechbankismorelikelytograntcredittonewborrow-

erscomparedwithconventionalbanksinresponsetoexpansionarymonetarypolicy.The

*Forcomments,discussion,andsuggestions,wethankGeneAmbrocio,GuidoAscari(discussant),ChristophBasten,ChristianeBaumeister,JonathanBenchimol(discussant),SallyChen(discussant),MarcoDiMaggio(discussant),ThomasDrechsel,ZuzanaFung´aˇcov´a,AndreasFuster,LeonardoGambacorta(dis-cussant),EmiliaGarcia-Appendini,AlexandraGutsch,JiayinHu(discussant),YiHuang,BoreumKwak,WeiLi(discussant),ChangMa,AakritiMathur,MrinalMishra,StevenOngena,MelinaPapoutsi,MalteRieth,MatthiasRottner,AlessandroSardone,ChristophSchult,LauraSolanko,IlhyockShim,RubenStaffa,GregorvonSchweinitz,YongjieZhang,andotherscholarsattheChinaFinancialResearchConference;theAsianFAConference;theBankofEnglandworkshoponAdvancedAnalytics:NewMethodsandApplicationsforMacroeconomicPolicy,theCentralBankResearchAssociation2022AnnualMeeting,the9thAnnualConferenceofMITGolubCenterforFinanceandPolicy,BISresearchmeeting,theECBChinaExpertNetworkWorkshop2022;andseminarsattheUniversityofZurich,BankofFinland,andHalleInstituteforEconomicResearch.Anyremainingerrorsareoursalone.

tChinaCenterforEconomicResearch,NationalSchoolofDevelopment,andInstituteofDigitalFinance,PekingUniversity.YiheyuanRoad5,Beijing,100871,China.Workphonenumber:+86106275-4798.Email:

yhuang@

主HalleInstituteforEconomicResearch,Martin-Luther-UniversityHalle-Wittenberg,andInstituteofDigitalFinance,PekingUniversity.KleineMaekerstrasse8,Halle(Saale),06108,Germany.Workphonenumber:+493457753-805.Email:

xiang.li@iwh-halle.de

sBankforInternationalSettlements.78thfloor,TwoInternationalFinanceCentre,8FinanceStreet,Central,HongKong.Workphonenumber:+8522982-7100.Email:

han.qiu@

"ChinaCenterforEconomicResearch,NationalSchoolofDevelopment,andInstituteofDigitalFinance,PekingUniversity.YiheyuanRoad5,Beijing,100871,China.Workphonenumber:+86106275-8935.Email:

changhuayu@

BigTechbank’sadvantagesininformation,monitoring,andriskmanagementarethepo-tentialmechanisms.Inaddition,theusageofBigTechcreditisassociatedwithastrongerresponseoffirms’salesinresponsetomonetarypolicy.

Keywords:FinancialTechnology;BankLending;MonetaryPolicyTransmissionJELCodes:E52;G21;G23

1

1Introduction

Financialtechnology(FinTech)hasbeenamajorphenomenonintherecentdevelopmentoffinancialmarkets.DuringtheCOVID-19crisis,FinTechhasplayedanunprecedentedlyprominentroleinstabilizingandreignitingtheeconomy(

CoreandDeMarco

2021

,

Kwan

etal.

2021

,

BaoandHuang

2021

,

FuandMishra

2021

).Bydefinition,FinTechisabroadconceptthatreferstotheuseoftechnologyinprovidingfinancialservices(

FSB

2019

).Whatmakesitstandoutinthelonghistoryoffinancialinnovationisthatthedisruptionthistimehasbeeninitiatedbyplayersoutsidethefinancialmarketsratherthanwithintheoldsystem.Digitalplatformsformarketplacelendingandcreditissuedbybigtechnologycompanies(BigTech),suchasAntGroup,Amazon,orMercadoLibre,haveposedseriouschallengestothelendingmodeloftraditionalfinancialintermediaries(

Bootetal.

2021

).

Figure

1

showsthatBigTechcredithasovertakencreditissuedbydecentralizedplatformsinrecentyears.BigTechcreditaccountsfor2%-3%ofgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)incountrieslikeChinaandKenya.TheseBigTechcreditsareparticularlyimportantformicro,small,andmedium-sizedenterprises(MSMEs),whicharethebackboneofentrepreneurshipandeconomicgrowth.Asoftheyear2018,MSMEsaccountfor99.8%ofestablishments,79.4%ofemployment,and68.2%ofsalesintheChineseeconomy.Armedwithinformation,distribution,andmonitoringtechnologiesbuiltintotheecosystemofBigTechdigitalplat-forms,BigTechlendersareabletoreducerelianceontraditionalcollateralandthuscovermoreborrowersthathavebeenunservedorunderservedbytraditionalfinancialinstitutions(

PetersenandRajan

1994

,

BergerandUdell

1995

,

Cornellietal.

2022

).BigTechcredithasbecomeatopconcernforeconomicpolicymaking(

Carstensetal.

2021

,

Adrian

2021

).Asrecognizedby

Philippon

(

2016

)and

Lagarde

(

2018

),thedisruptionbyFinTechbringsa“bravenewworld”formonetarypolicymakersandrequiresre-evaluationoftheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicytransmissionthroughthesenewlenders.Despitetheburgeoninglitera-

2

tureonFinTech,littleisknownaboutitsimplicationsformonetarypolicytransmission.

1

ThispaperbridgesthisgapbyexploringmonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismsthroughBigTechandconventionalbanks.

Total,USDbn

800

600

400

200

0

2013201420152016201720182019

PlatformCreditBigTechCredit

percapita,USD

150

100

50

0

2013201420152016201720182019

PlatformCreditBigTechCredit

Figure1:GlobalFinTechCredit

Datasource:

Cornellietal.

(

2020

).

WeemployauniquedatasetcoveringthefullborrowinghistoryofsampledMSMEsfromamajorBigTechlenderandtraditionalbanksinChina.WeaccessedcreditdatafromtheAntGroup,oneofthedominantBigTechcompaniesbothdomesticallyandinternationally,andmatchwiththeseMSMEs’borrowinghistoryfromtraditionalbanks.OurdatasetcoversmonthlyobservationsofbothBigTechcreditandbankcredittofirmsfromJanuary2017toDecember2019.Combinedwithvariationsinmonetarypolicy,ourdatasetprovidesanideallaboratoryforinvestigatingmonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismsthroughBigTechlendersandtraditionalbanks.ThefindingsbasedontheevidencefromChinamayshedlightonregulatoryandmonetarypoliciesinothercountriesaswell.

Ouridentificationstrategyfocusesontheextensivemargin,capturedbyanewlending

relationshipbetweenabankandafirm,andtheintensivemargin,capturedbynewlyissued

1See

Allenetal.

(

2021

)forasurveyofFinTechresearchandpolicydiscussion.

3

loanstoafirmthathasalreadyborrowedfromthebank.WeexploretherelativeresponseofBigTechlendingtochangesinmonetarypolicy,comparedwithtraditionalbanklending.Aftercontrollingfirms’demandforcredit,ourestimatescapturetheimpactofmonetarypolicythroughthecreditsupplyofdifferenttypesofbanks.Inaddition,weexaminetherealimpactonfirmsofBigTechcreditrelativetoconventionalbankloansbycomparingsalesgrowthinresponsetochangesinmonetarypolicy.

Themainfindingsofthepaperarethefollowing.WefindthatBigTechloanstendtobesmaller,andBigTechbanksgrantcredittomorenewborrowers,comparedwithconventionalbanks,inresponsetoexpansionarymonetarypolicy.Inotherwords,whenmonetarypolicyeases,BigTechlendersaremorelikelytoestablishnewlendingrelationshipswithfirms,comparedwithtraditionalbanks.BigTechbanks’advantagesininformation,monitoring,andriskmanagementarethepotentialmechanisms.Comparedwithtraditionalbankloans,BigTechlendingamplifiesmonetarypolicytoalargerextentforfirmsthathaveonlinebusinesses,ratherthanfirmsthathaveonlyofflinebusinesses,andwhenBigTechlendingiscomparedwithsecuredbankloans,ratherthanunsecuredbanksloans.However,BigTechandtraditionalbankcreditstofirmsthathavealreadyborrowedfromthesebanksrespondsimilarlytomonetarypolicychanges.Overall,BigTechcreditamplifiesmonetarypolicytransmissionmainlythroughtheextensivemarginrelativetotraditionalbankloans.Inaddition,monetarypolicyhasastrongerimpactontherealeconomythroughBigTechlendingthantraditionalbankloans.

Thisstudyrelatestothreebranchesoftheliterature.First,wecontributetotheliter-atureonmonetarypolicytransmissionbyfocusingonanewplayer,BigTechlenders,andcomparingtheirresponsestomonetarypolicywiththoseoftraditionalbanks.Thebanklendingchannelofmonetarypolicy(

BernankeandBlinder

1988

,

1992

,

KashyapandStein

1995

)dependsoncross-sectionalheterogeneityinvariousdimensions,includingliquidity,size,incomegap,leverage,andmarketpower(

KashyapandStein

2000

,

Brissimisetal.

4

2014

,

Drechsleretal.

2017

,

Gomezetal.

2021

,

Wangetal.

2021

).Therisktoleranceandriskexposureoffinancialintermediationmayamplifymonetarypolicyshocks,asisfoundby

Coimbraetal.

(

2022

)and

DiTellaandKurlat

(

2021

).Heterogeneityinlenders’techno-logicalcharacteristicsisamissinglinkintheliterature.

2

Recently,

Hasanetal.

(

2020

)and

Hasanetal.

(

2022

)examinetheroleofregionalFinTechpenetrationandbanks’in-housetechnologydevelopmentintheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.

DeFioreetal.

(

2022

)studyBigTech’sresponsetomonetarypolicybasedoncross-countryannualdataandmodeltheroleofBigTechasfacilitatingmatchingbetweensellersandbuyers.

Zhou

(

2022

)emphasizestheroleofsocialnetworkinhelpingFinTechenhancethetransmissionofmonetarypolicytothemortgagemarket.

ThekeyinnovationofourstudyisthatwefocusonthemonetarytransmissionmechanismthroughBigTechlendingrelativetotraditionalbanklendingbyexploringquasi-loan-leveldatabetweenMSMEsandtwotypesoflenders,BigTechandtraditionalbanks.Theevi-dencethatBigTechlendingamplifiesmonetarypolicyalsoaddstotherecentliteraturethatinvestigatestheroleofnonbanksinmonetarypolicytransmission(e.g.,

Elliottetal.

2019

,

Chenetal.

2018

).

Second,ourstudyisrelatedtotheburgeoningstudiesontherelationshipbetweenFin-Techlendersandbanks.WecontributetotheliteraturebydirectlycomparingthelendingbehaviorsofthesetwotypesoflenderstothesameMSMEborrowersthroughthelensofauniquedataset.Assummarizedin

Stulz

(

2019

),

Bootetal.

(

2021

),

Thakor

(

2020

)and

Bergetal.

(

2022

),therecentwaveoffinancialtechnologiesisnewandhasbroughtanabun-danceofdataandcodificationofsoftinformation.Thesedevelopmentshavestrengthenedscreeningandmonitoring,whichrationalizetheempiricalfindingthatcomparedwithbanks,

FinTechlendersrelymoreonhardinformation.Ontheonehand,manystudiesexamine

2Therearestudiesfocusingonfirms’technologyadoptionanditseffectonmonetarypolicy,buttheyarelimitedtonon-financialfirms.Forinstance,

Consoloetal.

(

2021

)findthatfirms’informationtechnologyinvestmentweakensthecreditchannelofmonetarypolicytransmission,and

FornaroandWolf

(

2021

)studytheimpactofmonetarypolicyonfirms’technologyadoptiondecisions.

5

whetherFinTechlendingsubstitutesfororcomplementsbanklending.Forinstance,usingU.S.mortgagelendingandpersonalcreditdata,

Buchaketal.

(

2018

),

DiMaggioandYao

(

2021

),and

DolsonandJagtiani

(

2021

)showthatFinTechlendersusedifferentinformationtosetinterestratesrelativetobanksandaremorelikelytoservenonprimeconsumers.UsingconsumerlendingdatafromLendingClubandbanksintheUnitedStates,

Jagtiani

andLemieux

(

2018

)and

Hughesetal.

(

2022

)showthatFinTechpenetratesareasthatareunderservedbybanks.

Surietal.

(

2021

)and

ErelandLiebersohn

(

2022

)findthatFinTechcouldimprovefinancialaccessandresilience.

GopalandSchnabl

(

2022

)documentthatFinTechlenderssubstitutedforthereductioninbanklendingtosmallbusinessafterthe2008financialcrisis.

Tang

(

2019

)and

Beaumontetal.

(

2022

)showthatFinTechlendingsubstitutesbanklendingforinfra-marginalbankborrowersbutcomplementsbanklendingwithrespecttosmallloans.

Liuetal.

(

2022

)comparesyndicatedloansbyaBigTechlenderandatraditionalbankinChinaandfindthatBigTechloanstendtobesmaller,havehigherinterestrates,andarerepaidfarbeforematurity.

Buchaketal.

(

2021

)useChinesedatatoshowthatFinTechfacilitatestheinterestrateliberalizationofbanksthroughcompetitionindeposit-likeproducts.Otherrecentstudies,suchas

PierriandTimmer

(

2022

),

Linetal.

(

2021

),

Kwanetal.

(

2021

),

Heetal.

(

2021

),

Hasanetal.

(

2022

),and

Modietal.

(

2022

),focusontechnologyadoptionbybanksandexamineitsimpactonlending.Although

Stulz

(

2019

)highlightsthespecialroleofBigTechcredit,thereislittleevidenceonthedifferenceincorporatelendingbetweenBigTechlendersandbanks,inparticulartheirresponsestomonetarypolicyshocks.Thisstudyfillsthisgapintheliterature.

Third,thispaperalsocontributestotheliteratureonfinancialinnovationandeconomicgrowth,byhighlightingtheimpactofBigTechcreditonfirmperformance.Manystudiesfocusontherealeffectsoftheinnovationsofnon-financialfirms,suchas

Akermanetal.

(

2015

),

Beaudryetal.

(

2010

),and

Autoretal.

(

2003

).Thesestudiesdwarfthoseontech-nologicalinnovationinthefinancialsector,whichmayspureconomicgrowth.Forinstance,

6

Becketal.

(

2016

)showthatbankinginnovationisassociatedwithhighergrowthincountriesandindustrieswithbettergrowthopportunities.

GortonandHe

(

2021

)findthatbankinginnovationcontributestoeconomicgrowthbyallowingbankstoofferlongermaturityloanstotherealsectorwithhigherproductivity.Bycontrast,researchontherealeffectsofFin-TechorBigTechcreditisquitelimited.

Chenetal.

(

2022

),

E¸caetal.

(

2021

),

Ahnertetal.

(

2021

),and

Becketal.

(

2022

)documentthataccesstoFinTechcreditreducessalesvolatil-ity,increasessalesgrowth,andspursfirminvestmentandentrepreneurship.Inthisstudy,weprovidefurtherevidencetoshowthat,comparedwithtraditionalbanklending,BigTechcreditincreasesMSMEs’salesgrowthinresponsetochangesinmonetarypolicy,echoingtherealimpactofmonetarypolicyasin

GertlerandGilchrist

(

1994

).

Therestofthepaperisstructuredasfollows.Section

2

describestheinstitutionalbackgroundofBigTechcreditinChina,thedataconstruction,andthevariablesusedinthepaper.Section

3

illustratestheidentificationstrategiesandreportstheempiricalresults.Section

4

providesfurtherdiscussion.Section

5

concludes.

2DataandVariables

ChinahasgraduallybecomealeadingplayerinBigTechcredit.AccordingtoboththetotalandpercapitaBigTechcreditofthetopsixcountriesfrom2013to2019(seeFigure

A1

intheappendix),China’sBigTechcredithasdominatedothercountriessince2017.Ontheonehand,aidedbyadvantagesininformation,technology,distribution,andmonitoringbuiltintoBigTechplatforms’ecosystems,BigTechcompanieshaveaccesstomillionsofunservedandunderservedcreditusersatverylowcost,particularlyMSMEs.Ontheotherhand,thegovernment’sregulatorytoleranceintheearlystagedevelopmentofFinTechhasplayedanimportantroleinsupportingtherapidexpansionofBigTechcredit(see

Chui

2021

).DoesBigTechcreditsubstitutefororcomplementtraditionalbanklendingtofirmssinceboth

7

typesofcreditprovidersmayfacethesamepoolofpotentialcreditusers?IsBigTechcreditmoreresponsivetofinancialmarketconditions,suchasthemonetarypolicystance,partic-ularlyindevelopingcountrieslikeChina?China’sBigTechcreditdiffersfromthatofothercountriesinmanydimensions.OneimportantdifferenceisthatunlikeintheUnitedStatesandotheradvancedeconomies,BigTechlendinginChinaisdominatedbybusinesslend-ingratherthanmortgagelending.WillBigTechcreditreducefirms’,particularlyMSMEs’,financialconstraintsandboosttheirgrowth?

Toaddressthesequestions,weusedatafromthebiggestBigTechcreditproviderinChina,MYBank.MYBankisownedbytheAntGroup,whichisanaffiliatecompanyoftheAlibabaGroupandoperatesvirtuallywithoutphysicalbranches.Sinceitslaunchin2015,MYBankhasfollowedthesamerulesandpoliciesoftheChinaBankingandInsuranceRegulatoryCommission(CBIRC)astraditionalbanks.

3

MYBankmainlyserveshouseholdsandMSMEssuchase-commercesellersandQRcodeofflinemerchants.TheAntGroupownstheworld’slargestdigitalpaymentplatform,Alipay,whichiseasytoaccessandusebybothmerchantsandcustomers.Bothe-commercesellersandQRcodeofflinemerchantsleavedigitalfootprintswhentheyuseAlipaytosettleonlineorofflinetransactions.Armedwiththisinformationandanadvancedriskmanagementmodel,MYBankoffersloanswitha“contact-freefeature,”withoutanyvisitstophysicalbankbranches,underaso-called“310”model.Thatis,MYBankpromisesthecompletionofuserregistrationandloanapplicationwithin3minutes,moneytransfertoanAlipayaccountwithin1second,and0humanintervention.MoreinstitutionalbackgroundonMYBankandotherBigTechlendersinChinacanbefoundin

Frostetal.

(

2019

),

Huangetal.

(

2020

),

Hongetal.

(

2020

),

Hauetal.

(

2021

),

Gambacortaetal.

(

2022

),and

Liuetal.

(

2022

).

3TheChinaBankingRegulatoryCommission(CBRC)wastheagencythatregulatedthebankingsectorinChina.InApril2018,itwasmergedwiththeChinaInsuranceRegulatoryCommission(CIRC)toformtheCBIRC.

8

DepositRatio(%)

60

40

20

0

2015201620172018201920202021

MYBankTraditionalBanks

Profitability(%)

1

.5

0

−.5

2015201620172018201920202021

MYBankTraditionalBanks

CapitalAdequacyRatio(%)

20

15

10

5

0

2015201620172018201920202021

MYBankTraditionalBanks

NPLRatio(%)

2

1.5

1

.5

0

2015201620172018201920202021

MYBankTraditionalBanks

Figure2:MainIndicatorsforMYBankandTraditionalBanksSources:AnnualReportofMYBank;CBIRC.

TherearesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenMYBankandtraditionalbanks.Both

typesofbanksareregulatedbytheCBIRC,attractdeposits,andlendtocreditusers.Theymayhavedifferentlendingmodels.Traditionalbanksusuallyrequirein-personinteractionandinspectiontoissueloansandthereforetaketimetoapproveloanapplications.MYBankissuesloansveryquicklybyusingvarioussoftandhardinformationfromtheAntGroupanditsparentcompany,theAlibabaGroup.Therepaymentschedulecouldbedifferenttoo.LoansfromMYBankcanberepaidearlywithoutanycost(

Liuetal.

2022

).Figure

2

showsthemainfinancialindicatorsforMYBankandothertraditionalbanksfrom2015to2021,includingthedeposit-to-assetratio,profitabilitycalculatedastheratioofnetincometoassets,capitaladequacycalculatedastheratioofcapitaltorisk-weightedassets,andtheratioofnonperformingloans(NPLs)toassets.Thefigureshowsthataftertheyearofitslaunch,2015,MYBankhastendedtodependlessonexternalfinanceviaattracting

9

deposits,haveaslightlylowercapitaladequacyratiothantraditionalbanksonaverage,buthavelowerprofitabilityandNPLratio.Lowerprofitabilitymaybeassociatedwithhighercompetitioninthecreditmarket,andthelowerNPLratiowouldimplythatMYBankmayhavebetterriskmanagementviaabundantinformationandadvancedtechnologies.

2.1DataConstruction

MYBankservesbothhouseholdsandfirmsinChina.Forourpurpose,wemainlyfocusonMYBank’sentrepreneurialcustomers.WeexplorehowmonetarypolicyaffectscreditexpansionandcontractiondifferentlythroughMYBankandtraditionalbanks.BothonlineandofflineentrepreneurialcustomerssettletransactionsviaAlipayandleavetheirdigitalfootprintsontheecosystemoftheAntGroup.Moreover,thebusinessactivitiesofonlinemerchantsonthedigitalplatformsoperatedbytheAlibabaGroupprovideadditionalin-formationforMYBanktoevaluatetheriskofthesemerchants.MYBank’slendingmodelmightrespondtomonetarypolicyquitedifferentlycomparedwithtraditionalbanks.

DuetoMYBank’sdataregulationpolicy,weobtaineda10%randomsampleofitsfirmcustomersfromJanuary2017toDecember2019.Wedroppedinactivefirmsbythefollowingcriter