《论文_外文翻译-小额信贷(定稿)》

1、2010届毕业生毕业论文姓名：院（系）：- 专业班级： 学 号： 指导老师：一 成 绩：小额信贷是否帮助穷人?孟加拉国旗舰计划所带来的新证据摘要：小额信贷运动使金融中介机构得到了创新，同样使贫困家庭减少了贷款的 成本和风险。孟加拉国乡村银行的小额信贷机制已经在全世界得到推广。虽然小 额贷款机制的忖的是为客户带来社会和经济效益，但是通过其获得一定量的利 益的尝试已经开始实施了。木文借鉴一个新调查来研究小额信贷是是否真止的帮 助穷人，该调查覆盖面近1800个家庭，其屮部分家庭获得了孟加拉乡村银行的 贷款，而另一部分则没有参与到小额贷款运动中。有资格获得贷款的家庭，他们 的消费水平低于平均消费水平，

2、这种家庭中，绝大部分的孩子不可能上得起学， 男子也往往会有更多的工作压力，而女子没有工作。更明显的，相对于对照组， 符合贷款资格的家庭在消费上的变化很小以及可以常年提供劳动力的特点。最重 要的潜在影响不是贫穷本身，而是因而最重要是减少相关的家庭漏洞。似乎导致 消费平滑主要原因是收入平滑，而不是借款和贷款。评论家有大量的关于低收入国家的其他方案的研究经验。虽然通常人们都是 使用固眾效力评估來控制与安置方案有关的不易观察的变量，但是使用固泄效力 评估会加剧偏见的影响，就如同本方案在较大的社区里特定人群的方案。关键词：小额信贷，项目评估，乡村银行，孟加拉1.介绍小额信贷在很多人的脑海里是用来减少贫困

3、。前提是操作简单。小额信贷提 供小额贷款，以促进小规模的创业活动，而不是向贫困家庭提供救济。这种信贷 除非放债人收取非常高的利率（往往收费高达每月10%）,否则不会发生。放债运 作缺乏竞争，因为潜在的进入者很快发现，借款人通常不能提供任何形式的抵押 品，这就使贷款存在咼成木和该风险。（拉希徳和汤森，1993）。然而，体制创新下的小额信贷运动似乎大大降低了风险和提供金融服务和 为贫困家庭提供服务的费用。创新包括借款合同、给予奖励、配出不良信用风险 和连带借款人的活动，要求每周或每半周还款（morduch, 1997）o 2005年该运动 已经在世界银行，联合国领导人，以及其他己加入的国际组织的推

4、动下成为联系 100万家庭的全球性的运动（小额信贷首脑会议，1997）。该运动在美国还得到相 当多的支持（包括钱第一夫人希拉里克林顿），现在该方案在美国有300个经营点 （经济学家，1997）。纽约时报仃997）还发表庆祝这个“继续的反贫穷方案的革 命”文章呼吁支持。但是，小额贷款到底给贫困家庭带来了怎样的巨大的影响？虽然小额贷款确实做到了减少贫困，但只有极少数研究使用相当人的样本和 适当的治疗/控制框架來研究这个问题。本研究调查了 1800户家庭在19911992 年间的孟加拉国格拉名银行的小额信贷项目，孟加拉国农村发展委员会（brac）, 和孟加拉国农村发展委员会（brdb）,本案例还包括

5、了一组没有任何小额贷款项冃 服务地区的家庭。这里考虑的这三个贷款方案在孟加拉国一共超过了 400万贫困 客户，它们的作用是非常广泛的。格拉米银行的国际小额信贷旗舰运动，其模式 己经被四人洲所复制，包括在美国的阿肯色州和内城芝加哥都取得明显成就。从其带来的影响我们可以简单得出小额信贷所带来的成就。例如，如杲享 受乡村银行服务的家庭按照从小额信贷项目贷款的总数來安排，则前四分z的 家庭享有人均消费相较于在底层四分之一的家庭要高出十五个百分点。另外， 62%的从乡村银行贷款的家庭的男孩可以上学，而34%的上学的男孩的家庭没有 贷款。而女孩的比例分别是55%对40%。然而，这些简单的比较，人部分是由于

6、选择偏差造成的。一旦，对照组坐 出了适当的比较，不管是受教育的男孩还是受教育的女孩，有权使用小额贷款项 冃的家庭并没有明显提高人均消费水平。总z,人均消费水平低于对照组。这一 结论是惊人的，关于小额贷款的反对声音也频繁的在国际响起。然而，有权获得项h资助确实使常年劳动力变得多元化。相应的，该方法也 降低常年各种各样的消费，所以，尽管该项目并没有提高平均消费水平，但他可 以通过稳定收入的方法使这些家庭稳定消费水平。至于在其弱点上的影响，结果 突出了小额贷款的优势，这些优势很少被关于小额信贷的文献所关注（除皮特及 科韩徳科，1998b）。该项目得到了一亿美金的援助，由此，我们也可以看到它的 优势。

7、这一结果同样证明，评估者很容易误导项廿的成就，而且，他们拥有许多 相似评估经验，这些经验包拾公众医疗及其他低收入国家的社会项日。同这里一 样，这些项忖经常被限制在特殊的区域和特殊的忖标人群，尤其是贫困家庭。不 同于那些富有国家，收入为基础意味着测试似乎从未进行过。反而，例如，孟加 拉国乡村小额贷款项目致力于“无地机能”，这条规定要求贷款的家庭必须有超 过半英亩的可耕种上地。如果这条合理要求被强制实施，并且是建立在家庭外因的特殊z上，这条项 目规定将是合理统计的基础。然后，我们就能从参与该项目的家庭组及未参与该 项忖的家庭组的比较中得到非常明朗的效果。这一 方法是冋归间断设计的一个形 式（坎贝尔

8、，1969年），其见解提供了皮特和科韩德科工作（1998a和1998 b； 在这里，他们用了相同的数据）的基础。但是我们不能从这个例了里推出任何有效结论，这个数据说明人们经常违反 规则。例如，30%的乡村贷款人拥有远远多于半英宙的土地，他们拥有土地所有 权的面的有14英亩之大。那些记录在案有权借款的家庭或有权参与项目的家庭, 其屮一部分所拥有的土地大概是2英市，相对的其他那部分要少一点。下面的方法反而通过在乡村的比较，运用了测试组及对照组的数据。乡村中 没有参与项冃的组中，其采样严格遵循半英亩规定。然而，参与项冃的村里，同 组的不对称性在这里同样出现了问题。采样战略在一开始就是一个解决办法。采

9、 样是设计好的，这样，对照组才可以同测试组作比较。强制要求测试纽需要同对 照组一样严格按照规定强制执行要求。另外需要关注非随机安置方案的是，当考虑到地区固定影响水平或者他们的 对等性时（例如皮特和科韩徳科，1998a）。当方案选择已经完成的好的地区的时 候，出现向上偏差；当项冃倾向于不发达地区时，则出现向下偏差。然后，柜员频繁声明这并不是解决非随机安置方案的万灵药。实际上，当项 目安置被预测到针对目标人群没有观察到影响时，包括地区固定影响水平能使偏 羞增大。这个数据暗示，这是经常出现的状况。但是，带着减少变化和劳动力供 应的期待，主要的定性结果对测试组及对照组的不易观察的乡村水平是健全的。小额

10、信贷在新兴优势突出的成果使得其很少考虑其脆弱性，这些好处应当判 断有数百万美元支持这些方案。研究结果还表明如何判别简单的误导性的指标， 他们持有类似的在低收入国家其他社会项目评估如公共健康和低收入的经验教 训。曲于，这些计划往往局限于特定地区和特定目标群体即典型的贫怵i家庭，所 以，以收入为基础的测试方法儿乎在较富裕的国家从来没有使用过。docs microfinance really help the poor?new evidence from flagship programs in bangladeshabstractthe microfinance movement has buil

11、t on innovations in financial intermediation that reduce the costs and risks of lending to poor households- replications of the movement flagship, the grameen bank of bangladesh, have now spread around the world while programs aim to bring social and economic benefits to clients, few attempts have b

12、een made to quantify benefits rigorously. this paper draws on a new cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households, some of which are served by thegrameen bank and two similar programs, and some of which have no access to programs. households that are eligible to borrow and have access to the prog

13、rams do not have notably higher consumption levels than control households, and, for the most part, their children are no more likely to be in school. men also tend to work harder, and women less. more favorably, relative to controls, households eligible for programs have substantially (and signific

14、antly) lower variation in consumption and labor supply across seasons. the most important potential impacts are thus associated with the reduction of vulnerability, not of poverty per se< the consumption-smoothing appears to be driven largely by income-smoothing, not by borrowing and lending. the

15、 evaluation holds lessons for studies of other programs in low-income countries. while it is common to use fixed effects estimators to control for unobservable variables correlated with the placement of programs, using fixed effects estimators can exacerbate biases when, as here, programs target the

16、ir programs to specific populations within larger communities.key words: microfinance, project evaluation, grameen bank, bangladesh1. introductionmicrofinance has captured the imaginations of many people working to reduce poverty. the premise is simple. rather than giving handouts to poor households

17、, microfinance programs offer small loans to foster small-scale entrepreneurial activities. such credit would otherwise not be available or would be only available at the very high interest rates charged by moneylenders (who often charge as much as 10% per month). moneylenders operate with little co

18、mpetition since potential entrants quickly find that costs and risks are high - and borrowers are usually unable to offer standard forms of collateral, if any at all (rashid and townsend, 1993).however, the emerging microfinance movement demonstrates institutional innovations that appear to greatly

19、reduce the risk and cost of providing financial services to poor households. innovations include contracts that give borrowers incentives to exclude bad credit risks and monitor other borrowers' activities, schedules of loans that increase over time conditional on successful performance, and wee

20、kly or semi-weekly loan repayment requirements (morduch, 1997). the movement is now global, and leaders at the world bank, united nations, and other international organizations have joined in pushing to reach 100 million households around the world by the year 2005 (microfinance summit, 1997). the m

21、ovement has also generated considerable support in the u.s. (including the high-profile support of hillary rodham clinton; buntin, 1997), and small-scale programs now operate in 300 u.s. sites (economist, 1997). the new york times (1997) has celebrated this "much-needed revolution in anti-pover

22、ty programs" and called for enhanced support but how great is the ultimate impact on poor households? while strong claims are made for the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty, only a handful of studies use sizeable samples and appropriate treatment/control frameworks to answer the questio

23、n. the present study investigates a 1991-92 cross-sectional survey of nearly 1800 households in bangladesh served by niicrofinance programs of the grameen bank, the bangladesh rural advancement committee (brac)，and the bangladesh rural development board (brdb). the sample also includes a control gro

24、up of households in areas not served by any microfinance programs. the three lending programs considered here together serve over four million poor clients in bangladesh, but their role is much broade匚 the grameen bank is the flagship of the international microfinance movement, and its model has now

25、 been replicated on four continents, including sites in the united states as varied as rural arkansas and inner-city chicago. simple estimates of impacts show clear achievements. for example, if households served by the grameen bank are ordered by the amounts they have borrowed from the program, the

26、 top quarter enjoys 15% higher consumption per capita than households in the bottom quarter. in addition, 62% of the school-age sons of grameen bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34% of the sons of eligible households that do not borrow. for daughters, the grameen advantage is 55% versus 4

27、0%.these simple comparisons appear to be driven entirely by selection biases, however. once appropriate comparisons with control groups are made, access to the three microfinance programs does not yield meaningful increases in per capita consumption, the education of sons, nor the education of daugh

28、ters. if anything, the levels are slightly lower than for control groups- the results are surprising and contradict frequent claims made about the programs in international discussions of microfinance.access to the programs does, however, appear to aid the diversification of labor supply across seas

29、ons. in turn, access is associated with a reduction in the variability of consumption across seasons. thus, while the programs may not increase consumption on average, they may offer households ways to smooth consumption through smoothing income in pointing to impacts on vulnerability, the results h

30、ighlight an advantage that is seldom considered in the emerging niicrofinance literature (an exception is pitt and khandker, 1998a). these benefits should be judged against the tens of millions of dollars that have supported the programs.the results also demonstrate how misleading simple performance

31、 indicators can be, and they hold lessons for evaluations of similar public health and other social programs in low-income countries. 1 as here, such programs are often limited to particular regions and particular target groups, typically poor households. unlike in wealthier countries, income-based

32、means tests are almost never used. instead, for example, the microfinance programs in rural bangladesh focus on the "functionally landless95 implemented as a rule barring lending to households owning over a half acre of cultivable land.the program rule can be the basis of a plausible econometri

33、c strategy if the eligibility requirement is strictly enforced and built around a feature that is exogenous to the household.then, clean impacts can be gauged by comparing the status of households clustered just below the arbitrary dividing line to households clustered just above. this approach is a

34、 form of regression discontinuity design (campbell, 1969), and the insights provide the basis of pitt and khandkers. 1 simple evaluations are subject to multiple selection biases: self-selection into the programs by the most able, non-random program placement, and endogenous determination of the int

35、ensity of participation (e.g., the size of loans in micro finance). the typical problem stems from the near impossibility of finding good instrumental variables work (1998a and 1998b; they use the same data as used here).but the idea can not be implemented reliably in this sample. the data demonstra

36、te frequent violations of the rules. for example, 30% of grameen borrowers own more land than the half-acre cut-off, with landholdings as large as fourteen acres. among households labeled in the survey as "eligible" to borrow and with access to programs, the fraction of borrowers is nearly twice as high for those holding over half an acre versus those below (63% versus 34% for the three