股票期权激励外文翻译文献

股票期权激励外文翻译文献股票期权激励外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：SOEExecs:GetReadyForStockIncentivesTANWEIStockoptionincentiveplanwillsoonbeavailabletostate-ownedenterpriseexecutives,butwillitleadtogreaterprosperityornewproblems?Atrailblazingnewschemetoinfusestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)withincentivestockoptionsisunderway.It’saplanthatmaybolstercompanyperformance,butit’snotwithoutrisks.OnAugust15,LiRongrong,MinisteroftheState-ownedAssetsSupervisionandAdministrationCommission(SASAC),disclosedthataftercarefulstudy,astockoptionincentivetrialplanwillbecarriedoutinthelistedSOEs.Accordingtothetrialplan,about102A-sharelistedSOEsareexpectedtobethetrialcompanies.Theshortlistofsomeofthoseexpectingtoparticipateincludes:ChinaUnicom,CiticGroup,KweichowMoutai,ChinaMerchantsBankandBeijingFinancialStreetHoldingCo.Stockoptionincentiveplanisdesignedtoenticeexecutivestoworkhardforthelong-termdevelopmentoftheircompanies.Asstocksrisebasedoncompanyperformance,theytoogainthroughthisprofitsharingarrangement.Thiskindofincentiveplanispopularinforeigncountries,especiallyintheUnitedStates,wherestockoptionscanaccountforashighas70percentofaCEO’sincome.Further,manyeconomistsbelievethestockoptionincentiveplanoptimizescorporategovernancestructure,improvemanagementefficiencyandenhancecorporatecompetitiveness.Ontheotherhand,aftertheMeasuresontheAdministrationofStockIncentivePlansofListedCompanieswasissuedearlythisyear,someofthecompaniesturnedouttohavemisusedtheincentivestockoptions.Theresultwasinsiderdealings,performancemanipulationaswellasamanipulationofthecompanystockprice.“Althoughthestockoptionincentiveschemeisafrequentlyusedtooltoencouragetopmanagement,itcouldalsobeadouble-edgedswordespeciallyinanimmaturemarketeconomy,”Lisaid.TheSASACisthereforetakingacautiousapproach,placingexplicitrequirementsoncorporategovernance,thetargetandextentoftheincentivemeasures,Liadded.Listatedthattheoverseas-listedSOEswouldbethefirstfewcompaniesthatwillimplementthemechanismbecauseoftheirsoundmanagementstructureandlaw-abidingnature.ThenthedomesticlistedSOEswillhavethechancetoembraceincentivestockoptions,whichwouldbepromotedifthetrialresultsweregood.Executiveface-liftAsformorethan900listedSOEs,thepersonnelstructureoftheboardsofdirectorswillprobablyfacesubstantialchange.That’sbecausetheplanstatesthatifthestockoptionincentivemechanismisgoingtobeimplementedinlistedSOEs,externaldirectorsshouldaccountforhalfoftheboardofdirectors.Thetrialplanintroducedtheconceptofexternaldirectorsforthefirsttime.TheexternaldirectorshouldbelegallyrecommendedbydirectorsoflistedSOEs,andshouldnotbeworkinginthelistedSOEsorinaholdingcompany,saidtheplan.However,currently,mostofboardsofdirectorsoflistedSOEsarenotincompliancewiththerequirement.Theyhavetoreadjustthestructureofboardofdirectorstofitinwiththenewmechanism.“FormostoftheSOEswhicharelistedintheA-sharemarket,theirboardsofdirectorsaremadeupofnon-externaldirectorsandindependentdirectors,whichmeansthatapartfromindependentdirectors,membersofboardofdirectorsareallworkingforthelistedcompanyorforthelargeshareholder,”saidZhuYongmin,aneconomistwiththeCentralUniversityofFinanceandEconomics.“Ifthestockoptionincentivemechanismistobecarriedoutinthosecompanies,alarge-scalerestructuringofboardofdirectorsisunavoidableandexternaldirectorsmustbeintroducedintotheboard.”ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC)stipulatesthatanindependentdirectorisonewhodoesn’tholdanotherofficebeyondhisjobasadirector,andhasnosuchrelationswithmajorshareholderthatwouldinterferewiththeexerciseofindependentandobjectivejudgment.“Currently,theindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniescanbecategorizedasexternaldirectors,”Zhusaid.“However,thedefinitionofexternaldirectorismuchbroaderthanindependentdirector.Thosewhoworkforacompanywhichhasbusinesstieswithalistedcompany,thoughtheydonotmeettherequirementsofbeinganindependentdirector,butcanbeconsideredanexternaldirector.”Additionally,thetrialplanalsostipulatesthatthesalarycommitteeoflistedSOEsthatexercisethestockoptionincentivemechanismshouldbecomposedofexternaldirectors.However,formostofthelistedcompanies,therearestillnon-externaldirectors.Asaresult,aconsiderablenumberoflistedSOEsneedtotransformtheirsalarycommitteetofulfilltheprerequisitesofthestockoptionincentivemechanism.Avoidingover-compensationOver-compensationissomethingthatthetrialstockplanistryingtoavoidaswell.Therefore,thetrialplanstatesthatdomesticlistedSOEs’executivesshouldreceivenomorethan30percentoftheirtotalsalary(includingoptionsanddividends).Butasfortheoverseas-listedSOEs,themaximumincentiveis40percentofthetargetsalary.Thetrialplanalsofixesthevolumeofincentivestockoptions.Thetrialplanstatesthatthevolumeofincentivestockoptionsshouldbefixedinaccordancewiththescaleofthelistedcompanyandthenumberofincentiveobjectives.Thenumberofshareallocatedmaynotexceed10percentofthecompany’stotalsharecapitalandnolessthan0.1percent.Infact,BeijingReviewwasinformedbytheCSRCthatsome20listedSOEsalsobeganexploringstockoptionincentiveschemesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.ButnoneofthemreceivedapprovalfromtheCSRCbecausetheirschemesrevealedsharpcontrastwiththetrialplanintermsofthescaleofincentivestockoptionsoffered.Results-orientedUnderthetrialplan,betterperformanceisamusttoobtainstockprivileges.ThenumberofincentivestockoptionsthatseniorexecutivesinlistedSOEscangetdependsontheirannualperformance.Iftheycannotfulfillthetargetedobjectives,thelistedcompanymayhavetherighttotakebacktheincentivethestockoptionsorpurchasethembackatthepriceatwhichtheyweresoldtotheexecutives.ZhuYongminnotedthatthestockoptionincentiveplanisnotinvariable.Thedirectorsoflistedcompanies,seniorexecutives,andcoretechnologicalandmanagementpersonnelmaynotgetthetargetstockoptionsiftheyfailtoachieveasatisfactoryperformance.NofreebiesForsure,statestockswon’tbegiventoexecutivesforfree,underthetrialplan.“Thestatestockshaveprices,”Zhengsaid.“Iftheywerepaidtoseniorexecutivesforfreeinthenameofincentivestocks,itisequaltoalossofstateassets.Toelaborate,theincentivestocksshouldbetheincrementofstocksthatareearnedbytheexecutivesforlistedSOEsaftertheimplementationofthetrialplan,andshouldnotbepreviousstockinventory.Inshort,thepastispast.Onlyfuturestockincreasescanbeusedasincentivestocks.”Further,“TheincentivestocksshouldnotbepaidonlybytheSASAC,whichisthelargestshareholderofallthecentralSOEs,”saidZhengPeimin,ChairmanofShanghaiRealizeInvestmentConsultingCo.,whotookpartindraftingthetrialplan,.“Theincentiveplanshouldbeajointactionofallshareholdersofacompanyandtheyshouldshoulderthesameresponsibilityandenjoyequalbenefit.”Already,shareholderspayforsalariesofdirectors,seniorexecutivesandtechnologymanagementstaff.“Theincentivestocksshouldalsobepaidbyallshareholders.”Zhengsaid.“Forinstance,ifthegovernment,orastateownedenterprise,holds60percentofalistedSOE,theyshouldonlypay60percentoftheincentivestocksand40percentshouldbepaidbyothershareholders.”译文：国有企业高管：准备迎接股权激励计划谭卫股票期权激励计划将很快应用于国有企业管理人员，但这会带来更大的繁荣，还是新的问题？一个开创性的计划正被引入——国有企业正在实施股票期权激励计划，它可能会增强公司业绩，但它并非没有风险。8月15日，国资委部长李蓉蓉透露，经过仔细研究，股票期权激励计划将要在上市国有企业试行。根据计划，约有102家A股上市国有企业将要参与此计划，包括：中国联通，中信集团，贵州茅台，中国招商银行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。期权激励计划致力于吸引企业管理人员专注于他们公司的长远发展。由于股票价格是在公司业绩提高的基础上上升的，他们也通过此来做工作安排。这种激励计划在国外很受欢迎，特别是在美国，那里的股票期权可以占到首席执行官的收入的高达百分之七十之多。此外，许多经济学家认为，股​​票期权激励计划有助于优化公司治理结构，提高管理效率，增强公司的竞争力。另一方面，在实施上市公司股权激励计划管理的初期，竟然发现一些公司误用激励股票期权。其结果导致内幕交易，恶意操纵该公司的股票价格。“虽然股票期权激励计划是一个经常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被称为一把双刃剑，尤其是在一个不成熟的市场经济体制之下。”李蓉蓉说。因此，国资委采取谨慎的态度，对于实施股权激励计划的企业，在企业管治，目标和奖惩措施的范围等方面提出了明确的要求，李蓉蓉补充说。李指出，因为海外上市的国有企业有可靠的管理体制和健全的法律机制，所以他们将是为数不多的几家将实现此股权激励机制的公司，这一现象也遵从了自然规律。其后，如果他们的试行被证明是有效地，在国内上市的国有企业将有机会实施期权激励。整顿管理层对于上市的900多个国有企业，董事局的人员结构可能将要面临实质的变化。这是因为该计划规定，如果上市公司预期实施期权激励机制，外部董事应当占上市国有企业董事会全部董事人数的一半。在该次计划的试行中，首次引入了外部董事这一概念。该计划规定，外部董事应当由上市国有企业的董事通过合法程序推荐，而不应在上市国有企业或控股公司工作。但是目前，大多数上市国有企业的董事会并不符合规定。他们必须重新调整董事会结构，以适应新的机制要求。“对于大多数在A股市场上市的国有企业，其董事会都是由非外部董事和独立董事组成，这意味着，除了独立董事，董事会成员都为上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大。”中央财经大学的经济学家朱永敏说。“如果股票期权激励机制在这些公司中实施，大规模改组董事会是不可避免的，外部董事必须加入其中。”中国证券监督管理委员会（证监会）规定，独立董事是指，不在上市公司担任除董事外的其他职务，并与其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股东不存在可能妨碍其进行独立客观判断关系的董事。“目前，上市公司的独立董事可归类为外部董事，”朱永敏说，“然而，外部董事的定义比独立董事更广泛。有些董事为某其他公司工作，而且此公司与上市公司存在业务联系，虽然他们不符合