阿富汗的例子：介入容易出局难（英）-哈佛大学肯尼迪学院-2021.7-68正式版

INTELLIGENCEPROJECTEasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOutTheCaseofAfghanistanNazaninAzizianPAPERJULY2021每日免费获取报告1、每日微信群内分享7+最新重磅报告；2、每日分享当日华尔街日报、金融时报；3、每周分享经济学人4、行研报告均为公开版，权利归原作者所有，起点财经仅分发做内部学习。扫一扫二维码关注公号回复：研究报告加入“起点财经”微信群。。TheCyberProjectBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairsHarvardKennedySchool79JFKStreetCambridge,MA02138/IntelligenceStatementsandviewsexpressedinthisreportaresolelythoseoftheauthorsanddonotimplyendorsementbyHarvardUniversity,HarvardKennedySchool,theBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs,ortheDepartmentofDefense.DesignandlayoutbyAndrewFaciniCopyright2021,PresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollegePrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaINTELLIGENCEPROJECTEasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOutTheCaseofAfghanistanNazaninAzizianNote:TheresearchandgenerationofthisreportwascompletedbeforetheBidenAdministrationannouncedtheirdecisiontowithdrawallAmericantroopsfromAfghanistanbythe20thanniversaryoftheSept.11attacks.PAPERJULY2021AbouttheAuthorDr.Nazanin“Naz”Azizianisacareernationalsecurityprofessionalwithexpertiseindefenseandmilitaryintelligence.NazsuccessfullycompletedaFellowshipattheJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity,whereshestudiedandresearchedabroadarrayofpressingdomesticandglobalissuesconcerningU.S.nationalsecuritypolicy.Dr.AziziancurrentlyworksattheOfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforIntelligenceandSecurity.ShehasworkedattheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseinvariousrolesincludingdefenseandmilitaryintelligencepolicy,congressionalaffairs,financialmanagement,programmanagement,engi-neering,andacquisition.Dr.AzizianwasborninKabul,AfghanistanandgrewupintheWashington,D.C.metropolitanarea.SheholdsaPh.D.inSystemsEngineering,M.S.inElectricalEngineering,andB.S.inBiomedicalEngineeringallfromtheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity.EasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistanAcknowledgementsAspecialthankstothefollowingindividualswhoselflesslygavetheirtime,guidanceandinsights:MajorGeneralWilliamE.Rapp(Ret.),HarvardKennedySchoolLecturerinMilitaryAffairsGeneralJosephF.Dunford(Ret.),formerChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffMrs.RobertaSydney,BusinessExecutivesofNationalSecurity(BENS)MentorMr.EdPope,BusinessExecutivesofNationalSecurity(BENS)MentorTheHonorableSusanM.Gordon(Ret.),formerPrincipalDeputyDirectorofNationalIntelligenceGeneralJosephL.Votel(Ret.),formerCommanderofUnitedStatesCentralCommandLieutenantGeneralHerbertR.McMaster(Ret.),formerNationalSecurityAdvisorAdmiralJamesA.WinnefeldJr.(Ret.),formerViceChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffGeneralJohnW.NicholsonJr.(Ret.),formerCommanderUnitedStatesForces-AfghanistanandNATO-ledResoluteSupportMissionLieutenantGeneralDouglasE.Lute,USA(Ret.),formerDeputyNationalSecurityAdvisorandforU.S.AmbassadortotheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationTheHonorableJamesR.Clapper(Ret.),formerDirectorofNationalIntelligenceMr.RobertCardillo,formerDirectoroftheNationalGeospatial-IntelligenceAgencyBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool iiiTableofContentsExecutiveSummary...........................................................................................11.U.S.ForeignPolicyPost-ColdWar.............................................................71.1TheImportanceofLessonsLearnedfromPost9/11U.S.Policy........................................91.2FactorsthatShiftedU.S.ForeignPolicyPost-ColdWarShift..........................................102.U.S.InterventionsinWarsonTerror..........................................................122.1InefficaciesofU.S.ForeignPolicyinAddressingGlobalTerrorismPost9/11.................122.2FeaturesofU.S.PolicytoAddressTerrorismPost9/11........................................................143.TheCaseofAfghanistan...........................................................................163.1U.S.FailuresinAfghanistan..........................................................................................................183.2InherentU.S.Challenges..............................................................................................................253.3ChallengesInherenttoAfghanistanHamperedU.S.ForeignPolicyEffectiveness.....333.4UnstableCoalitionofAllies.........................................................................................................393.5Pakistan’sPoisonousInfluence.................................................................................................404.ParallelPolicyShortfallsinOtherWars...................................................425.PolicyRecommendations.........................................................................475.1Re-envisionCounterterrorismStrategy..................................................................................475.2PolicyBasedonHierarchyofNationalInterests...................................................................495.3EmphasizeDiplomaticandEconomicInstrumentsofPower............................................505.4EmployEffectiveCommunicationPlan..................................................................................525.5MonitorProgressofPolicyandAdaptasNeeded................................................................525.6Partner-FocusedRegionalSecurityArchitecture.................................................................53Conclusion......................................................................................................56BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool

vAmemberoftheAfghansecurityforceswalksinthesprawlingBagramairbaseaftertheAmericanmilitarydeparted,inParwanprovincenorthofKabul,Afghanistan,Monday,July5,2021.APPhoto/RahmatGulEasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistanExecutiveSummaryThedissolutionoftheSovietUnioneffectivelyendedtheColdWarandlefttheUnitedStatesasthemostpowerful,secure,andprosper-ousnationintheworld.Theresultingmilitarysuperiority,lackofrivals,andvastwealthprovidedtheU.S.withunparalleledfreedomtoindulgeinwell-intendedglobalmissionstoshapetheworldwithoutseeminglyincurringsignificantrisksorconsequences.Inthe1990s,theU.S.advanceditsintereststopromotedemocraticgovernanceandfreemarketeconomies,fosterindividualfreedom,andprotecthumanrights.However,aftertheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001,U.S.foreignpolicyfocusshiftedtocombattinganddefeatingterrorism,predominantlyintheMiddleEastandAfrica.Thesemissionswouldcostnearly$5.4trillionandapproximately15,000Americanlives.1Unfortunately,theshortcomingsoftheU.S.waronterrorpoliciesoverthelasttwentyyearshaverepeatedlypreventedtheU.S.fromachiev-ingitsenvisionedoutcomesofdefeatingterrorismandreshapingfragileregionsinitsownimage.TheUnitedStates’inabilitytoachieveitsdesireddefinitionofsuccessinitsmissionsagainstterrorismhasnotbeenduetochallengesbymorepowerfulandstrategicallysavvyenemies.Norhasitbeenduetoinsufficientexpenditureofresources,nortoalackofwar-fightingexperience.Instead,thelackofsuccesshasbeenfarmoreduetoshortcomingsofU.S.foreignpoliciesthem-selves.TheyhaveentangledtheU.S.inprotractedwarsonterrorandhindereditsabilitytosecureitsowninterestsintheseconflicts.ThispaperexamineswhytheU.S.post-ColdWarforeignpolicyhaslargelybeenunsuccessfulinachievingU.S.objectiveswhileengagedinregionalconflictsofterrorism.UsingAfghanistanasacasestudy,thispaperidentifiestheinconsistencies,contradictions,gaps,andpoorpolicyimplementationsofvariousU.S.administrationpoliciesthathaveentrenchedthenationinprolongedwarsagainstterrorismandundercuttheprospectsofendingtheconflictsresponsiblyoverthelasttwodecades.Lastly,thispaperwillrecommendpoliciesthatBrownUniversity,WatsonInstituteofInternationalandPublicAffairs,“CostsofWar,”TheCostsofWar,March2021,/costsofwar/figures.BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool 1wouldimprovetheU.S.decisionsaboutwhereandforwhatpurposetocommittaxpayerdollars,riskAmericanlivesandenhancetheU.S.’sstra-tegiccompetencetoprevailinfuturekineticconflicts,particularlyagainstauthoritarianpowersandtransnationalterroristgroups.WhileU.S.foreignpolicyhaspreventedanotherlarge-scaleterroristattackonU.S.soilsinceSeptember11,2001andsimultaneouslyhelpingmanycountriesmakesignificantsocial,political,andeconomicalgains,thereremainsaschoolofthoughtthatU.S.policyleftmanycountriesworseoff,expandedterroristgroups,andresultedinaresurgenceofmorelethaljihadists.Theintentionofthispaperisnottoexpandonthisperspec-tiveof“blameAmericafirst.”WhiletherehavebeenflawsinU.S.policiesandimperfectionsinthewaythatthemissionshavebeencarriedout,U.S.interventionshaveresultedinenormoushumanitarian,economic,political,andsecuritygainsinmanycountriesaroundtheworld.ButU.S.foreignpolicycouldhaveperformedbetter.Goingforward,itmustdrawonlessonslearnedfrommissionsthatdidnotsecureU.S.interestsinthepastinordertobemoreeffectiveinthefuture.TheUnitedStatesremainsasoneoftheworld’smostpowerfulandinflu-entialcountriesdespiteitspost-9/11foreignpolicyshortcomings.TherearenumerousunderlyingfactorsthatprolongedthewarsinwhichtheU.S.intervenedtodefeatterrorismincluding:(1)Shiftingobjectivesthatwerenotcommensuratewiththeallocatedresources;(2)animbalanceofends,ways,andmeans;(3)lackofcommitmenttoalong-termstrategy;poorimplementationofthestrategytoachieveobjectives;(5)U.S.overconfidenceintakingonalarge-scalestatebuildingeffortswithoutadequateresourcesandtools;(6)conflictingdiplomaticandmilitarypoli-cies;(7)flawedassumptionsandmisjudgments;(8)thetendencytopursueshortandmid-termgainsinlieuoflong-termstrategicsuccess;(9)lackofproperunderstandingtheoperationalenvironmentandtheenemy;(10)underestimatingofthesocio-economic,historical,andculturalfeaturesoftheinvadedstate;(11)adesiretobuildWestern-styleinstitutionsdifficulttosustaininthehostnation;(12)Afailuretoapplylessonslearnedfromothersimilarmissions;and(13)theinabilitytocurbthedestructiveinflu-encesofregionalactors.EasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistanToaccountfortheselessonsfromthewarsofthepasttwodecades,thispaperpresentsthefollowingpolicyrecommendationstoguidetheU.S.futuredecisionsaboutwhenandhowtoengageonthreatsofterrorismabroad.Theserecommendationsmustbeimplementedinanintegrated,coherent,andbalancedmannersuchthattheywouldrevampdeficienciesofexistingstrategiesandprovideasetofU.S.actionsthatcouldbelesscostlyintermsofresourcesandrisktoAmericanlives.Re-envisiontheCounterterrorismStrategy—Investresourcestomitigatetheconsequencesofterrorismbeforeaconflictarises.TheareasoffocusforsuchcounterterrorismstrategyshouldincludeidentifyingandprioritizingfragilestateswhosevulnerabilitiesposeasignificantstrategicthreattoU.S.interests.Onceithasdoneso,theU.S.shoulddeterminewhetherthatstateisconducivetoassistanceandcommittedtoimprovingitsstability.TheU.S.shoulddeveloptrustandaworkingrelationshipwiththehostnationtodetectandunderstandemergingthreatsandallocateappropriateresourcestosuppressthethreat.TheU.S.shouldworkcloselywiththehostnationstoidentifyandeliminateterroristleaders.Finally,U.S.policyshouldencouragesocioeconomicreformstoemboldenthegovernanceofhostnationsandincentivizethelocalpopulationtorejectthepresenceofterroristgroups.EnsurePoliciesareBasedonHierarchyofNationalInterest—TheU.S.“whole-of-government”shouldidentifyandadoptacommonhierarchyofnationalintereststoguideitsdecisions.ThesenationalinterestswillguideinvestmentdecisionsinadisciplinedandfocusedwayandwillhelptheU.S.avoidtryingtoaddresseverythreatandeveryconflict.Insteaditcantraceitsgoaltoanultimateend,withthewaysandmeanstoachieveitdefined.ThispaperrecommendsthefollowingseventiersofU.S.nationalinteresttoundergirdforeignpolicydecisions:1)preventanddeterattacksonU.S.homeland,Americans,andallies,2)protectU.S.democracyathome,3)preventproliferationofWMD,especiallyinregionsoccupiedbyroguestatesthatarecontrolledorabouttobecontrolledbyterroristgroups,4)establishproductivecounterterrorismrelationshipswithregionalallies,consistentwithAmericannationalinterests,5)ensuretheviabilityandstabilityofBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool 3majorglobalsystemsincludingtrade,financialmarkets,energyandsuppliesofgoodsandservices,6)preventtheemergenceofmajorpowersthatareorcouldbeaggressivetowardtheU.S.,7)promotehumanrights,andwherefeasibledemocracy.Lastly,theU.S.needstofocusitsresourcesonlyonthehighestprioritychallenges.EmphasizeandResourceDiplomaticandEconomicInstrumentsofPower—AlthoughtheUnitedStatesreservestherighttousemil-itaryforcetokillorcaptureindividualsandgroupswhothreatenAmericaninterests,diplomaticandeconomictoolsofnationalpowermustbethoroughlyconsidered,resourced,andemployed.ShouldtheUnitedStatesdecidetousemilitaryforceinsupportofforeignpolicyobjectives,themilitarycomponentofthestrategyshouldbepartofanintegrated,coherent,andsynchronizedpolicyacrosstheU.S.governmentandwithpartnernations.U.S.policyshouldencouragepoliticalreformsthatestablishrelevantrulesoflaw,enforceaccountability,encouragenationalunity,andprovideforthesecurityandbasicneedsofthehostnation’scitizens.U.S.policyshouldfocusonpartneringwiththeinternationalcommunitytocreateeffectiveandsustainableeconomicgrowthprogramssuchasimprovingjobopportunities,increasingaccesstosomeformofhealthcare,advancingthemeansoftransportationbybuildingroads,andenablingmeansofcommunicationbyestablish-ingmobilecompanies.Thismeansthebudgetsforthoseagencies,especiallyfortheU.S.StateDepartment,mustbemorerobust.EmployEffectiveCommunicationPlan—TheU.Sgovernmentshouldadoptaclearstrategicmessagingandcommunicationstrategywheneveritdecidestomakeanimportantforeignpolicydecision.Internationalanddomesticaudiencesareimportant.Aclearcommunicationstrategywillpreventunnecessaryambiguityandprovideconsistentmessagingtoallrelevantstakeholderstopreventmisunderstandings,increasetrustandconfidence,andkeeptheAmericanpeopleawareofthereasonsforthesacrificesandinvestmentsmadeduringthemanywarstheUnitedStateshasengagedin.MonitorProgressofPolicyandAdaptasNeeded—TheU.S.foreignpolicyshouldputinplacemechanismstomonitorandEasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistanevaluatetheeffectivenessofimplementedstrategiesinordertodeterminewhetherU.S.objectivesarebeingachieved.Iftheyarenot,thenthepolicymustbeadjustedtoimprovefutureprogramperformance.Thepolicyshouldincludedatacollection,evaluationandanalysisplans,andrecommendationsfromtheseevaluations.ShouldtheU.S.engageinforeignconflicts,U.S.policymustensurethatassessmentandmonitoringofprogressisbeingmadeandcommunicatedtotheU.S.CongressandtheAmericanpublictotheextentfeasiblealongwithsupportingdata.Assessmentsmustbeclear-eyed,transparentandnon-political.Changesinstrategymustbemadecourageouslywhenassessmentsshowpoliciesarenolongerworking.InvestinPartner-FocusedRegionalSecurityArchitecture—TheU.S.policycouldpursueregionalsecurityarchitectures,whilemaintainingminimalmilitarypresencethatisreadyforintervention,ifnecessary,toprotectU.S.interests.Theseregionalsecurityarchitec-turesshouldhelptheU.S.defineitsnationalinterestsineachregion.Eachregion’sarchitecturemustbepredicatedonpromotingsharedmutualinterestsbetweenallstakeholdersandleveragethemultipolarbalanceofpower,inwhichregionalpowerstakeresponsibilityandsharetheburdentodeteraggressionbyrivals.EventhoughtheU.S.hasSenateapprovedallianceswithcertaincountries,whilenotwithothers,U.S.policyshouldactivelyengageallcountriesineachregion,includingthoseregardedasadversaries.Ournationalinterestsalignwithsomenationswhiletheydonotwithothers.TheU.S.shouldseekconstructiverelationshipwithallnationsineachregionwhilerecognizingthatourrelationshipwitheachcountrywillbeuniquebasedonhowwellournationalinterestsalign.ThispolicyislessdependentonU.S.maintenanceofbalanceofpowerbyheavymili-tarypresence,militaryassistance,andarmssales,andmorereliantonregionaldiplomacy.Insummary,theUnitedStatesmustcontinuetosecureitsinterestsgloballyandemployitsmilitarywhennecessarytoprotectanddefenditshomelandandtheAmericanpeople.TheU.S.shouldneverforgoitsaspirationstoexpanddemocracy,reinforcehumanrights,andpromotefreemarketcap-italism.Tomeetourforeignpolicyobjectives,however,theU.S.mustexertBelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool 5effectivediplomacy,modestlyapplyfinancialaid,employtheU.S.military,asnecessary,aspartofanintegratedandcoherentstrategy,andensurethattheU.S.civilianandmilitarylinesofeffortareeffectivelycoordinated.AsopposedtoengagingtheU.S.militaryasalastresort,U.S.foreignpolicymustidentifythepropermilitarydimensionofthethreat,andtailorthemilitarydimensionofthesolutioninthecontextofamorebalancedandintegrativeapproachthatusesallthetoolsofnationalpower.WhenU.S.militaryforceisused,itshouldbeemployedinwaysthatguaranteeshighprobabilityofsuccess,inaccordancewithlawofarmedconflict,andiscon-sideredaspartofanintegratedpoliticalaswellasmilitaryapproach.TheU.S.foreignpolicymustrecognizeAmerica’slimitswithhumilitybasedonitscurrentrestrainedresourceenvironment,emergingglobalthreats,andrisingchallengesinsideandoutsideitsborders.WhileU.S.foreignpolicyshiftstowardsaddressingtheGreatPowerCompetition,terroristorganizationscontinuetopresentapersistentthreattoU.S.nationalinterests.LackofU.S.involvementinstagingcon-flictsagainstterrorismcouldincreasethechancestheycouldspinoutofcontrolandbecomeacostlythreattoU.S.interests.TheU.S.shouldcertainlynotengageineveryconflictaroundtheworld,however,itmustsystematicallyassesstheconsequencesofitsinactiontoU.S.corevaluesandinterests.TheU.S.shouldacceptwithhumilityitsinabilitytofullyeliminateterrorism.Specifically,U.S.policymustbalance“ends,ways,andmeans;”establishclearandachievableobjectives;adoptefficient,effective,andresource-sustainablestrategies;ensuresynchronizationofdiplomaticandmilitaryefforts;buildalliancestosharetheburdenofcounteringter-rorism;andleveragecooperativemechanismsandregionalpartnershipstoincreasethecapacityandwillingnessofregionalstatestodefendtheirsovereigntyandcontributetomultinationalcoalitionsagainstterrorism.Abalanced,integrated,andsynchronizedstrategyencompassingdefense,diplomacy,economic,andhumanitarianassistancelinesofeffortshouldbecornerstoneofarevampedforeignpolicyinthecomingdecades.EasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistanU.S.ForeignPolicyPost-ColdWarThedefeatoftheSovietUnionintheColdWarlefttheUnitedStateswithunprecedentedandunchallengedpowerandprimacy.Inthesucceedingdecades,theU.S.chosetoutilizethatpowerinmannerthatbrokethepat-ternoftheforeignpolicyofthepreviousdecades.2ManypolicyanalystscontendthattheprimaryfocusofU.S.foreignpolicyduringtheColdWarwastodefendtheWest.However,afterpostdissolutionoftheSovietUnion,U.S.foreignpolicyfocusedonexpansionofWesternideologies,andwell-intentionedsociopoliticaltransformationandgovernanceeffortsofothercountries.3TheterroristattacksofSeptember112001furthershapedU.S.foreignpolicyinthedecadesthatfollowedascounterterrorismeffortsbecamethenation’shighestpriority.Althoughthemilitarymissionspriorto9/11inSomalia,Haiti,Bosnia,andKosovowereinitiallyintendedtoprovidehumanitarianaid,militaryinter-ventionspost9/11wereaimedtodefendtheUnitedStatesandprotectitfromanothercatastrophicterroristattack.Post9/11interventionsevolvedintopolitical,economic,andsocietaltransformationsofforeignstates.Thevastmilitaryandeconomicpower,andtheabsenceofathreateningrivalempoweredU.S.foreignpolicytoembarkinvarietyofwell-intendedmis-sions.TheU.S.foreignpolicysoughttoprotecthumanrightsandrescueothercountries,suchasinthecaseoftheGulfWarof1991,andexpandedinitiallyestablishedwarmissionstoattempttomakeothercountriesdem-ocraticstatesinplaceswhereU.S.’svitalinterestswerenotalwaysatstake.4ThecourseofU.S.foreignpolicysincetheterroristattacksof9/11entangledtheU.S.innumerousprotractedandexhaustingwarsagainstterrorismthathavefailedtoachievetheU.S.desiredend-states,despiteisolatedsuccessesandtheexceptionofpreventinganother9/11,canMichaelMandelbaum,MissionFailure:AmericaandtheWorldinthePost-ColdWarEra(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),2.StephenM.Walt,“America’sForeverWarsHaveComeBackHome,”ForeignPolicy,March3,2021,https:///2021/03/03/americas-forever-wars-have-come-back-home/;Mandelbaum,MissionFailure,5.CarlosLozada,“WhyAmericaIsTerribleatMakingtheWorldaBetterPlace,”WashingtonPost,April21,2016,/news/book-party/wp/2016/04/21/why-america-is-terrible-at-making-the-world-a-better-place/.BelferCenterforScienceandInternationalAffairs|HarvardKennedySchool 7beattributedtotherepeatingcommonerrors.TheU.S.foreignpolicybecamefocusedonaddressingtheworld’sterrorismthreatsinordertopreventtherecurrenceofanother9/11attackontheUnitedStates.Todoso,Washingtonembarkedonmissionstotopplecorruptleaders,remedycausesoftransnationalterrorism,democratizefragilestates,secureungov-ernedspacesvulnerabletobecomingterroristsafehavens,andestablishwestern-styleinstitutions.Washingtonremainsentangledmanyglobalwarsonterrorwithoutadefiniteend.ThispaperexaminesacasetoidentifyerrorsinU.S.policiesinawaragainstterrorismthathaslargelybeenunsuccessful.UsingAfghanistanasacasestudy,thispaperidentifiestheinconsistencies,contradictions,gaps,andpoorimplementationsofvariousU.S.Administration’spoliciesthathaveentrenchedtheU.S.inaprotractedtwodecadewaragainstterrorismwithoutsecuringitsinterestsandachievingitsenvisionedgoals.ThispaperwillrecommendpoliciesthatwouldimproveU.S.’sstrategiccompetencetoprevailinfuturewars,especiallyagainstauthoritarianpowersandtransna-tionalterroristgroups.WhileU.S.foreignpolicyhaspreventedanotherlarge-scaleterroristattackonU.S.soilafter9/11,thereisaschoolofthoughtthatbelievesthatU.S.policyleftmanycountriesworseoff,expandedterroristgroups,andresultedinaresurgenceofmoreviolentandlethaljihadists.Expandingonthisperspectiveof“blameAmericafirst”isnottheintentionofthispaper.WhiletherewereflawsinU.S.policyandimperfectionsinthewaythatthemissionshavebeencarriedout,U.S.interventionshaveresultedinenormoushumanitarian,economic,political,andsecuritygainsinmanycountriesaroundtheworld.EasiertoGetintoWarThantoGetOut:TheCaseofAfghanistan1.1 TheImportanceofLessonsLearnedfromPost9/11U.S.PolicyThemostimperativereasontodrawlessonslearnedfromU.S.foreignpolicythatentangledU.S.inexhaustiveandprolonged,costly,open-endedwarsonterrorwithoutachievingitsmissionistopreventfuturecostlyandprotractedwarsthatdepleteourcapacitytoadvanceandsecureournationalinterests.Identifyingflaws,failures,andmistakeswillenablepolicymakerstomakemoreeffectivedecisionstoachievepoliticalandmilitaryobjectivesinlinewithU.S.interestsinfutureconflicts,definitivelyattainmissionsuccess,andhonorAmerica’ssacrifices.Giventhatdefeatingterrorismhasproventobeimpossible,reformingU.S.policytomitigatetheirconsequencesontheUnitedStatesanditsalliesistheonlylong-termsolution.Further,improvingU.S.waronterrorpoliciesbasedonlessonslearnedwillimprovetheirperformance,leadtothedesiredU.S.outcomes,andavoidfurthertarnishingofAmerica’sreputation,credibility,andcompetencetoshapeworldevents.Despitetrillionsofdollarsspentandthousandsofliveslost,theIraqandAfghanistanwarsservedtoerodetheU.S.military’srep-utationasacompetentforce.TheU.S.wasunabletopermanentlydestroyterroristorganizationswithinferiorandunsophisticatedweaponryorsymmetriccapabilities.Theseorganizationswonthebattleforheartsandmindsthroughsuperioruseofmediaandpropaganda.Theyprovedquiteastuteinfinancingtheiroperationsandfightingaworldpower.Additionally,itisimportanttoidentify,andcorrectpolicyflawstoensurethatfutureapplicationsofsuchpoliciesdonotworsenglobalproblems.FlawsinU.Spolicysincetheterroristattackof9/11areviewedbysometohaveaggravatedcertainproblems.ThereiswideperceptionamongmanyAmericansthatoppositiontoU.S.policyhasdrivenanti-Americanism,deteriorationinworldwidedemocracy,fueledcivilwars,andexpandedextremistideologies.5Lastly,