关于在5G网络中使用卫星的四个国家安全问题-38正式版

Science&TechnologyInnovationProgramScienceandTechnologyInnovationProgramImagesource:Byktsdesign/Shutterstock,comAuthorsSeizingOpportunities:MelissaK.GriffithSeniorProgramAssociate,TheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholarsFourNationalSecurityQuestionstoAskAbouttheUseofSatellitesin5GNetworksChristopherM.HockingLieutenantColonel,U.S.AirForceSeptember2021AcknowledgementsAsacontributiontotwoinitiatives(TheWilsonCenter’s5GBeyondBordersandtheScienceandTechnologyInnovationProgram’sAcrossKarman),thispolicybriefaddressesthreepressingnationalsecurityconcernsrelatedtocriticalinfrastructureprotection:space,telecommunications,andcybersecurity.SpecialthanksgototheScienceandTechnologyInnovationProgram(STIP)andtoMegKing,ElizabethNewbury,andSophieGoguichvilifortheirfeedbackandcommentsthroughouttheeditingprocess.WealsooweadebtofgratitudetoEricBurger,JenniferManner,BryanTipton,andthemanyindividualswhosharedtheirexperiences,expertise,andinsightswithusoverthecourseofthisproject.ExecutiveSummaryInordertodeliveronthefullpromiseofthefifthgenerationofmobile(5G)networks(nearubiquitous,instantaneouscoverageforamassivenumberofconnecteddevices),satelliteswillneedtoplayafarmorecentralrolewithintelecommunicationsnetworksgoingforwardwithbothterrestrialandspace-basedcomponentsworkingintandemforawiderdiversityoffunctions.Giventheevolutionofthesatelliteindustry,bothintermsofbusinessmodelsandtechnology,thatgreaterroleisnowincreasinglypossible.Yet,whilemuchofthefocusonthenationalsecurityimplicationsof5GtodateintheUnitedStatesandabroadhasbeenontheterrestrialcomponentsofthesenetworks(e.g.InternetofThings(IoT)andmobiledevices,radioheadsandtowers,fiber,thecorenetwork,etc.),thepotentialroleofsatellitecommunicationssystemsinthesenetworkshasbeenlargelyoverlookedand/orpoorlymisunderstood.Whatsteps,therefore,shouldweprioritizetodaytoensuregreatersecurityandresilienceof5Gnetworksnowandinthefuture?Putanotherway:ifyouareapolicymakerconcernedwiththepotentialdata-centricnationalsecurityrisksassociatedwithrelianceonsatellitesegmentsby5Gtelecommunicationsnetworks,whatquestionsshouldyouaskandwhydotheanswerstothosequestionsmatter?ꢀ2TABLEOFCONTENTSIntroduction475GandNationalSecurity:WhyWorry?TheRoleofSatellitesin5GNetworks89WhenWeSay“Satellites,”WhatDoWeMean?HowHastheRoleofSatellitesinTelecommunicationsNetworksEvolvedOverTime?WhatPurposeCouldSatellitesServein5GNetworks?1116Satellites,the(NotSo)NovelCriticalInfrastructureProblemWorried?FourQuestionstoAsk1820Q1-Criticality:WhoDependsonaParticularSatelliteSystem(NowandintheFuture),toWhatDegree,andforWhatPurposes?212427Q2-PhysicalArchitecture:WhatDoestheGroundTeleportInfrastructureandLaunchCapabilitiesLookLike,andWhereAreTheyLocated?Q3-DataandDigitalSystems:HowDoestheSystemProtecttheDataItIsMovingandEnsureThattheDataKeepsMovingReliably?Q4-SupplyChains:Which,andHowMany,VendorsComprisetheSatelliteSystem’s(HardwareandSoftware)SupplyChain?31333536ConclusionAbouttheAuthorsReferences3IntroductionForthepromiseofthefifthgenerationofmobilenetworks(5G)tobefullyrealized(i.e.nearlyubiquitous,instantaneous,connectivityforlargenumbersofdevicesglobally),terrestrialtelecommunicationssystems,whichheavilyrelyonburiedfiberopticcables,willnotbeenough.1Instead,wewillneedtomovefrom(a)largelyseparatesatelliteandterrestrialcommunicationssystemswithsatellitesusedprimarilyforsolving“thelastmile”problem(areaswherelayingfiberwasaphysicaloreconomicchallenge)orfordiscreteusecases(e.g.processingcreditcardpaymentsatagasstation)to(b)anintegrated5G‘networkofnetworks’wheresatellitesplayanincreasingrolealongsideterrestrialnetworks.Whyis5GImportant?“5Gisacorefoundationuponwhichmodernsocieties—theireconomiesꢀandtheirmilitariesalike—willrest.ꢀ[Thisnetworkofnetworks]willbeessentialtohowindustriescompeteandgeneratevalue,howpeoplecommunicateandinteract,andhowmilitariespursuesecurityꢀfortheircitizenry.5Gispotentiallyoneofthemostimportantnetworksofthe21stcentury.Itistheveryꢀdefinitionofcriticalinfrastructure.”—excerptfrom“5GandSecurity:ThereisMoretoWorryaboutthanHuawei”(Griffith,2019)Why?Whiletheutilityofsatellitecommunicationsismorelimitedwithincitiesandincity-to-citycommunications(areaswherefiberandWIFIalreadydominateandthelinesofsightnecessaryforsatellitesaresignificantlyreduced),integratingsatelliteandterrestrialsystemswillbenecessarytomeetthefullspectrumoffuturedemandslikelytobeplacedon5Gnetworks.Theseinclude1.increasingtrafficandnumberofconnectionsoutsideofdensecitycentersinmoreruralandremoteareaswiththeproliferationofInternetofThings(IoT)devices,2.providingcoveragefordevicesonthemove(suchasashipatseaoracardrivingacrosstheUnitedStates),and3.processinganddatacachingpushingprogressivelycloserandclosertothenetworks’edge(i.e.edgecomputing)2andfartherawayfromareasofdensefiberavailability.12Theexactratiobetweenterrestrialandsatellitesystemsneededtorealizethefullpotentialof5Gremainsanopenquestion.Theanswerwilldependonavarietyoffactorsincludinggovernmentincentives(e.g.infrastructuresupporttolayfiber),thebusinessmodelsthatareemergingandcontinuetoevolveinthesatellitespace,thepreferencesof(orbusinessdecisionsundertakenby)networkproviders,themarketdynamicsofandexistinginfrastructureinthearea(ratioswilldifferbylocalityaswellascountrytocountry),theevolutionanddemandsofusecases(many5Gusecaseshavenotyetbeenfullyrealizedorimagined),etc.Edgecomputingreduceslatencybybringingcomputeandstoragecapabilitiesclosertotheend-user(theirdevicesandapplications).Thismigrationoffunctionalityisachievedbyleveragingcloudcomputingmodelsandotherinnovationsintheradioaccessnetwork(RAN)toshiftcomputingapplicationswithinortotheboundaryofanoperator’snetwork.4Take,forexample,theconnectivityneedsofmobility.Ifyoudisconnectamobileasset(car,truck,plane,drone,ship)fromthefibernetwork,youcanstillkeepitconnectedbyWIFIandterrestrial5Ginfrastructuresolongasitisinorisincloseproximitytocities.Butasyoumovetomoreruralandremoteareas,onlysatellitecommunication(SATCOM)hasthepotentialtoprovidereliablecoverageandsufficientdatadensity.Asthenumber,uses,andrequirementsofconnectivitycontinuetoevolve,sodoestheimportanceofextendingthepromiseof5Gnetworksbeyondtheurbananddenselynetworkedcommunities.Tomeetthesedemands,satelliteswillneedtoserveadiversityofpurposesrangingfromthe“lastmile”problemtoconnectionsonthemove,redundancyforcriticalemergencyservices,edgenetworking,andIoTdensetrafficareasoutsideofthealreadyhighlynetworkedcities.Asthenumber,uses,andInshort,satelliteswillplayakeyroleindeterminingourcollective5Gfuture.Howweintegrateterrestrialandspace-basedrequirementsofconnectivitycontinuetoevolve,sodoestheimportanceofextendingthepromiseof5Gnetworksbeyondtheurbananddenselynetworkedcommunities.componentswilldeterminethetypeanddegreeofconnectivity5GnetworksenableinpracticeacrosstheUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld,ratherthanwhattheycouldhaveenabledintheory.Asaconsequence,5Grepresentsmorethanjustanimportantshiftin(a)thepossibilitiesfor,(b)functionsof,and(c)thehardware-softwareinterplayinmobiletelecommunicationsnetworksaswemovedfromlegacygenerationssuchas3Gandmoremoderngenerationslike4GLTEandnowto5G.5Galsorepresentsanopportunityforashiftintherelationshipbetweenterrestrialandspace-basedcommunicationssystemsmorebroadly.And,importantly,forthefirsttime,anevolutionoftheunderpinningtechnology(primarilysatelliteandlaunchtechnology)andthebusinessmodelsofsatellitecompanies(includingsatellitessystemsasaservice)makesthisintegrationbothtechnicallypossibleandeconomicallyfeasible.ThisshiftcanbeseentodaybytheemergenceofcompanieslikeSpaceX,OneWeb,ASTSpaceMobile,andProjectKupier,whoseektocreatedisruptivebusinessmodelsinlowearthorbit(LEO),aswellasmoretraditionalgeosynchronous(GSO)providerslikeTelesatandViaSatwhoareadaptingtheirinfrastructureandsatellitecapabilitiestocompeteformarketsharewiththeproliferatedLEOproviders.ADiversityofBusinessModelsNotably,thereareadiversityofbusinessmodelsemerginginthisspace.SpaceXfeaturesaconsumer-focusedbroadbandservicewithStarlink,AST&Sciencehasspecializedinsatellite-to-smartphonewithASTSpaceMobile,OneWebandTelesatofferenterprise-focusednetworks,AWSGroundStationprovidesgroundstationsasaservicetosupportcustomers’satellitesinorbit,andLockheedMartinandOmnispacehavefocusedtheireffortsondevelopingahybridnetworkforbothcommercialandgovernmentcustomers.5Thisconvergencebetweenterrestrialandspace-basedtelecommunicationsnetworksfor5Gisnotmerelyhypothetical.Earlierthisyear(2021),LockheedMartin’sspacedivisionannouncedastrategicpartnershipwithsatellitestart-upOmnispacetojointlybuildoutaspace-based5Gnetwork.Theirhybridnetworkseekstocombinesatelliteandmobilewirelesscarriernetworkstocreate“aglobal5Gnetwork,whichenablesuserstoseamlesslytransitionbetweenthesatellite[andthe]terrestrialnetwork”(Sheetz,2021).Notably,thishybridnetworkwouldbethefirstintegrated5Gplatformforcommercialandgovernmentusefeaturingspace-basedandterrestrialnetworkarchitectures(“LockheedMartinandOmnispaceExploreSpace-Based5GGlobalNetwork,”2021).Takentogether,thesethreefactors-(i)evolvingsatellitesystemtechnologyand(ii)businessmodelscoupledwith(iii)growingdemandforbandwidth-makeitpossible(thoughnotinevitable)forsatellitestohaveanincreasingroleintelecommunicationsnetworksingeneraland5Gnetworksinparticular(Daehnick,Klinghoffer,&Wiseman,2020).5GrepresentsanopportunityforashiftintherelationshipYet,muchofourfocusonthenationalsecurityimplicationsof5GbetweenterrestrialandtodateintheUnitedStatesandabroadhasbeenontheterrestrialcomponentsofthesenetworks:IoTandmobiledevices,radiospace-basedcommunicationssystemsmorebroadly.headsandtowers,fiber,thecorenetwork,etc.While5Gisbestunderstoodasa‘networkofnetworks’,manyhaveoverlookedorareunawarethatsuchanetworkofnetworkscan,andshould,includesatellites.Assuch,forthoseofusconcernedwithaddressingnationalsecurityconcernsassociatedwiththiscriticalinfrastructurenowandinthefuture,satellitesystemsrequireadditionalattentionandscrutiny(Griffith,2019).Giventheirpotentialroleas“oneofthemostimportantnetworksofthe21stcentury”and“theverydefinitionofcriticalinfrastructure,”wecannolongeraffordtofocusourattentionsolelyonbuildingsatellitesthatcansurvivelaunch,initialoperations,andalonglifecycleinanhostilephysicalenvironment(Griffith,2019).Thesecurity,resilience,anddefensibilityofthesesystemsagainstpotentialmaliciousactorsovertimeisofequalimport.Giventhatadversaries,orpeercompetitors,increasinglyviewspaceasadomainofconflictandthatourcommunicationscriticalinfrastructure(like5G)willrelyonsatellites,thedependabilityofthesesystems(bothintermsoftheircontinuedfunctioningandtheconfidentiality,integrity,andavailabilityofdatatraversingthesesystems)inthefaceofpotentialmaliciousactivitycannolongeraffordtobeanafterthoughtorabsentfromourbroadercriticalinfrastructureconversations(“ChallengestoSecurityinSpace,”2019).LookingforaPrimeron5G?Foradditionalinformationandresourceson5Gnetworks,referto5G..Thereyoucanfindanoverviewof5GnetworksaswellasdeeperdivesintotheglobalandNorthAmericanstateofplay,technicalstandardssuchasOpenRAN,andtherelationshipbetween5Gnetworksandgreatpowercompetition.6Yet,legacysatellitesystemsarenotoriouslyinsecure(King&Goguichvili,2020).Manyofthesystembusses3usedoverthepastdecadeswereproductsofafocusonsurvivingtherigorsofspace—notorientedaroundthepervasivecybersecuritythreatswefacetodayandwillfaceinthefuture.ꢀDuetolaunchcosts,traditionalsatelliteswere,andstillare,designedforexceptionalresilienceandsurvivabilityinthemostunforgivingenvironmentknowntohumansoverlongperiodsoftime.Thisdrovetheprioritizationofredundancy,continuedperformancedespiteplannedhardwaredegradation,andotherspace-uniquedesignconsiderationsoverallelse.However,eveninnewersatellitesystems,securitycanoftenbeanafterthought,andalimitedoneatthat,ratherthanbakedintotheinitialdesign,deployment,andmaintenanceofthesesystems(Baileyetal.,2019).…ifyouareapolicymakerWhatsteps,therefore,shouldweprioritizetodaytoensuregreatersecurityandresilienceof5Gnetworks—theirterrestrialandspace-basedarchitectures—nowandinthefuture?ꢀconcernedwiththepotentialdata-centricnationalsecurityrisksassociatedwithrelianceonsatellitesegmentsby5Gtelecommunicationsnetworks,whatquestionsshouldyouaskPutanotherway:ifyouareapolicymakerconcernedwiththepotentialdata-centricnationalsecurityrisksassociatedwithrelianceonsatellitesegmentsby5Gtelecommunicationsnetworks,whatquestionsshouldyouaskandwhydotheanswerstothoseandwhydotheanswerstoquestionsmatter?ꢀthosequestionsmatter?Thispublicationservestwofunctions.First,weprovideanoverviewfortheshiftingroleofsatelliteswithinmobiletelecommunication,includinghowthisshiftispossibletodayandwhyitisnecessary.Wethenprovideabasicframeworkforstakeholdersofallsortstoaskquestionsofthesecurity,operations,andinfrastructureofnascent5Gnetworksandthesatellitesystemsthatsupportthemas5Gdriveshyperconvergenceoftelecommunications,satellitecommunications,andcloudcomputing.5GandNationalSecurity:WhyWorry?WhyshouldtheUnitedStatescareaboutthereliabilityandsecurityof5Gnetworks,includingsatellitecomponentsofthesenetworks?Theshortanswer:5Gisthecriticalinfrastructureofthefutureandincreasinglythecriticalinfrastructureofthenow.Morespecifically:whilecommunicationsservean“enablingfunction”forothercriticalinfrastructureandservices,giventhetransformativefunctionsof5Gnetworksandtheuse-casesthesefunctionswillfacilitate,telecommunicationswill,becomeevenmorefoundationaltothedailyoperationsofgovernments,companies,andsocieties.Inshort,5Gnetworkswillonlyincreasethescaleandcharacterofthat“enablingfunction.”AsdiscussedinmoredetailinapreviousSTIPpolicybriefentitled“BalancingthePromiseandthePerilof5G:TheStateofPlayintheUnitedStates”(Griffith,2021a):3Satellitesarecomprisedofapayloadandabus.Thepayloadismissionspecificanddiffersfromsatellitetosatellite(i.e.theequipmentnecessarytoperformitsspecificpurposesuchascommunications).Thebusprovidestheessentialfunctionality(i.e.electricalpower,electronics,andpropulsion)enablingthemissionpayload.7Threatstocriticalinfrastructureingeneral,andcommunicationsinparticular,arenotmerelytheoretical.Fromthevantageofnationalsecurity,thesesectorscanfallvictimtotwobroadcategoriesofmaliciousoperations:espionageoperationsanddisruptiveordestructiveoperations.Espionageoperationsfocusonthegatheringofintelligencebutnottheinterruptionordestructionofinfrastructure.Inotherwords,thesetypesofoperationsunderminetheconfidentialityofdatawithinsystemsbutnottheintegrityoravailabilityofthosesystems.Espionageoperationshavelongtargetedcommunicationsnetworksasatreasuretroveofinformation.Lookingto5Ginparticular,bigdatafoundtraversingthesenetworksrepresentsanappealingopportunityforintelligencegatheringandintellectualproperty(IP)theft.Incontrast,disruptiveoperationsseektounderminetheintegrityandavailabilitybyeithertemporarilyincapacitatingsystemsordestroyingthemaltogether.Disruptionsof5Gnetworkshavethepotentialnotonlytocrippleahospital’straditionalcommunicationssystems,butalsoterminateorintroducepotentiallydeadlylagtimesintoaremote-accesssurgeryinthemiddleofanoperation.Factoryfloors,leveragingamyriadofconnecteddevicesandsensorsformanufacturing,couldgrindtoahaltandtheircorrespondingsafety-criticalsystems(e.g.safetyinstrumentedsystems(SIS))couldbemanipulatedintounsafestates.Inaworldoffullyautomatedcars,suddenincreasesinlatencycanleadtophysicalcrashes.Ultimately,giventheimportanceofreliability,speed,lowlatency,andIoTfor5Guse-cases,smalldisruptionsin5Gnetworkscouldhaveoutsizedimpactsonthecyber-physicalsystemstheysupport.Notably,thetopicofthispaper–thesatellitecommunicationscomponentsof5Gnetworks–sitsatthenexusofnotonebuttwo“criticalenablers”:telecommunicationsandspace(inthiscase,theemergingregimeofproliferatedLEOsatellite)systems.Muchoftheworld’scriticalinfrastructure,includingcommunications,isheavilydependentonspace(suchasGPS)foritsdailyfunctioningandcommunicationsisnoexception(“ProtectingAmerica’sGlobalPositioningSystem”).A2013BBCarticlebyRichardHollinghamstrikinglydemonstratesthispointbyreflectingonwhatwouldhappenifallsatellitesstoppedworking:ahypothetical“daywithoutsatellites”(Hollingham).Thisdependency5Gisthecriticalinfrastructureofthefutureandincreasinglythecriticalinfrastructureofthenow.onsatellitesystemsisonlylikelytoincreasewiththedevelopmentanddeploymentof5Gnetworksandtheevolutionofthesatelliteindustry(bothintermsoftheunderlyingtechnologyandtheevolvingbusinessmodels).Thismakesactivelymitigatingnationalsecurityrisksrelatedto5GnetworksthatmayemanatefromortargetcommunicationsatellitesystemsanationalsecurityimperativefortheUnitedStates.Toeffectivelyassesscurrentandfutureeffortsinthisarea,however,requiresanuancedunderstandingoftheevolvingroleofsatellitesin5Gnetworks.TheRoleofSatellitesin5GNetworksWhatarethecomponentsofacommunicationsatellitesystem?Giventhosecomponents,howhavethesesystemsevolvedovertime?Giventhatevolution,whyarewelikelytoseeatransitionawayfromlargelydiscretetelecommunicationssystems(terrestrialvs.satellite)towardamoreintegratednetworkarchitectureaswebuildoutandseektofullyleverage5Gnetworks?8WhenWeSay“Satellites”,WhatDoWeMean?‘Satellites’isoftenusedasshorthandforsatellitesystems.Satellitesystemsconsistoffourbasicsegments:ground-basedassets,space-basedassets,linksbetweenelements(i.e.uplinks,downlinks,andcrosslinks),andconnectionpointstoothernetworksordevices(theusersorcustomersofthesesystems).SPACE-BASEDASSETSCROSSLINKSUPLINKSANDDOWNLINKSCONNECTIONPOINTSTOOTHERNETWORKSANDDEVICESGROUND-BASEDASSETSFigure1.Anatomyofasatellitesystem.Ground-basedassetsareterrestrial(surface-basedfacilities)andincludegroundstationsandlaunchfacilities.Launchfacilitiesmakeitpossibletoputasatelliteintospaceandarehistoricallyoperatedbyacompanythatisdistinctfromthoseoperatingthesatellitesinpractice.Groundstationsarethebrainoftheentiresatellitenetworks.Theyserveascontrolsystemsforthesatellitesinorbitand,asaconsequence,ifsomethinggoeswrongwithasatelliteinspace,thepersonnelatthesestationswillbethefirsttoknowandinthebestpositiontocarryoutincidentresponse.Thesestationsprovidereal-timecommunicationswithsatellitesenablingtelemetry,tracking,andcontrol(TT&C)oversatellitenetworksaswellasmanaginguplinks(sendingradiosignalstothesatellite)anddownlinks(receivingdatatransmissionfromthesatellite).Whenpeoplehearsatellitesystems,itisoftenthesatellitethatstandsoutandtendstogarnerthemostattention.However,thesesatellitesareonlyeffectiveiftheyhavesomewheretosendandactontheirdata(i.e.ground-basedassets).ThiscommandandcontrolfunctioniswhytheSpaceSecurityChallenge’s2020Hack-A-Satfocusedonregainingcontrolofacompromisedsatellitefromthegroundstation(“Hack-A-Sat”).Space-basedassetsincludecommunicationsatellites(e.g.tosupport5Gnetworks)butalsoothertypesofsatellitethatsupportsystemssuchaspositioning,navigation,andtiming(PNT)(supportsGPS,EU’sGalileo,RussianGLONAS)andweathersatellites.Communicationsatellites,andsatellitesingeneral,arecomprisedofapayloadandabus.Thepayloadismissionspecificanddiffersfromsatellitetosatellite(i.e.theequipmentnecessarytoperform9itsspecificpurpose,suchascommunications).Thebusprovidestheessentialfunctionality(i.e.electricalpower,electronics,andpropulsion)enablingthemissionpayload.Inthecontextofcommunicationssatellites,themissionpayloadisthecommunicationspackageincludingantenna,content/datarouting,andwaveformmanagement.Inadditiontouplinksanddownlinksbetweenthesatelliteandthegroundstation,somesatelliteconstellationscanalsocommunicatewitheachother(crosslinks).Satellitesystemsarenotanislandinanduntothemselves.Theirutilityisintheirabilitytoconnectwiththeirusers.Connectionpointstoothernetworksanddevicescantakemanyforms.Inthecaseofservingas5Gbackhaul,forexample,satellitesystemswouldconnecttheRadioAccessNetwork(RAN)tothecorenetwork.4Bothofthoseconnections(theRANandcore)areendpointsforthesatellitesystem.InthecaseofincreasingconnectivityforIoTdevicesinanurbanarea,numerousIoTdevicesbecomeendpointsthatalsoneedtobemanagedandwhereinsecuritycanbeintroducedintothesatellitesystem.Notably,communicationsatellitescansupportcommercial,government,ormilitarypurposesandoftensatellitescansupportmultiplecommunitiesatthesametime.Forexample,accordingtoaDoDstudy,“commercialcommunicationssatelliteswereusedin45percentofallcommunicationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandthePersianGulfregionduringDesertShield/DesertStorm”(“CriticalInfrastructureProtection:CommercialSatelliteSecurityShouldbeMoreFullyAddressed,”2002a).Asanindustry,satellitesystemsaresupportedbyadiversesetofplayersacrossthehardwareandsoftwaresupplychain.Assummarizedina2002GAOreportonCriticalInfrastructureProtectionforcommercialsatellitesystems(“CriticalInfrastructureProtection:CommercialSatelliteSecurityShouldbeMoreFullyAddressed,”2002b):[t]hecommercialsatelliteindustryincludesmanufacturers,thelaunchindustry,serviceproviders,andgroundequipmentmanufacturers.Manufacturersdesignandbuildsatellites,supportingsystems,andgroundstations.Thelaunchindustryuseslaunchvehicles,poweredbyrocketengines,toplacesatellitesinorbit.Oncecommercialsatellitesareinorbit,theyareoperatedbyserviceproviders,wholeaseavailableservices.Now,twodecadeslater,theindustryhasevolvedtoalsoincludeverticallyintegratedproviders-suchasSpaceX,whichcurrentlyproduceseverythingontheoperationsside,fromtheirrocketstosoftwarefortheirsatellites,inhouse5-aswellasadiversityofusersrelyingonthesesystemsfortheirconnectivityneedsasservicepricesdroppedwiththeemergenceofsmallersatellitesandCubeSattechnology,whichspreadsthecostofalaunchacrossmanyusers.Inshort,thecommunicationsatelliteindustryecosystemiscomposedofandsupportedbyanarrayofvendors,operators,andusers.Thosevendorsandoperatorsspanground-basedassets,space-basedassets,linksbetweenthetwo,andconnectionpointstoothernetworksanddevices(thecustomers).Forthefifthgenerationoftelecommunications,thatecosystemwillbeincreasinglyintegratedwiththeterritorialnetworksthatfrequentlycometomindwhensomeonesays5G-cellulartowers;radioheads;fiber;servers;sensorsincars,hospitals,andfactories;aplethoraofmobiledevices;etc.–andtheirsupportingecosystems.45Foradetailedexplanationofthecomponentsofa5Gnetwork,refertoBalancingthePerilandPromiseathttps://5/publication/balancing-promise-and-peril-5g-state-play-united-states.SpaceXcurrentlymakesalmosteverythingin-houseratherthanbuyontheoperationsside(whichisseparatefromthecorporatesideofthecompany,suchasaccounting,wordprocessing,email,etc.).However,thatmake-buydecisionhasnotleanedtowardmakesimplyforthesakeofmakingthingsin-house.ItistheresultofSpaceXproducingmoreofthesevarioustechnologies(atthehardwareandsoftwarelayers)thananyoneelseforthekindsofusecasestheyneedthemfor.Theychangethosetechnologiesmoreoftenthananyoneisusedto,andalotofitisnovelinthefirstplace.Asaresult,fromabusinessperspective,itcurrentlymakesmoresensetobuildin-housethantobuyfromelsewhere.However,ifanyofthosefactorschanged,thesubsequentmake-buydecisioncouldchangeaswell.10HowhastheRoleofSatellitesinTelecommunicationsNetworksEvolvedoverTime?Historically,satelliteandterrestrialcommunicationsnetworksdevelopedseparatelyandwerelargelyisolatedfromeachother.Satelliteshavebeenusedforbackhaulintelecommunicationsnetworksforalmost30years.However,whilesatellitesofferedsignificantbandwidthcapacity(upwardsof1GB/s),thelatencywasextremelyhigh,andrequiredextensivephysicalinfrastructuretomovedata.Thisme