复旦经济学院讲义笔记和其他国际经贸高级英语

TEXTWithanaverageannualreturnof35percentover26years,GeorgeSoroshasearnedtherespect,andenvy,offellowinvestors.Herehegiveshisviewsonthegame.Doyouthinkyoudeservetobeconsideredoneoftheworld’sgreatestmoneymanagers?That’sagoodquestion.IhavetorecognizethatIam,infact,upthere.HowlongIwillstayupthereisanotherquestion.You’renotasactiveinmoneymanagementtodayasyouhavebeeninthepast.That’swhyIhaveachancetostayupthere.TheQuantumFundhasbeenoneofthemostsuccessfulinvestmententitiessincethebeginningoftime.Onethousanddollarsinvestedin1969wouldbeworthwellovertwomilliondollarstodayifdividendscouldhavebeenreinvested.WhatissospecialaboutQuantumFund?UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingUnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting

Yes.Itisaratherunusualstructure,becauseweuseleverage.Wepositionthefundtotakeadvantageoflargertrends--wecallthismacro-investing--andthen,withinthoselargertrendswealsopickstocksandstockgroups.IamnotsurewhetherIammakingmyselfclear.Let’ssayweuseourmoneytobuystocks.Wepay50percentincashandweborrowtheother50percent.Againstbondswecanborrowalotmore.For1000wecanbuyatleast$50000worthoflong-termbonds.Wemayalsosellstocksorbondsshort:weborrowthesecuritiesandsellthemwithoutowningtheminthehopeofbuyingthembacklatercheaper.Andalsoderivativesplayarole.Dotheynot?UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingLessthanpeoplesuppose.Wedouseindexfutures,sometimesforhedgingpurposes,sometimestogainmarketexposureeitheronthelongortheshortside.Wedon’tuseoptionsverymuchbecausewedon’tknowhowtofitthemintotheriskexposurewearewillingtolivewith.Whenyoubuyoptions,you’repayingtheprofessionalsaheftypremiumforprovidingyouwithaleveragethatwecancreatecheaperourselvesbyborrowingagainstoursecurities.Whatdoesthatmean?Fora$100million,howmuchwereyouborrowingonaverage?Thatisameaninglessfigurebecause$100millioninvestedinTreasurybillshasamuchdifferentriskfactorthan$100millioninvestedin30yearbonds.Wetrytosimplifythings.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingInthelasttwentyyears,therehasbeenalotofprogressmadeinmeasuringriskforinvestmentportfolios.Howhasthishelpedyou?Wedon’thavearealorscientificwaytomeasurerisk.Peoplewhoareinthederivativebusinesshaveveryelaborateriskcalculations.Weareamateurs.WeliveintheStoneAge.Deliberatelyso.Howwouldyoudescribeyourparticularstyleofinvesting?MypeculiarityisthatIdon’thaveaparticularstyleofinvestingor,moreexactly,Itrytochangemystyletofittheconditions.IfyoulookatthehistoryoftheFund,ithaschangeditscharactermanytimes.Forthefirsttenyears,itusedpracticallynomacroinstruments.Afterwards,macroinvestingbecamethedominanttheme.Butmorerecently,westartedinvestinginindustrialassets.Iwouldputitthisway:Idonotplayaccordingtoagivensetofrules;Ilookforchangesintherulesofthegame.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingYouhavetalkedaboutthe“joyofgoingagainsttheherd.”Whatsignsdoyoulookfortodeterminewhetheritistimetobuckthetrend?Iamverycautiousaboutgoingagainsttheherd;Iamliabletobetrampledon.Accordingtomytheoryofinitiallyself-reinforcing,buteventuallyself-defeatingtrends,thetrendisyourfriendmostoftheway;trendfollowersonlygethurtatinflectionpoints,wherethetrendchanges.MostofthetimeIamatrendfollower,butallthetimeIamawarethatIamamemberofaherdandIamonthelookoutforinflectionpoints.Theprevailingwisdomisthatmarketsarealwaysright.Itaketheoppositeposition.Iassumethatmarketsarealwayswrong.Evenifmyassumptionisoccasionallywrong,Iuseitasaworkinghypothesis.Mostofthetimewearepunishedifwegoagainstthetrend.Onlyataninflectionpointarewerewarded.Howdoyoufindoutwhenthingsaregoingwrong?UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingIfeelthepain.Irelyagreatdealonanimalinstincts.WhenIwasactivelyrunningtheFund,Isufferedfrombackache.Iusedtheonsetofacutepainasasignalthattherewassomethingwronginmyportfolio.Thebackachedidn’ttellmewhatwaswrong—youknow,lowerbackforshortpositions,leftshoulderforcurrencies—butitdidpromptmetolookforsomethingamisswhenImightnothavedonesootherwise.Thatisnotthemostscientificwaytorunaportfolio.Whatexactlyisyourinvestmentphilosophy?Themainideaisthatourunderstandingoftheworldinwhichweliveisinherentlyimperfect.Thesituationsweneedtounderstandinordertoreachourdecisionsareactuallyaffectedbythosedecisions.Ontheotherhand,peoplemakedecisionsthataffectrealityandthesedecisionsarebasednotonreality,butonpeople’sinterpretationofreality—Icallthistheparticipatingfunction.Thetwofunctionsworkinoppositedirectionsandincertaincircumstancestheycaninterferewitheachother.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingWhatistheroleoftheparticipants?Firstly,wemustunderstandthattheycannotconfinetheirthinkingtofacts.Theymusttakeintoaccountthethinkingofallparticipantsincludingthemselves.Thatintroducesanelementofuncertaintyinthesensethattheparticipants’thinkingdoesnotcorrespondtothefacts—yetithelpsshapethefacts.Thisismycoreidea.Everythingelsefollowsfromit.Canyougivesomeexamples?Usuallytheytaketheformofboom/bustsequences;slowlyacceleratingandthenculminatinginacatastrophicreversal.Butnotalways.Exampleshavebeentheconglomerateboomofthe1960s,theclassiccaseoftheRealEstateInvestmentTrusts,thegreatinternationallendingboomofthe1970sthatculminatedintheMexicancrisisof1982,andsoon.Canyouexplainyourboom/busttheory?UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingThefundamentalideaisthatmarketpricesareinfluencedbytheparticipants’bias.Ifthatwereall,itwouldbetooobvioustodiscuss.Aboom/bustprocessoccursonlywhenmarketpricesfindawaytoinfluencetheso-calledfundamentalsthataresupposedtobereflectedinmarketprices.Intheconglomerateboom,conglomeratesusedtheirovervaluedsharesascurrencytobuyearningswhich,inturn,servedtojustifytheovervaluation.Intheinternationallendingboom,banksusedso-calleddebtratiostomeasuretheborrowingcapacityofdebtorcountries,suchastheratioofthedebtoutstandingtotheGrossNationalProductortheratioofdebtservicetoexports.Theyconsideredthesedebtratiosasobjectivemeasures,butitturnedguttheywereinfluencedbytheirownactivities:forinstance,whentheystoppedlending,theGrossNationalProductdeteriorated,andsoon.hisshort-circuitUnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingbetweentheso-calledfundamentalsandthevaluationplacedonthemdoesnotoccurveryoften,butwhenitdoesitsetsinmotionaprocessthatinitiallymaybeself-reinforcingbuteventuallyesself-defeating.Canyouexplainexactlyhowyouapplytheboom/busttheoryinfinancialmarkets?Let’stakethecaseofyourmostfamousexploit.Howdidyoutakeadvantageofthesterlingcrisis?Sterling,asyouknow,waspartoftheEuropeanExchangeRateMechanism(ERM),andthatmechanismfunctionedinanear-equilibriumconditionforafairlylongperiodoftime.Itwasactuallyaveryclever,sophisticatedsystemthatallowedforfrequentadjustmentsandtheadjustmentswerenotsevereenoughthatspeculatorslikemecouldmakealotofmoneyoutofthem.Soitwasanear-equilibriumsystem,aboutasgoodasanexchangeratemechanismcanget.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingbetweentheso-calledfundamentalsandthevaluationplacedonthemdoesnotoccurveryoften,butwhenitdoesitsetsinmotionaprocessthatinitiallymaybeself-reinforcingbuteventuallyesself-defeating.Canyouexplainexactlyhowyouapplytheboom/busttheoryinfinancialmarkets?Let’stakethecaseofyourmostfamousexploit.Howdidyoutakeadvantageofthesterlingcrisis?Sterling,asyouknow,waspartoftheEuropeanExchangeRateMechanism(ERM),andthatmechanismfunctionedinanear-equilibriumconditionforafairlylongperiodoftime.Itwasactuallyaveryclever,sophisticatedsystemthatallowedforfrequentadjustmentsandtheadjustmentswerenotsevereenoughthatspeculatorslikemecouldmakealotofmoneyoutofthem.Soitwasanear-equilibriumsystem,aboutasgoodasanexchangeratemechanismcanget.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingThencamethereunificationofGermany,andthesystemwasthrownintoadynamicdisequilibrium.TheflawwasthattheBundersbankplayedadualroleinthesystem:itwasboththeanchoroftheERMandtheconstitutionalprotectorofthestabilityoftheGermancurrency.TheOstmark/deutschemarkexchangeratehadmoretodowithpoliticalobjectivesthanwitheconomicreality?Right.AndthetremendousinjectionofcapitalfromWestGermanyintoEastGermanysetupstronginflationarypressureswithintheGermaneconomy.TheBundesbankwasdutybound—bytheconstitution,notjustbythelaw—tocounteractitbypushingupinterestratesanditdidsowithconsiderablevigor.ThiswasatatimewhenEuropeingeneral,andBritaininparticular,wereinthedepthsofarecession.ThehighGermaninterestratepolicywastotallyinappropriatetotheconditionsthatprevailedinEngland.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingAsthepressureonsterlingbuiltup,itbecamereallyexciting.TheclimaxwasfinallyreachedwhentheBritishgovernmentincreasedtheinterestrateby2percentinordertodefendsterling.ThiswasanactofdesperationthatsignaledtheBritishpositionwasuntenable.Itencouragedustocontinuesellingsterlingevenmoreaggressivelythanwedidbefore.Thatwastheend:interestsrateswereraisedatnoon.Bytheevening,sterlinghadtoquittheERM.Volatilemarketshavebeengoodtoyou.Isitheretostay?PaulVolckerputitverywell,“Everybodywouldagreethatexcessivevolatilityisharmful,butthereisnoconstituencyfordealingwithit.”Governmentsarepreoccupiedwiththeirselfinterestandtheprivatesector;thecommercialbanksandinvestmentbanksactuallybenefitfromvolatility,notonlybecausetheyhavegreatertradingvolume,butalsobecausetheycansellhedgesandoptions.Theyprofitcomingandgoing.Iwouldaddthathedgesandoptionstendtoamplifymarketvolatilitybyengenderingautomatictrend-followingbehavior.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingDoyouthinktheyshouldbebanned?Yes.Iamsurprisedthatyou,ofallpeople,shouldadvocatesuchdrasticaction.Ishouldlikefinancialmarketstosurvive.GeorgeSorosisthegreatestinvestorthiscentury.ForhisviewswemendSorosonSorosfromwhichthisarticleisaneditedextract.

(fromAsianBusinessReview,June1997)UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingExercisesⅠ.TranslatethefollowingintoEnglish,usingthewordsorphrasesinthetext:1.将投资目标定位在赚取长期利润上topositiontheinvestmentgoaltogainlong-termprofits2.用科学方法对投资组合进行风险估算tomeasureriskforinvestmentportfoliosinascientificway3.根据既定的规则制定不同的投资计划tomakedifferentinvestmentplansaccordingtogivenrulesUnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting4.

被认为反映整个经济现状的股价的上升或下降5.

导致投资风险的多种不确定性variousuncertaintiescausingtherisksofinvestment6.

吸纳大量外汇存款的高利率政策thehighinterestratepolicythathasattractedalargenumberofforeigndeposits7.

私人投机者通过对冲交易而获得的大量利益hugeprofitsgainedbyprivatespeculatorsthroughhedgingupsordownsinthestockpriceswhicharesupposedtoreflecttheentireeconomicrealityUnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting8.

1926年以来股票市场年均10%的回报率9.

自该基金启动起即不断把红利再投资以获利toreinvestdividendscontinuallytogainprofitssincethebeginningofthefund10.

从长期和短期两方面分析投资风险toanalysetheriskofinvestmentbothonthelongandtheshortside11.

调节股票占投资总额的百分比toadjustthepercentageofstocksinthetotalinvestmentanaverageannualreturnof10%inthestockmarketsince1926UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting12.

根据各人自己的投资哲学制定计划13.

顺应潮流投资房地产toinvestinrealestatetofollowthetrend14.不同的风险因素所导致的国库券与25年期债券的不同的利率thedifferentinterestratescausedbydifferentriskfactorsbetweentreasurybillsandthe25-yearbonds15.过高估计了负债国的借贷能力tooverestimatetheborrowingcapacityofdebtorcountriestomakeplansaccordingtoone’sowninvestmentphilosophyUnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvestingⅡ.TranslatethefollowingsentencesintoEnglish:1.政府在干预金融市场时通常会降低利率，使实际利率处于负水平。这就挫伤了储蓄的积极性，可用于投资的资金因此而减少。(interfere)

Whentheyinterfereinthefinancialmarkets,governmentsoftencutinterestratestonegativelevelsinrealterms.Thatdiscouragessaving,reducingthemoneyavailableforinvestment.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting2.债务占国内生产总值比率的持续上升会是很危险的，它会导致实际利率上升，从而排挤私人投资。(ratio)

AconstantlyrisingratioofdebttoGDPcanbedangerous,becauseitmaypushuprealinterestratesandsocrowdoutprivateinvestment.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting3.在90年代的房地产投资热潮中，过多的资金被投资于房地产开发中，造成了“泡沫经济”。(boom)Intherealestateinvestmentboomof1990s,toomuchcapitalwasinvestedintherealestatedevelopment,whichengenderedthe“bubbleeconomy”.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting4.在进行再投资之前，投资者必须考虑各种因素，如市场环境、经济周期、利率等。他们在做一项决策前必须进行复杂的风险计算。(takeintoaccount)Beforereinvesting,investorshavetotakeintoaccountallkindsofelements,suchasmarketenvironment,economiccyclesandinterestrates.Theyshouldmakeveryelaborateriskcalculationsbeforemakingadecision.UnitEleven

GeorgeSorosonInvesting5.自年初以来，股票价格飞涨，在本月7日达到历史最高，但也吸引了许多投机者进入股市，不确定因素较以前增多了。(culmirate)Sincethebeginningofthisyear,stockpricesha