世界经济千年史

1、91/92世界经济千年史2004年第54期（总第470期）2004年9月28日荷兰格罗宁根大学教授、世界经济千年史作者Maddison先生在中国经济研究中心万众楼做了题为“世界经济千年史”的讲座，集中讨论了宏观经济计量历史研究的进展进程。下面是他报告的要紧内容。宏观经济计量历史的进展经历了三个历史时期：20世纪50年代以来的“收入和财宝国际研究协会时期”即IARIW时期（International Association for Research in Income and Wealth）；18201950年的库兹涅斯研究为代表的时期或“Kuznetsian时期”；15001820年商人资本主

2、义年代。50年代以来，宏观计量的要紧目的是提供可能的政策选择以改善国家的增长表现以及进行国家间差异分析。我们现在有50年代以来世界大部分国家的增长和收入的官方可能。而在Kuznetsian时代，数量经济史学家在测量世界经济增长和量化增长因素方面取得了巨大进展。尽管仍有一些领域需要改进，但对那个时期经济进展大致轮廓没有实质争议。相反，关于商人资本主义年代的世界经济的描述则存在专门大分歧，作为代表的是亚当、斯密的乐观看法和马尔萨斯的悲观论。20世纪50年代以来的IARIW时代尽管50年代以来标准国民经济核算体系逐渐被采纳，然而现存可能中仍有专门多问题。使用苏联MPS体系（material prod

3、uction system）的国家增长被高估，需要做大量调整。非洲许多新生国家缺少必要的技术和资金进行国民收入增长核算，尽管国际组织工作在一定程度上弥补了这种不足，然而非洲数据也需要做大量调整。还有1995年以来一些高收入国家开始引入享乐指数（hedonic index）来反映产品质量的改善，然而这么做并没有充分的依照同时会高估经济增长，比如美国用新的计量技术重新进行19291950年国民经济核算，结果使国内生产总值(GDP)的增长率由2.6%增加到3.5%。最后关于教育和知识的计量也还没有成熟理论。另一问题是购买力平价转换与国家间GDP水平比较。政府统计官员会提供真实价格计算的总产出和总支出

4、数据，经济学家、新闻记者和官员们都将其作为经济增长和波动的要紧指标。购买力平价方法与用真实价格计量的目的是一样的，即修正价格差异使真实产出和支出水平的有效比较成为可能。以汇率转换的GDP与以购买力平价转换的GDP区不特不大。以购买力平价计算的进展中国家的GDP要大大高于以汇率转换的GDP，差距可能达到3-5倍。同时发达国家GDP以汇率计算则容易被高估。更为明显的一个例子是1950年中国和印度以汇率计算人均GDP分不是$85和$175（1990年价格），这两个数据低得让人难以置信。那么为何汇率转换还如此经常的被使用呢？一方面出于无知和支持自己观点的需要，另一方面许多进展国家不情愿同意购买力平价方

5、法，因为担心这会不利于他们申请世行的优惠贷款和资助。这导致了经济间比较分析的明显错误，媒体经常称日本是世界第二大经济尽管其GDP还不到中国的60，英国的政客们也始终相信英国的经济规模比中国大。18201950年的Kuznetsian时代Simon Kuznets教授对现代经济增长的研究成果，使能够数量化研究的时刻界限从20世纪50年代推进到19世纪20年代。关于这段时期我们现有的几个结论是：加速的经济增长始于1820年而非Kuznets认为的1760年；经济学家对西欧各国研究表明西欧的崛起是同时而非交错发生的；这段时期快速进展加大了西方与其他国家的差距；Kuznets研究推翻了Kondrati

6、eff长期循环的讲法和Schumpeter循环进展论点。事实上1820年以来的技术变革不是浪潮式的而是连续推进的，目前有足够证据把18202001这段时刻划分为5个不同的进展时期。其中19501973年是一个无可比拟的繁荣的黄金时代，那个时期世界GDP年均增长5，世界贸易年均增长8，人均收入有明显趋同趋势，大部分地区经济增长都快于美国。1973年以后，世界经济增长明显下降，各地区的差异加大，然而基于世界的角度，最近那个时期仍然是增长表现名列第二的时期。区分领导国家和跟随国家关于研究技术的动态传播和赶超过程是特不重要的，“领导”国家指那些处于技术前沿的国家，而“跟随”国家指劳动生产率较低的国家。

7、1500年以来共有4个领导国家，16世纪的意大利，16世纪至拿破仑战争时期的荷兰，此后的英国和1890年后的美国。对1820年以来英国、美国和日本的增长分析，最早考虑的是劳动力投入和生产率，战后资本成了一个特不重要的增长因素，之后又有观点将“人力资本”看作生产要素。Denison扩展增长分析方法指出1820年以来英国、美国和日本经济增长表现出以下一些显著特点：物质资本大量增长，非居住建筑和机器设备增加特不明显，伴随在机器设备中加速的技术进步。教育水平大大提高，英国提高了8倍，美国和日本11倍。人均劳动投入在英国和日本下降了40，在美国下降了20。对外贸易占GDP的比重在英国由3增至25，日本0

8、.2至13，美国2至10。自然资源的缺乏对增长并不构成限制，人均土地在美国下降了14倍，英国和日本下降了4倍。能源的投入增长比较和气，美国人均增长了3倍，英国6倍，日本8倍。15001820年的商人资本主义年代关于商人资本主义年代（15001820）经济表现，在18世纪末就差不多存在两种不同的解释。亚当、斯密乐观地认为，美洲大陆和新航线的发觉给大型经济，国际贸易和专业化的进展制造了新的机会，尽管因为对贸易的共同限制，这些机会不能被充分利用。马尔萨斯则悲观论则认为，经济表现取决于人口增长和固定的土地供给间的平衡，技术进步、资本形成和国际贸易专业化的因素被忽略，因此只有通过灾难（战争、饥饿、疾病）

9、才能实现平衡。这两种观点对立一直存在。此外悲观的看法有了一些其他的支持，LeRoy Ladurie认为法国13001720年的经济是停滞的，真实工资论者则更加悲观他们有人认为英国1820年的生活水平比1500年下降了44等等。关于15001820不同国家和地区的经济表现，Kuznets在1965年提出了关于西欧人口率和人均GDP增长的一个特不有阻碍的假讲，认为西欧发达国家15001750年可能的（同时或许是最大的）长期人均产出年均增长率为0.2%。对上述假讲验证表明，西欧15001820年人均年增长率为0.14，显著小于Kuznets可能，美洲国家整体而言人均GDP增长快于西欧，非洲南部和北部

10、的进展差异比较明显，亚洲国家整体而言收入水平是停滞的，日本的人均表现要好于中国和印度，然而特不明显中国那个时期有着广泛的增长，它在人口大量增长的情况下生活水平并没有下降同时GDP的增长与西欧一样显著。在分析商人资本主义时代的增长时，增长分析的方法就不再适用了。研究表明，人均劳动投入、资本和人力资本、知识在那个时期都有增加，然而特不明显的是全球化在那个时期起到了比以往更加重要的作用，相对来讲全球化在这段时期的作用比在20世纪还要重要。西方造船业和航海的巨大进展，使世界贸易在15001820年增长了20倍。欧洲国家还从殖民地，非洲奴隶贸易中猎取了专门多利益。美洲国家则经历了生态、技术和人口的转型。

11、引进新的农作物提高了粮食的产量；马和其他牲畜的引入则改善了交通条件；欧洲各种技术的引入也有助于经济的进展；欧洲疾病使2/3土著居民死亡，加上欧洲人和非洲奴隶大量涌入，改变了美洲的人口结构。非洲和亚洲国家也引入了美洲农作物。此外还存在大陆间的技术传递，欧洲向美洲输出武器、工具、车辆、船和造船技术、印刷、文字、教育和政治经济机构，欧洲采矿技术在美洲应用生产出大量金银供欧洲与亚洲进行贸易，同时期欧洲从亚洲引入了纺织和陶瓷技术。与亚当斯密和马尔萨斯关于商人资本主义的对立解释相对应，关于现代化的根源有特不不同的看法。有一个学派认为现代经济增长源于工业革命，而之前则是几个世纪的马尔萨斯停滞。专门多人支持那

12、个观点，然而这些观点在全然上是错误的。事实上向现代资本主义过渡经历了长时刻的预备。首先是教育和知识的传播由于印刷术的发明和推广而变革；其次造船业和航海业到1820年也发生了变革，船只的设计、装备和天文知识都大大改善，有了精确的航海指导等等。这些进展差不多上科研努力的结果。无疑，欧洲的这些进展是19和20世纪经济更快进展的前奏，欧洲的现代化不是一蹴而就的。（任丽达、卢锋整理） 发贴时刻： 2004-10-17 2:28:56 218.31.*.* errantking 等级：贫农财产：经验：魅力： 注册：2003-9-7 文章：55 鉴定：保密 Measuring and Interpretin

13、g World Economic Performance 1500-2001*Angus MaddisonThis is a suitable occasion for surveying the progress achieved, in the past 60 years, in quantifying world economic development, and analysing the causal influences which determine the pace and pattern of growth. This was a major objective of the

14、 founding fathers of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW). The initiative for creating an association including both academics and official statisticians came from Simon Kuznets (1901-85), the pioneer of quantitative economic history. Milton Gilbert (1909-79) and R

15、ichard Stone (1913-1991) were strategic partners with enormous international leverage in creating and diffusing standard procedures for construction of comparable national accounts by official statistical offices.This paper analyses the development of macro-measurement in three epochs:a) for the IAR

16、IW epoch, back to 1950, the main purpose has been to illuminate policy options to improve growth performance at the national level and to analyse inter-country divergence in real income levels to help devise policies for catch-up. We now have official estimates of growth and levels for the vast bulk

17、 of the world economy from 1950 onwards.b) For the Kuznetsian epoch of “modern economic growth” back to 1820, quantitative economic historians have made great progress in measuring world economic growth and in quantifying the forces determining performance. There is scope for further research to fil

18、l gaps and crosscheck existing estimates, but the broad contours of development in this period are not under serious challenge.c) for the “merchant capitalist” epoch, 1500-1820, there are sharply divergent interpretations about world, and particularly European performance. The dichotomy between posi

19、tive and negative assessments started with Adam Smith and Malthus at the end of the 18th century. In my view, the evidence for the Malthusian view is shoddy.Historians usually start at the beginning of their chronology. Quantitative economic historians have to work backwards from the present, procee

20、ding from what is known and accepted, to earlier epochs where evidence is weaker and there is greater reliance on clues and conjecture. *This is the first Ruggles Lecture, delivered at the 28th IARIW General Conference, Cork, Ireland August 2004I(i) Standardised Estimates of GDP Growth for 1950 onwa

21、rdsThe standardised accounts provide a coherent macroeconomic framework covering the whole economy, crosschecked in three ways. From the income side, they are the total of wages, rents and profits. On the demand side, they are the sum of final expenditures by consumers, investors and government. Fro

22、m the production side, the sum of value added in different sectors-agriculture, industry and services, net of duplication.Milton Gilbert had been responsible for the official US accounts during the war and from 1950 to 1961 was head of statistics and national accounts in OEEC. The Marshall Plan requ

23、ired criteria for aid allocation, and NATO needed them for its burden-sharing exercises. Gilbert met these requirements by pushing official statistical offices of the 16 OEEC member countries to adopt the standardised system of accounts designed by Richard Stone. Stone set up a programme in Cambridg

24、e to train official European statisticians to implement the standardised system. A set of national handbooks was prepared to explain the problems of adjustment to the standardised system, and a first comparative set of accounts for the 16 countries for 1938 and 1947-52 was published by OEEC in 1954,

25、 with extensive notes explaining the adjustments which had been made to achieve comparability.In 1953, Stone became chairman of a United Nations commission which established a system of accounts for worldwide application. The UN could not exert as much leverage on its member countries to conform as

26、was possible in OEEC. The communist countries used the Soviet SMS (system of material accounts) which had a narrower definition of productive activity (excluding many service activities), involved serious double counting (measuring gross output without deducting inter-sector transfers of inputs) and

27、 exaggerated economic growth. The price system and tax-structures were different from those in capitalist countries, and measurement conventions gave incentives to exaggerate quality change when new products were introduced. Abram Bergson (1914-2003) pioneered procedures for re-estimation of Soviet

28、GDP on a basis corresponding approximately to Western conceptions in coverage, with elimination of double-counting, and repricing on an “adjusted factor cost” basis with imputation for capital costs which were not considered in Soviet accounting. These corrective procedures were applied to Soviet st

29、atistics by a team of CIA Sovietologists in Washington. In New York, Thad Alton and his colleagues did the same for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. This work was financed for intelligence purposes, but was publicly available in annual reports to the US Congres

30、s (see Maddison 1998b).In the 1990s most of these countries adopted the standardised SNA system in principle, but implementation was complicated by the massive change in ownership, in the level and structure of prices, allocation of resources between consumption and investment, and statistical repor

31、ting procedures. It will take some years before these problems can be fully resolved. The IMF continues to use exaggerated measures of GDP growth for these countries. As a result, it shows a growth in world GDP averaging 3.9 percent a year for 1970-200, compared with my estimate of 3.3 percent. For

32、China it shows growth averaging 8.5 per cent a year, whereas my adjusted measure shows a growth rate of 6.5 per cent (see Maddison, 2003, p. 231).Another area of weakness is Africa, where there was and still is a great shortage of skills and money for such work in a large number of newly created cou

33、ntries. The gap in estimates of GDP growth was filled in substantial degree by the OECD Development Centre which compiled annual estimates of real GDP growth 1950-90 for 51 African countries. The Centre benefited from the expertise of Derek Blades, who had been chief statistician in Malawi for eight

34、 years, and by David Roberts who had similar experience in Gambia. A third problem in the assessment of GDP growth performance in the higher income countries derives from recent changes in measurement conventions from 1995 onwards, involving adoption of hedonic indexes to adjust for assumed changes

35、in quality of product, use of chain indices, and treatment of consumer software as investment. Hedonic indices are perfectly respectable in small doses, but one can be skeptical about the widespread assumption that quality changes have been so large and monotonically positive. In the USA, where the

36、switch to hedonics was most significant, their net impact was to raise the measured rate of growth to a somewhat greater degree than in Western Europe and Japan. US official estimates go back to 1929, and the changes in measurement technique had their biggest impact for 1929-50, raising the GDP grow

37、th rate for that period from 2.6 percent a year to 3.5. There was no counterpart to this long retrospective readjustment in other countries, and I have continued to use the earlier US official measure for 1929-50 (for reasons explained in Maddison, 2001, p. 138, and Maddison, 2003, pp.79-80). More t

38、han 40 years ago, Milton Gilbert warned that such adjustments could open Pandoras box: “In the end, they would make it impossible to construct measures of output and price changes that are useful to the study of economic growth” (Gilbert, 1961, p. 287). The danger which arises from an overdose of he

39、donics is discussed in Appendix 3.Ed Denison (1915-1992) expressed opposition to changes in national accounting which treat accretions of knowledge as investment. He considered this a “misclassification” which made “growth analysis chaotic” (see Denison, 1989, p. 10). A major justification for his c

40、omplaint was that his growth accounts included “human capital”, i.e. increments in the quality of the labour force due to increases in the level of education.In fact, the only form of knowledge which is now treated as investment is computer software. It is odd to treat this rapidly depreciating know

41、ledge as investment, whilst ignoring the more durable influence of books and education.(ii) Purchasing Power Converters for Cross-country Comparison of GDP Levels Once standardised accounts of real GDP growth in national currencies had been established for all OEEC countries, the next step to facili

42、tate inter-country comparison and multi-country aggregation was the development of purchasing power parity converters (PPPs) to measure real GDP levels, rather than relying on exchange rate comparison. The first OEEC study, co-authored by Milton Gilbert and Irving Kravis (1916-92). appeared in 1954,

43、 a second in 1958. They compared real expenditure levels in 8 OEEC countries. A third volume by Paige and Bombach (1959) compared real output levels in the UK and USA. Kravis and his colleagues, Alan Heston and Robert Summers improved the methodology of PPP estimation in their ICP project at the Uni

44、versity of Pennsylvania from 1968 onwards.The OEEC studies were binary comparisons between pairs of countries. The three options were i) a Paasche PPP, with “own-country” quantity weights; ii) a Laspeyres PPP with the quantity weights of the numeraire country-the United States; iii) a compromise geo

45、metric (Fisher) average of the first two measures. The corresponding measures of real expenditure were: i) Laspeyres comparisons of GDP levels based on the prices (unit values) of the numeraire country; ii) Paasche level comparisons based on “own-country” prices (unit values); iii) a Fisher geometri

46、c average of the two measures. Binary comparisons, e.g. Germany/USA and UK/USA, could then be linked with the USA as the star country. Such star comparisons could provide a proxy Germany/UK comparison, but it was not “transitive” (i.e. the result would not be identical to that derived from a direct

47、Germany/UK comparison). This was not a great drawback for OEEC countries where the inter-country deviation in performance levels was not too wide. But Kravis, Heston and Summers were engaged in comparisons over a much wider range of per capita income. They therefore adopted the Geary-Khamis method,

48、invented by Roy Geary (1896-1983) and Salem Khamis, which multilateralised the results, provided transitivity and other desirable properties. They used it in conjunction with the commodity product dummy method (CPD), invented by Robert Summers, for filling holes in the basic dataset. Their masterpie

49、ce was their third study, the 1982 volume World Product and Income, which contained estimates for 34 countries (in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe) in 1975 prices and international Geary-Khamis dollars. These countries accounted for 64 per cent of world GDP in 2001.Table 1 Nature of PPP Conver

50、ters to Estimate GDP Levels in the Benchmark Year 1990(billion 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and number of countries)Europe & Latin Asia Africa WorldW. Offshoots America ICP 15,273 (28) 2,131 (18) 8,017 (24) 0 (0) 25,421 (70)PWT 59 (3) 71 (14) 524 (16) 891 (51) 1,516 (84)Proxies 16 (10) 38 (15) 87 (17)

51、14 (6) 155 (48)Total 15,349 (41) 2,240 (47) 8,628 (57) 905 (57) 27,122(202)Source: Maddison (2003), p. 230The UN Statistical Office extended the ICP work and had covered 84 countries by 1985. UNSO then dropped this endeavour, though some of the regional UN bodies continued with it. The OECD recommen

52、ced its comparisons on a regular basis in 1982. Its latest work covered the 28 OECD countries and 20 others (in Eastern Europe, the 15 successor states of the USSR, and Mongolia). Alan Heston and Robert Summers produce short-hand estimates of PPPs and real income levels for countries for which full-

53、scale ICP type measures are not available. As a result, we now have reasonably acceptable PPP adjusted measures available for over 99 percent of world GDP,There were three Eurostat estimates (for 1980, 1985 and 1993) of PPPs for 22 African countries, but the results were erratic, and I preferred to

54、use the more comprehensive and plausible results of the Penn World Tables (see Summers and Heston, October 2002). Table 1 summarises the nature of the PPP estimates I used to create my 1990 benchmark estimates of world GDP.Table 2 Worlds 10 Largest Countries: Comparative Ranking, 1950 & 2001, at con

55、stant1990 prices, using 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP converters and 1990 exchange rates1950 2001 1950 2001GDP $billion, with 1990 PPP conversion $billion, with 1990 exchange rateUSA 1,456 7,966 1,456 7,966China 240 4,570 47 886Japan 161 2,625 206 3,358India 222 2,003 62 558Germany 265 1,537 337 1,951France

56、 221 1,258 261 1,491UK 348 1,202 363 1,253Italy 165 1,101 191 1,272Brazil 89 990 58 638Russia 315 791 154 388GDP per head 1990 PPP $ 1990 ER $ USA 9,561 27,948 9,561 27,948China 439 3,583 85 541Japan 1,921 20,683 2,458 26,466India 619 1,957 172 545Germany 3,881 18,677 4,928 23,717France 5,271 21,092

57、 6,244 24,985UK 6,939 20,127 7,266 20,985Italy 3,502 19,040 4,046 21,996Brazil 1,672 5,570 1,077 3,588Russia 3,086 5,435 1,515 2,669Source:Maddison (2003)Table 2 shows the difference between PPP and exchange rate conversion for the worlds 10 largest economies (which represented 65 percent of world G

58、DP in 2001). The exchange rate conversions on the right hand side show much lower levels for the poorer countries (China, India, Russia and Brazil) and somewhat higher levels for the west European countries and Japan relative to the USA than the PPP converters. In the case of China the deviation the

59、 exchange rate and the PPPs was very large-purchasing power was more than 5 times higher than the exchange rate. In India the ratio was more than 3 times higher, in Russia twice as high and in Brazil more than 50 per cent higher. In Japan and the west European countries, the exchange rate overvalued

60、 the purchasing power relative to the US dollar. In fact the big differential for poorer countries is a fairly systematic outcome in such comparisons. For the west European countries and Japan the differential is smaller and has varied above and below parity in the past two decades. The implausibili