周业安高级公司金融教学大纲09－7

1、周业安 中国人民大学经济学院 advanced corporate finance高级公司金融周业安fall 2009syllabuscourse overview the content of the course combines of several strings of research in corporate finance. first, the course provides a theoretical and empirical introduction of the core topics in corporate finance, including: corporate

2、 investment; capital structure and financial contracting; corporate governance ; mergers & acquisitions, and so on. second, the course puts a major emphasis on empirical methodology , especially on some papers based on the chinese financial market data. third, the course emphasizes research in under

3、standing of financial decision-making in firms by traditional model and behavioral corporate finance.course assignments and grading there will be a few longer theoretical & empirical assignments. i will count class participation (including evidence of intelligently reading the required papers and di

4、scussing them), and you may write a working paper according to theoretical & empirical assignments before this term ending. this paper must model or give some empirical evidences on listed companies in china. the grade composition will be as follows:30% for a working paper;20% for class participatio

5、n;50% for the final exam;required background as a general rule, you should have any training in corporate finance, econometrics, contract theory and game theory(all are undergraduate courses). schedule of classesclass topic1overview: topics and tool2efficient market hypothesis , behavioral corporate

6、 finance, and corporate financial decision3corporate investment (i): empirics; financial constraints4corporate investment (ii): asymmetric information and agency; diversification and internal capital markets5corporate investment (iii): behavioral corporate finance6capital structure (i): modigliani-m

7、iller theorem, trade-off7capital structure (ii): financial contracting8capital structure (iii): asymmetric information and pecking order9capital structure (iv):market timing10investment bank and securities issue-ipo and seos11corporate governance(i): institutional arrangement and voting rule12corpor

8、ate governance (ii): boards13corporate governance (iii): executive compensation14corporate governance(iv): investor protection15m&a 16dividends and repurchases17final examreadings（阅读材料）： 一、国外教材：科普兰，温斯顿和萨斯特里，2007，金融理论与公司政策，上海财经大学出版社，中译本。让梯若尔，2007，公司金融理论，中国人民大学出版社，中译本。威斯通，米切尔和马尔赫林，2006，接管、重组与公司治理，北京大学

9、出版社，中译本。哈特，1998，企业、合同与财务结构，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，中译本蒙蒂尔，2003，行为金融:洞察非理性心理和市场，中国人民大学出版社，中译本。赫什舍夫林，2007，行为公司金融创造价值的决策，中国人民大学出版社，中译本。de matos， joao amaro ，2001，“theoretical foundations of corporate finance”， princeton university press .二、国内教材：张春，2008，公司金融学，中国人民大学出版社。朱武详等，2006，中国公司金融学，上海三联书店。汪昌云，2006，公司财务政策与公司

10、治理：中国的实践，中国人民大学出版社。刘力等，2007，信念、偏好与行为金融学，北京大学出版社。三、论文集：马斯科西莫维，津巴，2007，金融经济学手册，世纪出版集团，上海人民出版社，中译本。卢俊（编译），2003，资本结构理论研究译文集，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，isbn 7-208-04705-7。丘和思腾斯特公司（主编），新公司金融：理论与实践，中信出版社，中译本。michael j. brennan, 1996, the theory of corporate finance, vol.1,2,and 3, an elgar reference collection.constan

11、tinides ,g.m. , m. harris, r.m. stulz (eds.)，2003，handbook of the economics of finance: corporate finance volume 1a，north holland.eckbo, b. espen (ed.)，2007，handbook of corporate finance, volume 1: empirical corporate finance，north holland; 1 edition.eckbo, b. espen (ed.)，2008，handbook of corporate

12、finance, volume 2: empirical corporate finance，north holland; 1 edition.richard h. thaler(ed.), 1993, advances in behavioral finance, russell sage foundation.richard h. thaler(ed.), 2005, advances in behavioral finance,vol.ii, russell sage foundation.shefrin, hersh (ed.), 2001, behavioral finance, v

13、ol.1-3, an elgar reference collection. 四、研究方法：坎贝尔，2003，金融市场计量经济学，上海财经大学出版社，中译本。迈克尔.j.塞勒，2004，金融研究方法论大全必备，清华大学出版社，2005年中译本。伍德里奇，横截面与面板数据的经济计量分析，中国人民大学出版社， 2007年。（美）卡梅隆，特里维迪，微观计量经济学方法与应用（英文版），机械工业出版社，2008年。kothari, s.p. and jerold b.warner, 2007, “the econometrics of event studies”, in b. espen eckbo

14、(ed.), handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 1 (handbooks in finance series, elsevier/north-holland), ch. 1, 2007.stata的使用。比如a. colin cameron ，pravin k trivedi ，2009，microeconometrics using stata，stata press，1 edition .五、相关综述：（一）公司金融的契约观基本讨论：1、朱民，刘俐俐，1989，“企业金融结构之谜现代企业金融

15、资本结构理论简介”，载于汤敏、茅于轼（主编），现代经济学前沿专题 第一集，商务印书馆2、哈里斯和拉维，1991，“资本结构理论”，载于卢俊（编译），2003，资本结构理论研究译文集，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，isbn 7-208-04705-7。3、哈特，2000，“金融合同”，载于比较，第16辑，中信出版社，2005年1月。（二）公司金融的契约观资本结构1.murray z. frank and vidhan k. goyal，2008， “trade-off and pecking order theories of debt”, i in the handbook of corpor

16、ate finance, volume 2:empirical corporate finance, chp.12, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/north holland, 2008.2.linda schmid klein,thoas j. obrien,stephen r peters,2002, “debt vs. equity and asymmetric information:a review”， the financial review37(3):317-349.3.john r. graham,2008, “taxes

17、and corporate finance”, in the handbook of corporate finance, volume 2:empirical corporate finance, chp.11, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/north holland, 2008.4.parsons, chris and sheridan titman, “capital structure and corporate strategy”, in b. espen eckbo (ed.), handbook of corporate f

18、inance: empirical corporate finance, volume 2 (handbooks in finance series, elsevier/north-holland), ch. 13, 2008.5. parsons ,christopher and sheridan titman, 2008, “empirical capital structure: a review”, foundations and trends in finance,vol. 3, no. 1 (2008) 193.（三）证券发行（投资银行）1、ritter, jay r. ,2003

19、, “investment banking and secrities”, in constantinides ,g.m. , m. harris, r.m. stulz (eds.)，2003，handbook of the economics of finance: corporate finance volume 1a，chapter 5,north holland.2、alexander ljungqvist,2007, “ipo underpricing”, in the handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finan

20、ce, volume 1, chp.7, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/north holland, 2007. 3. eckbo, b. espen, ronald w.masulis and oyvind norli, 2007, “security offerings” ,in the handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 1,chp.6, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/north ho

21、lland, 2007.（四）股利政策allen, franklin，roni michaely，2003, “payout policy”，in constantinides ,g.m. , m. harris, r.m. stulz (eds.)，2003，handbook of the economics of finance: corporate finance volume 1a，chp.7,north holland.kalay, avner and michael lemmon,2008, “payout policy”, in b. espen eckbo (ed.), han

22、dbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 2 (handbooks in finance series, elsevier/north-holland), ch. 10, 2008.（五）公司投资：1.stein, jeremy c., 2003, “agency, information and corporate investment”, in constantinides , g.m. , m. harris, r.m. stulz (eds.)，2003，handbook of the economi

23、cs of finance: corporate finance volume 1a, chapter 2，north holland.2.maksimovic, vojislav and phillips, gordon m.,2007, “conglomerate firms and internal capital markets”, in the handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 1, chp.8, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/no

24、rth holland, 2007.（六）公司治理1.shleifer, andrei, and robert w. vishny, 1997, “ a survey of corporate governance”, journal of finance 52, 737-83.2. becht, marco,patrick bolton and alisa rell,2003, “corporate governance and control”, in constantinides ,g.m. , m. harris, r.m. stulz (eds.)，2003，handbook of

25、the economics of finance: corporate finance volume 1a，chp.1,north holland.3. tirole, jean, 2001, “ corporate governance”, econometrica, 69, 1-35.4. zingales luigi，1997, “corporate governance”, the new palgrave dictionary of economics and the law。（七）行为公司金融baker, malcolm, richard ruback and jeffrey wu

26、rgler,2007, behavioral corporate finance: a survey. in the handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 1,chp.4, edited by espen eckbo. new york: elsevier/north holland, 2007.（八）并购betton, sandra, b. espen eckbo, and karin s.thorburn, 2008, “corporate takeovers”, in b. espen eck

27、bo (ed.), handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance, volume 2 (handbooks in finance series, elsevier/north-holland), ch. 15, 2008.六、阅读文献：1、 overview: topics and toola. backgound巴金斯和小米兰蒂，2002，公司财政史，中国经济出版社。2、efficient market hypothesis , behavioral corporate finance, and corporate fi

28、nancial decisiona. backgound 科普兰，温斯顿和萨斯特里，2007，金融理论与公司政策，第1、10、11章。蒙蒂尔，2003，行为金融:洞察非理性心理和市场，第1、2、7章。b. efficient market hypothesis vs behavioral corporate financefama, eugene f. 1970. “efficient capital markets: a review of empirical work,” journal of finance. 25, pp. 383-417.fama, eugene f. 1991. “

29、efficient capital markets ii,” journal of finance 46(5):1575-1617.赫什舍夫林，2007，行为公司金融创造价值的决策，第2章3、corporate investment (i): empirics; financial constraintsa. backgound科普兰，温斯顿和萨斯特里，2007，金融理论与公司政策，第2章。b. investment-cash flow sensitivitiesfazzari, s.m., r.g. hubbard and b.c. petersen ,1988, “financing co

30、nstraints and corporate investment,” brookings papers on economic activity, 141-195. kaplan, steven n. and luigi zingales ,1997, “do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?,” quarterly journal of economics 112: 169-216.kaplan, steven n. and luigi zingales

31、,2000, “investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing constraints”,quarterly journal of economics, 115,707-712.lamont, owen ,1997, “cash flow and investment: evidence from internal capital markets”, journal of finance 52, pp. 83-109.moyen, nathalie, 2004, investment-cash flo

32、w sensitivities: constrained versus unconstrained firms. journal of finance, 59(5), 2061-2092.rauh, joshua d., 2006, investment and financing constraints: evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans, journal of finance 61, 33-71.bushman, robert m., abbie smith, and frank zhang,2008, “invest

33、ment-cash flow sensitivities are really investment-investment sensitivities,” available at ssrn: c. other financial constraintsrhodes-kropf ,matthew, david t. robinson,2008, “the market for mergers and the boundaries of the firm”, journal of finance,volume 63, issue 3，pp:1169 1211maksimovic, vojisla

34、v,gordon phillips,2008, “the industry life cycle, acquisitions and investment: does firm organization matter?”, journal of finance, volume 63, issue 2，pp:673 708.nini, greg, david c. smith, amir sufi, 2009, “creditor control rights and firm investment policy”, journal of financial economics, volume

35、92, issue 3, pages 400-420 .4、corporate investment (ii): asymmetric information and agencya. backgound 科普兰，温斯顿和萨斯特里，2007，金融理论与公司政策，第12章。b. asymmetric informationmyers, stewart and n. majluf (1984), “corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have”,

36、 journal of financial economics 13, pp. 187-222.c. agencyjensen, michael c. and william h. meckling ,1976, “theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” journal of financial economics 3: 305-360. jensen, michael c. ,1986, “agency costs of free cash flow, corporate

37、finance, andtakeovers,” american economic review 76: 323-329. fama, e., and m. jensen, 1983, “separation of ownership and control,” journal of law and economics 26, 301-325.d. diversity and internal capital marketslang, larry h. p. and rene m. stulz, 1994，“tobins q, corporate diversification, and fi

38、rm performance,” journal of political economy, vol. 102, 1248-1280.stein, jeremy c. ,1997, “internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources,” journal of finance 52: 111-133.scharfstein, david s. and jeremy c. stein,2000,the dark side of internal capital markets: divisional rent-

39、seeking and inefficient investment, journal of finance55(6): 2537-2564.rajan, raghuram, henri servaes and luigi zingales ,2000, “the cost of diversity: thediversification discount and inefficient investment”, journal of finance 55, pp. 35-80.desai, mihir a., c. fritz foley and james r. hines, jr. ,2

40、004,a multinational perspective on capital structure choice and internal capital markets,journal of finance 59, no. 6, 2451-2488.mehmet e. akbulut and john g. matsusaka,2008, 50+ years of diversification announcements , university of southern california. university of southern california law and eco

41、nomics working paper series. working paper 73. mathews ,richmond d. ,david t. robinson,2008， “market structure, internal capital markets, and the boundaries of the firm”, journal of finance, volume 63, issue 6，pp:2703 2736.santalo, juan ,manuel becerra, 2008, “competition from specialized firms and

42、the diversification-performance linkage”, journal of finance, volume 63, issue 2 ，pp:851 883.fee ,c. edward, charles j. hadlock, and joshua r. pierce ,2009, “investment, financing constraints, and internal capital markets: evidence from the advertising expenditures of multinational firms “,review of

43、 financial studies 22: 2361-23925、corporate investment (iii): behavioral corporate financea. backgound赫什舍夫林，2007，行为公司金融创造价值的决策，第3章。b.behavioral corporate financestein, jeremy c. ,1989, “efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic corporate behavior,” quarterly journal of economic

44、s 104: 655-669.stein, jeremy c.,1996, “rational capital budgeting in an irrational world,” journal of business 69: 429-455.heaton, j.b. ,2002, “managerial optimism and corporate finance”, financial management 31, pp.33-45.malmendier, ulrike and geoffrey tate ,2005a, “ceo overconfidence and corporate

45、 investment”, journal of finance 60(6), pp. 2661-2700.malmendier, ulrike and geoffrey tate ,2005b, “does overconfidence affect corporate investment? ceo overconfidence measures revisited.” european financial management 11(5): 649-659.polk, christopher and paola sapienza , 2009, “the stock market and

46、 corporate investment: a test of catering theory ”,review of financial studies 22: 187-217.friedman ,henry,2007, “does overconfidence affect entrepreneurial investment?”, working paper, wharton research scholars journal,the wharton school, university of pennsylvania.baker, malcolm,2009,market-driven

47、 corporate finance, working pape. available at ssrn: 6、capital structure (i): modigliani-miller theorem, trade-offa. backgound 科普兰，温斯顿和萨斯特里，2007，金融理论与公司政策，第15章。让梯若尔，2007，公司金融理论，第2章。张春，2008，公司金融学，中国人民大学出版社，第2章。miller, merton h. ,1988, “the m-m propositions after 30 years,” journal of economic perspec

48、tives 2: 99-120. b. modigliani-miller theoremmodigliani, franco and merton h. miller ,1958, “the cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment,” american economic review 48: 261-297. miller, merton h. ,1977, “debt and taxes,” journal of finance 32: 261-275. fama, eugene f. ,1978

49、,“the effects of a firms investment and financing decision.” american economic review 68, 272-284. c. trade-offwarner, jerold,1977, “bankruptcy costs: some evidence.” journal of finance 32, 337-348. deangelo, harry and ron masulis,1980, “optimal capital structure under corporate taxes.” journal of f

50、inancial economics 8, 5-29. graham, john r.,2000, “how big are the tax benefits of debt?” journal of finance 551901-1941. strebulaev ,ilya a.,2007, “do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say?”，journal of finance,volume 62， issue 4，pp:1747 1787.byoun, soku, 2008， “how and when do firms

51、adjust their capital structures toward targets?”, journal of finance, volume 63, issue 6，pp:3069 3096.7、capital structure (ii): financial contractinga. backgound harris, milt and athur raviv ,1991, “the theory of capital structure”, journal of finance 46, pp.297-355.张春，2008，公司金融学，中国人民大学出版社，第5章。b. op

52、timal contracts with costly state verificationtownsend, robert，1979, “optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification”, journal of economic theory 21, pp. 265-293.gale, douglas and martin hellwig ,1985, “incentive-compatible debt contracts: the one-period problem”, review of

53、 economic studies 52, pp. 647-663.c. incomplete contracts哈特，1998，企业、合同与财务结构,第5章。aghion, phillipe and patrick bolton ,1992, “an incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting”, review of economic studies 59, pp. 473-494.d. empirical evidencekaplan, steven and per stromberg ,2003, “financial c

54、ontracting theory meets the real world:an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts,” review of economic studies 70, no. 2,pp. 281-315.frank， murray z. and vidhan k. goyal，2007，“capital structure decisions:which factors are reliably important? ”. available at ssrn: lemmon, michael l. ,michael

55、r. roberts and jaime f. zender,2008, “back to the beginning: persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure”, journal of finance,volume 63,issue 4 ，pp:1575 1608.banerjee ,shantanu,sudipto dasgupta, and yungsan kim, 2008,“buyer-supplier relationships and the stakeholder theory of ca

56、pital structure”, journal of finance,volume 63, issue 5 ，pp: 2507 2552.8、capital structure (iii): asymmetric information and pecking order a. backgound harris, milt and athur raviv ,1991, “the theory of capital structure”, journal of finance 46, pp.297-355.graham, john r., and campbell r. harvey, 20

57、01,“the theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field”, journal of financial economics 60, 187-243. 张春，2008，公司金融学，中国人民大学出版社，第3章。b. theoryleland, hayne and david pyle, 1977，information asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation, journal of finance, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 371-387.ross, stephen, 1977，the determinants of financial str