会计英文文献090：中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述

1、 外文翻译： 中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述 原文来源：wagenvoort, european investment bank, economic and financial studies rien (wagenvoo)rien (2009)更多原创经管论文及英文文献与翻译请访问：http:/经管论文.com/译文正文：本文介绍了中小企业融资问题和总结欧洲投资银行论文的主要研究结果这个版本的贡献，本概述强调中小企业的信贷供给关系的重要性的银行;指出了分歧和企业结构的异同首都在大小班和整个欧洲;注意到，尽管有广泛的中小企业信贷配给的迹象，金融市场不完善仍可抑制中小企业的成长和亮

2、点，在欧洲的金融环境的变化 - 包括银行合并和新巴塞尔协议 - 承诺，以促进中小企业财务 1.介绍 在欧洲的金融环境中一些变化应给中小企业融资支持。首先，新的信息和通信技术作出贡献，以较低的成本，减少贷款人与借款人之间的信息不对称问题，从而使中小企业贷款更具吸引力。其次，部分原因是由于在信息技术的进步，新的银行管理办法正在制定和实施。例如，银行信贷风险采取新的组合模式，让他们自己的资源配置和价格更有效。此外，信贷风险转移机制（如中小企业贷款securitarisation使用）正在蔓延，使银行能够专注于比较优势的活动，特别是信贷风险评估，贷款发放，信贷风险监控 - 所有活动提供重要的为中小企业

3、融资。第三，股权资本提供给中小型企业越来越通过（二级）资本市场和风险资本融资的发展。第四，欧盟第二银行指令旨在促进银行之间的竞争，从而提高银行融资的条款及条件，包括提供给那些中小型企业。 欧洲的金融环境的其他功能提出了关于中小企业融资的条件可能恶化的关切。首先，在国家银行市场的整合，减少了对银行的数目，并已在许多欧盟国家，特别是在较小的，增加了五大最大机构市场份额（欧洲央行2002年）。这可能不利于中小企业的贷款，因为有证据表明，与大银行相比，小区域银行投资小；其次是他们是资产比例较低的小企业贷款，有证据（戴维斯，此卷），资本市场和机构投资者获得对银行的理由。机构投资者与银行竞争时收集的经济积

4、蓄，但他们往往对中小企业贷款比银行少。第三，新资本充足架构银行（巴塞尔二）正在形成。在巴塞尔协议的主旨是为了更好地调整资本费用，并通过延伸，与潜在的信贷风险，贷款利率。由于中小企业贷款通常被认为是正确或错误，因为特别危险，许多观察家 - 尤其是中小企业本身 - 已针对中小企业融资（进一步）恶化的警告声。 为什么中小企业融资往往会比大型企业的融资困难。反映这些挑战，小企业往往比依赖外部资金来源的银行关系，没有其他选择，而大型企业可能转向银行以及资本市场我们还将阐述的利益和关系，银行费用，并简要考虑银行的关系银行竞争的影响。在第3节，我们讨论了在不同的平均班级规模的欧洲公司的资本结构和审查意大利，

5、德国和法国类似的结果。在第4节，我们在欧洲的中小型企业评估是否受到信贷限制，以及是否金融市场不完善阻碍公司成长。第5节始于一个简单的银行业务关系的实证描述，在这里介绍的三个国家，并继续与该银行合并的关系，法国银行业的影响评估。 2.横跨一般公司结构类的资本规模 wagenvoort区分五个不同的大小级：非常小，小，中型，大型和超大型企业。为了激励这样的分析，人们需要记住，一个为小型企业缺乏外部融资可能会出现在其资产负债表负债方的。回顾过去一段长时间作为一个整体在欧洲，总负债权益比率是全国规模大致相同的类，因此，杠杆是或多或少的一个典型的中小企业与大企业相同的一个典型。金融债务比率，以总负债，其

6、中主要包括中小型企业的银行贷款案中，也是全国规模大致相同的类。 然而，wagenvoort也表明，正在跨越欧盟国家的平均中小企业的资本结构显着的差异。这三个国家的研究证实这一结果。圭索表明，在其总资产的比例为小企业金融债务是意大利大大超过意大利的大型企业低。圭索仔细解释说，这种差异是因为许多小公司没有在金融机构的贷款未偿还。事实上，有条件的，有金融债务，金融债务比率和金融债务的期限结构之间存在广泛的大小类相似。在与意大利而言，hommel和施奈德形成鲜明对比发现，德国中小型企业（即德国小型和中小型企业）更是负债比德国大型企业。三分之二的德国企业三分之二经营与资产比率低于百分之二十，而百分之41

7、的德国公司报告百分之十以下股权比例。与此相比，欧洲约三分之一的平均资产比率（见wagenvoort）。迪特希找到一个法国公司的同类资产的比例，不论其大小。总的来说，平均欧洲，法国和意大利的中小企业似乎并非是资本不足，德国中小企业。 wagenvoort还分析了企业如何资本结构随时间的变化。他认为，金融债务比率是非常不同的动力相比，一般公司为在小型和中型公司类平均在大型和超大型规模类。更具体而言，中小企业则似乎不那么灵活调整其资产负债表的结构比大企业不断变化的发展机会。尤其是金融债务比率上升（下降在不断增长的速度较慢）（收缩）比增长（收缩）大公司小公司。我们对这个结果的解释是，小企业在应对不断变

8、化调整生长条件的金融债务较少的灵活性。 3.金融约束这是配给的财务约束缺乏弹性这三个国家的案例研究得出一个明确结论：中小企业信贷配给是不是在意大利，法国和德国普遍现象。圭索建立一个模型，可以解释为什么有些小公司带来金融债务，而有的则没有。实证结果表明，这些企业没有银行贷款，往往是那些与股权融资，其资产的比例相对较高。圭索认为，股权比例之间的继承和金融债务的概率呈负相关假说与配给以来的尖锐冲突立场坚定信贷配给是不可能代替金融债务的股权。金融债务对许多意大利公司的资产负债表的情况下是这样，主要是因为他们不想借钱，不是因为贷款人不想贷款的情况。不过，圭索认为，当信贷约束约束力，缺乏规模和股权似乎发挥

9、了关键作用。因此，信贷配给情况多与大公司比小公司。迪奇指出，除了很小的法国企业与1比欧元的年营业额不足200万，法国中小型企业不增加银行借款时，他们的信用状况有所改善。在与小型和中型公司的对比，具有坚实的信誉非常小公司做比同等规模提高他们的同龄人更多的贷款，但较低的信誉。有鉴于此，迪特希得出结论认为，信贷配给仅适用于非常不利的小企业信用评级有关，他表明，在法国相对少数公司有这些特点。 hommel和施奈德认为，信贷增长在2002年在德国几乎瘫痪主要可以归因于德国目前的经济周期性衰退。无论，此外，从结构不良的德国中小型企业的供应受到副作用还有待确定。然而，鉴于德国公司，股本权益缺乏大的差距是主要

10、的财务约束和额外的债务似乎并没有成为在德国提出最佳方式。有几个合格的话，是很值得。一个需要牢记的斯蒂格利茨和魏斯的信贷约束定义意味着只有一家公司认为是配给，如果贷款人拒绝对贷款的需求，虽然借款人愿意支付将利率（以及满足其他条件）在向他人借款人相同质量相同的贷款。换言之，根据这一坚定不被视为信贷配给的定义，如果它不希望在要求借款利率的条件，即使该银行施加过于苛刻相对于借款人的真实信用。在这方面，是值得观察的银行贷款利率一般比大大高于中小企业大firms.4都迪特希实证研究结果和wagenvoort建议，从投资组合信用风险的观点未必是合理的。诚然，在个别小企业比大企业高风险，因为预期违约概率是企业

11、规模呈负相关。一般使用银行这一论点辩护小企业贷款较高的风险溢价。但是对小企业贷款组合，不一定比一个大公司贷款组合的风险较大。迪奇认为，违约相关性的内比在大型企业集团中小企业组。下违约相关性可以弥补在一个较高的个人信用库的违约机率。事实上，公司特定风险可以分散，而不是系统性风险。据迪特希，大公司更敏感，系统性因素（经济的总体情况比小公司）。这可能是不足为奇的，因为小公司通常比大公司少多元化。然而，中小型企业可能会显示更大的灵活性，其业务转型时的宏观经济条件恶化或改善。大公司往往会被锁定在现有的组织结构和技术。 总之，高利率对中小企业贷款的观察，似乎很难对信贷风险的唯一理由辩解。这可能是因为错误的

12、理由中小型企业支付高利率。银行可能会成功过度充电中小企业由于（本地）银行市场的竞争和有限锁定在上述效果。因此，由于资金的限制，根据中小企业的投资有可能大规模发生时，在严格意义上的信贷配给斯蒂格利茨和魏斯1981年不会广泛出现。 超出信贷配给和金融市场不完善，可能导致资金的限制，其中包括信贷配给，但也限制过度贷款定价和提高股票以外的困难造成测试wagenvoort举措。在财政困难的实证检验测试这里归结为金融变数是否可用，如内部资金量，已经对公司的投资产生重大影响，因此，它的增长。更确切地说，wagenvoort估计之间的关系上，一方面，企业成长和另一方面，现金流和资本结构。一个高增长的现金流敏感

13、性是一个迹象，金融具有约束力。下面的结果是值得强调。首先，金融限制往往阻碍少于50名员工的小型和极小型企业（即公司的增长），对平均而言，这些公司的增长是一对一的有关保留溢利。第二，尽管财政困难似乎是相对于大型企业增长减去中小型企业，他们的成长，具有约束力，但更多地取决于对内部资金theavailability。第三，高杠杆企业有更大的困难，开拓外部资金，因此，利用他们的增长潜力。怎么可能改善对中小企业的金融供给？它是有用的区分公共政策措施和努力，贷款人和借款人可以缓解资金制约。 wagenvoort简要回顾了对公共贷款方案和保障计划的有效性文献。主要结论是，虽然直接贷款和担保计划的受助人通常受

14、益，并帮助缓解资金的限制，它已被质疑是否改善了经济资源的分配。 不过积极的公共干预的净回报可以预期，如果干预减少借贷双方的信息，从而有助于解决问题的信息不对称。例如，公共当局可刺激贷款人之间的信息共享。最近的一项研究（哈佩利和帕加诺2002）显示，在贷款银行的贷款信息交流的增加，减少信贷风险。借款人和贷款人本身也有助于减少信息不对称解决中小企业直接融资问题。如上所述，在长期关系的建立有可能实现这一目标。 4.银行和银行合并的关系银行和银行合并的关系是否有经验证据支持这样的观点的关系可以缓解银行资金的限制？ ongena和史密斯（2000）报告说，在整个欧洲国家的银行企业关系的平均人数大幅变化。

15、这三个国家在这里证实这一审查的结果，这些都显示出公司作出相当多的银行使用研究。圭索的分析显示，在意大利的小企业保持平均超过4个，而意大利的大型企业银行信用关系多样化超过10多个信贷机构的需要。正如hommel和施耐德，德国中小型企业表现出的依赖，但就在德国的银行联系较少，甚至小的平均借贷从多个贷款人的德国公司。非常小的德国公司四家银行的平均贷款两间银行，而德国大约corporates有较大的关系。迪奇在法国发现类似情况，除了极少数的法国公司，只从一个单一的机构借贷。从而使小企业比大企业较少的银行企业关系。这三个案例研究文件，中小企业也比大企业保持较短的关系。计量经济学研究的迪特希之间建立了一个

16、明确的信贷供应，一方面积极联系，数量和另一方面对银行企业关系的持续时间。此外，较小的公司，较大的影响。例如，小企业更敏感，比大公司的银行关系的长度。从迪特希的工作，我们认为双方关系的银行和多家银行，可以刺激中小企业融资。为什么那么，中小型企业比大企业不断减少，缩短银行的关系？随着信贷状况改善的关系变得更长时，人们会期望信息不透明的中小企业留在同一债权人（第）。首先是数量的关系，是中小型企业必须散布在一个较小的贷款额，贷款固定费用迪奇指出，一个明显的原因。添加更多的债权人对公司的金融中介机构名单将触发额外的费用。因此，小公司可能不太愿意从银行借贷数在同一时间。但是，只依靠一家银行的缺点是，这家银

17、行可能变成一个长期的垄断。迪特希解释说，虽然它是由较小的公司通过维护费用昂贵，挑起多重关系的贷款竞争行为，打破小企业仍可能通过切换时间的流逝时，银行的垄断。这可能解释了小企业银行企业关系的持续时间相对较短。更重要的是，一个提供大量来源于银行没有事先寻求融资的公司与公司的关系附近和/或直接从银行的地理位于外面。这是很奇怪，因为它往往认为是最好的一家本地银行在该地区了解企业，基本上是小企业捆绑到当地银行。在确定双方关系的银行和多家银行加强为中小企业提供信贷，以调查是否迪特希继续在法国银行合并改变了这两个重要特征的欧洲银行他的分析。他强调，在法国银行的同时，巩固了在商业贷款市场的低浓度的手。兼并和收

18、购浪潮从而似乎刺激了信贷机构之间的竞争。笔者还表明，数量关系，银行企业大大增加了巩固期。在数量相对变化的关系是最小型和中型公司的重要。在债权人的人数增加信贷供应趋于改善，而事实上，中小企业在法国商业贷款市场份额已大大增加，在20世纪90年代。这个镜像是一个贷款相对下降，以大公司，这失去了其最初的百分之65的市场份额在1993年百分之八。 5.结束语银行合并和新巴塞尔协议中提出的具有普遍担心银行可能会减少他们的部分参与中小企业贷款市场。到目前为止，这些期望不能承担的实证研究结果。相反，有迹象表明，欧洲银行业在最近和未来的发展将实际促进中小企业贷款。尽管如此，不足50名雇员（或年营业额低于200万

19、欧元）资金的限制似乎仍然妨碍它们的发展，特别是对企业。这是值得指出的是，缺乏资金，并不一定意味着对债务缺乏。事实上，在严格意义上的信贷配给很少观察到法国，意大利和德国。但是，这并不排除中小企业贷款，银行滥收费用，并作为造成的，这种金融市场的不完善有一个对中小企业成长的负面影响，从而在经济大国，公众在支持中小企业的政策需要在这样一个地方提供的财政援助是最有约束力的方式限制设计。在这方面，股权融资，值得更多的关注。据经合组织最近的一份报告（经合组织2002年），小企业在获得风险资本的经验相当困难。在欧洲，小企业是相对不重要的市场上的股票相比，美国。因此，资金资本市场促进二次创业资金的需求和排名高的

20、政治议程。sme financing in europe: introduction and overviewabstract introducing the topic of sme finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this edition of the eib papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of sme credit; points out the di

21、fferences and similarities in the capital structure of firms across size classes and across europe; observes that while there is little evidence of widespread sme credit rationing, financial market imperfections may nevertheless curb sme growth; and highlights that the changes in europes financial l

22、andscape - including bank consolidation and basel ii - promise to foster sme finance. 1. introduction some of the changes in europes financial landscape should work in favour of sme finance. firstly, new information and communication technologies contribute, at a lower cost, to reducing information

23、asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making sme lending more attractive (see, among others, frame et al. 2001). secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being developed and implemented. for instance, banks adopt new portfolio credit risk model

24、s that allow them to allocate and price their resources more effectively.moreover, the use of credit risk transfer mechanisms (such as the securitarisation of sme loans) is spreading, allowing banks to focus on comparative-advantage activities, notably credit risk assessment, loan origination, and c

25、redit risk monitoring - all activities crucial for the provision of finance to smes. thirdly, equity capital is becoming increasingly available to smes through the development of (secondary) capital markets and venture capital finance. fourthly, the second banking directive of the eu aims at boostin

26、g competition between banks, thereby improving the terms and conditions of bank finance, including those supplied to smes. other features of europes financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for sme finance. firstly, consolidation in national banking marke

27、ts has reduced the number of banks and has in many eu countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the top-five largest institutions . this may be detrimental to sme lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small busin

28、ess loans in comparison to small, often regional banks.1 secondly, there is evidence (davis, this volume) that capital markets and institutional investors are gaining ground over banks. institutional investors are in competition with banks when collecting savings in the economy, but they tend to len

29、d less to smes than banks do. thirdly, a new capital adequacy framework for banks (basel ii) is in the making. the thrust of basel ii is to better align capital charges and, by extension, interest rates on loans with underlying credit risks. as sme lending is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as

30、particularly risky, many observers - in particular smes themselves - have been vocal in warning against a (further) deterioration of sme finance. why financing of smes tends to be more challenging than financing of large firms. reflecting these challenges, small businesses often have no other choice

31、 than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to banks as well as capital markets.we will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank competition on relationship banking. in section 3, we discu

32、ss the capital structure of the average european firm across different size classes and review similar results for italy, germany, and france. in section 4, we evaluate whether smes in europe suffer from credit constraints and whether financial market imperfections hamper the growth of companies. se

33、ction 5 begins with a brief empirical description of relationship banking in the three countries covered here and continues with an evaluation of the impact of bank consolidation on relationship banking in france. 2. capital structure of the average firm across size classesin analysing the capital s

34、tructure of firms, wagenvoort distinguishes five different sizeclasses: very small, small, medium-sized, large, and very large firms. to motivate this analysis, one needs to bear in mind that a possible lack of external financing for small businesses could show up on the liability side of their bala

35、nce sheet. looking over a long period and at europe as a whole, the ratio of equity to total liabilities is broadly similar across size classes and, therefore, leverage is more or less the same for a typical sme and a typical large firm. the ratio of financial debt to total liabilities, which mainly

36、 contains bank loans in the case of smes,3 is also roughly equal across size classes. however, wagenvoort also shows that there are striking differences in the capital structure of the average sme across eu countries. the three country studies confirm this result. guiso shows that the financial debt

37、 of small italian firms in proportion to their total assets is substantially lower than for large italian firms. guiso carefully explains that this difference is because many small firms do not have any loans outstanding at financial institutions. indeed, conditional on having financial debt, the fi

38、nancial debt ratio and the maturity structure of financial debt are broadly similar across size classes. in sharp contrast with the italian case, hommel and schneider find that the mittelstand (i.e. german small and medium-sized enterprises) is much more indebted than large german firms. two- thirds

39、 of german firms operate with an equity ratio lower than 20 percent, and 41 percent of german firms report equity ratios below 10 percent. this compares to a european average equity ratio of around one-third (see wagenvoort). dietsch finds a similar equity ratio for french companies regardless of th

40、eir size. overall, while the average european, french, and italian sme does not appear to be undercapitalised, german smes are. wagenvoort also analyses how firms capital structure changes over time. he finds that the dynamics of the financial debt ratio are very different for the average firm in th

41、e small and medium size classes in comparison to the average firm in the large and very large size classes. more specifically, smes appear to be less flexible than larger firms in adjusting the structure of their balance sheets to changing growth opportunities. in particular, the financial debt rati

42、o increases (falls) at a slower rate in growing (shrinking) small firms than in growing (shrinking) large firms. our interpretation of this result is that small firms have less flexibility in adjusting financial debt in response to changing growth conditions. 3. finance constraints is this lack of f

43、lexibility due to credit rationing? the three country case studies draw a firm conclusion: sme credit rationing is not a widespread phenomenon in italy, france, and germany. guiso builds a model that can explain why some small firms carry financial debt whereas others do not. the empirical results s

44、how that those firms without bank loans are often the ones that finance a relatively high proportion of their assets with equity. guiso argues that a negative relationship between the equity ratio and the probability of carrying financial debt stands in sharp conflict with the rationing hypothesis s

45、ince a credit rationed firm is unlikely to substitute equity for financial debt. the absence of financial debt on the balance sheet of many italian firms is thus mainly because they do not want to borrow, not because lenders do not want to lend. however, guiso finds that when credit constraints are

46、binding, size and lack of equity seem to play a key role. so, credit rationing happens more often with smaller firms than with larger firms. dietsch observes that, except for very small french firms with an annual turnover of less than eur 2 million, french smes do not increase bank borrowing when t

47、heir credit status improves. in contrast with small and medium-sized firms, very small firms with a solid credit standing do raise more loans than their peers of equal size but lower credit standing. in light of this, dietsch concludes that credit rationing is only relevant for very small firms with

48、 unfavourable credit ratings, and he shows that relatively few firms in france have these characteristics. hommel and schneider argue that the virtual standstill of credit growth in germany in 2002 can mainly be attributed to the current cyclical downturn of the german economy. whether, in addition,

49、 the mittelstand suffers from structural adverse supply-side effects remains to be determined. however, given the large equity gap in german companies, lack of equity is the main finance constraint and additional debt does not seem to be the optimal way forward in germany. a few qualifying remarks a

50、re worth making. one needs to bear in mind that the stiglitz and weiss definition of credit constraints implies that a firm is only considered to be rationed if lenders reject the demand for loans although the borrower is willing to pay the going interest rate (and to meet other conditions) on equiv

51、alent loans made to others borrowers of the same quality. in other words, according to this definition a firm is not considered credit rationed if it does not want to borrow at the requested interest rate even when the conditions imposed by the bank are too demanding relative to the true creditworth

52、iness of the borrower. in this respect it is worthwhile observing that interest rates on bank loans are in general substantially higher for smes than for large firms.4 both the empirical findings of dietsch and wagenvoort suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified.

53、 it is true that on an individual basis smaller firms are riskier than larger firms because the expected default probability is negatively related to firm size. banks in general use this argument to defend a higher risk premium on small business loans. but a portfolio of loans to small firms is not

54、necessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large companies. dietsch finds that default correlations are lower within the group of smes than within the group of large firms. lower default correlations can offset the higher individual default probabilities within a pool of credits. indeed, firm-

55、specific risk can be diversified as opposed to systematic risk. according to dietsch, large firms are more sensitive to the systematic factor (the general state of the economy) than small firms. this may be surprising as small firms are usually less diversified than large firms. however, smes may sh

56、ow greater flexibility in the transformation of their business when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate or improve. large firms are often locked in to existing organisational structures and technologies. in sum, the higher interest rates observed on sme loans seem difficult to justify on credit ris

57、k grounds only. it could be that smes pay high interest rates for wrong reasons. banks may succeed in over-charging smes due to limited competition in (local) banking markets and the lock-in effect mentioned above. therefore, due to finance constraints, under-investment by smes may happen on a large

58、 scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of stiglitz and weiss 1981 does not widely occur. wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may lead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive

59、 loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. the empirical test of finance constraints here boils down to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firms investment and, thus, its growth. more precisely, wagenvoort estimates