成本与管理会计（第15版） 课件 GE-hca15-ch22

CHAPTER22Management-ControlSystems,TransferPricing,andMultinationalConsiderationsCopyright©2015PearsonEducationChapter22learningobjectivesDescribeamanagementcontrolsystemanditsthreekeypropertiesDescribethebenefitsandcostsofdecentralizationExplaintransferpricesandthefourcriteriamanagersusetoevaluatethemCalculatetransferpricesusingthreemethodsIllustratehowmarket-basedtransferpricespromotegoalcongruenceinperfectlycompetitivemarkets22-2Copyright©2015PearsonEducationChapter22learningobjectives,concludedUnderstandhowtoavoidmakingsuboptimaldecisionswhentransferpricesarebasedonfullcostplusamarkupDescribetherangeoffeasibletransferpriceswhenthereisunusedcapacityandalternativemethodsforarrivingattheeventualhybridpriceApplyageneralguidelinefordeterminingaminimumtransferpriceIncorporateincometaxconsiderationsinmultinationaltransferpricing22-3Copyright©2015PearsonEducationManagementControlSystemsAmanagementcontrolsystemisameansofgatheringandusinginformationtoaidandcoordinatetheplanningandcontroldecisionsthroughoutanorganizationandtoguidethebehaviorofitsmanagersandotheremployees.Somecompaniesdesigntheirmanagementcontrolsystemaroundtheconceptofthebalancedscorecard.Well-designedmanagementcontrolsystemsuseinformationfrombothwithinthecompanyandfromoutsidethecompany.22-4Copyright©2015PearsonEducationManagementControlSystems,cont’dConsistofformalandinformalcontrolsystems:Theformalmanagementcontrolsystemofacompanyincludesexplicitrules,procedures,performancemeasures,andincentiveplansthatguidethebehaviorofitsmanagersandotheremployees.Theformalcontrolsystemiscomposedofseveralsystemssuchas:Themanagementaccountingsystemforinformationaboutthefirm’scosts,revenuesandincome.Thehumanresourcessystemforinformationabouttherecruitingandtrainingofemployees,absenteeismandaccidents.Thequalitysystemforinformationaboutyields,defectiveproductsandlatedeliveriestocustomers.22-5Copyright©2015PearsonEducationManagementControlSystems,concludedConsistofformalandinformalcontrolsystems:Theinformalmanagementcontrolsystemincludesthesharedvalues,loyalties,andmutualcommitmentsamongmembersoftheorganization,thecompany’sculture,andtheunwrittennormsaboutacceptablebehaviorformanagersandotheremployees.22-6.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationEffectiveManagementControlTobeeffective,managementcontrolsystemsshouldbecloselyalignedtothefirm’sstrategiesandgoals.Managementcontrolsystemsshouldalsobedesignedtosupporttheorganizationalresponsibilitiesofindividualmanagers.Managementcontrolsystemsmustbealignedwithanorganization’sstructure.Anorganizationwithadecentralizedstructurewillhavedifferentissuestoconsiderwhendesigningitsmanagementcontrolsystemthanafirmwithacentralizedstructure.22-7.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationEffectiveManagementControl,cont’dEffectivemanagementcontrolsystemsshouldmotivatemanagersandotheremployees.Motivationisthedesiretoattainaselectedgoal(goal-congruenceaspect)combinedwiththeresultingpursuitofthatgoal(effortaspect).22-8.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationTwoAspectsofMotivationGoalcongruenceexistswhenindividualsandgroupsworktowardachievingtheorganization’sgoals—managersworkingintheirownbestinteresttakeactionsthatalignwiththeoverallgoalsoftopmanagement.Effortistheextenttowhichmanagersstriveorendeavorinordertoachieveagoal.Effortgoesbeyondphysicalexertiontoincludementalactionsaswell.22-9Copyright©2015PearsonEducationDecentralizationDecentralizationisanorganizationalstructurethatgivesmanagersatlowerlevelsthefreedomtomakedecisions.Autonomyisthedegreeoffreedomtomakedecisions.Thegreaterthefreedom,thegreatertheautonomy.Subunitreferstoanypartofanorganization.Itmaybealargedivisionorasmallgroup.22-10.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationBenefitsofDecentralizationCreatesgreaterresponsivenesstotheneedsofasubunit’scustomers,suppliers,andemployees.Leadstogainsfromfasterdecisionmakingbysubunitmanagers.Assistsmanagementdevelopmentandlearning.Sharpensthefocusofsubunitmanagersandbroadensthereachoftopmanagement.22-11Copyright©2015PearsonEducationCostsofDecentralizationLeadstosuboptimaldecisionmaking,whichariseswhenadecision’sbenefittoonesubunitismorethanoffsetbythecostsorlossofbenefitstotheorganizationasawhole.Alsocalledincongruentdecisionmakingordysfunctionaldecisionmaking.22-12Leadstounhealthycompetition.Resultsinduplicationofoutput.Resultsinduplicationofactivities.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationComparingbenefitsandcostsTopmanagersmustcomparethebenefitsandcostsofdecentralizationwhenchoosinganorganizationalstructure.Decisionsrelatedtothetypeandsourceoflong-termfinancingaremadeleastfrequentlyatthedecentralizedlevel.Centralizingitsincometaxstrategiesallowsanorganizationtooptimizeacrosssubunitsbyoffsettingtheincomeinonesubunitwithlossesinothers.22-13Copyright©2015PearsonEducationDecentralizationand

MultinationalFirmsMultinationalfirms,companiesthatoperateinmultiplecountries,areoftendecentralizedbecausecentralizedcontrolofacompanywithsubunitsaroundtheworldisoftenphysicallyandpracticallyimpossible.Decentralizationenablesmanagersindifferentcountriestomakedecisionsthatexploittheirknowledgeoflocalbusinessandpoliticalconditionsandtodealwithuncertaintiesintheirindividualenvironments.Biggestdrawbacktointernationaldecentralization:lossorlackofcontrolandtheresultingrisks.Multinationalcorporationsthatimplementdecentralizeddecisionmakingusuallydesigntheirmanagementcontrolsystemstomeasureandmonitortheperformanceofdivisions.22-14Copyright©2015PearsonEducationChoicesabout

ResponsibilityCentersRecallfromchapter6thataresponsibilitycenterisasegmentorsubunitoftheorganizationwhosemanagerisaccountableforaspecifiedsetofactivities.Tomeasuretheperformanceofsubunitsincentralizedordecentralizedcompanies,themanagementcontrolsystemusesoneoramixofthefourtypesofresponsibilitycenters:CostcenterRevenuecenterProfitcenterInvestmentcenter22-15.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationTransferPricingInadecentralizedorganization,muchofthedecision-makingpowerresidesinitsindividualsubunits.Thosesubunitsoftensupplygoodsorservicestooneanother.Inthatcase,topmanagementusestransferpricestocoordinatetheactionsofthesubunitsandtoevaluatetheperformanceoftheirmanagers.Transferprice—thepriceonesubunit(departmentordivision)chargesforaproductorservicesuppliedtoanothersubunitofthesameorganization.22-16.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationTransferPricing,cont’dThetransferpricecreatesrevenuesforthesellingsubunitandpurchasecostsforthebuyingsubunitaffectingeachsubunit’soperatingincome.Theoperatingincomescanbeusedtoevaluatethesubunits’performancesandtomotivatetheirmanagers.Intermediateproduct—theproductorservicetransferredbetweensubunitsofanorganization.22-17.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationCriteriaforevaluatingtransferpricesTohelpacompanyachieveitsgoals,transferpricesshouldmeetfourkeycriteria:Promotegoalcongruencesothatdivisionmanagersactingintheirowninterestwilltakeactionsthatarealignedwiththeobjectivesoftopmanagement.Inducemanagerstoexertahighlevelofeffort.Helptopmanagersevaluatetheperformanceofindividualsubunits.Preserveautonomyofsubunitsiftopmanagersfavorahighdegreeofdecentralization.22-18Copyright©2015PearsonEducationThreeTransferPricingMethodsTherearethreebroadcategoriesofmethodstopmanagerscanusetodeterminetransferprices.Theyareasfollows:Market-basedtransferprices.Cost-basedtransferprices.Hybridtransferprices.Underwhatcircumstancesshouldeachoftheseoptionsbeused?Let’slookinmoredetailateachcategory.22-19.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationMarket-BasedTransferPricesTopmanagersmaychoosetousethepriceofasimilarproductorservicethatispubliclyavailable.Sourcesofpricesincludetradeassociations,competitors,andsoon.Or,theymayselecttheexternalpriceasubunitchargesoutsidecustomers.22-20Copyright©2015PearsonEducationMarket-BasedTransferPrices,cont’dTransferringproductsorservicesatmarketpricesgenerallyleadstooptimaldecisionswhenthreeconditionsaresatisfied:Themarketfortheintermediateproductisperfectlycompetitive.Theinterdependenciesofsubunitsareminimal.Therearenoadditionalcostsorbenefitstothecompanyasawholefrombuyingorsellingintheexternalmarketinsteadoftransactinginternally.22-21.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationMarket-BasedTransferPrices,concludedAperfectlycompetitivemarketexistswhenthereisahomogeneousproductwithbuyingpricesequaltosellingpricesandnoindividualbuyerorsellercanaffectthosepricesbytheirownactions.Allowsafirmtoachievegoalcongruence,motivatingmanagementeffort,subunitperformanceevaluations,andpreservesubunitautonomy.Perhapsshouldnotbeusedifthemarketiscurrentlyinastateof“distresspricing.”22-22.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationCost-BasedTransferPricesTopmanagerschooseatransferpricebasedonthecostsofproducingtheintermediateproduct.Examplesinclude:Full-costbases.Variable-costbases.Usefulwhenmarketpricesareunavailable,inappropriate,ortoocostlytoobtain,suchaswhenmarketsarenotperfectlycompetitive,whentheproductisspecializedorwhentheinternalproductisdifferentfromtheproductsavailableexternallyintermsofitsqualityandthecustomerserviceprovidedforit.22-23.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationCost-BasedTransferPrices,cont’dDespiteitslimitations,managersgenerallyprefertousefull-cost-basedtransferpricesbecause:Theyrepresentrelevantcostsforlong-rundecisions.Theyfacilitateexternalpricingbasedonvariableandfixedcosts.Theyaretheleastcostlytoadminister.22-24.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationCost-BasedTransferPrices,concludedFull-costtransferpricingalsoraisesmanyissues:Howarethesubunit’sindirectcostsallocatedtoproducts?Havethecorrectactivities,costpoolsandcost-allocationbasesbeenidentified?Shouldthechosenfixed-costratesbeactualorbudgeted?22-25.Copyright©2015PearsonEducation22-26HybridTransferPricesTakesintoaccountbothcostandmarketinformation.Topmanagementmaysetthepricesbyspecifyingatransferpricethatisanaverageofthecostofproducingandtransportingtheproductinternallyandthemarketpriceforcomparableproducts.Typesofhybridtransferprices:Proratingthedifferencebetweenmaximumandminimumtransferprices.Negotiatedpricing.(mostcommonhybridtype)Dualpricing.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationHybridTransferPricing,cont’dProratingthedifferencebetweenthemaximumandminimumcost-basedtransferprices.Dual-pricing—usingtwoseparatetransfer-pricingmethodstopriceeachtransferfromonesubunittoanother.Example:sellingdivisionreceivesfullcostpricing,andthebuyingdivisionpaysmarketpricing.22-27.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationNegotiatedTransferPricesOccasionally,subunitsofafirmarefreetonegotiatethetransferpricebetweenthemselvesandthentodecidewhethertobuyandsellinternallyordealwithexternalparties.Mayormaynotbearanyresemblancetocostormarketdata.Oftenusedwhenmarketpricesarevolatile.Representtheoutcomeofabargainingprocessbetweenthesellingandbuyingsubunits.22-28.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationComparisonofTransfer-PricingMethods22-29.Copyright©2015PearsonEducationMinimumTransferPriceTheminimumtransferpriceinmanysituationsshouldbe:22-30.Incrementalcostistheadditionalcostofproducingandtransferringtheproductorservice.Opportunitycostisthemaximumcontributionmarginforgonebythesellingsubunitifth