荷兰国际关系研究所（Clingendael）：从灾难到饥饿：需要立即采取措施遏制苏丹的大规模饥荒

CRUPolicyBrief

vnetteHoffmann

Clingendael

NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelations

FEBRUARY2024

FromCatastrophetoFamine

ImmediateactionneededinSudan

tocontainmassstarvation

TheconflictinSudanhasasubstantialimpactonthecountry'sfoodsystemandhinders

people'sabilitytocopewithfoodshortages.Asthecountryshowstheworsthungerleveleverrecordedduringtheharvestseason(fromOctobertoFebruary),whichisusuallyaperiod

whenfoodismoreavailable,theseverityandscaleofhungerinthecomingleanseason

(mid-2024)willbecatastrophic.Thispolicybriefarguesthatratherthantheinevitable

consequenceofwar,thisfoodcrisisistheresultofthegenerals'deliberatedestruction

ofSudan'sfoodsystemandtheobstructionofpeople'scopingmechanisms.Basedon

availabledataandfamineliterature,accountsfromhungersufferers,aswellasdiscussionswithexpertsinandonSudan,thispolicybriefoutlinesscenariosthatlookseveralmonths

beyondcurrentlyavailablefoodinsecurityforecasts.Accordingtothemostlikelyscenario,sevenmillionpeoplewillfacecatastrophiclevelsofhungerbyJune2024(IPC5),withmassstarvationbeingtheprospect.Thewindowbywhichtosignificantlyreducetheimpactofwhatisbecomingtheworld'slargesthungercrisisindecadesisrapidllyclosing.

Besidesincreasingdiplomaticandeconomicpressuretostopthewar,theEU,itsmember

states,theUs,theUK,andNorway,aswellastheUNandINGOpartnersmusturgentlyand

massivelyscaleupmeaningfulassistanceby:

i.DeclaringtheriskoffamineforSudan;

ii.Injectingmobilecashdirectlytolocalproducers,aswellastoconsumersandlocalaid

providers(EmergencyResponseRooms);

ii.ImmediatelyscalingupfoodaidandWASH(Water,SanitationandHygiene)support.

Introduction:Sudan'slooming

famine'

Thewarthateruptedtenmonthsagobetweenthecountry'sregulararmy,theSudaneseArmedForces,andtheparamilitaryRapidSupport

TheauthorisindebtedtoTimmoGaasbeek,aseasonedfoodsecurityexpert,forhisguidanceandassiduousworkonthemodelswhichunderpinthescenariospresentedinthisbrief,andtoAlexdeWaalandEdwardThomas

fortheircriticalfeedbackonanearlierdraft.Special

thanksgotothemanySudanesetrappedinsideSudan

ordisplacedoutsideSudanwhosharedtheirinvaluableobservationswithme.Thebrief'scontentnaturally

remainstheresponsibilityoftheauthor.

Forceshaskilledatleast13,000people²

anddisplacednearly8million³.AsGeneral

Abdelfattahal-Burhan(SAF)andGeneral

MohamedHamdanDagalo(RSF)signalno

2Aconservativeestimate,asthelatestreportbytheUN

PanelofExpertshasannouncedthatbetween10,000and

15,000peoplehavebeenkilledinonecityinDarfuralone:

EthnickllingeinoneSudancity.leftypto.15.000.dead,.

!Nreportsaysl.Reuters.

3PTMSuden-Month!y.DisplacementQveryiew(05)!.

DisplacementTrackingMatrix():

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intentiontoceasefighting,civiliansbearthe

bruntoftheindiscriminateairstrikes,shelling

andincreasinglyethnicallymotivatedtargetedattacks.Amongthe45millionSudanesestillinthecountry18millionarefacingacutehunger,justafterthemainharvest.4Thisisequivalent

totheentirepopulationoftheNetherlands.

TheWorldFoodProgramme's(WFP)country

directorforSudanhassharedaccountsfrom

centralDarfurandpartsofKhartoumwhere

peoplehavediedeitherfrommalnutrition

orstarvation.5Thosewhoaretrappedinthe

hotspotsoffightingreporteatingbarelyone

mealaday.Moreover,reportsofchildrendyingofstarvationaretricklinginfromrefugeecampsinChad.?

Sudan'sgeneralshavenotonlyproducedthe

worstdisplacementcrisisintheworldtoday.8

Theyhavealsocausedtheworsthungerlevel

everrecordedduringtheharvestseasonin

Sudan.9Thisisusuallytheseasonwhenfoodis

moreavailableandaffordablethanduringthe

remainderoftheyear.Thecurrentfoodcrisisisthereforeexpectedtobecomemuchworseinthecomingmonths.AlreadylastyearinDecember,WFPraisedthealarmhintingatanimpending

hungercatastrophe.0Still,theUNkeepsrevisingtsownpredictionsupwards,showingthatthefoodcrisisisdeepeningatanalarmingpace.

Earlywarningsystemslackaprotocolfor

dentifyingtheriskoffamine,evenwhenlonger-termscenarios,aspresentedinthispolicybrief,suggestthatthetrajectorytowardscatastrophescertainandtheriskoffamineisveryhigh.

4WFPwarnsthathungercotgstropheloomsinconflict.hitSudanwithouturgentfoodassistance!World.Food.Programme:

5WarPushesSudentoBrinkofFirstFamineinDecedes.WFP.Says-Bloomberg:

6HungerinSouth.Kordofan'sDalamigs.calmreturms.after.fighting-Dobongg.Rodio.TY.Q).

7SudanesechildrenfacestarvationinChadcamp-Chad!.ReliefWeb.

8Sudan:!QMResponse!!QM,UNMigrgtion.

9!PCSudanAcuteFoodInsecurity.Qct2023_Feb2024.Snapshotpd()

10Hungercatastrophe!oominginwarrovagedSudan,UN.ggeneywarms!UNNews.

CombiningavailabledataandfamineliteraturewithinformationobtainedfromSudanexpertsandhungersufferersinsideSudan,thispolicybriefsummarizestheimpactofthewaron

Sudan'sfoodsecurity.Itoutlinesscenarios

ofmonthlycerealconsumptionpercapita

inSudanthroughout2024anddiscusses

theirimplications.Thebriefpresentsthree

complementaryrecommendationsforurgentactiontocontaintheseverityandscaleofthe

escalatinghungercrisisandadvocatesan

overhauloftheearlywarningsystem.Failingtoimplementtheseactionswithoutdelaywouldmaketheinternationalcommunitycomplicit

inimmensesuffering.Alackoftimelyand

adequateactionbyworldleaderswillcontributetowhatisbecomingtheworld'slargesthunger

crisisindecades,andexacerbatethealreadylargestdisplacementcrisisintheworld.

Background:Aprotracted

hungercrisis

ExtremehungerisnotnewtoSudan.The

countrywasplaguedbyaprotractedcrisisoffoodinsecuritylongbeforethewareruptedinApril2023.Decadesofexploitativeextractionsystems,thathadpersistedundersuccessivegovernments,resultedintheimpoverishmentoflargepartsofthepopulation.Farmers,

agriculturalworkersandminersinthecountry'speripheriesproducedthecountry'smain

exportcommodities(gold,sesame,peanuts,gumArabicandlivestock).Alargepartofthe

exportearningswereusedtopayforimportedandheavilysubsidisedwheatfortheurban

population."Thissystemplacedaheavy

burdenongovernmentrevenue,whileleavingthepopulationintheperipheriesstruggling

tosurviveontheirsubsistencemilletandsorghumproduction.

ThesecessionofSouthSudanin2011,throughwhichSudanlostmostofitsoilrevenue,led

11Thomas,E.andM.ElGizouli,2020.Sudan'sGrainDivide:Arevolutionofbreadandsorghum.RiftValleyInstitute,BriefingPaper.Feb2020.

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toadeepfoodcrisisl.Overalllevelsoffood

insecurityrosesharply;by2014,about20%of

thepopulationcouldonlyaffordtoeatcerealsandvegetables,nomeatordairyproducts.13

By2019,Sudanhadthehighestchildmalnutritionrateworldwide.4Thiscrisisbroughthunger

tothecapital-forthefirsttimeinSudan's

history-andultimatelycontributedtoal-Bashir'sfall.Theshort-liveddemocratictransitionthat

ensueddidnotchangethepoliticaleconomyoffoodsystemsandthecoupof2021reinstalledthe"hunger-makingpoliticalmarketplace"15.Thesuspensionofinternationaldevelopment

assistanceandthewarinUkrainelfurther

deepenedSudan'shungercrisis.Duringthe

harvestseasonbeforethecurrentconflict

brokeout,16%oftheSudanesepopulationwerealreadyenduringcrisis(IPC3)orworsethan

crisislevelsoffoodinsecurity".

Impactofthecurrentconflictonfoodavailability

ThefightingthateruptedinApril2023

exacerbatedboththeprecariousavailabilityoffoodandpeople'sabilitytoaccessit.

Abouttwo-thirdsofthegrainconsumedinSudanisgrownlocally:mostlysorghumandmillet,andsomewheatl⁸.Domesticproductionhasbeen

seriouslyaffectedbythefighting.Someregionsaremoreseverelyhitthanothers.Inthemain

producingareasofDarfur,Kordofan,andGezira,

12DeWaal,A.(2019).'Sudan:Apoliticalmarketplaceframeworkanalysis,'WorldPeaceFoundation,

occasionalpaperno.19,August.

13E.Thomas,2024.Sudan'sFood-HungerSystem,publishedonHome!Peaceofsudan:Unroveling.AdversityoftheWarinSudan.

141WFP[WorldFoodProgramme](2019).'Sudan

ComprehensiveFoodSecurityAssessment2018:

TechnicalSummary:'Rome:WFP,p.7.

15Thomas,E.andA.deWaal.2022.HungerinSudan'sPoliticalMarketplace.OccasionalPaper#32.WorldPeaceFoundation.ConflictResearchProgramme.April2022,p.4.

1680%ofSudan'swheatimportsdependedonUkraineand

Russia.The-Sudon-Grisis-Conflictond-Food-Insecurity.Juy-2023.pdf(insecurtyinsightorg):

17FAO[FoodandAgricultureOrganisation](2023).GIEWSCountryBrief.TheRepublicoftheSudan.'Rome:FAO,p.2.

18SUDAN'SFOOD-HUNGERSYSTEM*(pegceofsudan.

SRqce!:

insecurityhaspreventedfarmersfromcultivatingtheirland.InthecaseofDarfur,independent

investigationshaveconcludedthattheveryaimoftheattacksbytheRSFanditsalliedArab

militiaistoclearthelandofitsnon-Arabfarmingcommunitiesandtoimpedetheirreturn.20

PeopleindisplacementcampsinDarfurare

systematicallypreventedfromleavingthecamptoworkontheirland.?1Productioninthisregionis

thereforeexpectedtobeonlyafractionofthatin

previousyears.

GeziraState,southeastofthecapital,wasakeygrainproducingareaforSudan,withoneofthelargestirrigationsystemsintheworld.Before

thewar,theregiontypicallycontributedclosetohalf(42%)ofSudan'stotalwheatproduction?2

andwasthemainareafornationalgrainstorage.SincetheRSFviolentlytookcontrolinDecember,farmingactivityhasbeenconstrained.23

Forceddisplacementjeopardizesthehiringofagriculturallabour.Moreover,thedestructionoflargepartsofGreaterKhartoumhasimpactedthefinancialservicessector,whichexplains

thedifficultyinaccessingthecreditneededtopurchaseagriculturalinputs,evenwherethey

areavailable.24InthemechanizedfarmingareasoftheEastandtheNorth,farmerscannolongeraccesscreditorfuel,onbothofwhichthey

dependtobuyseedsandfertilizersandtohaveaccesstoagriculturalmachinery.IntheNorth,farmersreportdifficultiesinfindinglaboursince

theSAFintensifieditsrecruitmentcampaigns.25Thedisruptionofpestcontrolserviceshas

furtheraffectedyields.Thiswascompounded

byunfavourablerainfallinpartsofthecountry.Aneventwithpossiblelong-termconsequences

19TemplateWorkingPoper(ifpriorg):

20LastreportbytheUNPanelofExpertsonSudan,Jan.2024.

21ExchangeviaSignalwithinternallydisplacedpersonsfromWest,CentralandSouthDarfur.

22SpeciolReport?0??:FAO.ropandFoodSupply.

AssessmentMisslon(CFSAMtotheSuden.20March.

2023-Sudan!RellefWeh,p.24.

23InstancesarebeingreportedoffarmersinElGezirawhohavefloodedtheirfieldstopreventtheRSFfromattainingfurtherterritorialgains.

24Phoneinterviewswithagriculturalinputwholesalersand

distributorsinEastSudan.

25ExchangewithfarmersinRiverNileStateviaSignal.

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isthedestructionofSudan'sgenebank,whichskeytothedomesticproductionofimprovedseeds26.

Asaresultofthefightingandprevailing

insecurity,theexpectedcerealharvestfor

the2023-2024seasonismuchlessthan

average:theFAOhasestimatedthesorghum

andmilletharveststobe24%and50%lower

thanin2022,respectively.?'TheRSF'sviolent

takeoveroflargepartsofGeziraState,the

country'sbreadbasket²B,hasaffectedthewintercultivationofwheat.AstheSAFhasstarted

itscounter-offensivebringinginlargearms

shipmentsfromPortSudan,afurtherescalationofhostilitiesislikely.WhatremainsofSudan'sbreadbasketisatstake.

Nexttothewar'simpactondomesticgrain

production,manyagrifoodprocessingfacilitieshavestoppedfunctioning.Fromthefirstday

onwards,thecapitalhasbeenthetheatre

ofintensefighting(includingairstrikesand

artilleryexchanges)andsystematiclooting.

AsmuchofSudan'sagrifoodprocessingindustrywasconcentratedinKhartoum,mostofthe

factories(includingaboutthreequartersofthecountry'swheatflourmillingcapacity)have

ceasedoperating,althoughlevelsofdamage

areuncertain.?9Evenifpeacereturns,itwilltakemonthsbeforethesemillswillbeoperational

againandproductioncapacitywillbebacktotherequiredlevel.

AsavitalelementofSudan'sfoodprocessing

industry,andabeaconofhopeinthecountry'sfightagainstchildmalnutrition,theonlyfactoryforready-to-usetherapeuticfood(RUTF)has

26Thousandgeneticstrainsfaceonexistentialthreattg.

ggrieuturo!!esearchinAlgzeergskim-Darfur24News.

27llefweb,int/repert/sudan/suden-ipe-ocute:

food-insecurty-qnalysis-october-2023-februg!y-2024-

published-december-!?-2023,p.11.[accessed28January

2024].

28WarinSudanengultsggricultura!hear!landamidrecord.levelsofhunger:Peoples.Dispgtch.Beforethewar,

GeziraStateproducedhalfofallwheatgrowninSudan.

29Armed.conflictandbusiness.gpergtionsinSudan:.

Surveyevidencefromogr-foodprocessingfirms.-!FPR!.PublicotionsRepository-!FPR!KnowledgeCollections.

beendestroyed.30RUTFiscriticalfortreatingseverelymalnourishedchildren.3IImportsfromelsewherewillsubstantiallyincreasecostsanddeliverytimes.

Thesignificantdisruptionofdomesticproduction

increasesSudan'sdependencyongrainimports.

WheatisthepreferredfoodforSudan'surban

population.aInrecentyears,wheatimportscoveredathirdoftotalcerealrequirements.Yet,in2023

officialwheatimportsreachedonlyhalfofwhatistypicallyimported.33TradersquicklyadjustedtothedisruptioncausedbythefightinginKhartoumandstartedtoimportwheatflour,mostlyfromEgypt.34WhenWadMedanifell,furtherhamperingflour

distributionWestoftheNile,theoldtradingroutefromEgypttoElFasherwasswiftlyreactivatedtosupplytheDarfurandKordofanregionswithfooditems,includingwheatflourandbiscuits.However,pricesareextremelyhighandpurchasingpower

continuestoplunge.RecenttensionsintheRedSeahaveledtoanincreaseinshippingcoststhatwill

furtherdriveupwheatprices.35

Asthegeneralscontinuetocausecatastrophic

levelsoffoodshortages,theirwardoesnotsparefoodaideither.Intheyearsbeforethewar,foodaidusuallyonlymadeupabout2%ofSudan's

averagecerealconsumption.36Whilethisseemstobeverylittle,foodaidcansubstantiallyimprovefoodaccessforhungryhouseholds-boththrough

30The-Sudan-Crisis-Conflictend-Food-Insecurity:?uly-2023.

pdf(insecurityinsightorg)

31In2022,theSamilfactoryproduced60%oftheRUTF

inSudan,aswellasready-to-usesupplementaryfood

providedbytheWFP.The-Sudan-CrlsisGonflict:end-Food.

Insecurity-?uly-2023pdf(insecurityinsightorg):

32T‘homas,E.andM.ElGizouli.2020.Sudan'sGrianDivide.Arevolutionofbreadandsorghum.RiftValleyInstitute.

BriefingPaper.February2020.

February1.2024():AccordingtotheMinistryof

Agriculture,thetotalofficialwheatimportsin2023coveredonlyone-thirdoftheestimateddemandduetodeclining

governmentrevenueandshockstothesupplychain.

Itisworthnotingthatmuchoftheseimportstookplace

beforetheoutbreakofthewar,implyingthatimportlevelsin2024arelikelytobefurtherreduced.

34Accordingtoawell-informedsource,inthefirstmonthsofthewar,thisinfluxofwheatflourevenledtoasurplusandadropinprices,whichkickedoutmostofthesmallertraders.

35Reportfromaknowledgeablelocalexpert,25January2024.36

https://www.peaceofsudan.space/post/sudan-s-food

.

hunger-system.

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CRUPolicyBrief

Marketsandtraderouteactivitymap,cropland,andviolenceevents,

December-January2024'

*FEWSNET.SudanFoodSecurityAlertFebruary1,2024:ClashesinSudan'sbreadbasket

threatennationalfoodavailability,2024.

directtargeting,andindirectlybymitigating

foodpricesinthemarkets.Yet,lessthanhalfoftheUN'sHumanitarianResponsePlanforSudanin2023wasfunded.37Meanwhile,containers

withfoodassistancearestuckinPortSudanduetotheauthorities'refusaltoissuetherequired

permits.Ofevenmoreconcern,thefoodthatdoesenterSudanstrugglestoreachthose

inneed,andfoodstocksthatwerealready

availableinWFPwarehousesinDarfurandWadMedanibeforethewarhavebeenlootedbytheRSF.38Todate,WFPhasonlybeenable

37SudanHumanitorianResponse.Plan2023!Financial!.

Irocking.Service(unochg.o!g)WFPfacesadditionalfundingconstrointsinthelightoftheRedSeashippingcrisis.

38https!!!www.W/news/wfp-condemnstheft-ife-saving-food-warehouse-gezirg-stote

toreachpeopleinneedinthecapitalonone

occasioninthelastthreemonths.OnlyoneoutoffivepeoplewhoaremostinneedoffoodaidhasreceivedfoodaidfromWFPsincetheconflict

startedinApril.39

Thehostilitiesaredisruptinglogisticsand

marketsacrossthecountry,especiallyin

GreaterKhartoum,Darfur,theSouth,and,morerecently,theSouthEast.TheRSF'stakeoverofWadMedanihasaffectedhumanitarianaccessandlogisticalconnectivitybetweendifferent

partsofthecountrybecausethewarringpartiesallowforhardlyanyfoodtocrossthefrontlines.

39WFPwarnsthothungercotastropheloomsinconflict.hitSudanwithouturgentfoodassistance!World.Food.

Programme:

CRUPolicyBrief

Unsafetransportrouteswithnon-discerning

checkpointshamperthedistributionoffood,

whetheritislocallyproducedorimported.

Inaddition,conflictinGeziraalsoledtomarketdisruptionsinneighbouringGedarefstate,

responsibleforalmost20%ofnationalcereal

production,whichwillmakeitharderforGedareftofeedcereal-deficitareas.Thisisterriblenewsforthosetrappedinthecrossfire,asfoodmostlyreachesthosewhoareinsaferregionsandwhoarehencebetteroff.

Overall,thedisastrousimpactthatthewarhasongrainproduction,processing,importsand

aidhasdramaticallyincreasedthethreatthatthiswarposestonationalfoodavailability.40Ithasdoubledthepercentageofpeople(35%)enduringcrisislevels(IPC3)orworselevelsoffoodinsecuritybyJune2023(duringtheannualleanseason)ascomparedtobeforethewar.

Despitetherecentharvest,thiswasforecasttofurtherincreaseto37%fortheperiodbetweenOctober2023andFebruary2024.4IThatis

thehighestpercentageoffoodinsecurity

immediatelyaftertheharvestonrecordfor

Sudan.ThedisruptioncausedbythefightinginGezirawilllikelyincreasefoodinsecurityfurtherinfooddeficitareaswestoftheNile.Asthe

leanseasonkicksinfightingcontinues,foodinsecurityislikelytofurtherincreasesharplyinthecomingmonths.

Impactofthewaronpeople's

entitlementstofoodand

copingmechanisms

AsSudan'shistoryhaspainfullydemonstrated,peoplecangohungryevenwhenthereis

enoughfoodavailablein(partsof)thecountry.42

Theextenttowhichfoodshortagesaffect

people'snutritionalstatushingesontheir

40TheSuden:Ropidgssessmentonthesummersegsen.ggriculturg!performance().

41Sudan:AcuteFoodInsecuritySituationJune2023and.

ProiectionsforJuly-September2023andOctober2023.

:Februory.2024!!PG.-!ntegratedFoodSecurity.Phase.

Glassificgtion(ieeinfoorg.[accessed28January2024].42Gedaref,acityinEasternSudan,illustratesthis

phenomenon:Althoughitproducesone-fifthofSudan'ssorghum,itsuffersabove-averagefoodinsecuritylevels.

entitlements,i.e.theirabilitytoaccessfood

throughothermeanssuchasproduction,labourandmarketexchange.43Itiscriticaltounderstandthesedynamicsofaccessanddistributionandtolearnfromthecopingmechanismsandsurvival

skillspeopledevelop.Unlessexternalinterventionstoalleviatehungerdrawonthisinformationandtakeaccountofregionaldifferences,theywill

beineffectiveatbestandriskmakingthingsevenworse.44

Inearliercrisessuchasthe1984famine,copingmechanismshelpedmanypeopletoavoidtheworstimpactoffoodshortages.TypicalcopingmechanismsinSudanincludelabourmigration,salesoffirewood/charcoal,theconsumption

of'wildfoods',andthesaleoflivestock.45Inthe

currentcrisis,however,accesstothesecopingmechanismsismuchreduced.

ThefightingbetweentheRSFandSAFhas

causedtheworld'slargestdisplacementcrisis.

AsofJanuary2024,almost8millionSudanese

havebeenforciblydisplaced.Whilemanyofthe

displacedinEastandNorthSudanhavemovedtoareaswheretheymayfindsomeworkandfood,thedemandforagriculturallabourwillbeverylimiteduntilthenextplantingseason(June-July2024).

ThedisruptionoftheongoingwinterseasonintheGezirairrigationschememeansthatthedemandforlabourfortheharvestinMarchwillbemuch

lessthanusual.Thislackofincomeopportunitieswillsendmanyhouseholdsintoaneconomic

tailspinbetweenJanuaryandJune.Inaddition,

duetothemassivedisplacement,thefewregionsthatcanofferworkareovercrowdedwithpeopledesperatetowork.Wagesarelikelytoslumpinthecomingmonths.IntheWestandtheSouth,where

rainfedtraditionalagricultureprevailedbefore

thewar,farmersusuallyhaveagreaterrelianceonunpaidfamilymemberstocultivatetheirland.Soevenwhensecuritystillpermitsfarming,very

43Sen,A.(1981).PovertyandFamines:Anessayonentitlementanddeprivation,Oxford,ClarendonPress.

44DeWaal,A.1989.FaminethatKills.OxfordUniversityPress;

Thebenefitsoffamine:gpolitica!economyoffamineand.reliefinsouthwesternSudan,1983-1989-LSEResearch.Online.

45DeWaal,A.1989.FaminethatKills.1989.OxfordUniversityPress.

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fewemploymentopportunitieswillbeavailable.Recruitmentintoarmedgroupsandmilitiasmayincreasinglybecomeoneoftheveryfewoptionstoaccessfood.

Thecombinationofpopulationgrowthand

large-scaledeforestationsincethe1980smeansthatwhilethedemandforcookingfuelinplacesofrefugehassurged,amuchsmallerpercentageofthepopulationthanbeforewillbeableto

earnanincomefromsellingfuelwood.46The

threatofsexualviolence,shockinglyeversinceacorollarywithfirewoodcollectioninDarfur,hasseenahorrendousincreasesincethewar.47However,hungerwillinevitablysubjectwomenandgirlstothatthreat.

So-calledwildfoods',mostlyfruitfromwild

treesandseedsfromwildgrasses,canbean

importantfoodsourceinruralareasintimesofneed.Theiravailabilityis,however,largelylimitedtotherainyseason,andinmanycultivatedareastheclearingoflandmeansthatwildplantsare

hardlyavailable.Inthecurrentsituation,wild

foodscanmakeameaningfulcontributionto

thedietsofonlypartsofthepopulationfrom

Julyonwards,particularlyinpartsofDarfurandKordofan.EspeciallyIDPsandurbanpopulationswillhaveverylimitedaccesstothesewildfoods.

Thesaleoflivestockhastraditionallybeenan

importantcopingmechanismforthosewhoownlivestock.Thiswilllikelybesothisyearaswell.However,veryfewurbanresidentsanddisplacedpeoplewillhaveanylivestocktosell,evenif

theyusedtoownanimalsbeforebeingforcedtoleave.

Justlikewaraffectsfoodavailabilityacrossthecountryverydifferently,theviolenceanddisplacementalsoaffectpeople'sabilitytoaccessfoodthroughalternativecommoditybundles-i.e.labour,firewood,forestfoods,

46Thismayhaveaspill-overeffectinChad:inthelastdecadeorso,WestDarfurwasanimportantsourceoffuelwoodforEasternChad.BecauselargepartsofWestDarfurarenotsafe,thismaywellexacerbatedeforestationwithinChad.

47SILENTWEAPONSLQUDESTWQUNDS:Addressing.the.GrisisofSexua!ViolenceinSudan-S!HA():

livestock-distinctlyacrossthecountry.ItisworthnotingthatthecurrentcrisisdiffersfrompreviousonesinthatthistimearoundurbandwellersandIDPsinurbansettingswillbehitmuchharder.

Theiraccesstolivestockandwildfruitswillbeminimal.Thetypicalurbansavings-buildings,vehicles,jewellery-havebeensystematicallytargetedandlootedbytheRSF.

However,somecopingmechanismssignifyalifelineforSudaneseacrossallregions:

remittancesandcommunity-basedsupport.

AnnualremittancesforSudanwereestimatedtobeUSs3billionannuallyfor2018-2019.48Althoughnotuntroubledbythewarandthecollapseof

Sudan'sfinancialsystem,diasporaremittancesremainavitalassistanceforthepeople.Even

ftheydirectlybenefitonlythosewithrelatives

abroad,thesefinancialinflowsalsokeeplocal

marketsalive,constitutingthedemand(or

purchasingpower)neededtokeepgoodscomingin.Withvaluablesandsavingshavingbeenlootedandpeopledisplaced,remittanceshavean

evengreaterrelevanceasacopingmechanismthanintimesofrelativepeace.DiasporalargelyreliesonmoneytransferagenciessuchasAltras,cryptocurrency,currencyexchangetradersandBankak,anapplicationoftheBankofKhartoumthatfacilitatesmobilemoneytransfers.Althoughinternetconnectionisunreliableandpatchy

inmostpartsofthecountry,thisappiswidelyusedandacceptedinsideSudanincludingbysmallshopkeepersandtradersinsteadofcashpayments.49Assuch,itconstitutesalifelineformillionsofSudanese.

Theotherlifelineenablinghungrypeopleto

accessfoodiscommunity-basedinitiatives

and,inparticular,EmergencyResponse

Rooms(ERRs).5°Bornoutoftheneighbourhood

48ThePotentialofSudanese.Diaspo