资本结构代理成本外文翻译文献

资本结构代理成本外及翻译文献（文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译）原文：TheImpactofCapitalStructureonAgencyCosts[Abstract]Thispaperaimstoprovideempiricalevidenceontheagencycostshypothesiswhichsuggeststhatincreaseofleveragemayreduceagencycosts.Bothmultivariatetestsandunivariatetestsareemployedinthisstudy.Themultivariatetestsrevealthatgeneralrelationshipbetweenleverageandagencycostsissignificantlynegative.Univariatetestsarefurtherusedtoassesswhetheragencycostsaresignificantlydifferentwhenafirmhasarelativelyhigherdebttoassetratiofromwhenitislessleveraged.Similarsupportingevidenceisfoundfortheagencycostshypothesis.Moreover,resultsfromtheunivariatetestsalsoindicatethatthisgeneralnegativerelationshipnolongerholdswhenanextremelyhighlevelofleverageispresent.[Keywords]Agencycosts,Leverage,Agencycostshypothesis,andOppositeeffectIntroductionIntheirseminalwork,JensenandMeckling(1976)pointoutthatagencycostsoccurduetoincompletealignmentoftheagenfsandtheowner’sinterests.Theseparationofownershipandcontrolmaygenerateagencycosts.TwotypesofagencycostsareidentifiedinthepaperbyJensenandMeckling(1976):agencycostsderivedfromconflictsbetweenoutsideequityholdersandowner-managers,andconflictsbetweenequityholdersanddebtholders.Fromthenon,agreatamountofresearchhasbeendevotedtodemonstratetheinteractionbetweenagencycostsandfinancialdecisions,governancedecisions,dividendpolicy,andcapitalstructuredecisions.Muchempiricalevidencecollectedbyresearchers,forexample,Angetal.(2000),andFlemingetal.(2005),showsthatagencycostsgeneratedfromtheconflictsbetweenoutsideequityholdersandowner-managercouldbereducedbyincreasingtheowner-managers’proportioninequity,i.e.,agencycostsvaryinverselywiththemanager’sownership.However,theconflictsbetweenequityholdersanddebtholderswouldbemorecomplicated.Theoretically,JensenandMeckling(1976)arguethatthereshouldbeanoptimalcapitalstructure,underwhichthelowestagencycostsofafirmcanbededucedfromanindependentvariable---“theratioofoutsideequitytothewholeoutsidefinancing”.Thelocusofagencycosts,whichisequaltoagencycostsofoutsideequityandtheonesofdebt,wouldbeaconvexcurve.Thisimpliesthatagencycostsshouldnotbemonotonicanymore.SomeresearcherssuchasGrossmanandHart(1982);Williams(1987),arguethathighleveragereducesagencycostsandincreasesfirmvaluebyencouragingmanagerstoactmoreintheinterestsofequityholders.Thisargumentisknownastheagencycostshypothesis.Higherleveragemayreduceagencycoststhroughthemonitoringactivitiesbydebtholders(Angetal.,2000),thethreatofliquidationwhichmaycausemanagerstolosereputation,salaries,etc.(William,1987),pressuretogeneratecashflowforthepaymentofinterestexpenses(Jensen1986),andcurtailmentofoverinvestment(Harveyetal.,2004).However,astheproportionofdebtinthecapitalstructureincreasesbeyondacertainpoint,theoppositeeffectofleverageonagencycostsmayoccur(Altman,1984andTitman,1984).Whenleveragebecomesrelativelyhigh,furtherincreasesmaygeneratesignificantagencycosts.Threereasonsareidentifiedintheliteraturewhichcancausethisoppositeeffect:firstreasonistheincreaseofbankruptcycosts(Titman1984).Secondreasonisthatmanagersmayreducetheirefforttocontrolriskwhichresultinhigherexpectedcostsoffinancialdistress,bankruptcy,orliquidation(BergerandBonaccorsidiPatti,2005).Finally,inefficientuseofexcessivecashusedbymanagersforempirebuildingwouldalsoincreaseagencycosts(Jensen,1986).LiteratureReviewJensenandMeckling(1976)identifyagencycostsderivedfromconflictsbetweenequityholdersandowner-managersas“residualloss”whichmeansagentconsumesvariouspecuniaryandnon-pecuniarybenefitsfromthefirmtomaximizehisownutility.Relatedtothisissue,Harris&Raviv(1990),Childsetal.(2005)andLeeetal.(2004)arguethatmanagersalwayswanttocontinuefirm’scurrentoperationsevenifliquidationofthefirmispreferredbyinvestors.Also,Stulz(1990),Alvarezetal.(2006)andKentetal.(2004)suggestthemanageralwayswanttoinvestallavailablefundsevenifpayingoutcashisbetterforoutsideshareholders,andconflictbetweenthemanagerandequityholderscannotberesolvedthroughcontractsbasedoncashflowsandinvestmentexpenditures.Agencytheorybecomesmorecomplicatedwhendebtholders’interestisconsidered.Asafinancingstrategy,debtiswidelydiscussedincapitalstructureliteratures.ModiglianiandMiller(1963)demonstratethatinordertoraisethevalueofafirm,theamountofdebtfinancingshouldbeasbigaspossiblefortaxsubsidyii.However,theirtheoryignorestheagencycostsofdebt.Theoretically,JensenandMeckling(1976)pointoutthattheoptimalutilizationofdebtiswhenthedebtisutilizedtothepointwheremarginalwealthbenefitsofthetaxsubsidyarejustequaltothemarginalwealtheffectsofagencycosts.Anumberofresearchersfocusontheissueofimprovementoffirmefficiencybyreducingagencycosts.Someofthemfocusonthemethodstocontrolmanagers’behaviors.Forinstance,Fama(1980)conductsadiscussionofhowthepressurefrommanageriallabormarketshelpstodisciplinemanagers.Hepointsoutthatthekeyconditiontoacquireabsolutecontrolofmanagerialbehaviorthroughwageadjustmentsisthattheweightofthewagerevisionprocessissufficientenoughtoresolveanypotentialmanagerialincentivesproblems.AnotherexampleisChance’s(1997)argumentonaderivatesubstitutionofexecutivecompensation.Hesuggestsgivingthemanagerstockswithoutrighttovote,whichcouldbebeneficialinpreventinganexecutivefromwieldingtoomuchcontrol.Otherresearchersareinterestedintheoptimalcapitalstructureunderwhichvalueoffirmscouldbemaximizedwhileagencycostscouldbeminimized.Basedontheseobservations,theagencycostshypothesisstatingthattheleverageaffectsagencycostsisputforward.JensenandMeckling(1976)arguethatmonitoringactivitiesbydebtholderswilltendtoincreasetheoptimallevelofmonitoringandthereforewillincreasethemarginalbenefits.What’smore,bankswhichareoneofthemajorsourcesofexternalfundsespeciallyforsmallfirmsalsoplayacrucialroleinmonitoringtheactivitiesofmanagers.However,assuggestedbyJensenandMeckling(1976),theeffectofleverageontotalagencycostscouldnotbemonotoniciii.Whentheproportionofdebtintotalcapitalincreasesbeyondacertainpoint,thelosswouldincreaseduetonegativenetpresentvalueprojects,andthefirmwillnotbeabletomeetcurrentpaymentsonadebtobligation,thusbankruptcywilloccur(Terjeetal.2006).AlthoughHaugenandSenbet(1978)arguethatbankruptcycostsareaninsignificantdeterminantofafirm’scapitalstructure,Altman(1984)findsthatindirectcostsassociatedwithbankruptcyarenotinsignificantwhenthesecostsareaccountedforthefirsttime.Titman(1984)givesapossibletheoreticallinkbetweenliquidationandcapitalstructure.Itlinksthepotentiallysubstantialcostsassociatedwithliquidationwiththeeventofbankruptcy.Furthermore,BergerandBonaccorsidiPatti(2005)suggestthatinhighlyleveragedfirms,managersmayshiftriskorreduceefforttocontrolriskwhichwouldalsoresultinexpectedcostsoffinancialstress,bankruptcy,orliquidation.Additionally,inefficientuseofexcessivecashwhichisderivedfromhigherthannormalleveragelevelforempirebuildingwouldalsoincreaseagencycosts(Jensen,1986).Therefore,atlowlevelofleverage,increasesofleveragewillproducepositiveincentivesformanagersandreducetotalagencycostsbyreducingthecounterpartofexternalequity.However,afterreachingacertainpoint,wherebankruptcyanddistressbecomemorelikelyandtheagencycostsofoutsidedebtoverwhelmtheagencycostsofoutsideequity,anyfurtherincreasesinleveragewillthenresultinhighertotalagencycosts.Thesubjectofthemeasurementsoftheagencycostsmagnitudeandfirmperformancehasbeenwidelydiscussedintheliterature.Thesemeasurementsareusuallytakenbyusingratiosfashionedfromfinancialstatementsorstockmarketdata.Angetal.(2000)madeoneofthefirstattemptstomeasurethemagnitudeofagencycostsbytworatiosfromfinancialstatements.Firstratioisaproxyfortheso-calleddirectagencycosts.Inordertofacilitatecomparisons,itisstandardizedasoperatingexpensestosalesratio.Secondratioisaproxyforthelossinrevenuesattributabletoinefficientassetutilization.Thistypeofagencycostsisderivedfrommanagemenfsshirkingorfrompoorinvestmentdecisions.Thisratioiscalculatedbyannualsalestototalassets.BergerandBonaccorsidiPatti(2006)takeadifferentapproachandemployprofitefficiencyastheperformancemeasure.Theyuseprofitefficiency,ratherthancostefficiencytoevaluatetheperformanceofmanagers,sinceprofitefficiencyexplainshowwellmanagersraiserevenueswhilereducecostsanditprocessestighterrelationshipwiththeconceptofvaluemaximization.Additionally,Saundersetal.(1990);ColeandMehran(1998)usestockmarketreturnsandtheirvolatilitytomeasureagencycostsandfirmperformance.DataandMethodologyDatausedinthisstudyaredrawnfromDatastream.323UKcompaniesareselectedfromFTSEALLSHAREindex.WechooseUKpubliccompaniesinthisstudybecauseofthreereasons:First,TheUKisacountrywithmaturemoneyandcapitalmarketswheredebtfinancingisrelativelyeasytoconductbycompanies.Second,maximizationofshareholders9wealthisthedominantgoalofmanagementintheAnglo-Americanworldwhichisconsistentwiththetheorythisstudyisbasedon.Third,dataofpubliccompaniescouldreflecttheeffectofleverageonagencycostsmoreaccuratelyandsensitivelyespeciallyintheefficientmarketsliketheUK.Therearefivevariablesusedinthisstudy.Table1providesasummaryofthesevariablesalongwithdefinitions.FollowingAngetal.(2000)’sstudy,wefocusonmeasuringthedirectagencycostswhichistheratioofoperatingexpensestosales.Thisratioindicateshoweffectivelythefirm’smanagecontrolsoperatingexpensesandittendstocapturetheimpactofagencycostssuchasexcessiveperquisiteconsumption.Operatingexpensesvariablehereexcludescorporatewages,salariesandotherlabor-relateditems,interestexpense,rent,leasingandhiringexpenses,purchases,depreciationandbadassetswrittenoff.Aseriesofchecksandfiltersonthedatahavebeenconductedtoreducethesamplefromamaximumofapproximately400ivfirmstoafinalsampleof323firmsforYear2004toYear2005.Thetopandbottom5%varealsoremovedtoavoidthepossibleoutliereffect.Themeasurementsofleverageandagencycostsarecritical.Debttoassetratioisemployedwhichistotaldebtsdividedbytotalassets.However,wedonotdifferentiatebetweenlong-termorshort-termdebt.Threeothervariablesareconsideredtocontrolotherconfoundingeffects:performance(proxiedbyreturnonasset),firmsize(proxiedbylogofsales),andindustryclassification(13industrydummies).Notethatweinclude13industrydummyvariablesinthisstudybecausetheratioofoperatingexpensestosalesvariesacrossindustriesduetothevaryingimportanceofinventoryandfixedassets.译文：关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响［导言］本文旨在提供经验证据对代理成本假说这表明增加的杠杆可以减少代理成本。两个多元测试和单变量测试用于这项研究。多变量测试显示,一般关系和代理成本显著杠杆消极。单变量的测试是用来评估是否进一步代理成本有明显的不同，当一家公司有一个相对更高的债务资产比率从当它是更少的杠杆。类似的证据被发现为代理成本假说。此外，结果从单变量测试还表明这一普遍的负面关系不再适用，当一个非常高水平的杠杆是礼物。［关键词］代理成本、杠杆、代理成本假说，相反的效果介绍在他们的开创性工作，詹森和梅克林(1976)指出,代理成本发生由于不完全对齐的代理和业主的利益。所有权与控制权的分离可能产生代理成本。两种类型的代理成本中确定论文詹森和梅克林(1976):代理成本之间的冲突源于股权持有人和负责人，外与矛盾，股权持有人和债务持有人。从那以后，大量的研究一直致力于证明代理成本之间的交互和财务决策、治理决策，股利政策和资本结构决策。很多实证研究人员搜集的证据，例如,Angetal.(2000),弗莱明etal.(2005)表明,代理成本之间产生的冲突外，股权持有人和老总可以减少通过增加所有者和管理者的比例股权，即代理成本成反比的变化与经理的所有权。然而，股权持有人之间的冲突和债券持有者将更为复杂。从理论上讲,詹森和梅克林(1976)认为应该存在一个最优的资本结构，即代理成本最低的一个公司可以推断，从一个独立的变量 “比外部股权整个外部融资”。这个轨迹的代理成本，这等于外部股权代理成本，那些债务，将是一个凸曲线。这意味着代理成本不应该单调更多。一些研究人员如格罗斯曼和哈特(1982);威廉姆斯(1987)，认为高杠杆降低代理成本，增加公司价值，鼓励管理者行为的利益，股权持有人。这个论点是被称为代理成本假说。高杠杆可能减少代理成本通过监测活动由债券持有者(Angetal.,2000)，这可能导致威胁清算经理失去声誉，工资，等等。(威廉姆,1987)、压力产生的现金流支付利息费用(詹森1986)，和缩减的过度投资(Harvey等人,2004)。然而,随着比例的债务资本结构增加到一定程度，相反的效果，利用代理成本可能发生(奥特曼,1984年Titman)。当杠杆变得相对较高，进一步增加可能产生重要的代理成本。三个原因中确定文学会导致该相反的效果第一个原因是破产成本的增加(Titman1984)。第二个原因是，经理可能会减少他们的努力控制风险，导致更高的财务困境的预期成本、破产或清算(伯杰和Bonaccorsidi帕蒂,2005)。最后，利用效率低,过度的现金使用的经理也会增加帝国的建立代理成本(延森,1986)。文献综述詹森和梅克林(1976)确定代理成本来源于股票持有者之间的冲突和所有者和管理者为“剩余损失”这意味着剂消耗各种经济和耐公司受益最大化自己的效用。与此相关的问题，Harris&雷维夫(1990),蔡尔兹etal.(2005)和李etal.(2004)认为,经理总是想继续公司的当前操作即使清算公司青睐的投资者。同时，以及(1990),阿尔瓦雷斯etal.(2006)和肯特etal.(2004)建议经理总是想投资所有可用资金即使支付现金是更好的为外部股东和经理之间的冲突和股票持有者通过合同无法解决基于现金流和投资支出。代理理论变得更加复杂当债券持有者的利益考虑。作为一个融资策略，债务资本结构文献的广泛讨论。莫迪利阿尼和米勒(1963)表明,为了提高公司的价值，债务融资的数量应尽可能大的税收。然而，他们的理论忽略了债务的代理成本。从理论上讲，詹森和梅克林(1976)指出,最优利用债务是当债务是用来点财富的边际效益税收补贴只是等于边际财富效应的代理成本。许多研究者关注的问题，提高公司效率，减少代理成本。他们中的一些人关注的方法来控制经理的行为。例如，法玛(1980)进行讨论如何管理劳动市场的压力有助于纪律管理者。他指出，关键条件获得绝对控制的管理行为通过工资调整，工资的重量修订过程足以解决任何潜在的管理激励问题。另一个例子是机会(1997)的参数在一个衍生物替代的高管薪酬。他建议给经理股票没有选举权，可以有效防止执行从挥舞着太多的控制。其他研究人员感兴趣的最优资本结构下，公司的价值可以最大化而代理成本可以最小化。基于这些观察，代理成本假说指出杠杆影响提出了代理成本。詹森和梅克林(1976)认为监测活动由债务持有人将倾向于增加最优水平