彼得森经济研究所-欧洲五大经济体的新冠疫情信贷支持计划（英文）-2021.4正式版

WORKINGPAPER

21-6COVID-19CreditSupport

ProgramsinEurope’sFiveLargestEconomies

JuliaAnderson,FrancescoPapadia,andNicolasVéron

April2021

ABSTRACT

Thispaperpresentsdetailedinformationaboutnationalcreditsupportprograms,includingguaranteesforbankloans,implementedinthecontextofCOVID-19fiscalpolicyin2020inthelargestnationaleconomiesoftheEuropeanUnionandintheUnitedKingdom.Theinformationwascollectedthroughthoroughexaminationofpublishedmaterialandextendedexchangeswithnationalauthoritiesandfinancialsectorparticipants.Ithelpsusunderstand(1)howcountriespositionedthemselvesonthemanytrade-offsthatemergedindesigningandimplementingtheprograms;and(2)whatexplainsdifferencesinusageacrosscountriesanditslevelingoffeverywhereinthesecondhalfof2020.

JELcode:H810

Keywords:Loanguarantees,Creditsupport,COVID-19,EuropeanUnion

Note:ThispaperhasalsobeenpublishedasBruegelWorkingPaper03/2021.TheauthorsaregratefultoUgoAlbertazzi,OlivierBlanchard,MarcelloBofondi,DanielBouzas,DavidBuettner,FredrikBystedt,JamesChew,RebeccaChristie,FrancescoColumba,FabrizioCoricelli,PierreDarbre,ZsoltDarvas,MariaDemertzis,LilasDemmou,LucDresse,CarlosGómezFernández,GuidoFranco,JuanDiezGibson,AlessandroGullo,MarkHallerberg,HendrikHartenstein,PatrickHonohan,AlexandreJeanne,BenediktKolb,KariKorhonen,AlexanderLehmann,AntoineMathieu-Collin,ErikNielsen,StephenPegge,JeanPisani-Ferry,NikoPlennis,AlessandroPrivitera,SébastienRaspiller,SimonRay,AliciaSanchis,DietmarSchwarz,EnricoSette,IsabelleVaillant,GuntramWolff,andStavrosZeniosforvaluablefeedbackandencouragement.

JuliaAndersonis

aresearchanalyst

atBruegel.

FrancescoPapadiaisseniorfellowatBruegelandchairoftheSelectionPaneloftheHellenicFinancialStabilityFund.

NicolasVéron

isseniorfellowatthePetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsandatBruegel.

1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA|+1.202.328.9000|

Introduction

In2020,EuropeangovernmentsmitigatedtheeconomicimpactofCOVID-19lockdownsandotherpandemic-fightingprogramsthroughahostofinitiatives.Theseincludedeffortstosupportcredit,suchasguaranteesforbankloans,particularlytosmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs).Wepresentandanalyzedetailedinformationaboutthosenationalcredit-supportprogramsimplementedinthecontextoffiscalpolicyinEurope’sfivelargestnationaleconomies(besidesRussia)in2020:France,Germany,Italy,Spain,andtheUnitedKingdom.Theinformationwascollectedthroughthoroughexaminationofpublishedmaterialandextendedexchangeswithnationalauthoritiesandfinancialsectorparticipants.Theanalyticalpartofthepaperfocusesontwoaspects:(1)howcountrieshavedealtwiththemanytrade-offsthatemergedindesigningandimplementingtheprogrammes;and(2)whatexplainsthedifferentiatedusageofthefacilitiesintheexaminedcountries,aswellasitslevelingoffinthesecondhalfof2020.Section1definesanddescribestheprograms.Section2presentsthetradeoffsweidentifiedinprogramdesignandimplementation.Section3exploresthefactorsexplainingactualusageinthefivecountriesandovertime,andsection4concludes.Theappendicesprovidedetailsontheprogramsforeachcountry(appendix5)andinsummarizedmatrixform(appendix4).

1Nationalcreditsupportprograms

COVID-19lockdownslimitedthespreadofthevirus,butalsothecirculationofmoney.Inthefirstlockdown,fromMarchtoMay2020,Europeansreducedtheirconsumptionby13percent.1Evenasdustgatheredindesertedshopsandworkspaces,however,employees,suppliersandcreditorsstillhadtobepaid.

Borrowingmoneyisoneofthemainwaysforbusinessesfacingarevenueshortfalltomaintaintheirliquidity—togetherwith,say,cuttingcostsorsellingassets.Intheircampaignstosupportprivate-sectorliquidity,Europeangovernmentshaveprovidedloanguaranteesandothercreditsupportmeasures,togetherwithtaxdeferrals,wagessubsidies,othergrantsandloanmoratoria.

Scopeofanalysis

Bychoice,weonlyincludeinouranalysiscredit-supportprogramsthatare(i)country-specific2and(ii)implementedinthecontextoffiscalpolicy.Asaconsequence,wedonotincludecredit-supportactionsimplementedbytheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB),suchasthecorporatebondpurchasingscheme3andthebankrefinancingoperations.4OursecondcriterionexcludestheBankofEngland’sTermFundingSchemewithadditionalincentivesforSMEs(TFSME),whosestatedobjectiveistoenhancetheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy

1

2

3

4

2020Q2.Source:Eurostat.

TheEIBprogrammesarebrieflyexploredbelow,giventheirsimilaritytonationalprogrammes,butnotseparatelyincludedinourquantitativeanalysis.

UnderthePandemicemergencypurchaseprogramme(PEPP)initiatedinMarch2020.

Suchasthetargetedlonger-termrefinancingoperations(TLTROs).

2

measures.5Intherestofthispaper,theterm‘credit-supportprograms’isusedtoreferonlytothoseprogramsthatfallwithinourscopeofanalysisthusdefined.Ourdefinedscopealsoexcludesloanmoratoria,thoughtheseprogramsarecomplementstocreditsupport.

Thebulkofthecredit-supportprogramswereannouncedasheadlineenvelopesforguaranteedloans.On27March2020,forinstance,theGermangovernmentannounced€50billioningrantsforbusinessesanda€756billionenvelopetobackloanguaranteeprograms(thoughitwaslaterclarifiedthattheenvelopededicatedtoguaranteeprogramswassubstantialsmaller,i.e.,€550billion).6Thiskindofannouncementmakesthecreditsupportcomponentappeardominant.Inallsurveyedcountries,headlineenvelopesofcreditsupportrepresentmorethanhalfoftherescuefundsannouncedforbusinesses(Figure1,PanelA)andareworthbetween14percentand20percentofGDP(PanelB).Theenvelopes,however,bearlittlerelationtoactualneedand,asshownbelow,actualusage.Furthermore,creditsupporttypicallyonlycostspublicfinancesafractionoftheannouncedenvelopes,sincetheytendnottobeusedtothefullestpossibleextent(seesection3)andmostguaranteedloansareexpectedtoberepaid.

Figure1:AnnouncedsupportmeasuresforbusinessesunderCOVID-19-relatedprogramsin€billions(PanelA)andas%of2019GDP(PanelB)

PanelA

700

626

600

500

400

349

356

300

200

100

60

102102

48

29

31

58

35

45

20

28

6

24

15

18

0

France

Germany

Italy

Creditsupport(max.nominalamount)

Loanmoratorium(paymentrelief)

Labor(incl.automaticstabilisers)

Recapitalisation

367

188

72

60

27

28

6

3

13

0

0

1

Spain

UnitedKingdom

Deferrals(incl.taxesandexpenses)

Otherbusinessmeasures

5

6

“Wheninterestratesarelow,itislikelytobedifficultforsomebanksandbuildingsocietiestoreducedepositratesmuchfurther,whichinturncouldlimittheirabilitytocuttheirlendingrates.Inordertomitigatethesepressuresandmaximisetheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy,theTFSMEwill,overthenext12months,offerfour-yearfundingofatleast10%ofparticipants’stockofrealeconomylendingatinterestratesat,orverycloseto,BankRate.Additionalfundingwillbeavailableforbanksthatincreaselending,especiallytosmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs)”.BankofEnglandTFSMEmarketnotice,availableat:

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/market-notices/2020/term-funding-scheme-market-notice-

mar-2020.

Theenvelopecontainstwoelements:a€400billionforguaranteesmainlytolargefirmsthroughthe

EconomicStabilizationFund(WSF,forWirtschaftsstabilisierungsfonds)anda€150billionincreaseinthe

lendingcapacityofthepublicfinancialinstitutionsKreditanstaltfürWiederaufbau(KfW).Inaddition,€100

billionoutofthe€600billionWSFfundareallocatedtosupportKfWincaseitfailstoraisefundsoncapital

markets.Ofthese€100billion,KfWhaddemanded€38billionasofJanuary2021.SeeAnswerofthe

FederalGovernmenttoformalquestionfrommembersofparliament

(https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/204/1920416.pdf)

andBudget2020

(https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl119s2890.pdf%

27%5D__1612867870111)

.

3

PanelB

25%

20%

20%

18%

15%

17%

15%

14%

10%

5%

3%3%

3%

3%

3%

2%

2%

2%

3%

2%

1%

1%

1%

1%

1%

1%

0%

1%

1%

1%

0%0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

France

Germany

Italy

Spain

UnitedKingdom

Creditsupport(max.nominalamount)

Loanmoratorium(paymentrelief)

Deferrals(incl.taxesandexpenses)

Labor(incl.automaticstabilisers)

Recapitalisation

Otherbusinessmeasures

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonpublicannouncementsasofAugust2020orlatestmajorannouncement.Note:Forloanmoratorium,figuresrepresentactualpaymentreliefsasestimatedbytheECB(2020c).Deferrals(taxesandexpenses)correspondtothe2020budgetimpact(i.e.excludesintra-yeardeferrals).Spendingannouncedandratifiedbynationalgovernmentsfor2020.Excludesautomaticstabilizersexceptforlaboursupportmeasures(e.g.,short-timeworkschemes).Forloanmoratoria,figuresrepresentactualtake-upasreportedbytheEBA(2020)andincludebothlegislativeandnon-legislativemoratoria.LimitationsoftheEBAdataisdetailedinthenotestoTable6.ForItaly,figuresexcludea€200billionenvelopeforSACEexportguaranteeswhichwasannouncedbutnotimplementedin2020.‘Creditsupport’includessmallorregionalprogramsnotincludedintherestofthisanalysis.‘Otherbusinessmeasures’includesbusinessgrants,taxreductionsandsectorialmeasures.

Table1liststhemaincredit-supportprogramsannouncedandimplementedinthefivecountriesinthewakeoftheCOVID-19pandemicupto30June2020(seeAppendix1forafulllistofalloftheprogramsincludedinthisanalysis).

Table1:MainCOVID-19-relatedcreditsupportprogramsimplementedinFrance,Germany,Italy,SpainandtheUK

Creditsupportprograms

Numberof

Envelopeof

programs

programs(%total)

Guaranteeonloansandothernon-tradecredit

14

92%

Guaranteeontradecredit

3

2%

Purchaseofdebtsecurities

2

5%

Fundingofloans

1

Seenote

Subordinatedloans

1

1%

Wholesalerefinancingofloanportfolio

1

0%

Total

22

100%

Source:Authors’calculations.

Note:Germany’sKfWprogram,whichprovidesbothloanguaranteesandfunding,isincludedhereasoneloanguaranteeprogram.IntheUK,fourprogramswereannouncedunderoneenvelope.Forthepurposeofthistable,wesplittheenvelopeequallyamongthefourprograms.TworegionalguaranteeprogramsinGermanyareextensionsofexistingschemesandwerenotannouncedwithenvelopes,sothattheirenvelopesarenotincludedhere.GBPconvertedtoEURusingexchangerateon4November2020.

Table1showsthat,inthesefivecountries,guaranteesonloans(andothernon-tradecredit)havebeenthepreferredcredit-supportinstrumentandaccountforthevastmajorityofthe

4

announcedvolumes.7Theseprogramscoverbankloans,butalsopromissorynotesandoverdraftsandinvoicefinancefacilities,amongothers.Intherestofthispaper,werefertotheseprogramssimplyas‘loanguarantees.’

Nineofthetenlargestprogramsareloan-guaranteeprograms(thetenthistheBankofEngland’sdebtsecuritypurchaseprogram).Thesenineheadlineprogramsaccountfor90percentofthetotalenvelopevolumes.TheyarelistedinTable2.

Table2:LargestCOVID-19loanguaranteeprogramsinthefivecountries

Dateannounced

Headline

Country

Responsiblebody

Facilities

envelope

(2020)

(€billion)1

Ministryof

France

Economyand

70%-90%guarantees

March25

307

Finance,via

onloans

BPIfrance

Ministryof

March23butonly

approvedbythe

Finance

European

(Bundesministeriu

Upto90%guarantees

CommissiononJuly

mderFinanzen,

onloansmainlyto

8(Commission

400

orBMF),viathe

largecorporations

approvalcame

Economic

2

withindaysforthe

Germany

StabilizationFund

otherprogramsin

(WSF)

thistable)8

80%-100%guarantees

March23;coverage

KfW

onloans(including

increasedto100%

150

financing);syndicated

onApril15

loans

70%-90%guarantees

SACEexportcredit

onloanandother

agency(partof

credittolarge

April8

250

CDPgroup)

corporationsand

Italy3

SMEs

Centralfundfor

80%-100%

SMEguarantees

guaranteesonloan

March17

100

(FondoCentraledi

andothercreditto

GaranziaPMI)

SMEsandmid-caps

60%-80%guarantees

March24;extended

topromissorynotes

Spain4

ICO

onloans;70%on

179

onMay5;envelope

promissorynotes

increasedon3July

ThisisconsistentwithotherOECDcountries(OECD2020b).

TheslowapprovalwasprobablylinkedtotherecapitalizationprogrammeswithintheWSF,whichisnotdiscussedhere.

5

UK5

BritishBusiness

Bank(BBB)

80%guaranteeson

March23

loanandothercredit

80%guaranteeson

loanandothercreditApril20tolargecorporations

100%guaranteeson

May4

loans

92

92

92

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonKreditanstaltfürWiederaufbau(KfW),Bundesministeriumfür

WirtschaftundEnergie(BMWi),BankofItaly,FrenchMinistryofEconomicsandFinance,SpanishInstitutode

CréditoOficial(ICO),UKTreasury,BankofEngland,GoogleFinance(forcurrencyexchangerates).

Notes:

Inallcases,theenvelopeamountreferstothemaximumnominalamountofcreditcommitted.

IntheKfWenvelope,wedonotincludethe€100billionallocatedtosupportKfWincaseitfailstoraisefundsoncapitalmarkets.WSFstandsforWirtschaftstabilisierungsfond.

CommitmentsbytheFondoCentralediGaranziaPMIarecappedbyitsendowment.Asof17March,theFondowassettoguaranteeupto€100billioninloans.However,itsendowmenthassincebeenincreased,thoughnoannouncementshavebeenmadeaboutchangesintheenvelope.Theannounced€100billionenvelopefortheFondoCentralediGaranziaPMIincludesprovisionsfortheSMEloanmoratoriumguaranteeprogram.Theannounced€200billionenvelopeforSACErelatestothevalueofshareoffacilitiesunderguarantee.Forcomparability,thisfigureisconvertedusingtheaverageof80%guaranteecoverage(i.e.to€250billion).A€200billionprogramtoguaranteeexportcredit,toberunbySACE,wasannouncedonApril82020butnotexpectedtobeimplementeduntil2021.Itisthereforenotincludedinthisanalysis.CDPstandsforCassaDepositiePrestiti;SACEstandsforServiziassicuratividelcommercioestero.

€140billionannouncedintwostages:€100billiononMarch24and€40billionon3July2020.Thesecondpackageisaimedatfundingnewinvestmentprojects.Theannounced€100billion+€40billionenvelopesrelatetothevalueoftheshareoffacilitiesunderguarantee(e.g.80%ofthefacilities).Forcomparability,thisfigureisconvertedusingthehistoricalaverageof76%guaranteecoverage.Amountsincludethe€4billionallocatedtothepromissorynoteguaranteeprogramonSpain’sMercadoAlternativodeRentaFija(MARF)andthe€0.5billionallocatedtothecounter-guaranteeprogramoperatedbyCERSA.

IntheUK,fourprogramswereannouncedunderoneenvelope.Forthepurposeofthistable,weassumethattheenvelopeissharedequallyamongthefourprograms.GBPconvertedtoEURusingexchangerateon4November2020.

Thecentralroleofpublicfinancialinstitutions

AsTable2illustrates,publicfinancialinstitutionsplayacentralroleastheadministratorsofnationalcredit-supportprogramsonbehalfoftherespectivegovernments.Theyadminister17outofthe22programslistedinTable1,and8outofthe9largestloan-guaranteeprogramsinTable2.TheexceptionistheGerman€400billionguaranteeprogramforlargecorporations,whichisimplementeddirectlybytheMinistryofFinance(BMF).

Figure2correspondinglyillustratesthetypicalset-up.Forexample,underloan-guaranteeprograms,abusinessappliestoitsbankforaloan.Thebankassessestherequestandreferstheapplicationtoanationalpublicfinancialinstitutioninordertobegrantedapublicguaranteeonaportionoftheloan(60percent-100percent).Iftheloanqualifies,theguaranteebecomesaliabilityforthepublicfinancialinstitution.Thecentralgovernment,inturn,supportsthebalancesheetofthepublicfinancialinstitutionthrough,e.g.,freshfundingorastatecounter-guarantee.Guaranteesontradecreditfollowasimilarapproach.

Amongcredit-supportprogramsotherthanloanguarantees,aminoritydonotrelydirectlyontheparticipationofeitherpublicorprivate-sectorfinancialintermediaries.Such

6

programsmaybeimplementedbythecentralgovernmentdirectly,orthroughcreditguaranteenetworksorwiththehelpofprivateconsultants.TheBankofEngland’sbondpurchasescheme(theCOVIDCorporateFinancingFacilityorCCFF),forexample,functionswithoutthedirectinvolvementofprivate-sectorintermediaries.Underthisscheme,theBankofEnglandbuysbondsdirectlyonprimaryandsecondarymarkets.Thecentralgovernmentis,however,involvedbecauselossesincurredbytheBankofEnglandundertheschemeareindemnifiedbytheTreasury.

Publicfinancialinstitutionstendtobehighlyidiosyncratic.Whereasmostarefullystate-owned,Italy’sCDPispartiallyownedbyothershareholders.Thewaytheyaresupportedbythegovernmentalsodiffers.Thestatebearsacontingentliabilityinallcountries.However,thisliabilityisdirectinsomecases(e.g.,intheGermanWSFprogramwheretheguaranteeisdirectlyissuedbytheMinisterofFinance)andindirectinothers(e.g.,intheGermanKfWprogram,whereKfWmustuseitsownfundsfirst).Thefiscalliabilitymaytakedifferentformsandmechanismsinthesedifferentcircumstances,ultimatelywithvaryingconsequencesfortaxpayers(seeIMF2020b).Insomecases,thecontingentliabilityissupplementedbyadditionalfundsforthepublicfinancialinstitutionontheassetside(e.g.,theFederalGovernmentwillsupportKfWforupto€100billionifKfWfailstoraisefundsoncapitalmarkets).

Figure2:Typicalfunctioningofcredit-supportprograms

Counter-guarantees/funds/authorisesincreaseindebtcapacity

Guarantees/refinances/buys

Issuesloans,bonds,orotherformsofcredit

Source:Authors’calculations.

Table3providesmoredetailoneachofthepublicfinancialinstitutionsinvolvedintheheadlineguaranteeprograms.

7

Table3:Publicfinancialinstitutionsintheheadlineloan-guaranteeprograms

Country

Implementing

Legalformand

Ownership

Centralgovernment’sfiscal

institution

supervision

liability

France

Bpifrance(known

Private-sector

Caissedesdépôts

TheTreasuryistheguarantor.

before2013as

société

etconsignations

BanquePublique

anonymewith

(CDC)50%,

d'Investissement)9

abanking

Frenchstate

license,under

50%.CDCisitself

directECB

apublicfinancial

supervision

institutionwhich

isfullyownedby

theFrench

government.

Germany

Kreditanstaltfür

Corporation

FederalRepublic

TheTreasuryistheguarantor

Wiederaufbau

underpublic

ofGermany80%;

oflastresort.KfWtouseits

(KfW)

law,supervised

16States

ownfundsfirst.TheFederal

byGermany’s

(Bundesländer)

Governmentalsosupports

BaFin

20%

KfWincaseitfailstoraise

fundsoncapitalmarkets(up

to€100billion).

Central

Publicfund

Ministryfor

TheTreasuryistheultimate

GuaranteeFund

managedon

Economic

guarantor.Endowment

forSMEs

behalfofthe

Development

increasefundedbytheItalian

Ministryfor

State.

Economic

Developmentby

Mediocredito

Centrale(full

name“Banca

delMezzogiorno

–MedioCredito

Centrale”),a

Italy

bankfully

ownedbythe

Italian

government

since2017and

directly

supervisedby

theBankofItaly

underECB

supervisory

oversight

SACEexport

joint-stock

Fullyownedby

TheStatecounter-guarantees

creditagency

company,

CassaDepositie

SACE'sobligations.

supervisedby

Prestiti(CDP).

Bpifrancewascreatedin2013throughthemergerofseveralpublicoperators(OSEO,CDCEntreprises,and

FondsStrategiqued’Investissement).ReferencestoBpifrancepre-2013referstothesepredecessorentities.

8

theBankof

CDPisitself

Italy,the

owned83%by

Instituteforthe

theItalian

Supervisionof

Ministryof

Insuranceand

Economyand

theCourtof

Financeand16%

Auditors.

byprivate

banking

foundations.10

Spain

Institutode

Corporatestate-

Fullyownedby

TheTreasuryistheultimate

CréditoOficial

ownedentity,

theSpanish

guarantor.

(ICO)

supervisedby

government.

theBankof

Attachedtothe

Spain

Ministryofthe

Economyand

Digital

Transformation.

United

BritishBusiness

Publiclimited

Fullyownedby

BEISistheultimateguarantor

Kingdom

Bank(BBB)11

company;no

theUK

andallprogramcostsare

independent

government.

coveredbytheTreasury.

supervision

Attachedtothe

Departmentfor

Business,Energy

andIndustrial

Strategy(BEIS).

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonOECD(2009,2013,and2020a),exchangeswithrelevantnationalauthorities.

AllofthepublicfinancialinstitutionsinTable3(ortheirpredecessors)shareexperienceofadministeringguaranteeschemesintimesofstress.Intheaftermathofthe2007-2009globalfinancialcrisis,publicguaranteedloanstoSMEsmorethandoubledinItalyandtheUKandrosebymorethanathirdinFranceandSpain(OECD2013).

Thanksinparttothispriorexperience,publicfinancialinstitutionsreactedrelativelyquicklytotheCOVID-19crisis.Infact,mostpublicfinancialinstitutionsbuiltonexistingprograms,expandingtheircoverageorrelaxingtheeligibilitycriteria.Thevolumes,however,havebeenunprecedented.Forinstance,onlysixmonthsintotheCOVID-19crisis,Bpifrancehadguaranteed€115billionworthofloans,oroverthreetimesmorethaninthewholeof2019.12

66bankingfoundationswhichalsotypicallyhaveequityparticipationsinItalianbanks.OnMarch5th2021SACEwasacquiredbytheItalianTreasury(/article/italy-treasury-nationalisation/italian-state-lender-approves-sale-of-export-agency-sace-to-treasury-sources-idUSL5N2L32LQ)

TheBritishBusinessBank(BBB)wascreatedin2014throughthecombinationofCapitalforEnterpriseLimited(CfEL),alimitedcompanyownedbytheDepartmentforBusinessInnovationandSkills(BIS),andoftheBISSMEpolicyteams.ReferencestoBBBpre-2014referstoCfEL.

Bpifrance2019AnnualReport,availableat:

https://www.bpifrance.fr/content/download/118487/981300/version/1/file/EPIC%20Bpifrance%202019%

20Annual%20Report.pdf.

9

Stateaidcontrol

TheEUstateaidframeworkgenerallyprohibitsnationalgovernmentsfromsubsidisingorotherwiseselectivelysupportinglocalbusinesses.13ThepossibleexceptionsareenumeratedintheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)andfurtherspecifiedinEuropeanCommissionregulations.14MostpublicguaranteesareviewedbytheCommissionasstateaid,totheextentthattheyareprovidedunderpreferentialterms(e.g.,premiumsthatdonotreflectmarketrisk).15

Allbutoneoftheprogramsincludedinthisanalysisreceivedexemptionsfromthegeneralprohibitiononstateaid,byspecificEuropeanCommissiondecision.16Theseexemptionswere,forthemostpart,grantedonthebasisofArticle107(3)(b)TFEU.Thisarticleallowsforlargegovernmentinterventionswherethereisa“seriousdisturbance”intheeconomyofanEUcountry.17InMarch2020,theEuropeanCommissionruledthatCOVID-19qualifiesassuchaseriousdisturbance(firstforItaly,thenfortheentireEU)and,asitdidin2008,18

Programmesthatmeetthefollowingfourcriteriaareconsideredstateaid:(i)theinterventionismadebythestateorinvolvesatransferofstateresources,(ii)theinterventiongivestherecipientanadvantageonaselectivebasis,(iii)competitionhasbeenormaybedistorted,and(iv)theinterventionislikelytoaffecttradebetweenmemberstates.SeeVademecum(2008).

TheGeneralBlockExemptionRegulationorGBERdeclarescertaincategoriesofaidcompatiblewiththeinternalmarketinapplicationofArticles107and108oftheTreaty(CommissionRegulation(EU)N°651/2014of17June2014).Specifically,theso-calledDeMinimisregulationallowsstateaidintheformofguaranteeswithcoverageupto80%forloansupto€1.5millionovera5-yearperiodprovidedthebeneficiaryisnotsubjecttocollectiveinsolvencyproceedingsnorfulfilsthecriteriaunderitsdomesticlawforbeingplacedincollectiveinsolvencyproceedingsattherequestofitscreditors.(CommissionRegulation(EU)No1407/2013of18December2013ontheapplicationofArticles107and108oftheTreatyontheFunctioni