联合国西亚经济社会委员会-阿拉伯风险监测：一个概念框架（英）-2023.3

ArabRiskMonitor:A

Conceptual

FrameworkE/ESCWA/CL6.GCP/2023/TP.2Economic

and

Social

Commission

for

Western

AsiaArabRisk

Monitor:Aconceptual

frameworkUnitedNationsBeirut©2023UnitedNationsAllrightsreservedworldwidePhotocopiesandreproductionsofexcerptsareallowedwithpropercredits.Allqueriesonrightsandlicences,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedto

the

UnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia(ESCWA),email:publications-escwa@.Thefindings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseofthe

authorsanddo

notnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsoritsofficialsorMemberStates.Thedesignationsemployedand

thepresentationof

materialinthispublicationdonotimplytheexpressionofany

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theUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthe

delimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Linkscontainedinthispublicationareprovidedfortheconvenienceof

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UnitedNationsdocument.UnitedNationspublicationissuedbyESCWA,UnitedNationsHouse,RiadElSolhSquare,P.O.Box:11-8575,Beirut,Lebanon.Website:.23-00081iiiAcknowledgementsThispublicationwasdevelopedbythe

UnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia(ESCWA),

GovernanceandPreventionCluster.Thisis

thefirstof

athree-paperseriesoftheArabRiskMonitor.Thefirstpaperintroducesanaction-orientedconceptualframeworktounpacktheriskofconflict,crisisandinstabilitywithafocus

ontheArabregion.Thesecondpaperpresents

themethodologyutilizedin

quantifyingrisk,explainingdifferentmethodsto

normalize,scaleandweightselectedindicators.The

thirdpaperistheArabRiskMonitor.Itexploresissuesshapingconflict,crisisandinstabilityinthe

Arabregion,measuringvulnerabilitiesandresilienceacrossriskpathwaysofconflict,climateanddiscussedinseveraliterationsinvolvingexpertsfromacademia,thinktanksandcivilservice.Thesemeetingsincluded:

Themulti-stakeholdersubcommitteetosupporttheattainmentof

theSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)inArabconflictaffectedcountries

(7December2022);TheContributionofDevelopmentto

theEnjoymentofAllHumanRights(8–9November2022);Thesustainability

ofnaturalresourcesinlight

ofclimatechange:a

perspectivefrompublicadministration(12–13December2022)andSustainableSolutions

forHumanSecurity,RegionalInitiative

onClimateSecurityforArabStates(26October2022).ThemaincontributingauthorsfromtheUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsiawereRaffaeleBertini,JulieBryhn,YoussefChaitani,Pattile

Nahabedianand

PietroTornese.ResearchsupportwasprovidedbyJalaEl-AkoumandTalaAbdulSamad.development.ThepublicationswereimplementedundertheguidanceofTarikAlami,ClusterLeader,GovernanceandConflictPrevention.

TheywereivvKeymessages••The

proposedconceptualframeworkconsistsof

threeriskpathways(conflict,climateand

development),eachleadingtoriskthroughacombinationof

twoelements:increasingvulnerabilityanddecreasingresilience.The

report

defines

vulnerability

in

terms

of

likelihood

andstructuralexposure

toshocks

and

resilience

in

terms

of

thepolicy-driven

capacity

toabsorb

the

negative

impact

of

shocks.

For

some

countries,

risk

is

driven

bylower

resilience

(e.g.,

having

less

fiscal

space

or

low

food

security).

Forothers,

it

is

driven

by

higher

vulnerability(e.g.,

a

neighbouring

conflict).••Historicalgrievancesareamongthestrongestpredictors

of

futureconflict.Theriskof

futureinstabilityiscompoundedbya

country’senablingsecurityenvironmentsuchasitsdegreeof

militarizationandterritorialcontrol.••Whileclimatechangedoesnot

directlycauseviolence,itsimpactcanaffecttheriskof

conflictthrough

anumberof

mechanisms.Impacts

of

climatechange,suchasmorefrequentandintenseextremeweatherevents,areincreasinglyfeltintheArabregionwhichisalreadycharacterizedbystructuralissuessuchaswaterscarcity.•Economicandsocialsystemsandinstitutionalsettingsthatare

notcapableof

copingwithstructuralandsuddenshocksare

athigherriskcomparedtothosewhohavethiscapacity.viviiContentsAcknowledgementsKeymessagesIntroductioniiiv11.

Aconceptual

frameworkfor

conflictriskA.

TheConflictpathway36B.

Theclimate

pathway8C.

Thedevelopmentpathway102.

ConclusionReferences1517viiiIntroductionProtractedandcomplexcriseshavebecometofocuson

improvingeffortsatprevention.Thecentralityofconflictpreventionisunderscoredinthe

UnitedNationsCharterinvolvingarangeofactorsacrossthethree

UnitedNationspillarsofpeaceandsecurity,developmentandhumanrights.Preventionisextensivelyfeaturedin

theUnitedNationsSecretary-General’s2021landmarkreportOurCommonAgendawhoseNewAgendaforPeacecallsformoreincreasinglycommonbeenthesceneofmuchoftheworld’sdeadliestepisodesofviolence.In2021,activeconflictsorfatalpoliticalviolencehadbeenreportedinsevenArabcountries,

whilebattle-relateddeathshadgoneup

forthe

firsttimeinsevenyears.1andtheArabworldhas234Asconflictscontinue

toimpacttheregion,theramificationsofhostilities

onpeopleandsocietiescompoundedby

othershocksormegatrendssuchasthewarinUkraine,theCOVID-19pandemicandclimatechange,furtherexacerbatefragilityandvulnerability.TheArabregionishometo

just6

percentoftheworld’spopulationyethosts34per

centoftheworld’sinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)and35

percentofrefugees.Theregionalsohosts31percentoftheworld’speoplein

needofhumanitarianassistance,aswellasreports16percentof

global

deathsresultingfromconflictorfatalpoliticalviolence.Suchastateof

affairsposesseriousrisksforsustainabledevelopmentandpeaceefforts.investmentsinpreventionandpeacebuilding,aswellasbettersupport

to

regionalactorsinsustainingpeace.Furthermore,MinisterialSessionresolutions271(XXIV)and282

(XXV)requestthe

UnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia(ESCWA)tomitigateandaddresstheimpactsofconflictwithinthecontextof

strengtheningsocialandeconomicdevelopmentwithintheArabregion.TheLeagueof

ArabStates’Multi-StakeholdersSubcommitteeto

SupporttheAttainmentoftheSDGsinConflict-AffectedCountriesrequestedthepreparationofanArabreporton

fragilityandaskedESCWAto

presentapreliminarystudyon

thismatter.Preventionisdefinedby

thetwin2016GeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncilresolutionsonThegrowinghumanandeconomiccostsofconflicthaveacceleratedmomentumforfragilecountriesand

fortheinternationalcommunitysustainingpeace5astheavoidanceof

“theoutbreak,escalation,continuationand12345UnitedNationsandWorld

Bank,2018.Aconflictis

consideredactiveifthereareat

least25fatalitiesperyearfrom

eitherState-basedor

non-Stateviolence.Egypt,Iraq,Somalia,Stateof

Palestine,Sudan,SyrianArabRepublic,and

Yemen.ESCWA

calculations

based

on

data

retrievedfrom

the

Uppsala

ConflictData

Program’s

Georeferenced

Event

Dataset

version22.1.(A/RES/70/262and

S/RES/2282,respectively).2recurrenceofviolentconflicts”.6Whilethereisriskofconflict,crisisandinstabilitywithaspecificfocusonthe

Arabregion.nosharedconceptualunderstanding,animportant

distinctioncanbemadebetweenoperationalpreventionsuch

asearlywarningsandotheractionsto

preventimminentescalationofspecificcrises,andstructuralpreventionortheneedtoaddresstheeconomic,socialandenvironmentalrootcausesofconflictorviolence.

Bothoperationalandstructuralpreventionarenecessaryconduitstoaverttheoutbreakof

potentiallydevastatingcrises.Drawing

upon

decades

ofempirical

literatureondriversandpredictorsof

conflict

or

fatalpolitical

violence,

the

framework

identifiesthree

“risk

pathways”

thatareassociated

witha

greater

risk

of

crisisand

instabilityintheArab

region.

The

framework

is

action-orientedas

itdistinguishes

between

“structural”

riskfactors

over

which

a

country

canexerciselimited

control,and

“policy-driven”

factorsthat

canbe

mitigated

thereby

allowing

decisionmakers

to

effectively

tailorresponseandprevention.7Againstthisbackdrop,the

objectiveof

ESCWA’sArabRiskMonitoristoadvancerisk-informedpolicymakingandintegratedresponseintheArabregion,whichincludesstrengtheningpreventioncapacitiesaswellasawarenessofdevelopmentstakeholders

includingthememberStatesofESCWA(and

theLeagueofArabStates).To

contribute

towardsthisobjective,themaingoal

of

thispaper–the

firstinaseriesofthree–istoproposeanaction-Theremainderof

thisbackgroundpaperisasfollows.Section2introducestheauthors’conceptualframework.The

rationaleandjustificationforeachcomponentisthendiscussedinsections2.1to

2.3withanoverviewofappropriateliterature,as

wellasitsrelevanceintheArabcontext.Section3concludes.oriented

conceptualframeworktounpackthe86Resolution2282(2016)/adopted

bytheSecurityCouncilat

its

7680thmeetingon27April2016.Resolution

A/70/262/adoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyon27April2016.78Desai,2020.By

“action”

weconsiderbothpoliciesandprogramming.31.

Aconceptual

frameworkforconflictriskTheproposedconceptual

frameworkconsistsofthreeriskpathways(conflict,climateanddevelopment),eachleadingtoriskthrough

acombinationof

twoelements:increasingvulnerabilityanddecreasingresilience.Theriskpathwayshave

beenidentified

by

drawingfromdecadesofempiricalresearchonconflictdriversandtheirrelevanceforthe

Arabregion,whiledefinitionsof

risk,vulnerabilityandresilienceareadapted

fromtheliteratureoneconomicvulnerabilityanddisasterrisk.violence,itsimpactcanaffecttheriskofconflictthroughanumberofmechanisms.11

Impactsofclimatechange,such

asmorefrequentandintenseextremeweatherevents,areincreasinglyfeltintheArabregion

whichisalreadycharacterizedbystructuralissuessuchaswaterscarcity.The

third

risk

pathway

is

through

social,economic

and

institutional

development.

Thispathway

represents

all

the

complex

set

ofdynamics

that

in

most

of

the

cases

are

director

indirect

causes

of

risk

in

the

Arab

region.Thefirstriskpathwayisthroughconflict.HistoricalgrievancesareamongthestrongestEconomic

and

social

systems

and

institutionalsettings

that

are

not

capable

of

coping

withstructural

and

sudden

shocks

are

at

higherrisk

compared

to

those

who

have

thiscapacity.predictorsoffutureconflict.

Theriskoffuture9instabilityiscompoundedbyacountry’senablingsecurityenvironment

suchasitsdegreeofmilitarizationandterritorialcontrol.10TheconflictpathwayiscrucialtotheArabregionasithasbeenthe

sceneofmostoftheworld’sdeadliestconflicts.Borrowingfrom

theliteratureoneconomicvulnerability

toshocks,12

theproposedframeworkthendefineseach“riskpathway”asthecombinationof

twoelements:vulnerabilityandresilience.Thesecondriskpathwayis

throughclimate.Whileclimatechangedoesnot

directlycause9Collier,2003.10

Risse

and

Stollenwerk,2018.11

Forfurtherdetailsaboutthetransmission

mechanismsseeUppsala–PeaceResearchInstituteOslo

(PRIO)&ESCWA,2021.12

Briguglioandothers,2008.4ESCWAconceptual

frameworkforconflictriskSource:

CompiledbytheEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia(ESCWA).Theconceptofvulnerabilityhaslongexistedinrelationshiptothesustainabledevelopmentofcountries.AneconomicandenvironmentalvulnerabilityindexisnotablyusedbytheUnitedNationsCommitteeforDevelopmentPolicyasoneof

thecriteriaforidentifyingtheLeastDevelopedCountries(LDC)asmandatedby

theUnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCouncilandtheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(UNGA).13

Amultitudeof

conceptualizationsofvulnerabilityandrelatedterms,suchasfragility,havesincebeendevelopedeithertoclassifycountriesaccordingto

theirscores,orasameanstodetermine

foreignaidallocation.14Whileinitially

focusedon

economicshocks,definitionsof

vulnerabilityhaveincreasinglybeenadaptedtoaccountforthegrowingawarenessofshockssuch

asclimatechange.Inthecontextof

disasterrisk

reduction(DRR),forexample,the

UnitedNationsdefinesvulnerabilityas“theconditionsdeterminedbyphysical,social,economicandenvironmentalfactorsorprocesseswhichincreasethesusceptibilityofan

individual,acommunity,assetsorsystemstotheimpactsofhazards”.15Thedefinitionwasnotably

spreadthroughtheworkoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)16

andtheSendaiFrameworkfor13

LDCIdentificationCriteria

&

Indicators

_Departmentof

Economicand

SocialAffairs./development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-criteria.html.14

Foranoverviewsee

United

Nations,2021Possible

DevelopmentandUsesof

MultidimensionalVulnerabilityIndices,AnalysisandRecommendations.15

Vulnerability_

UNDRR./terminology/vulnerability.16

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),2012

–Field,C.B.and

othersCambridgeUniversityPress,TheEdinburghBuilding,ShaftesburyRoad,CambridgeCB28RU,England,pp.582.5RiskReduction2015–2030,17

andusedin

thedevelopmentofriskmanagementtoolsforclimatichazards.18unpackrisk,

not

only

by

its

thematiccomponents

(e.g.,

economic

vs.

social

factors)but

alsoby

the

extent

to

which

it

is

subject

topublic

policy.

By

doing

so,

this

frameworksupports

policy

formulation

showing

what

acountry

can

and

cannot

do

to

mitigate

orexacerbate

its

risk,

andultimately

helping

totailor

prevention

and

response

policy

andprogramming.However,

the

DRRframeworkdoes

not

accountforshockssuch

asconflictand

violence

whichare

specifically

excluded

in

theUNGA-endorsed19report

produced

by

the

intergovernmental

expertworking

group.20

In

the

DRR

context,

hazardsinclude

only

“biological,

environmental,geological,

hydrometeorological

andtechnological

processesand

phenomena”.Forallthe

reasonsaforementioned,

this

reportdefines

vulnerability

in

terms

of

likelihood

andstructural

exposure

to

shocks,

and

resilience

interms

of

the

policy-driven

capacity

to

absorbthe

negative

impact

of

shocks.

For

somecountries,

risk

is

driven

by

lower

resilience(e.g.,

having

less

fiscal

spaceor

low

foodsecurity).

For

others,

it

is

driven

by

highervulnerability

(e.g.,

a

neighbouring

conflict).Another

feature

of

the

disaster-basedframeworkis

that

it

does

not

disentangle

between

structuralandnon-structural

factors

of

risk.

Structural

riskfactors

are

those

that

are

independent

of

presentpolicymaking

either

resultingfrom

past

choices

orinherent

to

the

economic

structure,

whicharerelatively

stable

over

time

and

therefore

cannot

beattributed

to

poor

policy

or

governance.

Examplesof

such

factors

include

a

country’s

reliance

onfood

andenergy

imports,

or

an

ongoingconflict

ina

neighbouring

country.

Non-structural

risk

factorsare

those

over

which

a

government

has

controlwhich

enable

a

countryto

withstand,

rebound

oravoid

the

negative

impact

of

a

shock.

Such

anability

is

enhanced

if,

for

example,

the

country

haseffective

public

institutions,a

skilled

labour

forceand/ora

strong

fiscal

position.

The

literature

onconflictdrivers

finds

bothstructural

andThisconceptualization

isinlinewithUNGAresolutionA/RES/75/215,callingforamultidimensionalindex

of

vulnerability

toshocks(nothazards)forsmallislanddevelopingStates,andthesubsequentworkcarriedoutbytheUnitedNationsOfficeof

theHighRepresentativefortheLeastDevelopedCountries,LandlockedDevelopingCountriesandSmallIslandDevelopingStateswhichunderlinesthedifferencebetweenstructuralandnon-structuralfactors.21non-structural

factors

to

be

associatedwith

risk.Theremainderof

thissectiondiscussestherationaleandjustificationforeachofthethreeriskpathwaysthroughanoverviewofappropriateliteratureaswellasitsrelevanceintheArabcontext.In

the

context

of

conflict

prevention,

then,

thedistinction

between

“structural”

and“non-structural”

factors

has

a

distinct

advantage.It

allowspolicymakers

to

understand

and17

TheSendaiFramework

forDisasterRiskReduction2015–2030.18

INFORM

Risk.

https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk.19

A/RES/71/276./access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/71/276&Lang=E.20

A/71/644.21

/ohrlls/mvi/why-need-an-mvi.html.6A.

Theconflictpathwayeconomiesand

State

capacities,

causingskilled

citizens

and

civil

servants

to

flee,

anddestroyingphysical

infrastructure,

amongstother

things.27

Civil

wars

alsoleave

behindorganizational

legacies

and

social

bonds

–

theties

that

formercombatants

formwith

oneanother,

and

with

key

stakeholders–

makingpost-conflict

countriesmore

vulnerable

tofuture

conflict.28

These

patterns

ofreoccurrence

have

been

referred

toas

the“conflict

trap”,

stemming

from

theirresolution

of

fundamental

issues

that

fuelledthe

conflict,

underlying

dynamics

andunresolved

grievances.29TheArabregionhasbeenthesceneofmuchoftheworld’sdeadliestepisodesofviolence.Between2010and2021,justfourArabcountries–Iraq,Somalia,SyrianArabRepublic,andYemen–accountedfor55

percentof

theworld’sconflict-relateddeaths.22

Drawingfromempiricalliterature,theconflictpathwayto

riskidentifiestwokeyfactorsashavingthegreatestpotentialto

affectfutureconflictriskintheArabregion:thelegacyof

prior

conflictsandtheenablingsecurityenvironment.1.

Historicalgrievances2.

EnablingsecurityenvironmentLiteraturefindsthatcountrieswhohaveexperiencedconflictin

the

pastaremuchmorelikelytoreturntowarthanarecountriesthathavebeenat

peace.23

Protractedconflicts,especiallycivilwars,leadto

dividedandfractionalizedsocieties.24

Thelegacyofhatredandmistrustresultingfrompastconflictpersistslongafterithasendedandcanbehardtoovercome,asconflictleavesbehinda

dividedsocietyandservesasacatalystforpolicyandpoliticalinstitutiondeterioration,leadingtoahigherriskofrecurrence.25

ThisisparticularlytrueintheabsenceofameaningfulInadditiontothelegacyofpriorconflict,literaturefindsthatacountry’sbroadersecurityenvironment–suchasaState’sabilitytoprovidesecurity,theextenttowhichitmaintainscontrol

oftheterritoryand

thepressureofforciblydisplacedpopulations–canalsoaffecttheriskofconflict.Firstly,securityisoneofthemostessentialservicesthatagovernmentprovidestoitscitizens.AState’ssecuritysectorensuresitsmonopolyoverviolence,abilityto

ensuresovereignty,controloverterritoryandpublicsafety.30

Poorlymanagedor

ineffectivesecuritysystemscanoftenresultininstabilityandinsecurity,signallingthat

thosecountrieswithlargeandfar-reachingsecurityforcesarelessreconciliationprocess.26Inaddition,

priorconflictsexacerbate

thosefactors

that

make

countries

vulnerable

to

warsin

the

first

place

by

weakening

their22

ESCWA

calculations

based

on

data

retrievedfrom

the

Uppsala

ConflictDataProgram’s

Georeferenced

Event

Dataset,version

22.1.23

Gatesandothers,2016.24

Palikandothers,2022.25

Collier,2003.

p.

22;Kaufmann,1996.26

Bloomfieldandothers,2003.27

ESCWA,2020;Walter,2004.28

Daly,2012;Christensen,

2008.29

Collier,

2003.p.

83.30

Collierandothers,2009.7proneto

conflict.31

Armedforcesthataregroups.37

Therefore,

professionalmilitarycapabilitieswithreachintoruralandsecludedareasarerequiredforthe

Stateto

beable

toprojectitsauthorityacrossitsterritoryandimposeorderwithinitsjurisdiction.38

WhenaStatelacksterritorialauthorityitslegitimacyisimpairedwhichcanleadtodistrusttowardsthegovernmentanditsservices.39untrainedand

undisciplinedcanfacilitate

theescalationofviolencedue

to

theirlimitedabilitytoprotectandmitigatesecurityconcerns.32Weaksecuritysystemscan

leadtoseveralnegativeconsequencesastheStateisplacedinapositionof

disadvantage.

Forexample,theabsenceofeffectiveStatesecuritycouldleadtoarmedmilitiasandcompetitionwhichwouldresultinfurtherconflictor

acceptanceofviolenceasadisputeresolutionmethod.ThepresenceofeffectiveState

securitylimitstheincentivesforpeopletojoinmilitantgroupsasameansofprotection.33

To

thisavail,adisciplinedsecurityforcethatpracticeshumanrights,internationalconventionsandruleof

lawinitssecurityoperationscanhelpensurethataState'smonopolyon

violenceismaintainedandsufficientto

preventeitherthedemandformoremilitantgroupsortheproliferationofviolence;34andinadditiondeteranyforeignaggression.Finally,peoplefleeconflictareasinsearchofsafety,theirdisplacementandsubsequentsettlementinhostcommunitiesmayposeariskfactorcontributingto

societalfragility.Forciblydisplacedpeoplearemade

vulnerablethroughalossofland,assets,livelihoodsandsocialcapital.40

Additionally,manysufferfromtraumaandarevictimsofsexualandgender-basedviolence.Heightenedsecurityconcernsandtheinflowof

refugeescanalsoincreasetensionsinhostcommunities.Thisisbecausedisplacedpopulationscanhavesignificantdestabilizingeffectsinfragilecontextsastheirsuddeninfluxmayincreasepoliticaltension,insecurityandvulnerability.

OftenStatesandcommunitieshostingIDPs,andrefugees

themselves,arealreadyaffectedbyconflictorcrisesandtheadditionalstressesandshocksresultingfromaninflux

ofdisplacedpersonscanleadto

tensionsandoutbreaksofviolenceintheseSecondly,alackofeffectiveterritorialcontrolisassociatedwithextensive

periodsofviolence.35Theextentto

whichaState

controlsitsterritoryimpactsitsabilityto

deliverbasicservicestoitscitizensandexecuteitsmonopolyof

force.ForaStateto

beable

toprovide

securitytoitscitizens,itfirstneedsto

maintainamonopolyoforganizedviolencewithindifferentlocalcommunities36

andsecureitthroughitsabilitytodissuadepotentialchallengersorarmedcommunities.41

SuddensignificantinflowsofdisplacedpersonsintoaState,and

particularlyintocrowdedurbanareas,canhaveanegative31

HegreandSambanis,2006.32

HumphreysandWeinstein,2006.33

Ball,2005.34

Fearon,2011.35

De

laCalleandSánchez-Cuenca,2015.36

Naudéandothers,2011.37

CollierandHoeffler,2004.38

Herbst,2004.39

SchmelzleandStollenwerk,2018.40

Corralandothers,2020.41

Landry,2013.8effectonStatestabilitydue

totheeconomic,environmental

andsecurity-relatedstressesexperiencedbythehostcommunityaswellasanincreasedstrainonbasicresourcesandservices.42

Asanincreaseinrefugeepopulationscanleadtoresourcecompetition,thismightincreasetensionswithhostcommunitiesandcontributetowardsan(re)emergenceofcivilwar.43andtheprevalenceof

rainfedagriculturalland49inseveralcountries.Despitethis,thereareindicationsthatadaptationmeasuresarelessnumerousintheArabregionthanelsewhere.501.

ClimatehazardsWhileclimatechangedoesnot

directlycauseviolentconflict,itcanaffecttheriskofconflictthroughseveraltransmissionmechanismsnamelylossoflivelihoods,

competitionforresources,migrationanddisplacement,B.

Theclimatepathwaymacroeconomiccontractionand

foodTheimpactsofclimatechangeareincreasinglyfeltacrosstheArabworldwith21differentnaturaldisasterstakingplacein2021affectingalmost20.8millionpeople.44

Theregionisalreadysufferingfromwaterscarcity45

andlanddegradation,whichmay

be

exacerbatedbyclimatechange.46

Climatechange-inducedwaterscarcitymight,forexample,leadgrossdomesticproducttodropby

upto

14

percentby2050.47Theregion’sexposureto

climateimpactisalsoaffectedbylargeemployment

inagriculture48insecurity.51

Losso