观察家研究基金会-走向知情话语与选民教育：电子竞选批判（英文）-2021.5-25正式版

IssueBrief

ISSUENO.466MAY2021

©2021ObserverResearchFoundation.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copied,archived,retainedortransmittedthroughprint,speechorelectronicmediawithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromORF.

TowardsInformedDiscourseandVoterEducation:ACritiqueofE-Campaigns

ArchitLohaniand

PriyalPandey

Abstract

Digitalspacesarebecomingincreasinglyvitalforpublicdeliberationonissuesofsharedinterest,includingduringelectoralcampaigns.Thisbriefexaminesthetypesofdiscourseonsocialmediaplatformsthatelectoralcandidatesengagein.Itstudiesthecontentoftheonlinecampaignsandtheirpotentialimpactonvotereducation,andrecommendscountermeasuresagainstthethreatofuninformedandunethicalonlinenarrativesthatonlyencouragepolarisation,ratherthangenuinediscourse.

Attribution:ArchitLohaniandPriyalPandey,“TowardsInformedDiscourseandVoterEducation:ACritique

ofE-Campaigns,”ORFIssueBriefNo.466,May2021,ObserverResearchFoundation.

01

Introduction

Inthelastfewyears,onlineplatformshavestartedoutstrippingtraditionalprintmediaassourcesofnewsandotherinformationarelevantduringelectoralcampaigns.1Theseplatformsenabledirectinteractionbetweenthecandidateandthetargetvoters.Publicperceptioniskeyinelections,2afterall,andtheopticsofone’scampaigncanbedirectlylinkedtothe

informationthatismadeavailabletovoters.Socialmedia,inparticular,areakeytoolforelectoralcandidatesastheyfacilitateeasyandeffectiveonlineengagement.3

TheElectionCommissionofIndia(ECI)hasrecognisedtheneedtonotonlyencouragehighervotingturnoutsbuttoalsopromoteatrulyparticipative,informedandethicalvoting.In2009,itlaunchedtheSystematicVoters’EducationandElectoralParticipation,itsflagshipprogrammeforvotereducation.Morethanadecadesince,however,theECIhasyettocreateeffectivemechanismstorespondtothemisuseofsocialmediaforelectioncampaigns.Thereexistsalegalframeworkforaddressingtraditional,“offline”abuseslikeboothcapturingandvote-buying;butasimilarmechanismisabsentfornewerformsofmalpracticethathaveevolvedononlineplatforms.Theseactivitiesincludeinformationtamperingbygovernmentagencies,politicalparties,privatefirms,media,andinfluencers;4disseminationofhatespeech;5misinformation;6voterprofiling;andblackpropaganda.7

TheSupremeCourt(SC)ofIndiahaslaiddownafundamentalprinciple:thatavoter’srighttofreespeechentailsarighttoreceiveinformationaswell.8TheSCarguedthatsuchinformationenablescriticalthinking,andthereby,informeddecision-making.However,thereisnolegalstandardagainstmisleading,manipulative,orfalseinformationsharedonlinebygovernmentauthorities,candidatesorevenparties.TheECI,andothergovernmentagencieswithjurisdictionovertheseissues,havenotbeenswiftenoughtoaddressthechallengesposedbytechnologicaltools.Theevolvingformsofmisuseofonlineplatformsforpoliticalgainsremainoverlooked.

Thisbriefanalysesthepredominantformsofonlinediscourseduringelectionsandwhetherornottheypromoteissue-based,informedvoting.Thebrieffocusesontwoelectioncampaigns—theIndiangeneralelectionsof2019andtheDelhistateelectionsin2020—andcombedtheTwitterplatformforthe

Thisbriefusestheterm‘information’torefertofacts,news,opinion,statistics,anycontent,ordatathathelpsavotertointerpretthequalityofacandidate/politicalparty.Thiscouldincludeonlinereportageordiscourserelatedtothecandidate’spastwork,identity,education,awarenessoftheconstituency/state/country,plannedorimplementedpolicies,party’smanifesto,andcriminalrecord.

3

Introduction

evaluation.Thebriefaimstooutlinethetypologyofinformationdisseminatedbyvariouspoliticalparties,mediapractitioners,andpartycandidatestointeractwithvoterswhofrequentdigitalspaces.

TheoreticalFramework

Onlinespaceshavebeen“democratised”inIndiawithgreateraffordabilityofsmartphonesandsomeoftheworld’scheapestdataplans,leadingtoanenormousincreaseinrecentyearsintheplatformuserbase.9,10,11Indeed,analystshavereferredtothe2019nationalpollsasthe‘WhatsAppElections’,12forthewideuseofthemessagingappbycandidatesinbringingtheircampaignstomassivenumbersoftargetvoters.13Forafewyearsbeforethat,certaincandidatesandpoliticalpartiesstartedexpandingtheirdigitaloutreach,operatingtheirelectoralcampaignswiththeconvenienceoftoolslikeadvertisementsandsponsoredcontentonsocialmediaplatforms.

TheCentrefortheStudyofDevelopingSocieties(CSDS),ina2019report,highlightedtheIndianpublic’sincreasingpoliticalparticipationonsocialmediaplatforms.Atthesametime,thestudysaid,thereisstillalackofevidenceofatangibleandsubstantialinfluenceoftheseplatformsonelections.14Thereportexplorestwokeyfindingsthathintofthegrowingimpactofinformationsharingonline:(a)socialmediausersweremoreopinionatedthannon-users;and(b)“theawarenesswasfoundtobedecliningamonguserswithdeclineintheusage.”b

OtherstudiesoutsideofIndia,meanwhile,havearguedthattheinfluenceofplatformsoncitizen’sperceptionofpoliticiansandpoliticalissuesisevident.15,16Bothperspectives,whileagreeingthatthereisincreasingrelianceonplatformsforconsumingpoliticalinformation,disagreeonitstrueimpact.17

Otherstudieshaveattemptedtocontextualisetheuseofsocialmediainthelargerquestionofpoliticaloutreach.Onesuchstudy,publishedbytheACMCOMPASS,18questionsthebinaryunderstandingofpoliticaldiscourse.Itarguesthatalthoughapoliticianmayprimarilycommunicatethroughaspecificplatformwithaparticularaudience,thesaidinformationoftenreachesthemainstreampopulationthroughtraditionalmedia.Stillotherstudieshavefound

The‘awareness’inthestudywaslimitedtoonlinetrendingissuesandsloganslike“#MeinbhiChokidar”andtheBalakotstrikes.

4

Introduction

alonghistoryofthemisuseofsocialmediaplatformstoinfluencedemocraticdialogue,especiallyduringelections.,19InIndia,aspecificareaofconcernisWhatsApp,whichhasoftenbeencalleda“blackhole”ofdisinformationduringelections.20Abiggercontextcouldbethat,asMicrosoft’sdigitalcivilityindexhasfound,Indiansaremostlikelytoencountermisinformationonline.21

Indeed,socialmediaplatformshaveevolvedfromprovidingpublicutilityfunctionsforitsend-userstoalsobeinggatekeepersofnewsandinformation.22Theseplatforms’abilitytoaggregatenarrativesforthevotermakethemapotentialthreattotheautonomyofelections.23Variousstudies,includingthoseinurbanIndia,havefoundthatthebuildingofnarrativesandperceptionsinsocialmediaisassistedbycuratingfavourablepoliticaldialoguethroughtheemploymentofrhetoric,24propaganda,clientelisticpromises,candidentityandvotebankpolitics.25

Thepotencyinsocialmediaplatformsliesintheirspeed:anMITstudy,forinstance,hasunderlinedthatmisinformation,inparticular,tendstospread“farther,faster,anddeeper”ontheseplatforms.26Moreover,platformalgorithmsprioritisecertaintypesofcontentoveranother,assensationalistspeechgarnersmoreengagementonline.

Thereisalegalframeworkforaddressingtraditional,‘offline’abuseslikevote-buying;asimilarmechanismisabsentfornewformsofmalpracticeononlineplatforms.

“Clientelism”referstoanimplicitorexplicitpromiseofgoodsandservicesforpoliticalsupport.

5

ElectionsSpotlightonIndian

ThisbriefanalysesthetypesofinformationpromotedonTwitterrightbeforethe2019LokSabhaelections,dandthe2020stateelections.eThesampledtweetswereclassifiedaccordingtothefollowing:campaignorpropaganda;divisiveorconspiratorial;policy-relateddiscourse(supportorcriticism).Thetweets

examinedforthesentimentanalysiscouldfallundermultiplecategories:e.g.,bothcampaignorpropaganda;anddivisiveorconspiratorial.

FindingsandAnalysis

Figure1:

Campaign-relatedtweets,bycategory,

LokSabhaelections2019

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77

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29.33%

46

50

44.66%

40

30

20

10

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Campaigningor

Divisiveor

Policy-related

Propaganda

Conspiratorial

discourse

*Totalsamplesizeoftweets=150

LokSabhaElections(2019)-tweetswerecollatedfromstakeholdersbeforeelections,from11March2019(thedayofpartynomination)to11April2019(thefirstdayofpolling).Atotalof744tweetsacross73trendinghashtagswererecorded.Thereafter,topreventanypoliticalorideologicalbiases

inthefindings,150tweetswererandomlyshortlistedthroughtheprocessofrandomisationonthesoftwareR.

DelhiStateElections(2020)–focusedonthethreemainpoliticalpartiesinthecapital:AamAadmiParty(AAP),BharatiyaJanataParty(BJP),andINC.Fromeach,10standingcandidateswiththehighestTwitterfollowerswereshortlisted.Overall,300tweetswereanalysedfromarandomisedsetoftentweetspercandidate.Thetimelinewasfrom24January2020(lastdateforwithdrawalofnomination)to6February2020(lastdayofcampaigningallowedforpoliticiansbeforepolling).

6

ElectionsSpotlightonIndian

Asignificantproportionofthenarrativeswerenon-policycriticism,conspiratorialspeech,anddivisivediscourse;thenfollowedbyblindcampaigningorpropaganda.Intermsofconstructivediscussion,lessthanone-thirdoftheanalysedtweetsengagedinanyformofpolicy-relateddiscussion.

Figure2:

Campaign-relatedtweets,bycategory,

DelhiStateelections2020

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150

100

64

50

50

0

Campaigningor

Divisiveor

Policy-related

Propaganda

Conspiratorial

discourse

**Totalsamplesizeoftweets=300

AsimilarpatternwasobservedintheDelhielection.ItwasassumedinsomemediadebatesthatDelhielectionswereprimarilyperformance-basedandendorsedpolicyissuessuchaseducation,water,andelectricitysupply.27Thedatashows,however,thatpolicywasanunder-discussedtopicwhencomparedwithothercategories.

7

ElectionsSpotlightonIndian

Duringboththeelections,politicalpartiesandcandidatesdeployedsocialmediatechniques.Forexample,positivemeasureshighlightinggoodwillnature,hardworkingattributesandexemplarystatesmanshipwereundertakenthroughvideos,interviews,andadvertisements.fFortheirpart,negativemeasures(withinthescopeofthisanalysis)identifiedasgeneric-blindcampaigning,unethicalornon-policydiscussions,alsocontributedtoinformationdumpingonTwitter.

Boththe2019LokSabhaelectionandtheDelhielectionthefollowingyearexhibitedsimilarpatternsinthewaysocialmediawasutilisedbycandidatesandtheirparties.Thefollowingpointssummarisethosetrends.

Therewasahighpercentageoftweetsinthecategoryof‘campaigningandpropaganda’duringbothelections,withrarementionandfocusonmanifestos,policy,orpastperformance.Mostofthetweetsfollowedthebandwagonofblindcampaigningwithoutprovidinganyinsightsintothe(futureorpast)policyplansandremainedlimitedtoself-praise.

Todiminish,belittleandtarnishanopponent’scandidature,‘divisiveandconspiratorialtweets’werealsolargelyutilised,contributingtounconstructiverhetoricandexclusionarynarratives.Evencriticismremainedlimitedtoindividualsoridentities,ratherthanpolicies.

Othernegativemeasuressuchasmisinformation,“junknews”,28misinformation,andhatespeechwerealsoemployedtoweakenothercandidatures.29,30,31Theyareoutsidethescopeofthisanalysis.

Tobesure,theuseofrhetorictovilifyorcreateanexclusionarynarrativeisnotanewphenomenon.Politicaldiscoursehaslongbeenweaponisedandtargetedtogarneremotionalresponseswith“themvs.us”narratives.32Charteris-Black,ascholarof‘politicsandrhetoric’,explains:“Whilemetaphors–suchasthatofdarknessandlightandthepersonification‘strippedofourinsistence’–providetheframeoftheargument,thepersuasiveeffectofConvictionRhetoricisproducedbytheirinteractionwithcontrast,rhetoricalquestions,andpatternsofrepetitionandreiteration.”33

Forinstance-DelhiBJPITCellpartneredwithpoliticalcommunicationsfirmTheIdeazFactorytocreate“positivecampaigns”usingdeepfakestoreachdifferentlinguisticvoterbases.ItmarkedthedebutofdeepfakesinelectioncampaignsinIndia.

8

ElectionsSpotlightonIndian

Fromthecasestudiesusedinthisbrief,itisclearthataplatformlikeTwitter—whichintheorycanofferspaceforgenuinepoliticaldiscourse—wasnotusedinsuchamannerduringhighlyengagingtimeframes.SimilarinsightswerederivedbytheOxfordUniversity-basedProgrammeonDemocracyandTechnologyinitsexaminationofthe2019elections:itfoundhighpenetrationofjunknews,andofdivisive,conspiratorial,andpolarisingnarrativesonWhatsappandFacebook.34Candidateswereoftenobservedtoemploytechniquesthatdeterdiscussiononpoliciesenshrinedintheirmanifestos,astheyfocusedoncampaigningalongthelinesofidentitypoliticsandusingconspiratorialordivisivespeech.Thisdisruptsthe‘trickle-down’modelofinformation,askeyaspectsofpoliciesdidnotreachthevoters,inturnencouraginguninformeddecision-making.Potentially,thequalityofvotedeterioratesbyattachingprimacytoindicatorslike‘identity’abovepolicies.

Similarly,overrelianceoncampaigningandpropagandaisfurtheringbiased,misleading,unethical,uninformed,ormanipulativeinformation.Thiscanoverwhelmvoterswithsurplusinformationthatiscounterintuitivetoone’scriticalthinkingandisindirectcontradictiontotheobjectivesoftheECI’svotereducationprogramme.Eventechniqueslikeblindcampaigningmaybeharmlessbutcontinuetodisseminatenon-constructiveinformationamongvotersthatengageorconsumeinformationonline.Theyalsocontributeto‘noise’thatonlydiminishescriticalthinking.

Intherun-uptothe2019LokSabhaelectionsandtheDelhistatepollstheyearafter,Twitterwasusedmoreforpropaganda,andlessforpolicydiscussion.

9

TurnoutsIndia:

Votingisregardedasafundamentalrightthatallowscitizenstobepartofapoliticalcommunity.A‘righttovote’,inturn,assumestheeffectiveexerciseofsucharightwithduediligence.Asmentionedbrieflyearlier,theSupremeCourtofIndiahasopinedthatavoterisentitledtoinformationabouttheantecedentsofacandidateand

theprocessofcastingavoteisafacetoftheirfreedomofspeechandexpression.35EvenduringtheConstituentAssemblydebates,B.R.Ambedkarhadarguedfortheimportanceof“quality-voting”.WhileintroducingtheprincipleofUniversalAdultFranchiseasavotingright,Ambedkarexplaineditasatoolforpoliticaleducation,equalmembershipinthepolity,andpoliticalcorrectness.g,36Accesstorelevantinformationlikemanifestos,pastperformance,qualification,andparty-policyawarenessisnecessarytoeducatevoters.Thisaccessnotonlyguaranteestheupliftmentofvotequalitybutalsoempowersvoterswithinformationthatisnecessarytoexpresstheirpoliticalwill.

in

HighVoterEducation

Identity-basedpoliticsorclientelisticpoliciesoftenrewardbytippingvotingpreferences.37Thisallowsvoterperceptiontobemanipulatedandmischaracterisedbygivingprimacytoagroupidentityoverthecandidate’s

performanceorqualifications.38,39,40

Thisiscommonasvoterstypicallylackaccesstonecessaryinformation.A2011studytitled,“DoInformedVotersMakeBetterChoices?ExperimentalEvidencefromUrbanIndia,”arguesthateducationaboutperformance-basedindicatorscan

Duringthe

ConstitutionalAssemblydebates,BRAmbedkarexplainedthe‘righttovote’asatoolfor

politicaleducation,andequalmembershipinthepolity.

BeyondVoter

changeelectionoutcomes.41Informationaboutperformance-basedindicatorsenableschangeinelectoralbehaviourtoselectbetterperformers.42Additionally,withbetteraccesstoqualityinformation,votersareincentivisedtovote,resultinginbetterturnoutnumbers.43,44

Atthattime‘politicalcorrectness’referredtocollectiveactionagainstthewrongscommittedbytheBritishbutwiththeforesightofempoweringvoterstoassistinthesocio-politicaldecisionsbyelectingidealrepresentativesinthefuture.

10

BeyondHighVoterTurnoutsVoterEducationinIndia:

Otherrecognisedbenefitsofarobustvotereducationmodelinclude:accesstocorrectinformation;reductioninelectoralmalpractices;prioritisationofdevelopmentoveridentity-basedpolitics;movebeyondpreconceivednotions;qualitydeliberationandcriticalthinking;andlessincidenceofpreferentialidentity-basedvoting.Essentially,votereducationnecessitatesaccesstoinformationthatfacilitatescriticalthinking,pavingthewaytoinformedchoice.

Aseveryindividualenjoyssimilarrightsofvoting,votereducationhasthecapacitytobreakidentitybarriersinpolitics.Itallowsdiverseparticipationandinclusivityforwiderengagementbetweenthecitizensthemselves,ratherthanthroughself-appointedgatekeepers.Forexample,researchonperformance-basedindicatorsfoundthatthenumberofdrinkingwaterprojectsinareaswithwomen-ledpanchayats(localcouncils)was62percenthigherthaninthosewithmen-ledcouncils.45Therefore,realigningpoliticalinterestswithperformance-basedindicatorscanself-correctlocalgovernancemodelsandpromotebetterpoliticiansfrommarginalisedcommunities.AneffectiveVoterEducationmodelhasthepotentialtoinstitutionaliseameritocratic,policy-basedelectoralcampaigningthatinstallsperformance-basedincumbency.

Atthesametime,evenasvotereducationisanimperativeforaneffectiverighttovote,itisbynomeanssufficient.Itisanessentialcomponenttoassistinformedandethicaldecision-makingtoaddressvoteraspirations.‘RighttoVote’itselfnecessitatestheimperativeofethicalandinformedvotingthroughchoice,awareness,andaccesstorelevantinformation.Votereducationhasthecapacitytorealise,changethequality,scope,andthekindofgovernmentcitizens’desire.

Votereducationnecessitatesaccesstoinformationthatfacilitatescriticalthinking,pavingthewaytoinformedchoice.

11

RegulatoryChallenges

Withincreasingdigitalisation,socialmediaplatformshavebecomehostsofpublicforumsthatarenecessaryfordeliberationanddirectpoliticalinteraction.However,theveryalgorithmicdesignoftheseplatforms—whichcuratepersonaliseduser-feedsandconductuserprofiling—has

non-democraticimplications.Algorithmssolidifyhomogeneousinformationecosystemsthatenhancesimilarinterestsfrompastpreferences,tocurate“engaging”userfeeds,resultingintheincubationofwhatarecalledecho-chambers.46,47Thislimitsthescopeofcriticalthinkingandcounter-speech,furthermakingitdifficulttoperceiveadverseinformation.Coupledwithpoliticalbots,unregulatedsponsoredcontent,theabsenceoffact-checkingpolitical

advertisements,userprofiling,andsusceptibilitytoforeigninterference—theseposehugethreatsofplatformmisuse.

A2020studybyReutersInstitutehighlightedthatalthoughonly20percentofmisinformationwassharedbypoliticians,celebrities,andotherprominentpublicfigures,itcontributedtothelargestchunkofresharedandengagedcontent(69percent).48Thistop-down(mis)informationmodelreflectsaspecialpersuasivepoweryieldedbypoliticalfigureheads.Meanwhile,a2020studybyWashington-basedCenterforDemocracyandTechnologynotedthatthiscanresultinvotersuppression.49

Atpresent,thereisnolegalstandardagainstanytypeofill-speechsharedonline.A2021studybyOxfordInternetInstitutefoundIndiangovernmentagenciesandpoliticalinstitutionsdirectlylinkedtosponsoringcomputationalpropaganda.h,50Toensuretransparencyandaccountability,thenatureofalgorithmshasalsowarrantedadebateintothegrowing“public”roleof“platform-ised”speech.Thecurrentapproachavoidsanyconcretestructuralorcontent-basedregulationsforplatformsorpoliticalinstitutions.Itpredominantlydictatesself-regulation,withoutimplicatinganyresponsibledutiesorliability.

ComputationalPropagandaisaformofpoliticalmanipulationthattakesplaceonlineusinginternettoolslikesocialmediaplatformsandalgorithms.

12

RegulatoryChallenges

Toensurefreeandfairelections,theModelCodeofConduct(MCC)underlinesrulesforspeeches,portfolios,manifestos,processions,andgeneralconduct.Rulesofcampaigndoapplytosocialmediainteractionsbutarelimitedtopoliticalpartiesandpoliticiansbutnottheiragents.TheMCCisneitherlegallyenforceablenorisitapplicablethroughouttheyear,exceptforamonthbeforetheelectionsorsometimesevenless.51TheMCChasevolvedovertheyearstoencompassvariousissuesofelectoralmalpracticebutduetoitsperiodicandnon-bindingnature,itisregularlyfloutedandoffendersarenotheldaccountable.TheStandingCommitteeonPersonnel,PublicGrievances,LawandJustice,recommendedmakingMCCapartoftheRepresentationofthePeopleAct,1951(RPA)toensureitsenforceability.TheECIalsolaidinstructionsforregistrationofaccounts,pre-certificationofpoliticaladvertisementsandexpendituredisclosure.52However,duetothesheervolumeofinformationshared,itrendersanymonitoringineffectiveanddiscountstheroleofhiredagentsorotheraffiliatedmachinery.53

Acomprehensiveapproachtocurbthemisuseofsocialmediaplatformswasoverlookeduntiltherecent"VoluntaryCodeofEthicsforthe2019GeneralElection".54Thiscode,however,failstoplacetheuseratthecentreofthespectrum.Itdoesnotprovideforanynoticeoractionthatcanbeinitiatedbytheusers,effectivelyignoringtheviralanddirecteffectonvoters.Thereportingmechanismhasbeencentralised,withonlytheECIempoweredtoraiseconcernsagainstonlinecontent.

BroadtransparencymeasuresaresuggestedwhilespeedyremovalorredressalisnotguaranteedunderboththiscodeandtheMCC.ThescopeoftheECIandjudicialauthoritiesislimited,asplatformsaretaskedwithdeterminingvoluntarypractices.Questionsalsoloomovertheauthenticationprocessofofficialaccounts;reviewingislimitedonlytopaidadvertisementsfore-newsproviders;itrequiresdisplayingelection-relatedexpenditurebutimposesnolimit;itfailstoprioritisedigitaleducation;anditisunabletopreviewcontentpostedbypartymembers.

Anequallyimportantgapisthat‘hatespeech’and‘disinformation’remainundefinedandlackanylegalprecedenceforconsistentapplicationtoonlinespeech.Thereisaclearabsenceofanypunitiveliabilityagainstextremist,hatespeechanddisinformationcontentevenundertheRPA.AlthoughSection123(3A)ofRPAidentifiespromotionofhateasacorruptpractice,itisnotdefinedunderanylegislationnorreflectedunderMCC.Subsequently,lackof

13

RegulatoryChallenges

anyregulatoryorenforceabilitystandardleavesplatformsfunctioningunderaregulatoryvacuum.ThereformstoMCCandRPAareimperative,theymustincludeonlinepoliticaldiscourseandrealignwiththeECIvotereducationprogramme’sprincipleofpromoting“ethicalandinformed”voting.

Astruthfulandfact-basedinformationisnecessarytoexpresspoliticalwill,itisimportanttoidentifysubtlecampaigningtechniquesthataimtoblurvoterperceptionthroughunethicaloruninformedinformation,floodingtactics,andvote-bankpolitics.Asonlineinformationwillcontinuetoplayakeyroleinshapingperceptions,itisnecessarytomovetoexplicitpolicyinterventions.Byunderstandingthedominanttypesofinformationsharedonline,itcancontributetoraisingstandardsofinformedvoting.

Algorithmssolidifyhomogenousinformationecosystems,limitingthescopeforcriticalthinkingandmakingitdifficulttoperceiveadverseinformation.

14

PolicyRecommendations

Itwillbefallacioustoblamepoliticiansaloneforlackofsustainable,effectivestandardsforpolicy-orperformance-basedpolitics.Asthereisalsoalackofincentiveforvoterstoobtainandanalyseinformationtomakeinformedvotingchoices,itleadstoloweraccountabilityamongstpoliticalagentstodeliverperformance-orpolicy-basednarrativesto

upliftthequalityofpoliticaldiscourse.Instead,votersremainsusceptibletovote-grabbing,whereinpoliticiansappeasevotersthroughidentitypolitics,populism,propagandaorvote-bankpolitics.

Itisdifficulttooverhaulthetriedandtestedunethicalincentivemodeltomakewayforapolicy-friendlyinformationecosystem.However,withsocialmediaplatformsbeingusedasapoliticaltoolforcampaigningandengagement,theirmisusecanendangerthedemocraticrighttovote.Itisnecessarytoformulateaholisticmodelthatprovidesopportunitytoself-correctthroughaccountability,transparency,andbetterincentives.Otherwise,leftunchecked,thecurrentpatternscandestroythefreeandfairfabricofIndianelections.

1.Movingbeyond“voterliteracy”and“voterturnout”

ThisanalysishasemphasisedthattheECI’sobjectivesofpromotingvotereducationor“ethicalandinformedvoting”,takesabackseatinitsownstrategies.Ratherthanupliftingthequalityofvotes,ECI’sprogrammeforvotereducation,ineffect,ismorefocusedonitsotherenshrinedprinciplesofenlargingvoterturnoutnumbersorpromulgatingliteracyabouttheprocess,ortheliteralactofhowtocastavote.Theimportanceofpromotingcriticalthinkingbeforeballotsandinformedvotingisnotyetrealisedacrossstatepolicies,atleastnotuniformly.ThereisalsoalackofcohesioninvariousstatepracticesunderSVEEP.Forexample,whilethestateofKerala’smodellaysfocuson“qualityvotingandhundredpercentvoterturnout”,55manyotherstateshavestruggledtoevenformulateSVEEPpoliciesorremainsilentontheprincipleof“informedvoting”.56

Tostrengthenthe‘R