IMF-新兴市场：前景与挑战Emerging Markets Prospects and Challenges 2022

EmergingMarkets:ProspectsandChallenges

TryggviGudmundsson,VladimirKlyuev,LeandroMedina,Boaz

Nandwa,DmitryPlotnikov,FranciscoSchiffrer,andDiYang

WP/22/35

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thoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarily

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2022

FEB

©2022InternationalMonetaryFund

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IMFWorkingPaper

Strategy,Policy,andReviewDepartment

EmergingMarkets:ProspectsandChallenges

TryggviGudmundsson,VladimirKlyuev,LeandroMedina,BoazNandwa,DmitryPlotnikov,Francisco

Schiffrer,andDiYang*

AuthorizedfordistributionbyStephanDanninger

February2022

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:ThisarticledocumentsrecentdevelopmentsinemergingmarketsinthecontextoftheCOVID-19pandemic,assessestheirprospectsandchallenges,anddiscussesappropriatepolicysettingsforthemediumterm.ItarguesthatEMpolicymakers’abilitytograpplewithanincompleteandunevenrecoverywillbeconstrainedbyhighpublicdebtanduncertaininflationprospectsaswellasexternalriskssurroundingcapitalflowsandexchangeratedevelopments.ThepaperalsodiscussespotentialimpactofatighteninginglobalfinancialconditionsandappreciationoftheUSdollarthatcouldbetriggeredbyageneralincreaseinriskaversionorareassessmentofthelikelypathofUSmonetarypolicy.

JELClassificationNumbers:F01,E52,E58

Keywords:Emergingmarkets,COVID-19,MonetaryPolicy

TGudmundsson@IMF.org

,

VKlyuev@IMF.org

,

LMedina@IMF.org

,

Author’sE-MailAddress:

BNandwa@IMF.org

,

DPlotnikov@IMF.org

,

FSchiffrer@IMF.org

,

DYang@IMF.org

*AuthorswishtothankGastonGelosandRobertoPiazzafortheirhelpfulcommentsandsuggestionsaswellasparticipantsattheAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanEconomicAssociationandattheIMF’sEMForumforengagingdiscussions.SpecialthankstoUmaRamakrishnanandStephanDanningerfortheirguidanceandsupport.

WORKINGPAPERS

EmergingMarkets:ProspectsandChallenges

PreparedbyTryggviGudmundsson,VladimirKlyuev,LeandroMedina,BoazNandwa,DmitryPlotnikov,FranciscoSchiffrer,andDiYang1

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EmergingMarkets:ProspectsandChallenges

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Contents

1.Introduction

3

2.Rearview

3

3.Wherearewenow?

6

4.ProspectsandPolicyChallenges

12

4.1Policyresponses

12

4.2.Debtissues

13

4.3.Monetarypolicytightening

14

5.PotentialtighteninginglobalfinancialconditionsandUSdollarappreciation

15

6.Conclusion

17

References

18

FIGURES

1.2020GDPGrowthOutcomevsProjections

3

2.EM:2020GDPGrowthOutcomevsProjections

4

3.DiscretionaryFiscalResponsetotheCOVID-19Crisis

5

4.PublicDebt-to-GDPRatioin2021

6

5.COVIDDeathRates

7

6.VaccinationRates

7

7.EMInflation

8

8.EMCentralBankMovesin2021

9

9.DebttoGDPRatiosAmongEms

9

10.CumulativeEmergingMarketBondFundFlows

10

11.EmergingMarketBondYields

11

12.ReservesAdequacy

11

13.ActivityShortfall

12

14.FiscalSupport:G-20GeneralGovernmentcyclicallyadjustedprimarybalance

13

15.CorporateInsolvencies:DistributionacrossEMs

14

16.EMNEERinHistoricalPerspective

15

17.ForeignExchangeDebtofhouseholdsandNon-FinancialCorporations

16

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1.Introduction

COVID-19dealtahugeblowtotheworldeconomy,resultinginanunprecedented3-percentcontractioninglobaloutput.Theemergingmarkets(EMs)wereaffectedparticularlystrongly.Theimpactwouldhavebeenevenlargerhaditnotbeenfordecisiveandunprecedentedpolicyactions.Theseactionscamewithaprice,though–theirvirtuallyunavoidablesideeffectwasaccumulationofvulnerabilitiesinmanycountriesandsectors.ThisarticledocumentsrecentdevelopmentsinEMs,assessestheirprospectsandchallenges,anddiscussesappropriatepolicysettingsfortheperiodahead.Towardtheend,itzerosinononeparticularchallenge–theriskofatighteninginglobalfinancialconditionsandappreciationoftheUSdollarthatcouldbetriggeredbyageneralincreaseinriskaversionorsuddenreassessmentofthelikelypathoftheUSmonetarypolicy.

2.Rearview

COVID-19deliveredamajorshocktotheglobaleconomy.Itledtomassiveunderperformancerelativetoprojections,andinmostcountries(including90percentofEMs),outrightdeclinesinoutput(Figure1).

Figure1.2020GDPGrowthOutcomevsProjections

InPercent

Sources:WEOJanuary2022andOctober2019.

RealGDPinEMsdropped7.4percentonaveragein2020,10percentagepointsbelowpre-pandemicexpectations.1Thedownturnwasparticularlydeepincountriesrelyingontourismandthosewithlargeservicesectors–reflectingthenatureofthecrisisandensuinglockdownsandborderclosures–andincountrieswithhighpublicdebt(Figure2).

1Unlessotherwisenoted,numbersinthetextandinthefiguresaresimpleaverages.

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TheimpactinthefirstyearofthecrisiswashigherinEMsthaninadvancedeconomies(AEs)andinlow-incomecountries(LICs).ThisoutsizeddeclineinEMsrelativetoAEswaspartlyduelower-capacityhealthsystems,whichforcedrelianceonstrictermobilityrestrictions,andsmallerproportionof“teleworkable”jobs

(IMF

(2021a)).WhilesomeLICsavoidedoutputdecline,partlyduetotheiryoungerpopulationsandinitiallyslowervirusspread,their2020growthasagroupwassignificantlyslowerthanexpectedpriortothecrisis.

Figure2.EM:2020GDPGrowthOutcomevsProjections

InPercent

Sources:WEOJanuary2022andOctober2019.

Widespreadandunprecedentedpolicysupportpreventedanevenworseoutcome.Fiscal,monetaryandmacroprudentialpolicieswererelaxeddramaticallyaroundtheglobe.

ThefiscalpolicyreactionfollowingtheinitialoutbreakofCOVID-19inEMswasdecisive.Thisisinsharpcontrasttomanypreviousepisodeswherefiscalpolicysupportcametoolateandtendedtobeprocyclical(seee.g.,

Cuadraetal(2010)

).Inadditiontodirectlyaddressingthehealthcrisis,thefiscalpolicyresponseinEMsputafloorunderoutputandmanagedtomitigatetheworsteffectsofthepandemic.Thepolicyeasingcamethroughavarietyofchannels,includingbothabove-the-line(suchasadditionalhealth,socialandpublicworksspending,subsidies,taxbreaksanddeferrals,employmentandunemploymentsupport)andbelow-the-linemeasures(suchasequityinjections,assetpurchases,anddebtassumptions)aswellasguaranteesandquasi-

fiscaloperations.TheabilitytoprovideacountercyclicalresponsewasinpartduetotheforcefulactionofAEcentralbanks,whichhelpedeaseglobalfinancialconditionsandindirectlyfacilitatedcontinuedmarketaccessforEMs.

WhiletheaveragesizeoffiscalresponsetotheCOVID-19shockintheEMswassubstantial,itwasstillnoticeablysmallerthaninAEs

(IMF(2021d)

,

Alberolaetal(2020)

),which–inadditiontothefactorsmentionedabove–explainswhyEMsexperiencedalargergrowthdeclinethanAEs.

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Fiscalresponsesvariedbycountrydependingontheirborrowingaccessandtheirpre-crisisdebtlevels

(Gasparetal(2020)

).Specifically,inmanyhighlyindebtedEMsandLICs,governmentshadlimitedspacetoincreaseborrowing,whichrestrictedtheirabilitytoscaleupfiscalsupport(Figure3).

Figure3.DiscretionaryFiscalResponsetotheCOVID-19CrisisInPercentofGDP;WeightedAverage

Source:DatabaseofFiscalPolicyResponsestoCOVID-19-October2021.

Becauseofthisstillunprecedentedfiscalsupport,publicdebtincreasedsignificantly.Themedianpublic-debt-to-GDPratioinEMsattheend-2021stoodat60percent–8percentagepointshigherthantheIMFhadexpectedbeforethepandemic(Figure4).Thechangeinthedebtratiosreflectsnotonlynetnewborrowingbutalsootherfactorsaffectingthestockofdebt,includingcurrencydepreciations,aswellasthedeclineinrealGDP.

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Figure4.PublicDebt-to-GDPRatioin2021

InPercent

Sources:WEOJanuary2022andOctober2019.

Note:Thetopandbottomedgesoftheboxrepresentthe75thand25thpercentile,respectively.Thehorizontallineinthemiddlerepresentsthemedian.

MonetarypolicyalsoplayedakeyroleinthecountercyclicalresponseofEMpolicymakerstotheeconomic

effectsofthepandemic.Over90percentofEMcentralbanksundertookconventionaleasingbyreducingtheirpolicyinterestrates

(IMF(2020a)

),butperhapsmorestrikingwasthewidespreadandunprecedentedusageofassetpurchaseprogramsamongEMstohelpeasefinancialconditionsandmaintaincreditintheirdomesticeconomies

(Muhleisenetal(2020b)

).Earlyevidencesuggeststhattheseprogramswerebyandlargesuccessfulinstabilizingfinancialmarketsandreducingbondyields

(Frattoetal(2021)

,

WorldBank(2021)

).

Prudentialpolicieswerealsoloosenedtomaintaintheflowofcredittotheeconomyandtopreventawaveofbankruptciestriggeringadownwardspiral.Suchactionsincluded,forexample,relaxationofloanclassificationandprovisioningrulesandloweringcountercyclicalcapitalbuffers.Insomecountries,insolvencyframeworksforcorporatesandindividualsweresuspendedortemporarilymodified.

3.Wherearewenow?

ThecurrentconjuncturepresentsmultiplechallengesforEMpolicymakers.

Forone,COVIDcontinuestoaffectlivesandlivelihoods.Sincethefirstquarterof2020,globaloutbreaksofCOVID-19havecomeinseveralwaves,witheachreachinghigherdailyinfectionratethantheonebefore.COVID-19remainswidespreadinmanyEMs,andinmostofthem,thenumberofCOVID-relateddeathsin2021surpassedthatinthefirstyearofthecrisis,2020(Figure5).Vaccinationrates,althoughrising,remainlowerthantargetedbyhealthofficials(Figure6).2Thus,thepandemiccontinuesdepressingeconomicactivity.

2About63percentofEMpopulationhadreceivedatleastonevaccinedosebyend-2021,InstituteforHealthMetricsandEvaluationat/.

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Figure5.COVIDDeathRates

Per100,000;2020vs2021

Source:OurWorldinData,WHO.

Figure6.VaccinationRates

FullyVaccinated;InPercentofPopulation

Note:CountrybordersdonotnecessarilyreflecttheIMF’sofficialposition.

Source:OurWorldinData,WHO.Lastupdate:Dec23,2021

Inflationdeclinedearlyinthepandemicasdemandcontractionoutweighedsupplyconstraintsandascommoditypricesdroppedmarkedly.Thependulumhasswungbackinadramaticfashion,however,with

resurgentcommodityprices,supply-chaindisruptions,laborshortages,andrecoveryindomesticdemandspurringinflationtolevelsnotseeninyears

(IMF(2021f)

,

AdrianandGopinath(2021)

and

Danningeret

al.(2022)).

Themedianyear-on-yearinflationamongEMsroseto6.7percentinNovember2021,comparedto

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about3percentbeforethepandemic(Figure7).IncountrieslikeArgentina,Brazil,Turkey,andUkraineinflationhasexceeded10percent.ManyEMsareexperiencingasharpriseinfoodprices,whichaccountforasizableshareintheirconsumptionbasket

(CaselliandMishra(

2021)and

IMF(2021f)

).CoreinflationhasalsoriseninmanyEMs,albeitatamoremodestpace,withcurrencydepreciationaffectingthepriceofimportedgoods.Medium-terminflationexpectationsappearreasonablywell-anchoredinmostEMsforthemoment,butthereisaconcernthatpersistentlyhighinflationmayaffectexpectations,makingthejobofbringinginflationdownconsiderablyharder.

Figure7.EMInflation

MediansandHeadlineinterquartilerange,Percent

Sources:IMFCPI,GDSdatabases.

[Note:Onlyshowing80percentofthesampleinDecember2021duetodataavailability.

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ConcernsoverrisinginflationarypressuresandcurrencydepreciationhavecompelledanincreasingnumberofEMcentralbankstobegintighteningmonetarypolicy(Figure8).

Figure8.EMCentralBankMovesin2021

Policyrate,basispoints

Source:HaverAnalytics.

Troublinglevelsofpublicdebthavebeenmentionedabove.Itisworthnotingthatprivatenon-financialdebtalsoattainedrecordlevelsinEMsduringthepandemic(Figure9).

Figure9.DebttoGDPRatiosAmongEms

PercentofGDP;Excl.China

Note:Theestimatedratiosofglobal(94EMcountries)debttoGDPareweightedbyeachcountry'sGDPinUSD.

Source:IMFGlobalDebtDatabase

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Onthepositiveside,mostEMshavesubstantialFXreserves,partlyduetoahistoricSDRallocationimplementedin2021.WhilethecapitaloutflowsfromEMsatthestartofthepandemicwerelargeandabrupt(aboutUS$65billionbetweenFebruaryandMay),theywereshort-lived.CapitalinflowsbegantorecoverassoonasJune2020,althoughduring2021outflowsresumedfromEMex.Chinalocalcurrencydebt(Figure10)andyieldsonthatonthatinstrumenthaverisen(Figure11).EMcurrentaccountpositionswerestrongerin2019thanbeforetheGlobalFinancialCrisis,andin2020currentaccountsimprovedinmorethanhalfofthem,reflectingimportcompressioninthosecountriesanddemandforimportsinAEs(whereproductionwasaffectedbylockdownswhiledemandwassupportedbymonetaryandfiscalstimulus).ReserveswerefurtherboostedbyanAugust2021SDRallocationequivalenttoUS$650billion,ofwhichUS$224billionwenttoemergingmarkets

(IMF(2021b)

).Asaresult,attheendof2021,58percentofEMswereestimatedtohave

internationalreservesexceeding100percentoftheIMF’sadequacymetric(Figure12).SomeEMsalsobenefitfromprecautionaryarrangementswiththeIMF,swaplineswithAEcentralbanks,andotherelementsoftheglobalfinancialsafetynet.Consequently,inaggregateEMsarefacingthecurrentuncertainenvironmentwithrelativelystrongexternalbuffers.

Figure10.CumulativeEmergingMarketBondFundFlows

InUSDbillion,sinceJanuary2020

Source:EPFRDatabase.

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Figure11.EmergingMarketBondYields

InPercent

Source:Bloomberg.

Figure12.ReservesAdequacy

InPercentofEMs

Sources:AssessingReservesAdequacyDatabase;WEOJanuary2022;andstaffcalculations.

Note:ReservesinpercentoftheweightedsumoffourpotentialBOPdrains,specificallyshort-termdebt,broadmoney,net-exports,andotherexternalliabilities.

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4.ProspectsandPolicyChallenges

MostEMshaveentered2022againstthebackgroundoftighteningglobalfinancialconditions,withthepandemicstilldepressingactivitybutinflationsignificantlyexceedingdesirablelevelsandwithelevatedpublicandprivatedebt–vulnerabilitiessomewhatmitigatedbyconsiderableinternationalreserves.Whataretheirnear-termprospectsandwhataretheoptimaleconomicpolicysettingsinthesechallengingcircumstances?

Theeconomicrecoveryisexpectedtocontinuebuttoremainincomplete,uneven,andsubjecttodownsiderisks.TheIMFisprojectingasignificantlyslowerreturntopre-pandemicoutputforEMsthanAEs,inpartduetoaslowerrolloutandadministrationofvaccines

(IMF(2022)

);itdoesnotexpectEMsasagrouptocatchuptotheirpre-pandemictrajectory(Figure13).RisingenergyandfoodpricescoupledwithpersistentsupplychaindisruptionsamidhighuncertaintyregardingtheevolutionandconsequencesofthepandemiccontinuetoexertinflationarypressuresinEMsthatisenvisagedtoremainelevatedthrough2022,albeitwithsignificantvariationacrosstheEMcountries

(AdrianandGopinath(2021)

and

Danningeretal(2022)

).Coreinflationisalsoexpectedtoremainelevatedin2022,buoyedbyareboundindomesticdemand,wagepressuresinsomelabormarketsectors,lingeringsupplydisruptions,andanincreaseinshippingcosts.Theseinflationarypressuresare,however,expectedtosubsidein2023reflectingsofteningofcommodityprices,ebbingofsupply-demandimbalances,andanchoringofinflationexpectationsduetotighteningofmonetarypolicy,alongsidefurtherscalingbackoffiscalsupport,contributingtomoresubduedaggregatingdemand.

Figure13.ActivityShortfall

PercentDeviationfromOCT2019WEOProjection

Sources:October2019andJanuary2022WEO

4.1Policyresponses

ForEMsasagroup,thestrengthoftherecoveryisconstrainedbythelimitedabilityofpolicymakerstosupportgrowth,comparedtotheirAEcounterparts

(Muhleisenetal(2020a)

).Thisisthecasebothforfiscalpolicy,wheredebtlevelsareelevated(Figure14),andformonetarypolicy,whereinterestratesareincreasingfromhistoricallylowlevels,inflationisinmanycasesabovetarget,andtheabilitytoeaseisrestrictedbyexternalconsiderationssuchascapitalflowsandexchangeratemoves.However,thereisgreatheterogeneitywithin

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EMsintermsoftheavailabilityofpolicyspace,bothonfiscalandonmonetaryfront.Furthermore,structuralchallengestogrowthandtheextenttowhichthesectoralcompositionconstitutesaheadwindortailwindtothepost-pandemicworldarehighlycountry-specific.Therestofthissectiondiscussesthesefactors,howpolicymakerscanboosttherecoveryprospects,andanumberofconstraintsthatareparticularlyacuteforemergingmarkets.

Figure14.FiscalSupport:G-20GeneralGovernmentcyclicallyadjustedprimarybalancePercentofpotentialinfiscalyearGDP

Notes:DatanotavailableforSAU.AggregatesaresimpleaveragesacrossG-20economies.

Sources:January2022WEO;andIMFstaffcalculations.SeeIMF(2022forthcoming)).

4.2.Debtissues

Thedebtlevelsrepresentakeyrisktoemergingmarketsasagroup,evenastherecoverycontinues,asariseingrowthmaynotfullycompensatefortheadverseeffectthathigherinterestrateswillhaveondebtdynamics.Countriesarethereforeexpectedtofaceatradeoffbetweensupportingtherecoveryandaddressingdebt

sustainabilityconcerns,whichwillconstrainEMsmorethanAEsduringthetighteningcycle,justasitdidintheexpansionaryperiodof2020

(Blanchardetal(2021)

).ThiswillinturncomplicatetheoutlookincomingyearsforEMpolicymakersandpotentiallyaffecttheirdevelopmentagendas(

Gasparetal(2021)

).Thisisparticularly

thecaseforcountrieswithespeciallyelevateddebtlevels,largeexposurestoforeigncurrencydebt,andshortmaturitieswithlargerepricingandrolloverrisks.

Asnotedabove,notonlypublicbutalsoprivatedebthasrisentoconcerninglevels.Highcorporateandhouseholddebtmakesthefinancialsystemvulnerabletoanincreaseininterestrates.Whilethemulti-facetedsupportivepoliciesandrelaxationofprudentialruleshavekeptmanystressedcorporatesafloat,suchthattheinitiallyexpectedwaveofbankruptciesdidnotmaterialize,eventualwithdrawalofextraordinarysupportandforbearancealongwithtighteningoffinancialconditionswilllikelyleadtoaspikeininsolvencies(Figure15).

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Figure15.CorporateInsolvencies:DistributionacrossEMs

Annualchangeinpercent

Sources:EulerHermes,andIMFstaffcalculation

Asurgeindefaultscouldaffectthebankingsystemandrestricttheflowofcredit.Thenegativeimpactontheeconomywouldaffecttaxcollection,potentiallyexacerbatingconcernsaboutpublicdebtsustainability.Corporateandsovereignspreadstendtomoveintandem

(Augustin,etal.,(2018)

).Duringtheonsetofthepandemic,bothcorporateandsovereignspreadsspikedduetoheighteneduncertaintyandshocksbutlaternarrowedasconditionsimprovedandasgovernmentsinfusedsignificantsupportintothecorporatesector.Lookingahead,EMpolicymakersshouldrebuildbuffersasmarketconditionsallow,includingbyreducingpublicdebtandincreasingforeignexchangereservesasneeded.Inadditiontotheserequiredefforts,theIMF’srecentSpecialDrawingRights(SDR)allocationhelpedincreasepolicyspaceforseveralcountriesandimprovedliquidityconditions

(IMF(2021c)

).Todealwithlingeringeffectsfromthepandemic,tailoredsupportmeasurestoviablefirmsisimportantwhilemacroprudentialpoliciesshouldbemobilizedtoaddressbuildingfinancialvulnerabilitiessuchasrisi