IMF-土耳其的气候缓解政策（英）

ClimateMitigationPolicy

inTürkiye

IanParry,DanielleMinnett,andKarlygashZhunussova

WP/23/108

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progressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedto

elicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersare

thoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarily

representtheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,

orIMFmanagement.

2023

MAY

©2023InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/23/108

IMFWorkingPaper

FiscalAffairsDepartment

ClimateMitigationPolicyinTürkiye

PreparedbyIanParry,DanielleMinnettandKarlygashZhunussova

AuthorizedfordistributionbyJamesRoaf

May2023

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:ThispaperdiscussespotentialelementsofacomprehensivestrategyformakingheadwayonTürkiye’snetzeroemissionspedgefor2053.Theseelementsinclude:(i)aligning2030emissionscommitmentswithlongtermneutrality;(ii)implementingacarbonpricerisingtoanilustrative$75pertonneby2030;(iii)enhancingacceptabilitythroughusingcarbonpricingrevenuesefficientlyandequitablyandincludingcompetitvenessmeasures;(iv)introducingvariousfeebateschemes(thefiscalanalogueofregulations)toreinforcemitigationincentivesinthepower,industry,transport,building,forestry,andagriculturalsectors.Accordingtomodellingresultsaphasedrevenue-neutral$75carbonpricereducesCO2emisisons21percentbelowbaselinelevelsin2030,raisesrevenuesof1.7percentofGDP,avoids11,000airpollutiondeathsoverthedecade,whileimposinganaverageburdenonhouseholdsof3percentoftheirconsumption(beforerevenue-recycling).Withrevenuesusedfortargetedtransfersandlabortaxreductionstheoverallpolicyispro-poorandpro-equity(averagehouseholdisbetteroffby0.4percent).

RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Parry,I.,Minnett,D.,Zhunussova,K.(2023).ClimateMitigationPolicyinTürkiye.IMFWorkingPapers,2023/108

JELClassificationNumbers:Q48,Q54,Q58,H23

Keywords:

Climatechange;Türkiyeclimatemitigation;carbonpricing;carbontax;emissionstradingsystem;feebate;power;industry;buildings;transportation;agriculture;forestry.

Author’sE-MailAddress:

iparry@IMF.org

;

dminnett@IMF.org

;

kzhunussova@IMF.org;

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PreparedbyIanParry,DanielleMinnett,andKarlygashZhunussova

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Contents

1.Introduction

4

2.NationalEmissionsTrendsandTargets

7

3.CarbonPricing:Rationale,InstrumentChoice,andDesignIssues

10

A.Rationale

10

B.InstrumentChoiceandDesignIssues

11

4.ImpactsofCarbonPricing

15

A.EmissionsandEnergySystem

15

5.EnhancingtheAcceptabilityofCarbonPricing

19

A.AddressingBurdensonHouseholds

19

B.AddressingBurdensonFirms

21

6.ReinforcingSectoralPolicies

24

A.PowerGeneration

24

B.Industry

27

C.Transportation

29

D.Buildings

30

E.Extractives

32

F.Agriculture

32

G.Forestry

33

H.Waste

34

I.FuelTaxes

35

6.SummaryofRecommendations

36

AnnexA.TheIMF-WBClimatePolicyAssessmentTool(CPAT)

37

AnnexB.BehavioralResponsesPromotedbyAlternativeCO2MitigationPolicies

40

AnnexC.AdditionalDetailsonCarbonPricingSchemes

41

References

42

BOX

1.IllustrativeImpactsofCarbonPricingandFeebatesonProductionCostsforSteelandCement

28

FIGURES

1.GlobalGHGEmissions,NationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)andTemperatureTargets

4

2.CO2Emissions,MitigationAmbitionandPolicyGapsto2030

4

3.TrendsinInternationalFuelPrices

6

4.PerCapitaEmissionsandGlobalShares,2020

7

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5.GHGsbySectorandFuel,2020

8

6.DriversofBAUCO2Emissions2021-2030

9

7.Annualprojectedlocalairpollutiondeathsto2030

9

8.CurrentandIllustrativeCO2EmissionsCutsforG20Countriesversus2030BAU

10

9.AllowancePriceVolatilityinETSs

12

10.NationalorRegionalCarbonPricingSchemes,2021

14

11.CO2EmissionsImpactsfromCarbonPricing,G20Countries2030

15

12.CO2Reductionsunder$75CarbonPricebySectorandFuel,2030

16

13.AnnualrevenuesfromPhased$75CarbonPricebyFuelProduct,2030

17

14.CumulativeAvertedDeathsfromReducedAirPollutionfromPhased$75CarbonPrice

17

15.AnnualAbatementCostsandDomesticEnvironmentalCo-BenefitsfromPhased$75CarbonPrice203018

16.CostIncreasesforTurkishExportersfromtheProspectiveEUBCA,2020

18

17.BurdenonHouseholdsfrom$75pertonneCarbonPricebeforeandafterRevenueRecycling,2030

20

18.ProductionCostIncreasesforSelectedEITEIndustriesandCountriesfrom$75CarbonPricein2030

21

19.BurdensonTradingPartnersfrom$75pertonneCBAMinTürkiye,2020

22

20.RenewableGenerationSharesand2030Targets,G20countries

25

21.ProjectedElectricityGenerationSharesinTürkiyeunderCarbonPriceRisingto$75in2030

26

22.IllustrativeFeebateforPowerSector

27

23.EVSalesShares2020,SelectedCountries

29

24.CO2-BasedComponentsofVehicleTaxes,SelectedCountries

31

TABLES

1.SummaryComparisonofCarbonTaxesandETSs

13

2.EnergyPriceIncreasesfrom$75CarbonPrice,2030

16

3.ComparingInstrumentstoAddressCompetitiveness

23

4.ExciseTaxesbyFuelandSectorin2020,G20Countries

35

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1.Introduction

1.Limitingglobalwarmingto2°Cor

1.5°Crequirescuttingglobalcarbondioxide(CO2)andothergreenhousegases(GHGs)25or50percentbelow2019levelsby2030,followedbyarapiddeclinetonetzeroemissionsnearthemiddleofthiscentury(Figure1).Currentnationaltargetsachieveonly13percentemissionscutsbelow2019levels.Iftheneededemissionsreductionsarenotachieved,thiswilllikelyputtheParisAgreement’stemperaturegoalsbeyondreach.Indeed,withoutnewmitigationpolicies,inthebusinessasusual(BAU)casewithnonewortighteningofexistingmitigationpolicies,globalemissionsareprojectedtocontinuerising.

2.Theworldisnotyetontracktonet-zeroontwofronts(Figure2).

•Thereisalargeglobalambitiongap.136countries,representing88percentofglobalGHGs,haveproposed,orset,netzerotargetsforaroundmid-century.1Butevenifintermediatepledgesfor2030incountries’NationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)werefullyachieved,theywouldonlyreduceglobalCO2emissions13percentbelow2019levels.

•Thereisanevenlargergapinpolicyimplementation.KeepingexistingpoliciesfixedwouldimplyemissionswellabovetargetsandlevelsrequiredbyParis’temperaturegoals.

3.Observedglobalwarmingtodateof1.2oCiscausedbyhumanfactorsandwarmingishappeningfasterthanpreviouslyexpected.2

Warmingisalreadycausingawiderangeofclimateimpactsincludingheatwaves,droughts,floods,hurricanes,highersealevels,andswings

Figure1.GlobalGHGEmissions,Nationally

DeterminedContributions(NDCs)and

TemperatureTargets

GlobalannualGHGemissions(bntonnesCO2e)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

(2015)

Historic

Projections

NDCs

Business-as-usual

Other

NDCs(2021)

Methane

FossilfuelCO2

2C

1.8

1.5

1990201020302050

Sources:Blackandothers(2022a).

Note:Excludeslanduseandlandusechange

Figure2.CO2Emissions,MitigationAmbitionandPolicyGapsto2030

Annualglobalemissions(bntonsCO2)

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2°C

1.8°C

1.5°C

Historical

Business-as-usualNDCs(2015)NDCs(2021)

2015202020252030

Implentationgap

Ambitiongap

Source.Blackandothers(2022a).

1See/net-zero-tracker.

2ThisparagraphdrawsfromIPCC(2018,2021).

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betweenclimateextremes,andthefrequencyandseverityoftheseimpactswillriseastheplanetheatsup.Moreover,therisksoftippingpointsintheglobalclimatesystem(e.g.,runawaywarmingfromreleaseofmethaneandcarboninthepermafrost,collapseofmajoricesheetscausingdramaticsealevelrises,shuttingdownofoceancirculatorysystems,destructionofthenaturalworld)riseexponentiallywithwarmingabove1.5oC.Türkiyewilllikelyexperiencethreeacceleratingtrends:risingtemperatures,dehydration,andrisingsealevelswhichwillcausemorefrequentandmoresevereweatherconditions.

4.AmbitiousclimatepolicyispotentiallyinTürkiye’sownnationalinterest.Acomprehensivemitigationstrategywithcarbonpricing3asitscenterpiececanmobilizevaluablegovernmentrevenues,savelivesbyreducinglocalairpollutionexposure,reducepoverty,andpresentTürkiyeasaleaderincombatingtheglobalclimatechallenge.

5.TürkiyeplanstocompleteaClimateLawlayingoutanetzerotransitionstrategyinarevisedNationallyDeterminedContribution(NDC).Türkiyeratifiedthe2015ParisAgreementinOctober2021andsetanetzeroemissionstargetfor2053.Potentialkeyelementsofthestrategywillinclude:(i)aligningintermediateemissionstargetswithlongtermneutrality;(ii)emissionspricing,likelyintheformoftrading;(iii)measurestoenhancetheacceptabilityofpricing;and(iv)supportivepoliciestoreinforceresponseslikeshiftingfromcoaltorenewables,andelectrificationoftransportation.

6.Inchoosingarevisedemissionstargetfor2030,Türkiyewillneedinformationon:(i)BAUemissionsprojectionsateconomywideandsectorallevel;and(ii)thecostsofcuttingemissionsbelowBAUlevels.Botharesensitivetoassumptionsaboutkeyunderlyingfactors(e.g.,GDPgrowth,incomeelasticitiesforenergyproducts,futureBAUenergyprices,fuelpriceresponsiveness)thatvaryacrossdifferentmodels.Thispaperpresentsanalysesbasedonaspreadsheettoolthatisapproximatelyparameterizedtothemid-rangeofthebroaderenergymodellingliteratureandillustratestheimplicationsofalternativeassumptions.

7.Achievingasubstantialemissionsreductionwilllikelyrequirecarbonpricing.Comprehensivecarbonpricingprovidesacross-the-boardincentivestoreduceenergyuseandshifttocleanerenergysourcesandthecriticalpricesignalforredirectinginvestmenttocleantechnologies.Therearemanytechnicalissueshoweverinthechoicebetweenanddesignofcarbonpricinginstruments,namelycarbontaxesandemissionstradingsystems(ETS).Thisincludesadministration,pricelevels,relationtoothermitigationinstruments,useofrevenuestoaddressefficiencyanddistributionalobjectives,supportingmeasurestoaddresscompetitivenessconcerns,andextensiontobroaderemissionssources.Thispaperdiscussesthemainissuesandpresentsanextensivequantitativeassessmentoftheemissions,fiscal,andeconomicimpactsofcarbonpricing.

3CurrentlyTürkiyeisworkingontheestablishmentofanETSinthecountry.

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8.Acomprehensivestrategycanenhancetheacceptabilityofcarbonpricing,especiallygivenhighenergyprices.Globalgas,coal,andoilpricesincreasedabout700,180,and110percentrespectivelybetweenmid-2020andmid-2022(Figure3).Thiswasinpartduetotherecoveryinglobalenergydemand,previouslyweakfossilfuelinvestment,anddisruptionsfollowingtheRussianinvasionofUkraine.Thesehighpricesareakeychallengeforthepoliticalacceptabilityofcarbonpricing.However,thoughsubjecttomuchuncertainty,projectionssuggestfuelpriceswilldeclinegraduallyovertimeasdemandandsupplyadjust.Thisprovidesanopportunitytograduallyincreasecarbonprices,whileallowingthepriceofgastodeclinebelowcurrentlevels.Forillustration,phasingina$75carbonpriceontopofprojectedpriceswouldimply2030gaspricesthatare32percentbelowmid-2022levels,whileoilandcoalpriceswouldbe3and28percenthigherrespectively.Withoutcarbonpricing(orrelatedmeasures),theimpactofhigherbaselineenergypricesondecarbonizationislimited,because:therelativeincreaseingaspriceshascausedswitchingtocoal;pricechangesareseenasreversable;andhighermarketpriceshaveincreasedtheprofitabilityoffossilfuelproduction.

Figure3.TrendsinInternationalFuelPrices

1.NaturalGasPrices,$/MMBTu

50

2.CoalPrices,$/GJ

20

15

10

5

3.OilPrices,$/bbl

150

100

50

40

30

20

10

0

2015202020252030

IMF(2021)forecastIMF(2022)forecastIMF(2022)+$75carbontax

02015202020252030

IMF(2021)forecast

IMF(2022)forecast

IMF(2022)+$75carbontax

02015202020252030

IMF(2021)forecast

IMF(2022)forecast

IMF(2022)+$75carbontax

Source:Blackandothers(2022a).

Notes.Pricesinreal2021US$,deflatedbyrespectiveIMFprojections.Carbontaxstartingat$10in2022andrisingto$75in2030isassumedontopofIMF(2022b)baselineassumingelasticsupply(thisassumptionislikelyreasonableforcoalandgas,althoughpossiblylesssoforoil).NaturalgaspricesareaweightedaverageofnaturalgasinEurope,NorthAmerica(HenryHub)andLNGmarket(Japan).CoalpricesareaweightedaverageofdomesticsectoralcoalpricesinChina,India,andtheUS.OilpricesareanaverageofBrent,DubaiFateh,andWestTexasIntermediate.Thecarbontaxisassumedtobefullypassedforwardintodemandprices.

9.Acceptabilitymightbefurtherenhancedthroughexploitingtherevenuepotentialofpricing

(e.g.,byauctioningallowancesinanETS)andusingtherevenueinawaythatboostseconomicactivity(e.g.,throughcuttinglabortaxes)andthataddressesdistributionalconcerns(e.g.,bytargetingsomeoftherevenuestolow-incomehouseholds).Alsoimportantistoaddressconcernsaboutimpactsonindustrialcompetitiveness.Thepaperprovidesaquantitativeanalysisofthedistributionalburdenofcarbonpricingonhouseholdsandfirmsunderdifferentscenariosforfutureenergyprices,carbonpricing,andrevenuerecycling.Italsodiscussescarbonborderadjustmentmechanisms(BCAs)inTürkiyeandtheEUandothermeasurestoaddresscompetitivenessconcerns.

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12.Thepaperusesextensivequantitative

analysis.Mostofthisanalysisisbasedonaflexibleandtransparentspreadsheetmodel—theClimatePolicyAssessmentTool(CPAT)—developedbyFundandBankstaff.Thismodelprovidesconsistentcross-countryprojectionsfor200countriesoffueluseandCO2emissionsbymajorenergysectorsandtheemissions,fiscal,economic,anddistributionalimpactsofcarbonpricingandothermitigationinstruments.AlthoughCPATisbasedoncentralcaseparametervalues,anymodellingexerciseinvolvesinherentuncertaintiesoveremissionsprojectionsandpolicyimpacts.ThemodelisdescribedinAnnexA.

2.NationalEmissionsTrendsandTargets

13.Inpercapitaterms,Türkiye’semissionsarearoundtheglobalaverage,butTürkiyeremainsalargeglobalemitterinabsoluteterms(Figure4).Accordingtostaffestimates,Türkiye’sGHGemissionsamountedto5.9tonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent(CO2e)percapitain2020,

10.Reinforcingsectoralinstrumentscanalsohelpwithhard-to-abatesectorsandtotheextentcarbonpricingissubjecttoacceptabilityconstraints.Sectoralinstrumentsarelessefficientthancarbonpricing(i.e.,theypromoteanarrowerrangeofmitigationresponses)buttheylikelyhavegreateracceptabilityastheyavoidasignificantincreaseinenergyprices.Thispaperdiscussesthepotentialuseoffeebates,orsimilarinstruments,forthepower,industry,transport,building,forestry,andagriculturalsectors.Feebates,whichareamorenovelapproach,arethefiscalanalogueofemissionrateorenergyefficiencyregulationsbutcanbemoreflexibleinaccommodatinguncertaintyovermitigationcosts.

11.ThepapersuggestspotentialelementsofacomprehensivemitigationstrategyforTürkiyeandisorganizedasfollows.4ThenextsectionprovidesbackgroundonnationalemissionstrendsandtargetsinTürkiyeand,forcomparison,GroupofTwenty(G20)countries.SectionIIIdiscussesconceptualissuesinthechoicebetween,anddesignof,carbonpricing.SectionIVpresentsestimatesoftheemissions,fiscal,andcostimpactsofcarbonpricing.SectionVdiscussesthedistributionalimpactsofpricingandmeasurestoassisthouseholdsandfirms.SectionVIdiscussesadditionalcomplementaryinstrumentsatthesectorallevel.Section

VIIsummarizesthemainrecommendations.

Figure4.PerCapitaEmissionsandGlobalShares,2020

Shareofglobalemissions

0%10%20%30%40%

China

UnitedStates

India

Russia

Japan

Brazil

Indonesia

Germany

Canada

Korea

Mexico

SaudiArabia

Australia

SouthAfrica

Türkiye

UnitedKingdom

France

Italy

Argentina

0102030

GHGpercapita,tCO2e

GHGpercapitaShareinglobalGHG

Sources:UNFCCC(2022);EDGAR(2022);staffestimates

Note:GHGsexcludelanduse,landusechangeandforestry(LULUCF)emissions.WorldGHGsexcludeinternationalmaritimeandaviation.

4ThepolicyrecommendationsarebroadlyinlinewiththoseinotherrecentIMFstaffassessmentsofclimatemitigationstrategies(e.g.,ArreguiandParry2020,Blackandothers2021aandb,Parry2021).Someissuesarebeyondthescopeofthepaperincludingfinancialsectorpolicies(seeIMF2022a,WBG2022a)andtechnology-relatedmarketfailures(seeDechezleprêtreandPopp2017).

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comparedwithaglobalaverageof6.1tonnespercapita,whichislowerthanOECDaverage(10.3tonnes).Atthesametime,Türkiyewastheeighteenthlargestglobalemitterinabsolutetermsin2020producingGHGemissionsof495milliontonnesor1percentoftheglobaltotal.ActionstomitigateemissionsinTürkiyearethereforesignificantatthegloballevelandcouldhelptocatalyzemitigationactionamongotheremergingmarketeconomies.

14.Energy-relatedCO2emissionsaccountedfor73percentofTürkiye’s(non-landuse)GHGsin

2020.SeeFigure5.Powergenerationaccountedfor21percentofGHGs,industryfossilfuelCO224percent,transport15percent,buildings13percent,industrialprocessemissions(e.g.,fromcement)11percent,agriculture13percent,andwaste3percent.Byfueltype,combustionofcoal,oil,andnaturalgasaccountedfor45,30,and24percentoffossilfuelCO2emissions.Land-use,landusechange,andforestry(LULUCF)onnetabsorbed82.3milliontonnesofemissionsin20205(thoughmeasurementoftheseemissionsislessaccurateandmorecontentiousthanforenergy-relatedCO2emissions).

Figure5.GHGsbySectorandFuel,2020

Waste3%

Agriculture14%

Industrial

processes

13%

Energy

70%

Powersector

20%

Transport

14%

Buildings

12%

Industry

24%

Nat.

gas,

24%

Oil,

30%

Coal,

45%

Source.TurkishStatisticalInstitute(2022);IMFstaffusingCPAT

Notes.GHGsexcludeLULUCFemissions.Buildingsincludeemissionsfromresidences,services,andfueluseinagricultureandforestry.

15.GHGemissionsinTürkiyeincreased138percentbetween1990and2019but,accordingtoIMFstaffestimates,BAUemissions6willdecreaseby27percentbetween2019and2030.AlthoughGDPinTürkiyeisprojectedtogrowbyapproximately44percentinrealtermsbetween2019and2030,theCO2emissionsintensityofGDPdeclines42percentoverthisperiod,reflectinggradualimprovementsinenergyefficiency(asolder,lessefficientcapitalisretired)andstandardassumptionsthatthedemandforelectricityandfuelsincreasebylessthaninproportiontoGDP.AsidefromIndia,projectedCO2emissionsgrowthinotherG20countriesoverthisperiodisaround0-20percent.SeeFigure6.

5WRI(2021).AccordingtoTurkishStatisticalInstitute,LULUCFabsorbed56.95milliontonnesofemissionin2020.

6BAUisestimatedintheClimatePolicyAssessmentTool,developedbytheIMFandtheWorldBankstaff.SeeAnnexAforadditionalinformation

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16.Recent2030BAUemissionsprojectionsbytheTurkishauthoritiesarehigherthaninIMFstaffprojections.Türkiye’sNationallyDeterminedContribution(NDC)submittedfortheParisAgreementprojectsBAUGHGemissionsof1175milliontonnesin2030,or175percenthigherthanintheIMFBAUprojections.Thedifferenceinpartreflectsgrowthinelectricitydemandwhichthegovernmentexpectstodoubleby2030,7whiletheIMFprojectsgrowthof16percent.

17.Baselinedeathsfromlocalairpollutionareprojected8toreach9,700ayearby2030,whichbringsapproximately2.7bnUSDofGDPloss,mostlyfromoutdoorairpollution.SeeFigure7.Coalanddieselcombustioncausesemissionsoffineparticulates,bothdirectly,andindirectly(throughsulfurdioxideandnitrogenoxideemissionswhichreactintheatmospheretoformparticulates)—gasandgasolinecombustioncausemuchsmalleramountsofthesepollutants.Fineparticulatesaresmallenoughtoenterthelungsandbloodstreamandelevatemortalityrisksfromvariousheartandlungdiseasesandstrokes,especiallyforseniorswithpre-existingconditions.

18.Türkiye’scurrent2030pledgeisnotalignedwithnetzeroemissionsinthelongterm—indeedaccordingtoIMFprojections,the2030targetwillbemetintheBAUwithoutmitigationaction.ForTürkiye,alinearemissionspathwaytoemissionsneutralitybetween2022and2053wouldimplyreducingGHGs28percentrelativeto2021levelsto292milliontonnesin2030.Incontrast,initsfirstNDCTürkiyepledgedtolimitemissionsto929milliontonnesin2030,21percentbelowtheauthorities’ownBAUprojection.DuringCOP27,Türkiyehasannouncednewtargetreductionof41percentcomparedtoBAU,approximatelylimitingtheGHGemissionsat693milliontonnesin2030.

Figure6.DriversofBAUCO2Emissions2021-2030

-60-300306090

Australia

Canada

EU-27

Japan

Korea

SaudiArabia

UnitedKingdom

UnitedStates

OtherHIC

HICweightedaverage

Argentina

Brazil

China

Mexico

Russia

SouthAfrica

Türkiye

OtherMIC

MICweightedaverage

India

Indone