不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

PAGE不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Non-performingLoansManagementandRecoveryWilliamJ.BaumanandAlanS.BlinderAbstractWiththedeepeningofChina'seconomicsystemreformdevelopmentandcontinuousimprovementofthesystemofthemarketeconomy,banks'lendingbusinessbecomescompletelyopentoindividuals,personalloansofbusinessgrowing,continuestoexpandthescopeofbusiness,especiallythedevelopmentofindividualhousingloanmorequickly.PersonalhousingloanbusinessinChinaatthetimeofitsdevelopment,therearebadcreditrisksaswellasthecompetitivesituationisnotoptimistic,toacertainextent,hamperthedevelopmentofindividualhousingloans,tosustainabledevelopment,researchmanagementmustbestrengthenedonanumberofissues.Thisarticlefromthecurrentdevelopmentstatusofindividualhousingloanbusinesstostart,pointedoutthatbecauseoftheexistingproblemsaswellasproblemsandfocusonhowtodeveloppersonalhousingloanbadcreditriskreduction,foreignexperiencesandlessonslearned,andthoughtsandcountermeasuresformanagement,topromotethehealthyandrapiddevelopmentofthebusiness.Keywords:Housingloanstoindividuals;Badcreditrisks;presentsituation;problem;Countermeasure1.IntroductionUnderthefive-categoryloanclassification,substandard,doubtfulandlossloansaredefinedasnon-performingloans.Becausethereasonsbehindnon-performingloansformationaredifferent,creditassociatesmusttakeeffectivemeasurestomanage,recoveranddisposeofthesepartsofassetaccordingtotheirdifferentcharacteristics.Thebankshouldfirstfindouttheresponsibilitiesoftheguarantoranddisposeofthesecurityintime.Onlywhentheyconfirmthattheguarantorhaslosttheguaranteeabilitiesandthesecurityisnotsufficienttopayofftheloan,cantheybegintodisposeofthenon-performingloans.2.ReasonsTherearemanyreasonswhybankshavepoorlyperformingloanportfolios.Irrespectiveofthesecauses,bankshaveanobligationtoshareholders,depositorsandcreditorstomaximizecashflowfromassets,themosttroublesomeaspectofwhichhasbeenthepoorrecordofbanksinrecoveringloans.Itisthisfactorthathascontributedthemosttobankinsolvency,andliquidityconstraints.Thereareseveralcomplementaryoptionsavailabletobankstorestructureproblemloansandportfolios,including:Exerciseofcollateral(liensagainstproperty,inventories)throughjudicialorextra-judicialmeans.Out-of-courtsettlementthatmayfocusexclusivelyondebtnegotiation,restructuringandrepayment,orleadtothefinancial,physicalandoperationalrestructuringoftheenterprise.Bankruptcy/liquidationproceduresthroughformalcourtproceedings.Thismayinvolveliquidation,reorganizationorprivatizationofanenterprisetoenforcepartialortotalloanrepayment.(Besidesthebankitself,sometimesgovernmentalsoleadsarestructuringprogramtohelpthebanktosolvetheproblemofNPLinordertostabilizethebankingindustryorthewholeeconomy,forexample,AssetManagementCompany(AMC),aspecialpurposecompany,buysorexchangesNPLfrombankanddisposesofthem).3.Work-OutUnitWithaggregateloanportfoliosuniversallytroubledbydelinquenciesanddefaults,somebankshaveoptedtodevelopwork-outunitstoimproveloanportfolioquality.Whenwork-outunitsareestablished,theyareusuallysetuptodealwithmostofabank'sproblemloans,effectivelysectioningoffnon-performingloansfromthebroaderbankportfolioofperformingloans.Thebenefitsexpectedfromwork-outunitsinclude;Concentratedfocusontherecoveryofproblemloans;Moredevelopedbankingexpertiseandcreditriskevaluationskills;Improvedinternalbanksystem(earlywarningsystems,collateralrequirements,creditinformationneeds).Work-outunitscanmakeasignificantdifferenceinrestructuringloanportfolios,particularlywhensupportedbyeffectivetechnicalassistance.4.LoanRestructuringandLoan"Rollover"Case-by-caseloanrestructuringiscommoninmarket-orientedeconomies,particularlywhenborrowersareunabletomeettheoriginaltermsoftheloanagreementduetoexternalfactors.Theserestructuringinvariablychangesintheamount,termsand/orscheduleofinterestrates,principalrepayment,andcollateralvalues.Loancovenants(ratios,reportrequirements)oftenchangetofacilitatecompliance.Insomecases,radicalmeasuressuchasreplacingmanagementareinvolved.Thisapproachissimilartowhatwork-outunitsattempttodo:recoverportionsofloanportfolioswhichhavedeterioratedandarenon-performing.However,workoutunitsareoftenorganizedonthebasisofsector,locationorbankexposure.Case-by-caseloanrestructuringisconductedonanindividualizedbasis.Thebenefitsofindividualcase-by-caseloanrestructuringsinclude:Reinforcementofthebank-clientrelationship.Retentionoftheloanbythebankonitsbalancesheet,evenifprovisionsaremadeforpossiblelosses.Preservationofthefirm'srelationswithotherparties(tradecreditors,otherbanks,buyers,employees),therebymaintainingitsreputationwithoutembarrassingandcostlybankruptcy/liquidationprocedures.Aswithdebt-equityswaps,therisktothebankisthatitisoverlyoptimisticaboutprospects,andthatadditionalresourcesarecommittedtotheborroweraddingtobanklossesandreducedloanablefundsatafuturedate.Thishasoccurredfrequentlyintransitioneconomies(suchasChina,EastEuropeancountries,formerSovietUnion).Intransitioneconomybanks,theclosestapproximationtotheWesternloanrestructuringhasbeentheloan"rollover"whichhasbeenacommonpractice.Rolloversgenerallyinvolvethefollowingtwotechniques:Simplerolloverofprincipalon/beforetheduedate,withtheenterprisemeetinginterestobligations.Rolloverofprincipalon/beforeduedate,withinterestaddedbacktotheprincipalamount(“interestcapitalization").Thefirsttechniqueislegitimateandrationalunlesstheenterpriseisunabletorepayprincipal,andlikelytoremainimpairedinthefuture.Thesecondtechniqueoftenreflectsatroubledloanandenterprise,andhasbeentypicallypracticedintransitioneconomybankingsystems.Furthermore,thelattertechniquehasbeenaccompaniedbyaccountingtreatmentwhichmistakenlyrecognizestheseassetsasperformingloans,artificiallyinflatingincomestatementsandbalancesheetbookvalues.5.Debt-equitySwapsandLoanSales/AssetSwapDebt-equityswapresultsinbankownershipofenterprisesoccurwithdifferingfrequenciesindifferentcountries.Insomecountries,bankownershipofenterprisesiscommon(Germaninterlockingdirectorates),whileinothercountriesitisstrictlyregulated(USA)orstrictlyprohibited(InChina,debt-equityswapisdonethroughassetmanagementcompany).ByswappingNPLforequity,bankscanexercisemoredirectcontrol/supervisionoverenterprisemanagementwhiletheenterprisebenefitsfromincreaseddebtcapacity.Therisktobankisexcessexposuretoariskyinvestmentwhichmayjeopardizedepositsafetyandbankcapital,anddemandscarcemanagementtimeandresources.Debt-equityswaprepresentsnascentventurecapitaloperation.Perhapsonlyonein10oftheseinvestmentsmaysucceed,butthisshouldbesufficienttocovertheriskoftheotherninelosinginvestment.Givenexistinglowbookvaluesandthecurrentlythinmarketthatislikelytoimproveinthecomingyears,banksareprudenttoallocateasmallpercentageofassetstoenterprisestheybelievewillgeneratesignificantprofitatalaterdate.Atthatpoint,bankscanselltheirshares,andreapsignificantprofittobolstercapital.Allofthismakesmoresensegiventhecurrentdownsiderisk,whichislimited,asmostofthesetransactionsarepapertransactionsthatdonotfurtherimpairbankliquidity.Butbankequityswapmaybeindicativeofthefailureofbanksinsomecountriestoproperlydefinebank'srolesasfinancialintermediaries,streamlinetheiroperations,specializeinafewkeyareaswithinthelimitoftheircurrentmanagerialandstaffingcapabilities,writedowntheirassetstomoreaccuratevalues,andprogresstowardamorestableandprudentlymanagedsystemdevoidofexcessrisk.Investmentinlosingenterprisesraisestheriskoffutureliquiditybeingdrainedtopropuptheseenterprisesinthehopeofeventualprofitability,whichputsdepositorsandshareholdersatrisk.Inadditiontodebt-equityswaps,loansalesswapsareanoptionthatcouldbeusedtorestructurebankbalancesheets.However,thisoptionhasnotbeencommonlyfoundintransitioneconomyduetoabsenceofsecondarymarketdevelopment.6.SecuritizationofNon-performingLoanNon-performingloansecuritizationisapoolingofnon-performingloanspackagedandissuedassecuritiestoinvestorsthrougharrangementsoflegalstructure,cashflow,andcreditratingmechanisms.Non-performingLoansarealsoknownasbadloans,overdueloans,receivablesundercollection,andloansstillundernormalpaymentstatuses,butwithcirculatingbondsratedlowerthanCCClevel.Duringthesecuritizationperiod,theoriginator(seller)willselectthemostidealportfoliobasedonasetofeligibilitycriteria,suchasdebtors'locations,creditperiod,currency,andoverdueratingsfromallavailablenon-performingloans.Afterthescreeningprocess,bankwillproceedwiththeriskassessment,cashflowsimulationandcredittranche.Thesecuritiesarethenofferedtoinvestorsafterconfirmationfromcreditratingagenciesandregulatoryapprovalobtained.Theassetmanagementagencyisparticularlyimportanttoanon-performingloansecuritizationsincetheassetmanagementagency'sexpertiseisinstrumentaltoincreasingcollectionratesofthesenon-performingloans.Investors'risksareminimizedthroughcreditenhancementtechniques;defaultrisks,prepaymentrisks,etc.arealsoemphasizedtoevaluatetheriskprofileofnon-performingloans.7.In-courtBankruptcy/LiquidationProceedingsResortingtolegalprocedurestocollecttherepaymentofnon-performingloansisthelastdefenseline.Inpractice,banksshouldgraspthetimingoflitigation.Becauseblindlawsuitswillinvolvebanks'time,energy,moneyandpeople.Inaddition,theycouldhavenegativeimpactontherelationshipbetweenbanksandtheirclients.Firstly,beforelitigation,banksshouldinvestigatetheborrowers'incomeresourcesandassetcategoriesandpreventthemfromhidingortransferringassetinthisperiodoftime.Bankscanapplytothecourtforassetpreservation.Secondly,banksshouldtrybesttocorrectthedeficienciesofcreditdocumentsandwinthemselvesadvantageousconditionsinlitigation.Thirdly,banksshouldalsopreparethemselvesfortheresultsofreconciliationorfailure.Bankruptcy/liquidationisaneffectivecomplementtoout-of-cnurtapproaches,andservesasalaststageofdebtcollection,providingcreditorswithcontroloverdebtorsinfinancialdistressandpromptingtheirrestructuring.Forthisreason,manycountries(transitioneconomies)havedevelopedandareseekingtoexpandtheuseofformalbankruptcytobroadenthearrayofdisputeresolutionmechanisms,providebankswithlongneededrecourse,andinstillgreaterfinancialdisciplineonenterprises.8.ExerciseofCollateralWhenadebtmaturesorisgoingtomatureandthedebtorhasencounteredseriousoperationdifficulties,thedebtorcannotrepaytheloanincashandtheguarantorcannotrepaytheloanincasheither.Maybeafternegotiation,thetwoparties(thebankandtheborrower)orthreeparties(thebank,theborrowerandtheguarantor)canreachaconsensus.Inlinewiththeconsensusortherulingbythecourt,thedebtorortheguarantorcanmakein-kindrepaymentofdebts,whichisoneoftheimportantmeanstodisposeofnon-performingloans.9.Writing-offBadLoansInaccordancewithrelevantstaterulesandregulation,iftheprincipalofaloanisidentifiedasunrecoverable,thebadloancanbewrittenoff.Writing-offofbadloansistheinternalactivityofabank.Sothebankstillenjoystherecourserightandshouldcontinuetodemandtherepaymentofthefund.10.ConclusionWereanalyzedbythenon-performingloansmanagementrecycling.Badcreditriskmanagement,therearestillmanyproblemstobesolved,howthelendingbusinessintheinternationalfinancialplaceneedstobefurtherresearchandcontinuetoexplore.Inshort,themanagementofnon-performingloansofChina'seconomicdevelopmenthasmadeasignificantcontribution,buttherearestillshortcomingsintheirownsystem,theexternalcompetitiveenvironmentinthedevelopmentofthepersonalloantherearemanyadverse,whichrequirescountriestofullyunderstandindividualhousingloansanimportantroleonthebasisof,forthebanksinternalmanagementandexternalriskmanagementandreasonableplanningtoongoingdevelopment.Personalloansalsohavetorecognizetheirownpositionandwheretoadoptappropriatestrategiesandmarketpositioning,innovation,adjustment,reform,focusingonriskmanagementinordertomorerapidlygrow.ReferencesStevenHusted,MichaelMelvin,InternationalEconomics[M],(thefifthedition),HigherEducationPress,2002Beck,T.,Demirguc-Kunt,A.,&Maksimovic,V.(2005).Financialandlegalconstraintstogrowth:Doesfirmsizematter?TheJournalofFinance,60,137–177.Peng,Y.(2004).KinshipnetworksandentrepreneursinChina'stransitionaleconomy.AmericanJournalofSociology,109,1045–1074Qian,Y.(2000).TheprocessofChina’smarkettransition(1978–1998):Theevolutionary,historical,andcomparativeperspectives.JournalofInstitutionalandTheoreticalEconomics,156,151–171.Shane,S.,&Cable,D.(2002).Networkties,reputation,andthefinancingofnewventures.ManagementScience,48,364–381.Newton,K.(2001).Trust,socialcapital,civilsociety,anddemocracy.InternationalPoliticalScienceReview,22,201–214.Liu,Z.(2003).TheeconomicimpactanddeterminantsofinvestmentinhumanandpoliticalcapitalinChina.EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange,51,823–850.Birner,R.,&Witter,H.(2003).Usingsocialcapitaltocreatepoliticalcapital.InThecommonsintheNewMillennium:Challengesandadaptation(pp.291–334).CambridgeandLondon:MITPress.AppliedEconomics,theDrydenPress,2006P75-78.不良贷款的管理和回收威廉J鲍姆，阿伦S布林德摘要随着我国金融体系建设的进一步发展和市场体制的迅速完善，银行的贷款业务逐渐向个人完全展开，个人贷款的业务种类不断增多，业务范围持续扩大，特别是个人住房贷款业务的发展更为迅猛。我国个人住房贷款业务在其发展的同时，存在的不良信贷风险问题以及竞争形势不容乐观，在一定程度上阻碍了个人住房贷款业务的发展，要持续快速发展，必须加强对一系列问题的研究管理。本文从分析目前不良贷款的情况，指出存在的问题以及问题出现的原因，并着重针对商业银行对不良贷款的回收和管理，借鉴先进的经验教训，并提出思考及相应对策进行管理，以加快这一业务的正确快速发展。关键词：不良贷款管理回收一、前言在五级贷款分类法理论中，次级、可疑和损失类贷款被看做是不良贷款。由于不良贷款的形成原因很难发现，信贷助理必须根据各类贷款的不n-性质，对这类不良资产采取有效的措施来管理、回收和处置。在处理不良贷款时，银行应该明确担保人的责任，并及时处置担保物权。只有在银行确认担保人丧失了担保能力，担保物权已经不能足额偿还贷款时，银行才能够处置不良贷款。二、不良贷款形成原因银行不良贷款形成的原因有很多。但不论是什么原因，银行都对股东、存款人和银行债权人负有最大限度将资产变现的责任，将不良资产变现是银行回收贷款过程中最困难的环节。对绝大多数银行来说，这一因素限制了银行的清偿力和流动性。下面是对银行重组不良贷款和资产有利的几点建议：1．通过司法或非司法方式执行担保物（处置所有权和存货）；2．庭外和解主要集中在债务的协商、重组和偿还上，或会导致公司在财务、实体或运营上的重新安排；3．通过正常的司法程序对借款人进行破产清算，该方式通过对企业进行清算、重组或者私有化以收回部分或全部贷款。（此外，政府有时也会出面领导一项重组，帮助银行解决不良贷款的问题，以维持银行业的稳定或整个经济的稳定。例如政府成立资产管理公司，该类特殊机构专门从银行购买不良资产，然后对不良资产进行处理）三、不良资产处理小组当违法和违约产生大量不良贷款时，有些银行通过成立不良资产处理小组来改善资产的质量。在不良资产处理小组成立后，银行就可以有效地将不良贷款从正常贷款中分离出来进行专门集中的处理。成立不良资产处理小组有以下几个优点：1．可以对不良贷款的回收进行集中处理；2．可以培养更多的专业人才，开发先进的信用风险评估技术；3．改善银行内部机制（以完善预警机制，满足银行在担保和信用信息方面的需求）。在进行贷款组合重组方面，不良资产处理小组将会发挥很大的作用，尤其是在有效的技术支持的情况下。四、贷款重组和展期在市场经济国家，贷款逐个重组是处理不良贷款常见的方法，尤其是当借款人由于外部原因不能。按合同的约定偿还贷款的时候。这些重组安排并不改变贷款的额度、条款、利率安排、本金的偿还和担保的价值。贷款协议的改变是为了使借款人能更好地履行合同。而在有些情况下，银行会采取一些极端的措施，如替换公司管理层等。该方式与不良贷款处理小组所做的工作有些相似：回收资产质量恶化的不良贷款。然而，不良贷款工作小组通常以行业、区域或银行分支机构为基础，而逐个贷款重组是以单个具体的不良贷款为对象展开的。贷款逐个重组有以下几方面的优点：加强银行与客户之间的关系；如果银行的贷款准备金充分，就可以将贷款留在银行资产负债表上；保护该企业与其债权人、其他银行、其买家和员工的关系，可以维持该公司的信誉，避免公司破产或清算。债转股对银行来说可能是对企业的前景过于乐观，这有可能增加由借款人造成的贷款损失，导致未来贷款资金回收的减少。债转股在转型经济国家非常常见，例如中国、东欧国家和前苏联。在经济转型国家，银行处理不良贷款最常用的方法是贷款展期。贷款展期通常涉及以下两方面的技术问题：企业在按期偿还利息的前提下，在到期前或到期日对本金展期；在到期前或到期日对本金展期，并将利息转化为本金（这称做利息资本化）。第一种方式只有在借款人不能偿还贷款本金的情况下才合法合理，但在将来应该逐步减少对客户展期。第二种方式通常反映出贷款和企业存在很大问题，该情况在转型经济国家的事务中是常见的。此外，第二种方法需要做会计上的处理，这会使人误以为贷款是正常的，会虚增损益表和资产负债表的账面价值。五、债转股、贷款出售和资产互换债转股会导致银行成为企业的股东，这在不同的国家会有很大的不同。在有些国家，银行持有企业的股份是很常见的（例如德国），而在另外一些国家会受到严格管制（如美国）或禁止（如中国，债转股通常通过资产管理公司来进行）。将不良资产转换成股权，银行可以加强对企业管理层在借债方面的控制和监督。对银行来说，这样做相当于增大了银行投资的风险，这有可能危及银行存款和资本的安全，需要投入更多管理时间和资源。债转股基本上属于风险资本运营，大约只有1/10的案例是成功的。对于债转股，银行必须接受低的账面价值和萧条的市场，但银行会对它们认为将来能够产生巨大收益的企业提供债转股的机会。企业情况好转以后，银行就会卖掉所持有的股份，从而获取不菲的利润。这一过程需要银行对企业当前的风险有准确的认识，这些风险必须是有限的。债转股交易仅仅是纸上交易，不会降低银行的流动性。但是，在一些把银行定位为金融中介机构的国家，债转股交易对银行来说可能存在失败的风险，也会为银行的运营流程改造、在现有管理层和员工等人力资源限制下进人新的领域、为避免额外风险而创建稳定审慎的管理机制等方面带来不利影响。对损失不断增加的企业追加投资会增加银行未来的流动性风险，对这些企业在贷款上的支持会增加银行股东和存款人的风险。相对债转股，银行出售贷款可以重构银行资产负债表。然而，这种方法在经济转型国家并不常见，这是由于这些国家二级市场不发达。六、不良资产证券化不良资产证券化是指将不良贷款打包，然后通过一系列的法律安排、现金流和信用评级等环节向投资者发行证券。不良贷款还包括坏账、过期贷款、有担保的应收账款，以及贷款虽然目前被按期部分偿还，但其流通股票被评为CCC级以下。在资产证券化过程中，卖者应根据合理的标准选择最佳的资产组合，例如借款人所在地区、信用期限、货币、不良贷款的预期时间等方面进行考虑。就整个过程来看，银行所要做的工作有风险评估、现金流预测、信贷份额确定等。证券在销售给投资者以前须找评级机构对其进行评级，并获得监管当局的批准。在此过程中，资产管理机构的参与对资产证券化尤为重要，因为资产管理机构在增加不良资产评级方面有非常专业的经验。投资者的风险可以通过强化的信用风险技术最小化，违约风险和偿付风险也是应该重点考虑的方面。七、法庭强制破产／清算借助司法程序回收贷款是最后一道防线。在实际操作中，银行应该把握好起诉的时间，这是由于诉讼需要银行投入很多时间、精力、资金和人员。此外，法律诉讼还会对银行与客户之间的关系产生消极影响。首先，在起诉前银行应该调查清楚客户的收入来源、资产