金融市场学双语题库及答案(第十八章)米什金《金融市场与机构》

1、Financial Markets and Institutions, 8e (Mishkin)Chapter 18 Financial Regulation18.1 Multiple Choice1) During the boom years of the 1920s, bank failures were quiteA) uncommon, averaging less than 30 per year.B) uncommon, averaging less than 100 per year.C) common, averaging about 600 per year.D) comm

2、on, averaging about 2,000 per year.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition2) When one party to a transaction has incentives to engage in activities detrimental to the other party, there exists a problem ofA) moral hazard.B) split

3、incentives.C) ex ante shirking.D) precontractual opportunism.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition3) Moral hazard is an important consequence of insurance arrangements because the existence of insuranceA) provides increased ince

4、ntives for risk taking.B) impedes efficient risk taking.C) causes the private cost of the insured activity to increase.D) does both A and B of the above.E) does both B and C of the above.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition4) T

5、he existence of deposit insurance can increase the likelihood that depositors will need deposit protection, as banks with deposit insuranceA) are likely to take on greater risks than they otherwise would.B) are likely to be too conservative, reducing the probability of turning a profit.C) are likely

6、 to regard deposits as an unattractive source of funds due to depositors' demands for safety.D) are placed at a competitive disadvantage in acquiring funds.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition5) Although the FDIC was create

7、d to prevent bank failures, its existence encourages banks toA) take too much risk.B) hold too much capital.C) open too many branches.D) buy too much stock.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition6) When bad drivers line up to purc

8、hase collision insurance, automobile insurers are subject to theA) moral hazard problem.B) adverse selection problem.C) assigned risk problem.D) ill queue problem.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition7) Deposit insuranceA) attra

9、cts risk-prone entrepreneurs to the banking industry.B) encourages bank managers to take on greater risks than they otherwise would.C) reduces the incentives of depositors to monitor the riskiness of their banks' asset portfolios.D) does all of the above.E) does only A and B of the above.Answer:

10、 DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition8) The possibility that the failure of one bank can hasten the failure of other banks is called theA) bank run effect.B) moral hazard effect.C) contagion effect.D) adverse selection effect.Answer: C

11、Topic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition9) If the FDIC decides that a bank is too big to fail, it will use the method,effectively ensuring that depositors will suffer losses.A) payoff; largeB) payoff; noC) purchase and assumption; largeD) p

12、urchase and assumption; noAnswer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition10) If the FDIC uses the purchase and assumption method to handle a failed bank, A) all deposits will suffer losses.B) small deposits will be paid in full but deposi

13、ts over the insurance limit will not.C) all deposits will be paid in full.D) none of the above will occur.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition11) One problem of the too-big-to-fail policy is that it the incentives forby big ban

14、ks.A) reduces; moral hazard by big banksB) increases; moral hazard by big banksC) reduces; adverse selection by big banksD) increases; adverse selection by big banksAnswer: BTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition12) The result of the too-

15、big-to-fail policy is that banks will take onrisks, making bank failures more likely.A) small; fewerB) small; greaterC) large; fewerD) large; greaterAnswer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition13) The too-big-to-fail policyA) exacerbat

16、es moral hazard problems.B) puts large banks at a competitive disadvantage in attracting large deposits.C) treats large depositors of small banks inequitably when compared to depositors of large banks.D) does only A and C of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial

17、 RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition14) Which of the following solutions have been proposed to solve the too-big-to-fail problem?A) Break up large, systemically important financial institutions.B) Impose higher capital requirements on large, systemically important financial institutions.C) D

18、o nothing, since Dodd-Frank effectively eliminated the problem.D) All of the above have been proposed.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.6 Too-big-to-fail and Future RegulationQuestion Status: New Question15) Some view that Dodd-Frank eliminated the too-big-to-fail problem. How did it achieve this?A) By mak

19、ing it harder for the Federal Reserve to bail out financial institutionsB) By eliminating the Volcker ruleC) By reducing the regulation of SIFIsD) All of the above.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.6 Too-big-to-fail and Future RegulationQuestion Status: New Question16) The primary difference between the &q

20、uot;payoff" and the "purchase and assumption methods of handling failed banks is that the FDICA) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $250,000 limit, when it uses the "payoff" method.B) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $250,000 limit, when it uses th

21、e "purchase and assumption" method.C) is more likely to use the "payoff" method when the bank is large and it fears that depositor losses may spur business bankruptcies and other bank failures.D) does both A and B of the above.E) does both B and C of the above.Answer: BTopic: Cha

22、pter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition17) The primary difference between the "payoff" and the "purchase and assumption methods of handling failed banks is that the FDICA) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $250,000 lim

23、it, when it uses the "payoff" method.B) guarantees all deposits, not just those under the $250,000 limit, when it uses the "purchase and assumption" method.C) is less likely to use the "payoff" method when the bank is large and it fears that depositor losses may spur bu

24、siness bankruptcies and other bank failures.D) does both A and B of the above.E) does both B and C of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition18) Regulators attempt to reduce the riskiness of banks' asset portfolios b

25、yA) limiting the amount of loans in particular categories or to individual borrowers.B) prohibiting banks from holding risky assets such as common stocks.C) establishing a minimum interest rate floor that banks can earn on certain assets.D) doing all of the above.E) doing only A and B of the above.A

26、nswer: ETopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition19) One way for bank regulators to assure depositors that a bank is not taking on too much risk is to require the bank toA) diversify its loan portfolio.B) reduce its equity capital.C) reduce

27、the size of its loan portfolio.D) do both A and B of the above.E) do both B and C of the above.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition20) Banks do not want to hold too much capital becauseA) they do not bear fully the costs of ban

28、k failures.B) higher returns on equity are earned when bank capital is smaller, all else equal.C) higher capital levels attract the scrutiny of regulators.D) all of the above.E) only A and B of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Pre

29、vious Edition21) When regulators engage in microprudential regulation, they focus on .A) the safety and soundness of individual financial institutionsB) the credit standards of individual loansC) the safety and soundness of each customer of a financial institutionD) the safety and soundness of each

30、asset the financial institution holdsAnswer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: New Question22) When regulators engage in macroprudential regulation, they focus on A) the safety and soundness of the entire financial institutionB) the credit standards

31、 of all loans held by the financial institutionC) the safety and soundness of the financial system in aggregateD) the safety and soundness of each liability of the financial institutionAnswer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: New Question23) The in

32、creased integration of financial markets across countries and the need to make the playing field equal for banks from different countries led to the Basel Accord agreement toA) standardize bank capital requirements internationally.B) reduce, across the board, bank capital requirements in all countri

33、es.C) sever the link between risk and capital requirements.D) do all of the above.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition24) Under the Basel plan,A) assets and off-balance sheet activities are assigned to various categories to ref

34、lect the degree of credit risk.B) a bank's total capital must equal or exceed 8 percent of total risk-weighted assets.C) both of the above occur.D) none of the above occur.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition25) Of the foll

35、owing assets, the one which has the highest capital requirement under the Basel Accord isA) municipal bonds.B) residential mortgages.C) commercial paper.D) securities issued by industrialized countries' governments.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuest

36、ion Status: Previous Edition26) Which of the following is not true regarding the Basel 2 proposal to reform the original 1988 Basel Accord?A) It attempts to link capital requirements more closely to actual risk by expanding the number of risk categories.B) It focuses on assessing the quality of risk

37、 management in banking institutions.C) It attempts to improve market discipline by requiring increased disclosure of pertinent information about banks.D) It has been well received by banks and national regulatory agencies.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Regulation Q

38、uestion Status: Previous Edition27) Ways in which bank regulations reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in banking includeA) a chartering process designed to prevent crooks from getting control of a bank.B) restrictions that prevent banks from acquiring certain risky assets, such a

39、s common stocks.C) high bank capital requirements to increase the cost of bank failure to the owners.D) all of the above.E) only A and B of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition28) The chartering process is especially

40、 designed to deal with the problem,and regular bank examinations help to reduce the problem.A) adverse selection; adverse selectionB) adverse selection; moral hazardC) moral hazard; adverse selectionD) moral hazard; moral hazardAnswer: BTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Regula

41、tionQuestion Status: Previous Edition29) The chartering process is especially designed to deal with the problem,and restrictions on asset holdings help to reduce the problem.A) adverse selection; adverse selectionB) adverse selection; moral hazardC) moral hazard; adverse selectionD) moral hazard; mo

42、ral hazardAnswer: BTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition30) Regular bank examinations and restrictions on asset holdings indirectly help to reduce the problem because, given fewer opportunities to take on risk,risk-prone entrepreneurs w

43、ill be discouraged from entering the banking industry. A) moral hazardB) adverse selectionC) ex post shirkingD) post-contractual opportunismAnswer: BTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition31) Regular bank examinations and restrictions on

44、asset holdings indirectly help to the adverse selection problem because, given fewer opportunities to take on risk, risk-prone entrepreneurs will be from entering the banking industry.A) increase; encouragedB) increase; discouragedC) reduce; encouragedD) reduce; discouragedAnswer: DTopic: Chapter 18

45、.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition32) The legislation that separated commercial banking from the securities industry is known as the .A) National Bank ActB) Federal Reserve ActC) Glass-Steagall ActD) McFadden ActAnswer: CTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric

46、 Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition33) The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980A) approved NOW accounts nationwide.B) restricted the use of ATS accounts.C) imposed interest rate ceilings on bank loans.D) did all of the above.Answer:

47、 ATopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition34) The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980A) approved NOW accounts nationwide.B) imposed uniform reserve requirements.C) mandated the phase out of interest-rate ce

48、ilings on deposits.D) did all of the above.E) did only A and B of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information and Financial RegulationQuestion Status: Previous Edition35) As a way of stemming the decline in the number of savings and loans and mutual savings banks, the Garn-St. Germ

49、ain Act of 1982 allowedA) money market certificates.B) money market mutual funds.C) money market deposit accounts.D) negotiable order of withdrawal accounts.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 18.2 The 1980s Savings and Loan Banking CrisisQuestion Status: Previous Edition36) An impact of the Garn-St. Germain Ac

50、t of 1982 has been toA) put savings and loans at a competitive disadvantage.B) make the banking system more competitive.C) give money market mutual funds a competitive advantage.D) do both A and B of the above.E) do both A and C of the above.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 18.2 The 1980s Savings and Loan Ba

51、nking CrisisQuestion Status: Previous Edition37) Moral hazard and adverse selection problems increased in prominence in the 1980sA) as deregulation opened up more avenues for savings and loans and mutual savings banks to take on more risk.B) following a burst of financial innovation in the 1970s and

52、 early 1980s that produced new financial instruments and markets, thereby widening the scope for risk taking.C) following an increase in federal deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000.D) because of all of the above.E) because of only A and B of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.2 The 1980s Sa

53、vings and Loan Banking CrisisQuestion Status: Previous Edition38) Moral hazard and adverse selection problems increased in prominence in the 1980sA) as deregulation opened up more avenues for savings and loans and mutual savings banks to take on more risk.B) following a burst of financial innovation

54、 in the 1970s and early 1980s that produced new financial instruments and markets, thereby widening the scope for risk taking.C) following a decrease in federal deposit insurance from $100,000 to $40,000.D) because of all of the above.E) because of only A and B of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 1

55、8.2 The 1980s Savings and Loan Banking Crisis Question Status: Previous Edition39) The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991A) increased the FDIC's ability to borrow from the Treasury to deal with failed banks.B) reduced the scope of deposit insurance in several ways.C) e

56、liminated governmentally administered deposit insurance.D) did only A and B of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.3 FDIC Improvement Act of 1991Question Status: Previous Edition40) The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991A) reduced the scope of deposit insurance in several

57、 ways.B) eliminated restrictions on nationwide banking.C) allowed well-capitalized banks to do some securities underwriting.D) did only A and B of the above.E) did only A and C of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 18.3 FDIC Improvement Act of 1991Question Status: Previous Edition41) The Federal Depo

58、sit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991A) reduced the scope of deposit insurance in several ways.B) limited the FDIC's ability to use the "too-big-to-fail" policy.C) requires the FDIC to intervene earlier when a bank gets into trouble.D) did all of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 18.3 FDIC Improvement Act of 1991Q