挪威能源转型2023-英

ENERGYTRANSITIONNORWAY2023A

nationalforecastto2050Commissioned

by:DNV

Energy

Transition

Norway

2023FOREWORDThe

2023

edition

of

the

Energy

Transition

Norway

2050reconfirms

that

Norway

is

not

on

track

to

meet

ParisAgreement

targets

for

reducing

greenhouse

gas

emissions.Despite

cross-political

support

for

55%

and

100%

GHGreductions

by

2030

and

2050,

respectively,

Norwayis

heading

for

27%

less

in

2030

and

80%

in

2050.term.

Norway

can

maintain

its

significant

market

share

inenergy

supply

to

Europe,

but

through

a

new

export

mix

ofelectricity

alongside

hydrogen

(initially

blue

and

thengreen)

and

ammonia

as

energy

carriers.

Again,

this

cannotbe

achieved

without

sufficient

renewable

power.The

decarbonization

effort

in

Norway

and

globally

is

anenormous

business

opportunity

for

the

Norwegianindustry.

Huge

opportunities

lie

ahead

in

industrializingfloating

wind

farms,

setting

up

a

complete

value

chain

forbatteries

for

the

energy

system

and

transport,

and

inhydrogen

and

ammonia.

In

addition,

conventional

industryproducts

need

to

be

carbon-neutral

going

forward

tocomply

with

customers’

future

requirements.

If

not,

we’lllose

market

share.When

Norway

ratified

the

Paris

Agreement

in

2016,nearly

all

its

electricity

was

from

hydropower.

We

also

got140

TWh

of

energy

from

fossil

fuels.

To

replace

that

fossilconsumption

to

reach

climate

targets,

roughly

100

TWh

ofadditional

renewables

capacity

for

electricity

and

makinghydrogen

and

ammonia

was

needed.

The

electricity

gridneeds

strengthening

across

Norway,

and

carbon

captureand

storage

is

part

of

the

equation.

We

are

far

fromachieving

this

and

thus

face

an

expected

net

electricitydeficit

in

2028

lasting

until

2032,

that

could

see

Norwaypaying

European

price

levels

or

more

for

electricity.Norway’s

urgent

need

to

build

a

significant

amount

ofnew

renewable

power

requires

an

attractive

financialframework

and

streamlined

concessions

and

permitting.Norsk

Industri

is

worried

that

there

are

close

to

zero

newapplications

for

hydropower

and

onshore

wind.

Thissuggests

the

political

framework

is

unattractive.

Newgreen

industries

as

defined

by

the

government

requirefinancial

frameworks

comparable

to

those

in

the

EU.This

report

shows

the

need

for

390

TWh

renewable

powerin

2050,

nearly

three

times

more

than

today,

throughconverting

existing

fossil

generation,

building

newgreen

industries,

and

enabling

hydrogen

productionfor

domestic

use

and

export.

Additional

solar

and

hydro-power

are

important,

especially

in

the

short

term,

butmake

limited

contributions.

Onshore

wind

is

affordableand

may

contribute

40–50

TWh.

Offshore

wind,

especiallyfloating

offshore

wind,

will

be

the

main

contributor

withmore

than

100

TWh

near

2050.Time

is

of

the

essence.

We

have

only

six

years

left

tomeet

2030

ambitions.

Our

politicians

need

to

take

bolddecisions

to

get

us

back

on

track.

We

all

have

theresponsibility

to

make

a

better

tomorrow.All

renewables

are

weather-dependent,

and

we

shouldexpect

intense

supply

and

demand

dynamics

at

national,regional,

and

local

levels.

Balancing

the

grid

requireshydropower

plants,

huge

numbers

of

batteries,

anddata-driven

algorithms

working

in

real

time.NilsKlippenbergEurope

depends

on

Norwegian

gas

to

meet

demand

andstabilize

the

geopolitical

situation.

This

demand

is

expectedto

increase

in

the

short

term

but

decline

steeply

in

the

longChairmanElectroandEnergy—NorskIndustri2ContentsCONTENTSForewordHighlights2412Introduction61.1

About

this

Outlook1.2

Assumptions

and

policies68Energy

demand122.1

Transport2.2

Buildings2.3

Manufacturing2.4

Non-energy2.5

Energy

demand

carriernergy

supply243.1

Oil3.2

Natural

gas3.3

Electricity262829456Energy

trade404652EmissionsNorwegian

transition

in

an

EU

contextReferencesProject

team58593DNV

Energy

Transition

Norway

20231HIGHLIGHTSNorway

not

on

track

for

2030

and

2050emission

targetsLack

of

new

power

productionplaces

industrial

development

anddecarbonization

at

risk−

Implemented

and

planned

actions

are

not

creatingthe

dramatic

change

needed

to

reach

the

short-termgoals−

Norway

aims

to

cut

emissions

by

55%

by

2030

and90-95%

by

2050.

We

forecast

27%

reduction

by

2030and

80%

by

2050

compared

with

1990−

The

more

urgent

action

is

delayed,

the

narrower

thewindow

for

reaching

the

targets

becomes,

especiallythe

nearer-term

ambitions

for

2030−

Only

transport

and

the

oil

and

gas

sector’s

emissionsare

falling

close

to

the

levels

necessary

to

reachNorway’s

2050

target−

By

2050,

significant

carbon

capture

(8

Mt)

and

carbonremovals

(2

Mt)

reduce

Norway’s

emission

by

half,helping

to

get

closer

to

reach

the

target,

but

needsfurther

efforts−

There

is

mounting

pressure

for

high-income

countries,such

as

those

in

Europe

and

rest

of

OECD,

to

reachnet

zero

well

before

2050

to

allow

the

world

to

reachthe

ambitions

of

the

Paris

Agreement−

The

existing

electricity

surplus

in

Norway

will

shortlybe

consumed

by

increased

electricity

demand

fromhouseholds,

industry,

the

electrification

of

transport,and

electrification

of

several

oil

and

gas

installations−

Limited

opportunities

for

adding

new

electricitygeneration

short

term

will

likely

create

an

electricitydeficit

by

the

late

2020s−

The

deficit

is

currently

being

managed

by

‘default’demand

reduction:

new

industrial

growth

is

beingdiscouraged

by

uncertainty

in

future

electricityprices,

an

unclear

regulatory

framework,

and

a

lack

ofgrid

connections−

Offshore

wind

has

the

highest

potential

to

addsignificant

electricity

to

Norwegian

power

system

inthe

2030s,

but

delays

in

concessions

and

auctionsplace

this

potential

at

risk−

Grid

expansion

is

needed

to

increase

flexibility,remove

bottlenecks

and

maximize

the

value

of

windpower.

The

current

pace

of

grid

build-out

is

too

slow4HighlightsNorwegian

energy

exports:

short-termgrowth,

steep

decline

in

the

long

termThe

energy

transition

creates

several

greenindustry

opportunities

for

Norway−

European

demand

for

natural

gas

is

falling

and

will

fallmuch

further

than

expected

before

the

Ukraine

waras

a

consequence

of

European

climate

and

energysecurity

considerations−

The

global

energy

transition

will

see

a

significantincrease

in

renewable

energy

sources

and

otherdecarbonization

technologies,

offering

growthopportunities

for

green

industries−

Norway’s

gas

exports

decline

35%

and

oil

export

93%to

2050−

A

growing

share

of

Norwegian

energy

exports

willbe

converted

to

electricity

,

hydrogen

and

its

deriva-tives,

but

will

only

represent

a

fraction

of

today’senergy

export

revenues−

Energy

exports

from

Norway,

especially

renewableenergy

and

low

carbon

hydrogen,

will

likely

beattractive

at

any

time

during

the

next

30

years,

but

theprime

window

of

opportunity

for

green

industrialgrowth

and

building

new

value

chains

is

the

nextfive

years−

Norway

has

a

unique

opportunity

to

supply

bluehydrogen

to

Europe

by

the

mid-2030s,

switching

togreen

hydrogen

by

the

2040s−

DNV

forecasts

22

GW

offshore

wind

in

production

by2040

and

43

GW

by

2050.

Norwegian

wind

powergeneration

increases

to

210

TWh

in

2050,

of

which80%

is

offshore

wind.

Surplus

wind

power

is

likely

tobe

used

to

produce

hydrogen

for

export,

while

mostof

the

electricity

export

will

be

based

on

hydropowerand

offshore

wind−

Norway

has

a

competitive

edge

in

many

decarboni-zation

technologies,

particularly

floating

offshore

wind,which

will

see

steep

growth

globally

towards

2050−

Large-scale

hydrogen

value

chains,

initially

blue

butturning

increasingly

green

leveraging

surplus

powergeneration,

can

generate

significant

export

revenuecomplementing

electricity

exports−

Carbon

capture

and

storage

(CCS)

will

play

a

criticalrole

in

reducing

emissions,

and

Norway's

expertise

inCCS

can

be

leveraged

for

decarbonizing

natural

gasand

creating

opportunities

in

hydrogen

and

ammoniaproduction.

Storage

of

CO

on

the

Norwegian2Continental

Shelf

(NCS)

is

a

huge

opportunity

withlimited

competition,

especially

close

to

Europe−

In

maritime

transport,

Norway's

leadership

in

LNG,batteries,

and

hydrogen

for

short-sea

shipping

canbe

expanded

to

develop

low-

and

zero-carbonsolutions

for

global

deep-sea

shipping5DNV

Energy

Transition

Norway

20231INTRODUCTION1.1

AboutthisOutlookIn

linking

our

global

forecast

to

Norway’s

energy

system,we

have

had

to

make

several

adjustments.

Not

all

global,or

even

regional,

energy

dynamics

are

equally

valid

whenwe

apply

them

at

country

level.This

Energy

Transition

Norway

(ET

Norway)

reportdescribes

the

energy

future

of

Norway

through

to

2050.The

analysis,

the

most

likely

model

framework

behind

it,

themethodology,

theassumptions,

and

hence

also

the

resultslean

heavily

on

DNV’s

global

forecast,

theEnergy

TransitionOutlook

2023

(DNV,

2023a)

and

the

Energy

TransitionOutlook

(ETO)

model.

This

approach

yields

a

consistent

andenergy-balanced

result,

as

Norway

is

part

of

the

globalenergy

system,

and

the

country’s

energy

supply

anddemand

are

affected

by

what

happens

elsewhere.

Similarly,what

happens

in

Norway

can

affect

other

countries.Our

analysis

produces

a

single

‘best-estimate’

forecastof

Norway's

energy

future,

given

expected

economic,policy

and

technology

developments

and

associatedcosts,

as

well

as

some

behavioural

adjustments.

Theforecast

also

provides

a

basis

for

assessing

whetherNorway

is

likely

to

meet

its

energy

and

climate-relatedtargets.6Introduction

CHAPTER

1relevance

to

the

energy

transition;

first

and

foremost

theunprecedentedenergy

prices,

but

also

GDP

development,EU

and

Norwegian

policy

interventions,

and

behav-ioural

changes.Our

bestestimate,notthefuturewe

wantAsingleforecast,notscenariosIn

addition

to

incorporating

the

energy

trade

of

oil,

gas,and

coal,

we

include

import

and

export

of

electricity,hydrogen,

and

ammonia.

We

have

extended

our

modelto

include

the

energy

exchange

between

Norway

andEurope.

This

is

an

important

dynamic

in

Norway’senergy

system,

and

will

prove

increasingly

important

inthe

future

as

fossil-fuel

exports

decline

for

Norway

andelectricity

and

hydrogen

export

grows.Continueddevelopmentofproventechnology,notuncertainbreakthroughsLong-term

dynamics,notshort-term

imbalancesInterviewsOur

modelling

approach

and

the

calibration

of

themodelling

input

values

become

increasingly

sensitivewhen

we

model

a

country

compared

with

a

region

orglobally.

This

is

especially

prevalent

when

we

considerexogenous

or

outside

assumptions

such

as

policies

orfactors

that

are

country-specific

and

have

a

significanteffect

in

forcing

the

model

to

select

solutions

that

arenot

necessarily

the

cheapest

option

or

‘most

likely’.

Suchfactors

could

be

a

changing

geopolitical

landscape,energy

security,

job

creation

or

global

and

local

climatecommitments.

So,

to

better

understand

the

most

likelydevelopment

in

the

near-

to

medium-term,

when

theseissues

have

the

biggest

impact

and

are

also

easier

toforecast,

we

have

conducted

interviews

and

discussionswith

politicians,

advocacy

groups,

and

business

leadersto

gain

insights

on

how

they

view

the

medium-termfuture

policy

landscape

unfolding.

In

addition

toexternal

experts,

we

have

held

internal

discussions

withcolleagues

in

different

parts

of

DNV.

Much

appreciationto

everyone

for

taking

the

time

to

respond

and

givefeedback

on

different

topics.Mainpolicytrendsincluded;cautiononuntestedcommitments,e.g.NDCs,etc.Behaviouralchanges:someassumptionsmade,e.g.linkedtoa

changingenvironmentOur

approachOur

model

simulates

the

interactions

over

time

of

theconsumers

of

energy

(transport,

buildings,

manufacturing,and

so

on)

and

all

sources

of

supply.

It

encompassessupply

and

demand

of

energy

globally,

and

the

use

andexchange

of

energy

between

and

within

10

world

regions.To

tailor

the

model

for

this

project,

we

added

Norway

asa

standalone

region

by

splitting

region

Europe

into

tworegions:

'Norway'

and

'Europe-without-Norway'.

In

thisway,

we

derive

separate

forecast

results

for

Norwayalong

with

the

other

ten

regions.The

analysis

covers

the

period

1990–2050,

with

changesunfolding

on

a

multi-year

scale

that

is

fine-tuned

in

somecases

to

reflect

hourly

dynamics.

We

continually

updateour

model’s

structure

and

the

input

data.

In

this

report,we

do

not

repeat

all

details

on

methodology

andOuranalysisproduces

a

single‘best-estimate’

forecast

of

Norway'senergy

future,

givenexpected

economic,policyandtechnologydevelopmentsandassociated

costs.assumptions

from

Energy

Transition

Outlook

2023(DNV,

2023a),

but

refer

to

that

report

for

further

details.We

are

also

mindful

that

this

analysis

has

been

preparedwhile

Russia's

war

on

Ukraine

is

an

ongoing

internationalconflict

and

in

the

context

of

the

unsettled

economicenvironment

at

the

tail-end

of

the

COVID-19

pandemic.These

factors

add

uncertainty

to

several

parameters

of7DNV

Energy

Transition

Norway

20231.2

AssumptionsandTechnology

developmentDNV

bases

its

forecast

on

the

continued

development

ofproven

technologies

in

terms

of

costs

and

technicalfeasibility,

not

uncertain

breakthroughs.

However,

duringthe

period

covered

by

this

Outlook,

the

list

of

those

thatwe

currently

consider

‘most

promising’

could

change

dueto

shifts

in

levels

of

financial

support

or

changed

potentialfor

cost

reduction.

Other

technologies

may

achieve

abreakthrough,

such

that

they

become

cost-competitive.policiesKey

input

assumptions

in

the

ETO

model

are

linked

toparameters

such

as

population,

economic

development,technology

development

and

policy.PopulationWe

use

the

most

recent

research

and

results

from

theAustria-based

IIASA

Wittgenstein

Centre

for

Demographyand

Global

Human

Capital

(WIC,

2023).

These

resultshave

been

updated

in

2023,

and

the

data

calibrated

tomost

recent

UN

data

projects

a

global

population

closeto

the

UN

population

estimates

for

2050.

Compared

withprevious

ET

Norway

reports,

lower

fertility

rates

andlimited

immigration

give

Norway

a

slightly

lower

populationestimate

of

6.1

million

(mn)in

2050

from

5.4mn

today.With

technology

learning

curves,

the

cost

of

a

technologytypically

decreases

by

a

constant

fraction

with

everydoubling

of

installed

capacity.

This

cost

learning

rate(CLR)

dynamic

occurs

because

ongoing

market

deploy-ment

brings

greater

experience,

expertise,

and

industrialefficiencies,

as

well

as

further

R&D.

Technology

learningis

global,

and

it

is

the

global

capacity

that

is

used

in

CLRcalculations.Economic

developmentGDP

per

capita

is

a

measure

of

the

standard

of

living

in

acountry

and

is

a

major

driver

of

energy

consumption

inour

model.Core

technology'costlearning

rates'that

wehaveusedthrough

to2050inourforecast

include16%forbatteries,

16%forwind,

and26%forsolarPV

butfallingto17%later

intheforecast

period.DNV

has

this

year

decided

to

use

the

long-term

economicdevelopment

data

from

OECD

(2021).

At

infrequentintervals,

extraordinary

events

cause

a

notably

differentGDP

and

productivity

changes.

The

2020

COVID-19outbreak

caused

such

a

change,

with

negative

growthfigures.

Because

our

model

is

not

suited

for

such

short-runchanges,

we

have

chosen

to

deviate

from

the

OECD

GDPmodel

and

instead

use

economic

growth

figures

from

theInternational

Monetary

Fund

(IMF).

The

IMF

data

pointsto

a

GDP

change

for

Norway

that

is

growing

from

the

lowlevels

in

2020

by

an

average

1.6%

per

year

until

2027,thereafter

returning

to

the

growth

rates

given

by

theOECD

GDP

model.CLRs

cannot

easily

be

established

for

technologies

withlow

uptake

and

which

are

still

in

their

early

stages

ofdevelopment.

In

such

cases,

calculations

rely

instead

oninsights

from

similar

but

more

mature

technologies.Carbon

capture

and

storage

(CCS)

—

other

than

that

usedin

enhanced

oil

recovery

—

and

next-generation

electrolysisare

examples

of

this.

Solar

PV,

batteries,

and

windturbines

are

proven

technologies

with

significantgrounds

for

establishing

CLRs

with

more

confidence.Further

down

the

experience

spectrum

are

oil

and

gasextraction

technologies

where

unit

production

costs

andaccumulated

production

levels

are

high

and

easy

toestablish.

However,

hydrocarbons

face

pressures

fromthe

structural

decline

in

oil

demand

in

tandem

with

risingFor

Norway,

2022

GDP

was

USD

429

billion

(bn),

or

NOK3,800bn,

while

in

2050

it

will

be

USD

667bn

(NOK5,900bn).

This

implies

a

compound

annual

growth

rate(CAGR)

of

1.6%

per

year.

GDP

per

capita

increases

fromUSD

78,900

to

USD

109,100

per

person

in

the

sameperiod.

All

numbers

are

stated

in

2017

purchasing

powerparity

terms

denominated

in

2022

USD

and

thereforemust

be

converted

to

get

real

or

nominal

GDP.8Introduction

CHAPTER

1extraction

costs

and

carbon

prices.

It

is

virtually

impossibleto

disentangle

these

two

effects

using

costs

and

volumesalone;

we

therefore

use

historical

datasets

to

separatelyestimate

CLR

and

depletion

effects.

For

all

technologies,it

is

necessary

to

separate

out

the

cost

of

the

coretechnology

(e.g.

solar

PV

panels)

from

supportingtechnologies

(e.g.

solar

PV

control

systems

andinstallation

kits).

Typically,

the

latter

have

a

lower

CLR.For

example,

PV

core

technologies

and

balance-of-supply

(BOS)

equipment

have

CLRs

of

28%

and

9%,respectively.

For

some

technologies,

like

batteries,the

core

technology

is

almost

all

there

is,

and

so

thehighest

CLR

dominates.

For

other

technologies,

likeunconventional

gas

fracking,

other

cost

componentsdominate.Core

technology

CLRs

that

we

have

used

through

to

2050in

our

forecast

include

16%

for

batteries,

16%

for

wind,and

26%

for

solar

PV

but

falling

to

17%

later

in

the

forecastperiod.

Oil

and

gas

development

has

a

CLR

of

10–20%,but

the

annual

cost

reduction

is

minor

because

it

can

takedecades

for

the

cumulative

installed

capacity

to

double.Population

(MN)GDP/person

(USD)GHG

emissions

(MN

tonne

CO

e)2GDP

(USD

BN)GHG

emissions/person

(t/person

CO

e)2Norway202278

90042948.995.4Norway2050109

10067010.41.76.19DNV

Energy

Transition

Norway

2023PolicyFIGURE

1A

wide

range

of

policy

objectives

—

such

as

climate

goals,air

quality,

health,

job

creation,

energy

security

—

will

drivepolicy

changes,

in

turn

driving

change

in

the

energy

system.Policy

factors

included

in

our

OutlookIn

our

global

model,

country-level

data

on

expectedpolicy

impacts

are

weighted

and

aggregated

to

produceregional

figures

for

inclusion

in

our

calculations.

ForNorway,

we

incorporate

existing

and

likely

future

policyfactors

into

our

forecast.1.

Renewablepower

support2.

Energy

storagesupport3.

Zero-emissionvehicle

supportIt

is

not

a

given

that

energy

or

climate

ambitions

andtargets

will

be

met

at

either

national,

regional,

or

globallevels.

As

such,

our

forecast

does

not

assume

that

Norwaywill

achieve

its

national

target

of

reducing

greenhouse

gasemissions

by

55%

by

2030

compared

with

levels

in

1990.4.

Hydrogensupport5.

CCS,

DACsupport6.

Energy-efficiencystandardsTargets

and

ambition

levels

may

or

may

not

be

translatedinto

real

policy.

There

are

numerous

examples

of

goalsand

targets

not

being

met

in

Norway.

However,

ambitioustargets

are

often

followed

by

specific

policy

measurestranslating

ambitions

into

reality

influencing

theemissions

trajectory.7.

Bans,

phase-outplans,

mandates8.

Carbon

pricingschemes9.

Fuel,

energy,

andcarbon

taxationFrom

the

main

ETO

report

(DNV,

2023a)

we

have

acomprehensive

list

of

policy

factors

influencing

theforecast.

The

same

policy

factors

are

incorporated

in

thisanalysis

with

the

following

adjustments

for

Norway:10.

Air

pollution11.

Plastic

pollution

12.

Methaneintervention

interventioninterventionRenewable

power

support—Fixed

and

floating

offshore

wind

projects

will

initially

receive

financial

support

to

supply

domestic

energydemand

and

to

establish

a

domestic

market.

As

costs

decrease

and

the

proportion

of

electricity

exported

toEurope

grows,

offering

higher

profitability,

financial

support

will

gradually

reduce.

In

addition

to

these

sources

ofincome,

we

expect

there

to

be

mechanisms

to

redistribute

profits

from

high-margin

energy

exports,

such

ashydropower

and

green

hydrogen

exports,

to

further

enhance

the

financial

viability

of

offshore

wind

development.Zero-emission

vehicle

support—Thesupportschemefor

passenger

EVs

incorporatethenew

scheme

from

1

Jan2023,

with

slightly

increasingcostsforEVpurchasesofvehicles

above

the

500,000

NOK

price

point

as

theseareineligiblefor

the

25%

VAT

exemption.For

EVs

in

the

commercial

vehicles

segment,

support

schemes

will

continue

as

today

then

grow

slowly

fromthe

late

2020s

until

EVs

account

for

90%

of

new

vehicle

sales

in

2040,

when

we

expect

maximum

uptake

ofelectric

drivetrains.——We

have

included

the

government’s

ambition

on

increased

use

of

biofuel

in

transport.

The

fraction

of

biofueluse

for

internal

combustion

engines

increases

from

13%

in

2022

to

20%

in

2030

and

stays

there

until

2040,then

declines

with

shrinking

use

of

internal

combustion

engine

vehicles.10Introduction

CHAPTER

1Hydrogen—We

expect

some

production

projects

to

be

subsidised

to

compensate

for

high

hydrogen

prices

where

carbondioxide

(CO

)

pricing

still

makes

hydrogen

uncompetitive.

The

level

of

support

is

expected

to

be

USD

0.30/kgH22for

blue

hydrogen

and

as

high

as

USD

2.5/kgH

for

green

hydrogen,

until

the

early

2030s.2—We

expect

tax

and

grid

charges

for

grid-connected

electrolysers

to

be

only

25%

of

the

levels

that

apply

to

otherindustrial

consumers.