员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献

员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Researchdirection:staffmotivationproblemsandCountermeasures1.IntroductionAsrecognizedinthelaw(e.g.,theSarbanes-OxleyActof2002),professionalriskframe-works(CommitteeofSponsoringOrganizationsoftheTreadwayCommission[COSO]1992,2004),auditingstandards(AmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountants[AICPA]2007;PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard[PCAOB]2007),accountingtextbooks(Redingetal.2007;RomneyandSteinbart2009),andmanagementbestpractices(MerchantandVanderStede2007),formalcontrolsserveavitalroleinsafeguardingacompany’soperationalprocesses,information,andassetsandinprovidingreasonableassuranceregard-ingthereliabilityoffinancialreporting.Althoughcriticaltoacompany’ssuccess,relativelylittleisunderstoodabouthowandwhyspecifictypesofformalcontrolareeffective.Priorresearchinaccountingandeconomicsexamineshowformalcontrolsinfluenceemployeebehavior,oftenfindingthatformalcontrolscanhavenegativeconsequences,suchasloweremployeeeffortandfirmprofit.Recently,researchhasbeguntofocusonhowemployees’responsetoformalcontrolscanbeinfluencedbyspecificaspectsoftheimposedcontrol(e.g.,Christ,Sedatole,andTowry2011).Thisstudyextendsthislineofresearchbyprovidingevidenceastohowandwhytwotypesofformalcontrols,preven-tivecontrolsanddetectivecontrols,affectemployeeperformanceandmotivation.RomneyandSteinbart(2009:200)definepreventivecontrolsascontrolsthat‘‘deterproblemsbeforetheyarise’’anddetectivecontrolsascontrolsdesignedto‘‘discoverprob-lemsaftertheyoccur’’.Thesetypesofformalcontrolsdifferintwofundamentalways.First,preventivecontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomybyprohibitingcertainbehaviors(e.g.,employeescannotenterdataormakeapaymentunlessauthorizedtodoso).Alter-natively,detectivecontrolsmaintainthedecisionrightsofemployeesandthereforedonotlimittheirautonomy(Christ,Sedatole,Towry,andThomas2008).Second,thefeedbackprovidedbypreventivecontrolsisneverdelayed,whereasdetectivecontrolscanprovideimmediateordelayedfeedback.Importantly,companiescanoftenchoosetoimposeeitherpreventiveordetectivecontrolstoaddressthesamecontrolobjective.Forexample,withrespecttotheexpenditurecycle,differenttypesofcontrolscanbeimplementedtoensurethatonlyauthorizedcashdisbursementsaremade.Specifically,managementcouldimplementeachofthefollowingtypesofcontrols:(1)preventive:estab-lishauthorizationlimitsprohibitingemployeesfrominitiatingdisbursementsaboveapre-specifiedamount;(2)detectivewithimmediatefeedback:analertisactivatedonanemployeeand⁄orsupervisor’scomputermonitorwhenadisbursementaboveaprespecifiedamounthasbeenentered;or(3)detectivewithdelayedfeedback:areportofalldisburse-mentsovertheprespecifiedamountisproducedperiodically(e.g.,monthly).Ourresearchexaminesdifferentialcostsandbenefitsofthesethreetypesofcontrols,whichshouldenablemanagerstomakemoreinformedcontroldecisions.Weexamineseveralofthecostsandbenefitsofthesetypesofformalcontrolsinaset-tinginwhichmanagementhasimplementedanincompletecontract.Specifically,onedimensionoftheemployees’responsibilitiesisdirectlycompensated(i.e.,compensatedtaskdimension)andtheotherdimensionisnotcompensated,butissubjecttoaformalcontrolimposedbymanagement(i.e.,controlledtaskdimension).Weexaminetheeffectsoffor-malcontrolonthecompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsofthetaskseparatelysothatwecanisolateformalcontroleffectsfromtheincentivecontracteffects.Werelyonpsychologyresearchonsalience,norms,andintrinsicmotivationtoformourpredictionsregardinghowpreventiveanddetectivecontrolswillaffectemployeeper-formanceandmotivation.Weexpectthatwhenaformalcontrolisactivated,itwillincreasethesalienceoftheemployee’sgoaltocomplywithvariousgoalsoftheorganiza-tionforwhichs⁄heisnotexplicitlycompensated,despitethefactthatitmayconflictwiththeemployee’sgoaltoperformstronglyonthecompensateddimensionsofhis⁄hertask.Wehypothesizethatreductionsinautonomycausedbyacontrolandincreasesinthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackwillincreasethesalienceofthecontrolobjective.Thus,weexpectemployeessubjecttopreventivecontrolstoexhibitstrongerperformanceonthecontrolleddimensionthanemployeesintheothercontrolconditions.Employeesworkinginconditionswithdetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackshouldbethenextbestper-formersonthecontrolleddimensionofthetaskfollowedbyemployeesworkingincondi-tionswithdetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackandemployeesoperatingwithoutcontrols,respectively.Motivationalframingresearchfurthersuggeststhatitisdifficultforindividualstohavemultiple(potentiallyconflicting)goals⁄framesactivatedatthesametime(Lindenberg2001).Wethereforepredictthatwhenemployeesfocusonthegoalofperformingwellonthecontrolledtaskdimension,theywillfocuslessonthegoaltoexcelonothertaskdimensions(e.g.,thecompensateddimensioninourstudy)andwillconsequentlyperformworseonthosedimensions.Thissuggestsareverseorderofhowemployeesfacingthesecontroltypeswillperformonthecompensateddimensionofthetaskrelativetotheirper-formanceonthecontrolleddimension.Totestthesepredictions,weuseasimplifieddataentrytaskinanexperimentalsettinginwhichparticipantsarefinanciallymotivatedtoenterdataasquicklyaspossible(com-pensateddimension).Importantly,participantsareinformedthatthecompanyvaluesbothdataentryspeedandaccuracy.However,ratherthanalsocompensatingparticipantsforaccuracy,thecompanyimplementsaformalcontroltoencourageaccuracy(controlleddimension).Ourresultsrevealthatparticipantsexposedtopreventivecontrolsordetectivecontrolswithimmediatefeedbackperformsignificantlybetteronthecontrolleddimensionofthetask(dataentryaccuracy)thanparticipantsinthedetectivecontrol-delayedfeedbackcon-dition.Thissuggeststhatthetimelinessofcontrolfeedbackisthesalientfeatureinfluenc-ingperformance.Wedonotfinddifferencesintheoverallperformanceonthecompensateddimension(dataentryspeed),suggestingthatexplicitincentivesstillprovideapowerfulmotivationdespitetheactivationofformalcontrolsdirectingattentiontootherdimensionsofthetask.Inadditiontoexamininghowformalcontrolsaffectemployeeperformance,weaddtothegrowingliteratureontheunintendedcostsofformalcontrolsbyexamininghowdifferentformalcontroltypesaffectemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformthetask.Weexpectthatbecausepreventivecontrolsrestrictautonomy,whichlikelywillbeperceivedbyemployeesas‘‘controlling’’,theywillbemoredetrimentaltoemployees’intrinsicmotivationthandetectivecontrols.Consistentwithourexpectations,theresultsshowthatpreventivecontrolssignificantlyreduceintrinsicmotivationrelativetobothtypesofdetectivecontrols.Thissuggeststhattheextenttowhichformalcontrolsrestrictemployees’autonomy,andnotthetimelinessofthefeedbacktheyprovide,influencesemployees’intrinsicmotivationtoperformtheirresponsibilities.Further,weconfirmresultsfrompriorresearchfindingthatlowerintrinsicmotivationleadstolowerperformanceonalldimensionsofthetask.Takentogether,ourresultssuggestthatdetectivecontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackcanbejustaseffectiveatproducinghighemployeeperformanceaspreventivecontrols(andmoreeffectivethandetectivecontrolswithdelayedfeedbackornocontrols),withoutcausingadecreaseinintrinsicmotivationthatisexhibitedbyemployeessubjectedtopreventivecontrols.Therefore,organizationscanlikelyachievemanyoftheircontrolobjectivesbyincreasingthetimelinessoffeedbackfromdetectivecontrols,withoutbearingthecostsassociatedwithpreventivecontrols.Thisstudyprovidesseveralimportantpracticalandtheoreticalcontributions.First,thisstudycaninformpractitioners,auditors,andregulatorswhodesign,implement,andevaluateformalcontrolsaboutsomeofthepotentialcostsandbenefitsofvarioustypesofformalcontrols.Formalcontrolsplayacriticalroleinpromotingefficiency,reducingriskofassetloss,ensuringthereliabilityoffinancialstatements,andpromotingcompliancewithlawsandregulations(COSO1992).Ourstudysuggeststhatpractitionerscanbetterachievemanyofthesecontrolobjectivesbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedback.Furthermore,thisstudysuggeststhatformalcontrolswhichrestrictemployeeautonomyreduceemployees’intrinsicmotivation,andpractitionerswouldthere-forebenefitinmanysituationsbyimplementingformalcontrolsthatprovideimmediatefeedbackbutdonotrestrictuserautonomy.Second,thisstudycontributestoseveralstreamsofacademicresearchonformalcon-trols.Toourknowledge,oursisthefirststudytoexaminethedifferentialimpactofpre-ventiveanddetectivecontrolsonemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,thisstudyalsocontributestoagrowingbodyofliteratureexaminingsomeoftheunintendedconsequencesofformalcontrols(e.g.,Frey1993;DasandTeng1999;TenbrunselandMessick1999;Christetal.2008;TaylerandBloomfield2011).Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2providestheoreticaldevelopmentofourhypotheses.Insection3wedescribeourexperiment.Weprovideourresultsinsection4andconcludeanddescribepotentialavenuesforfutureresearchinsection5.2.LiteraturereviewandhypothesesdevelopmentClassificationsandimportanceofformalcontrolsFormalcontrolscantakemanyforms,including,butnotlimitedto,policiesandproce-dures,segregationofduties,performance-basedcompensation,supervisoryreviews,com-puterizededitchecks,andsoon.Academicshavedevelopedavarietyofcontrolframeworkstoclassifythemanydifferenttypesofcontrols.Somefocusontheobjectofcontrol(e.g.,behaviorvs.output)(MerchantandVanderStede2007),whileothersfocusonthecontrolmethod(e.g.,boundarysystems,beliefsystems,etc.)(Simons1990).How-ever,practicingaccountantsandauditorsgenerallyclassifycontrolsaspreventiveordetec-tive,basedonhowriskismitigated(COSO1992,2004;AICPA2007;PCAOB2007).Whendeterminingthespecificformalcontroltypetoimplement,managementwouldbenefitfromunderstandinghowdifferentcontroltypesinfluenceemployeeperformanceandmotivation.Further,prioracademicresearchrevealsthatformalcontrolsoftenhaveunintendedconsequences,whichcanultimatelybedetrimentaltotheorganization(e.g.,DasandTeng2001).Therefore,managementshouldalsoconsiderthepotentialrepercus-sionsoftheircontroldesignchoiceswhendesigningformalcontrols.Inthisstudy,weexamineasimplifiedworkenvironmentinwhichwemanipulatetheformalcontroltypeandmeasureemployeeperformanceandintrinsicmotivation.Similartotherealworld,weuseaworkenvironmentinwhichmanagementemploysanincompletecontract(e.g.,Williamson1985;Ittner,Larcker,andRajan1997),usingformalcompensationcontractstoencouragecertaintypesofbehaviorwhileimplementingformacontrolstoencourageothertypesofbehavior.Thus,weexaminehowdifferentformacontroltypesimpactemployees’performanceonbothcompensatedandcontrolleddimensionsoftheirresponsibilities.Thecontrolenvironmentusedinourexperimentisdesignedtoisolatetheeffectofvariousformalcontroltypesfromtheeffectsoftheincentivecontract.Therefore,weexplicitlydonotcompensatetheemployeesbasedonalltaskdimensions,butratherallowtheformalcontroltoinducecertaindesiredbehavior.EffectofformalcontrolsoncontrolledtaskdimensionsStandardeconomictheorypredictsthatindividualsareself-interestedandthereforepri-marilymotivatedbyexplicitincentives.Followingthislogic,employeesareexpectedtorespondonlytothefinancialincentivesdescribedintheirformalemploymentcontract.However,agrowingbodyofresearchonindividuals’preferencesforsocialnormsandsit-uationalframingsuggeststhatthereareotherwaystodirectemployees’behaviortowardsthebestinterestsoftheorganization(e.g.,Evans,Hannan,Krishnan,andMoser2001;CamererandFehr2004;OsterlohandFrey2004;Hannan2005;Hannan,Rankin,andTowry2006;FischerandHuddart2008).Asubstantialbodyofresearchhasdevelopedindicatingthatindividualsarestronglymotivatedbystatedgoalsandobjectives(e.g.,Locke,Shaw,Saari,andLatham1981;LockeandLatham1990;Locke1996).Indeed,specificperformancemeasuresareincorpo-ratedintoemploymentcontractstoalignemployees’goalswiththegoalsoftheorganiza-tionsothatemployeeswillfocustheireffortsonactivitiesbenefitingtheorganization(Farrell,Kadous,andTowry2008).Onereasongoalsprovidesuchpowerfulmotivationisthattheycanchangethewayasituationisframed.Lindenberg(2003)describestwoframeslinkedtoemployees’goalsthat,together,canprovidestronggovernance:thegainframeandthenormativeframe.Thegainframerelatestoone’sgoaltoimproveone’sresources(i.e.,earnmoney).Thenormativeframeisrelatedtoone’sgoalto‘‘actappropriately’’,whichcanbedefinedasadheringtoinstitutionalizedrulessuchaspoliciesandpro-cedures(MarchandOlsen1995).Whenanemployeeisfacedwithanexplicitcontracttyingspecificaspectsofhis⁄herperformancetofinancialincentives,itislikelythatthegainframewillbedominantandanyothergoalswillbesecondary(Lindenberg2003).However,individuals’behaviorcanberedirectedorrefocusedwhenastimulusisintro-duced.Inthispaper,wearguethattheactivationofaformalcontrolissuchastimulus.翻译：研究方向：员工激励问题及对策1.引言公认的法律(如。,2002年的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案),职业风险框架(行动委员会赞助组织委员会(COSO)1992年,2004年),审计准则(美国注册会计师协会(会计师协会)2007;公众公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB)2007),会计教科书(雷丁etal.2007;罗姆尼和Steinbart2009),和管理最佳实(MerchantandVanderStede2007),正式的控制有重要作用在维护公司的操作流程,信息,资产和提供合理的保证regard-ing财务报告的可靠性。虽然对公司的成功至关重要,相对较少的理解如何以及为什么特定类型的正式控制是有效的。先前的研究在会计和经济学研究正式控制如何影响员工的行为,经常发现正式的控制可以有负面影响,如降低员工的努力和公司的利润。最近的研究已经开始关注如何影响员工应对正式控制的特定方面实施控制(如。2011年,SedatoleTowry)。本研究扩展了这一行的研究提供的证据是如何以及为什么两种类型的正式控制,远程控制和侦探控制,影响员工绩效和动力。罗姆尼和Steinbart(2009:2009)预防控制定义为控制,阻止之前就出现问题,侦探控制作为控制设计为“发现难题后发生”。这些类型的正式控制不同在两个基本方面。首先,预防控制限制禁止某些行为(如员工的自主权。,员工不能输入数据或付款除非授权这样做)。也可,侦探控制维护员工的决策权,因此不限制他们的自主权(基督,Sedatole、Towry和托斯·2008)。第二,预防控制提供的反馈是从来没有推迟,而侦探控制可以提供立即或延迟反馈。重要的是,企业通常可以选择实施预防性或侦探控制地址相同的控制目标。例如,对于支出周期,不同类型的控制可以确保只有经过授权的实现现金支付。具体来说,管理可以实现以下类型的控制:(1)预防:建立授权限制禁止员工发起支付高于预先规定的数量;(2)与即时反馈侦探:警报被激活员工和⁄或上司的电脑显示器时支付指定金额已经进入以上;或(3)侦探延迟反馈:所有支付超过指定数量的报告是定期(如。、每月)。我们研究了微分的成本与效益这三种类型的控制,这应该使管理者做出更明智的控制决策。我们检查一些成本和收益的这些类型的正式控制set-ting管理实现了一个不完整的合同。具体地说,一维的直接补偿(即员工的责任。,补偿任务维度)和其他维度不是补偿,但正式的控制(即实施管理。控制任务维度)。我们检查的影响对于控制任务的补偿和控制维度分别,这样我们可以隔离正式控制效果的激励契约的影响。我们依靠卓越心理学研究,规范和内在动机形成我们的预测预防和侦探控制如何影响员工由于和动力。我们希望当一个正式的控制被激活时,它能够提升员工的卓越的目标符合各种目标集聚的年代⁄他是没有明确补偿,尽管它可能与员工的目标冲突表现强劲的补偿尺度⁄她的任务。我们假设减少引起的自主控制,提高控制反馈的及时性将增加显著的控制目标。因此,我们期望员工须预防控制在控制维度表现出更强的性能比其他员工的控制条件。员工工作条件与侦探控制即时反馈应该是下一个最好的先前成型机任务的控制维度紧随其后的是员工为对象与侦探与延迟反馈控制和员工操作没有控制,分别。激励框架研究进一步表明,个人很难有多个(可能是相互冲突的)目标⁄帧同时激活(Lindenberg2001)。因此,我们预测,当员工关注的目标表现良好控制任务维度,他们会更少关注目标在其他任务维度(如excel。,在我们的研究)和补偿维度将因此对这些维度执行更糟。这说明员工们如何面对这些控制类型的倒序将执行任务的补偿尺寸相对于由于控制尺寸。测试这些预测,我们使用一个简化的数据录入任务参与者在实验环境下的经济动机尽快输入数据(补偿维度)。重要的是,参与者被告知公司价值观数据输入的速度和准确性。然而,而不是也为精度补偿参与者,该公司实现了一个正式的控制,鼓励精度(尺寸控制)。我们的研究结果显示,参与者暴露预防控制与即时反馈表现得明显更好或侦探控制任务的控制维度(数据录入准确性)的参与者侦探控制反馈。这表明影响控制反馈的及时性是显著特征的性能。我们没有找到补偿的总体性能的差异维度(数据录入速度),建议明确激励仍然提供了一个强大的动机尽管正式激活控制指挥注意任务的其他维度。除了检查正式控制如何影响员工的表现,我们增加了文学在正式的意想不到的成本控制通过检查不同的正式控制类型如何影响员工的内在动机来执行任务。我们预计,由于预防控制限制的自主权,这可能将员工视为“控制”,他们将更不利于员工的内在动机比侦探控制。与我们的预期一致,结果表明,预防控制显著降低内在动机相对于两种类型的侦探控制。这表明正式的控制在多大程度上限制员工的自主权,而不是他们