3000字翻译成英文

3000字翻译成英文篇一：3000字英文翻译

BoltSupportingofLarge-SpanSoftRockwayin

ShaquColliery

AbstractTheinstabilityoftrapezoidalI-steelsupportisanalysedforthepoundroofofmaincoalseaminShaquColliery,andthemechanismofboltsupportingisstudied.Aschemeofboltsupportinghasbeengivenandputintopractice,remarkabletechnicalandeconomicbenefitshavebeengot.

Keywords:large-span,poundroof,boltsupporting,mechanism

1.Introduction

InshaqucollieryalargecoalmineminingrarecokingcoalinChina,mostroadwaysarelaidoutinmaincoalseam

roofofcoalseam.Thesoftpound,whichisposedofmudstoneandcoalseam

containsaboundantbeddingsandjoints.Thestrengthoftheroofissolowthatitsuniaxial-saturatedpressivestrengthisonly10.7Mpa.RQDvalueofcoalseamandiszero,andthatofmudstoneislowerthan10%.Thereisclaymineralsinmudstone,mainpositionsareinterbeddedstrataofilliteandmontmorillonitewhichwillswellwhensoakedbywater,Thespanofpreperationroadwaysandgatewaysiswiderthan4m,andthatofsomemainroadwaysisover5m.Inshaqucolliery,preperationroadwaysandgatewaysweresupportedbytrapezoidalI-steelsupport,thebeamsofwhichwerebentanddamaged,andtheroadwaysweredestroyedseriouslywithinashortperiodjustafterexcavated.Roof

controllingofLarge-SpanSoftRockwaysinthecoalseambecamethekeytotheproductionandconstructionofshaqucolliery.

2.supportingstatusandinstabilityanalysisoftrapezoidalI-steelsupports

trapezoidalI-steelsupportswereusedindrawingroadways,whichroofspanis4.0m,floorspanis4.9m,andhight2.95mandspacing0.5m.Initialresistanceofthesupportswasalmostzerobecauseitwasdifficulttothesupportbeamscontacttheroof,evenifwithhighqualityofinstallation.ThetrapezoidalI-steelsupportswouldnotcarryloaduntilthedisplacementofsurroundingrockexcceded80-100mmbecausethesupportsincreasedveryslowly.Therefore,rightafterexcavation,theroofwouldbendandsubsideseverly.Eighthoursafterexcavation,theroofstratawouldbreakpletely,andthenformrockcavity.Theweightofcavingrockwouldactonthebeamsofsupports,whichformslooserockpressure.

Bycalculating,theultimateload-bearingcapacityissmallerthanroofpressurewhetheritisuniformalorconcentrated,Basedonthein-situobservation,inflectionvalueofmostroofreached200-300mm.Whenpairedsupportswereused,pairedbeamswerestillbentanddamaged;thenmidpropswereadded,theywerealsodestroyed.Manyroofbeamswerestabilizedonlyif2-3propshadbeenadded.Thesupportsweredamagedpletely,andmostofthemcouldnotbereused.Thepart

sectionofroadwayshadbeeinvertedtrapezoid,andtheavailablesectionwasfarsmallerthanthedesignedsection.Partofroadwayswasoutofusebecauseitwasinthedangerofseriouscaving.

3.Mechanismofboltsupporting

Itsmechanismistomakefulluseoftheself-load-bearingcapacityofsurroundingrockbybolting,andthenmakethesurroundingrockstabilizebyitself.Thestabilityofsurroundingrockdependsontheequilibriumstatusofgroundpressure,self-load-bearingcapacityofsurroundingrockandanchoringforceofbolts.Groundpressureistomakesurroundingrockdeformandbreak;self-load-bearingcapacityisthemainfactortostablizesurroundingrock.Anchoringforceofboltscannotchangetheequilibriumstatusofthethreebecauseitisverysmall,paredwithgroundpressureandself-load-bearingcapacity.Anditsfunctionistochangethedecreasingregularityofself-load-bearingcapacityversusthedeformationofsurroundingrock,andbalanceself-load-bearingcapacityagainstgroundpressureearly.

RoofpressureisthepressureactingontheroofbeamswhenI-steelsupportsareusedtocontroltheroof.Whenroofissupportedbybolts,theroofpressurechangetobethepressureactingontherockwithintheboltingrangebecausethispartofrockischangeintoself-bearingbody.Accordingtothecharacteristicsoftheroofofcoalseams

canbedividedintosixsubstrata.,boltsstrata

Whenthevalueofroofsubsidenceiszero,roofpressureisin-situstress;thenroofpressuredecreaseswiththeincreaseofroofsubsidence.ThevariationofroofpressureisanalyzedbyFLAC,Theresultsareshownascurve1inFig.1.Wheoofsubsidencereaches19mm,thefirstroofsubstratumbeginstobearingtensilestress,thenlostsself-load-bearingcapacity,androofpressuredecreasesto0.67Mpa.Whenroofsubsidencereaches40mm,thesecondsubstratumlosesself-load-bearingcapacity,androofpressuredecreasesto0.16Mpa.Whenroofsubsidencereaches100mm,thefourthsubstratumlosesself-load-bearingcapacity,androofpressuredecreasesto0.08Mpa.Intheinitialstageofroofsubsidence,roofpressuredecreasesrapidly,andinthelaterstageofroofsubsidence,roofpressuredecreasesslowlyandthenhasanincreasingtrend.

Theself-load-bearingcapacityoftheroofwithoutboltingiscalculateduponthetheoryoflaminatedbeam,theresultareshownascurve2inFig.1.Whenroofsubsidenceiszero,theself-load-bearingcapacityisatitsutmostvalue0.0625Mpa;whenroofsubsidenceis100mm,roofstratahavebroken,mostofself-load-bearingcapacityhaslost,andtheresidualself-load-bearingcapacityisonly0.0375Mpa.Theself-load-bearingcapacityoftheroofwithboltingiscalculateduponthetheoryofbinedbeam,theresultareshownascurve3inFig.1.Whenroofsubsidenceiszero,theself-load-bearingcapacityisatitsutmost

value0.4Mpa;whentheroofsubsidencereaches40mmtheself-load-bearingcapacitydecreasesto0.225Mpa,andwhenroofsubsidencereaches100mm,theself-load-bearingcapacitydecreasesto0.1Mpa.

AsshowninFin.1,theself-load-bearingcapacityofroofstratawithoutboltingislowerthanroofpressureduringthewholecourseofroofsubsiding,soroofstratacaveinevitably.Whenbolted,roofstrataischangedfromlaminatedbeamintobinedbeam,andtheselr-load-bearingcapacityincreasesmarkedly.Whenroofsubsidencereaches44mm,theself-load-bearingcapacityexceedsroofpressure,thenroofstratastabilizedbyitself.

4Anchoringtechnology

Basedontheabovestudyofboltingmechanism,largesettingresistance,highspeedofresistanceandhighfinalresistancearethekeytechnologytothelarge-sponsoftrockroadwaybeforeroofstratadetaching,whichincludes:(1)toimprovethesettingresistanceincreasingandachievehighspeedofresistanceincreasing,tomaketherealworkingpropertiesofboltscoordinateself-load-bearingpropertiesofroofstrata,whichenablestomakefulluseoftheself-load-bearingcapacityofroofstrata;(2)toraiseboltingreliability,andsolvethedifficultproblemsthatanchoringforcebetweenboltsandsoftrockissmallandeasytolose.

4.1Blotingscheme

篇二：3000字翻译

Monetarypolicy

Anunfinishedrevolution

Aug9th2022,12:53byR.A.|LONDON

PROGRESSinthepracticeofmonetarypolicyoccursonedisasteratatime.Fromthedepressionofthe1930seconomistslearnedthatmoneymatters,andthatacontractioninthemoneysupplycanproduceapainfuldownturn.Fromtheinflationofthe1970seconomistslearnedthatinflationisamonetaryphenomenonwhichcanbecontrolledthroughtheproperapplicationofmonetarypolicy.Onehasthesensethataltoughtheworld'spresentdisasterising—slowly,fitfully—toanend,centralbankersarestillquitealongwayawayfromunderstandinghowtheyfailedandhowtheymightdobetterinthefuture.ThemostrecentmovesfromtheBankofEnglandandtheFederalReservesuggestthatthisparticularrevolutionremainsunfinished.

Monetarylessonsareneverlearnedquickly—unfortunately,sinceanearlierunderstandingofthenatureofthedisastersmightallowpolicymakerstochangecoursemorequicklyandpreventalotofhumansuffering.Governmentsbeganexperimentingwithreinflationin1932-33,touchingoffaproperrecoveryafterfourlongyearsofdepression,butAmericablunderedbackintorecessionin1937aftertighteningmonetarypolicyonceagain.Onlywhenmonetarypolicywasentirelysubordinatedtothewareffortwasthedepressionwellandtrulybeaten.Andonlyinthedecadesafterthewarwouldeconomistsbeginarticulatingtheconnectionbetweenmonetarycontraction,deflation,anddepression;MiltonFriedmanandAnnaSchwartz's"MonetaryHistoryoftheUnitedStates"wasnotpublisheduntil1963.

Inflationbeganitslongmarchupwardsinthemid-1960sandragedindoubledigits,acrosstherichworld,formuchofthe1970s.Notuntiltheearly1980sdidgovernmentsbeginwringinginflationoutofthesystemthroughmonetarytightening.Inthatcase,theintellectualheavyliftingprecededthepolicyexperimentation.Monetaristsandrationalexpectationstheoristshadreadyexplanationsforgallopinginflation,butcentralbankerstookconvincingthathammeringeconomieswithtighterpolicywouldmakeadifference.Theworld'smostrecenteconomicdisasterbeganinthelate1990s,whentheJapaneseeconomyfellintoaliquiditytrapandembarkedonitslostdecade.EconomistsquicklysettoworkdiagnosingtheJapaneseeconomyandbuildingpolicyremendations.ButargumentsoverjustwhatJapan'scrisismeantwereuesolvedwhenaJapan-likedisasterdescendedonmuchoftherestoftherichworld.Andcentralbankshaveonlygingerlyandbelatedlybeguntryingoutideasmeanttobringthecrisistoaquickanddefinitiveend.

Therichworld'sdisasterhingesontheproblemofzero,intwoways.First,astheinterestratesunderthecontrolofthecentralbankapproachzero,policymakersareatalossastohowtocontinuelooseningpolicy.Andsecond,wheninflationapproacheszerothe

relationshipbetweeneconomicweaknessanddisinflationbreaksdown.Wheninflationishighasurgeinunemploymentwillquicklyslowpriceincreases,butwheninflationisloageandpricerigiditiesblunttheeffectofunemployment,leavinginflationtargetingcentralbanksuncertainhowtoproceed.

Thesepuzzlesprovokedanongoingdebate.Inonecornerstandsagroupwithalongandproudhistory:thosereadytogiveuponmonetarypolicy.Somehavebeeninthecornersinceratesfirsttouchedzeroin2022whileothershavejoinedovertimeasunconventionalpoliciesfailedtobringbackfullemployment.Butlikethosewhosaidmonetarypolicycouldn'tfixthedepressionorreinininflation,thisbunchreckonsthatzeromeansit'stimeforotherstrategies,ortosimplyacceptpresentsuffering.

Inanothercornertherearethemechanics,whoreckoncentralbankshavetheirframeworkrightandonlyneedtofindnewtools.Ifinflationfallsdangerouslybelowtargetwhilethemainpolicyrateisnearzero,thenoneshouldsimplytargetlongerratesandbringthemdowntozero.Ifevenmoreoomphisneeded,thenthecentralbankcanturntoratesonprivate(ratherthangovernment)loansandsecurities,anddrivethemdowntozero.ThisgroupwonthedayinJapan,wherethecentralbankdebuted"quantitativeeasing"intheearly2000s.ItheldtheearlyedgeelsewhereintherichworldintheaftermathoftheGreatRecession;boththeFedandtheBankofEnglandreachedfor量化宽松政策aftertheirbenchmarkratesdroppedtonearzero.

Thentherearethosewhoemphasiseexpectations.Itisnotacontroversialstatementincentralbankingtonotethatthestanceofmonetarypolicyisdeterminedbyexpectationsofhowacentralbankwillreacttochangingeconomiccircumstances.Butthatofcourseimpliesthatbytellingmarketsaboutwhatsortsofthingswilltriggerrateincreasesinthefuture,acentralbankcantightenorloosenmonetarypolicyinthepresent,allwithoutadjustinganyinerestrates.Soifmarketsarebehaving—thatis,saving,borrowing,andinvesting—asifthecentralbankislikelytostarttighteningwhenx,y,andzthresholdsarecrossed,andthecentralbankthensaystomarketsthatitisactuallypreparedtoallowexpansionbeyondthosethresholdsbeforeraisingrates,thenmarketsshouldchangetheirbehaviourimmediately.

Thisbunchhasbeenascendentoverthepasttwoyears.Beginningin2022FederalReservepolicystatementsincludedanapproximatecalendardateonwhichinterestrateswouldbegintorise;inAugustof2022ratesweresaidtobelikelytostaylowuntilatleastmid-2022.ForthenextyeartheFedadjusteditscalendarguidanceinresponsetoeconomicconditions.TheninDecemberoflastyearitswitchedthingsup,changingitsguidancetorevolvearoundeconomicvariables,namely,thelevelofunemploymentandinflation.Rateswouldstaylow,theFedsaid,untiltheunemploymentratehadfallentoatleast6.5%,providedthatinflationexpectationswerenomorethanhalfapercentagepointabovetheFed's2%target.Fedofficialshavesinceindicatedthatongoing量化宽松政策willalsobepeggedtoparticularchangesintheeconomy,timedtoendastheunemploymentratefallsto7%.ThisweektheBankofEnglandembracedasimilarapproach.TheBank'smainpolicyratewillnotriseand量化宽松政策willcontinueuntil

theunemploymentratehasfallentoatleast7%,providedthatinflationtwoyearsaheadisnotexpectedtobemorethanhalfapercentagepointabove2%andthefinancialsystemisnotjudgedtobetiltingtowardinstability.

Theexpectationscrowdseemstohavegainedanedgeamongpolicymakersforafewdifferentreasons.First,centralbankassessmentsoftherisk-returnprofileof量化宽松政策seemtohavebeenworsening.Centralbankersneverseemedparticularlyfortablesplashingoutongovernmentbonds,butappeartohavebeenlessthanimpressedwiththeresultsoftheirpurchasesandsickofhearingplaintsaboutunpleasant量化宽松政策sideeffects(realandimagined),fromfinancial-systemdistortionstoloominghyperinflation.Somemayalsohaveworriedthatintheabsenceofclearmunicationaboutfuturepolicy量化宽松政策'seffectswerebeingblunted.Marketsmightreacttoexpansionary量化宽松政策bysimplymovingforwardthedateonwhichtheyexpectedpolicytightening,therebycancellingoutthegooddonebytheassetpurchases.Betterexpectationsmanagementcouldhelpsecuresomeofthe量化宽松政策gains.Andlastly,thethresholdsapproachedhasgivenhawkishcentralbankersanexitstrategytoclingto:asensethatallthelargessewillend,andperhapsinthenot-too-distantfuture.

ButtheFedhasbeentinkeringwithexpectationsmanagementforawhilenoithoutgeneratingtherapidrecoveryonewouldhopeforfromappropriatemonetarypolicy.WhiletheBankofEnglandapprovedoftheFed'sinnovationsenoughtoadoptthemforitsown,GovernorMarkCarneyseemedtogooutofhiswaytowarnnottoexpecttoomuchfromthenewguidance.

Andyetthesunhasyettoshineonthoselingeringinthelastcorner,whosuggestthatmaybethereissomethingslightlymorefundamentalamisswiththecurrentmonetarypolicyapproach:namely,thatitstillhasa2%inflationtargetatitsheart.

Thata2%inflationgoalmightbeamajorculpritintherichworld'scurrenteconomicmessisahardthingtostomachforeconomistsandpolicymakerswhocameofageinthe1970s.Yettherearegoodreasonsforfingeringthe2%rateasarealproblem.Troublesbeganbeforethecrisis,asthenear-totalabsenceofinflationpressurehelpedusherinterestratessteadilydownward,leavingmuchlessbreathingspacebetweentheFed'spolicyrateandthedreadzero.TheFed'smainpolicyratewasjust4.25%whentherecessionbegan,givingthecentralbanklittleroomtocutratestobattlethedownturn.Economistshavehadtoraisetheirestimatesofjusthowoftenaneconomywillendupstuckwithinterestratesnearzerowhencentralbankstargetlowratesofinflation.

Aseconddifficultyemergedsoonafter:lowandstableinflationtranslatesintoveryrigidwagesandprices,eveninthefaceofbigdeclinesindemandandsoaringunemployment.Whenthevariabilityofinflationdrops(asitdid,dramatically,fromtheearly1980son)workersandfirmsgetinthehabitofadjustingpriceslessfrequently,theydropautomaticwageindexing,andtheygenerallyincreasetherigidityoftheeconomy-widepricelevel.Thisrigidityisespeciallyproblematicatnear-zeroinflationratesgivenresistancetoacceptingabsolutecutsinwagesandprices.Asaresulteventheepiceconomiccollapseoflate2022andearly2022translatedintorelativelymoderateanddelayeddisinflation.

Andthatmeantbigtroubleforeconomiesinwhichcentralbanksuseddeflationastheirdepressioncanary-in-a-coal-mine.Priortothecrisismanycentralbankerswouldhaveinsistedthattherecouldbenodemandcollapseifinflationwerekeptabove1%andthatkeepinginflationabove1%wouldbesufficienttopreventademandcollapse.Buttheywerewrong.

Andthoughthelinkbetweensufficientdemandandstableinflationwouldseemtohavebeencalledintoquestion,centralbankershaveyettoupdatetheirmentalmodelsaccordingly.Theyhaveevolvedabit.Astheshifttowarddualthresholds,includingunemploymentaswellasinflation,indicates,centralbankersarerecognisingthatthereisinformationoutthereaboutdemandthaniscontainedintheinflationrate.Andyettheirevolutionisinplete,becausetheyinsistontargetingahigherlevelofdemandsubjecttocontinuedfidelitytotheinflationtarget.Theyhavegiventhemselvesabitofwiggleroombysayingtheywilltolerateexpectedinflationashadeabove2%.Butwhattheyhavemanifestlynotdoneisdeclarethattheywantmoredemand,whetherornotthathappenstoinvolveinflationsustainedabove2%.

Withinthepre-crisispolicyparadigmthatviewmakesperfectsense.Risinginflation,inthatworldview,isasignthattheeconomyisapproachingitsstructurallimits:isgrowingasfastasitpotentiallycan.Goosingdemandoverandabovethatlevelisworsethanuseless;anygrowththatresultsisunsustainableandwillfuelacceleratinginflation.

Butthecrisisoughttohaveledcentralbankerstoreconsiderthisview.Foronething,asnotedabove,therelationshipbetweeninflationandunemploymentisnotasclearasonewouldthinkatverylowinflationrates.Studyafterstudy,includingmanyproducedbyFedeconomists,indicatesthatmostofthegapbetweenthecurrentunemploymentrateandthe"normal"levelistemporary—therereallyisquitealotoflabour-marketslack—andyetinflationisnotmuchbelowtarget.Ifinflationislessinformativeaboutslackthanitusedtobe,thenacentralbankinterestedingettingridofslackshouldprobablydiscounttheinflationsignaltosomeextent.

Ortoputthingssomewhatdifferently,aninflationrateof3%or4%isnotinandofitselfdangerous.Itcouldbeworrisomeifitseemedtosignalaneconomybeingpushedbeyonditscapacity.Butifthereisgoodreasontobelievethattheeconomyisnotclosetocapacity,thenthereisnoparticularreasontofear3%inflationor4%inflation.Inflationacceleratingfrom3%through4%andbeyondyes,butofalltheproblemsricheconomieshavehadoverthepasthalfdecadeturningarisinginflationratetoafallingonehasnotbeenamongthem.

Itisworthacknowledgingthattherecanbecoststoahighbutstablerateofinflationrelativetoalowbutstablerate.Ifsomepricesadjustlessquicklyoreasilythanothers,thenahigherrateofinflationmayentailgreaterdistortionsinrelativepricesthatentailsomeefficiencycosts.Suchthingsneedtobekeptinperspective,however.TheAmericaneconomy,forinstance,hasbeenoperatingwithanoutputgapcloseto$1trillionforhalfadecadenow.Evenifthatestimateiswildlyoverstated,andtheactualgapiscloserto$200billionor1.3%ofGDP,thatcostprobablyswampsanydamagefromrelative-price

distortions.

Neitheristherelationshipbetweenslackandinflationtheonlythingtoconsider.Withinterestratesnearzeroitmaybeverydifficulttoraisedemandwithoutliftinginflationexpectationsabovethe2%rate.Normalmonetarypolicyoperatesontheprinciplethatthereisa"marketclearing"realinterestrate(orsetofrealmarketrates),thatbalancesdesiredsavinganddesiredborrowingandpreventsresources—orwillingworkers—fromsittingaroundidle.Thecentralbank'snormalgoal,then,istoadjustitspolicyratetonudgemarketratestowardthatmarket-clearinglevel.Butwhatifthemarket-clearingrealpolicyrateis-3%andtheactualpolicyrateisstuckat0.5%whileinflationisjust1.5%Onewouldthenneedanalternativemetric,whichofcoursetakesustothenominaloutputbrigade.NominalGDP,ortotalspendingorineintheeconomyindollarterms,haslongbeenoneofthegaugesonthecentralbanker'sdashboard.Itishardtothinkofabettermeasureofeconomy-widedemandthanthetotalamountofmoneyspenteachyearindollarterms.SupportersofanNGDPtarget(eitherarateofgrowthoratrendlevel)pointtoseveraladvantages.One,whichshouldbeclearalready,isthatthereislittleriskofmonetarypolicyfumblingsituationslikethepresentinwhichdemandswingsarenotentirelyreflectedinchangesininflation.Anotheristhatbyanchoringmarketexpectationsaroundademandpathratherthananinflationpaththebusinesscycleshouldbesubstantiallyattenuated.AndanotheristhatafocusonNGDPmakesforbettermanagementofsupplyshocks,sinceitimplieslooserpolicy,relativetoaninflationtarget,whentheeconomyisalreadybeinghitbyanegativesupplyshock(ratherthanatighterpolicywhichwouldamplifytheblowofthesupplyshock),andtighterpolicywhentheeconomyisenjoyingapositiveproductivityshock,whichcouldconceivablypreventeconomicexuberancefromtakingaturntowardtheirrational.TheupshotofaswitchtoNGDPtargetingatthepresentmomentwouldbemuchmoreexpansionarypolicy;thecentralbankwouldfocusontargetingtheobviousshortfallindemandandignorethemisfiringinflationsignal.

篇三：外语翻译3000字

应用性高校中全面型外语翻译人才培养形式的探究与构建

摘要：21世纪以来，中国经济开始走向多元化，世界各国之间交流合作增多，对于人才的要求也走向多元全面，尤其是对于外语翻译人才的需求不再是简单的对话翻译，社会经济和科学技术的开展对教育也提出了新的挑战，作为应用型高校，其人才的培养应该是以实用和理论为主，本文从外语翻译人才培养的现状入手，找到目前存在于外语翻译教学中的问题并提出对策，对于全面型外语翻译人才培养形式的构建进展探究，力求完善我国的外语翻译人才培养形式，并推动其开展。

关键词：全面型，外语翻译人才，应用型高校

一．前言

全球一体化的趋势使得国家之间的界限越来越模糊，国与国之间的文化交流与日俱增，对于外语人才的要求也逐渐走向多元化，外语翻译人才的培养成为了当务之急，而外语翻译作为专业性的人才培养课程，也必须进展改革，为了到达良好的教学效果，外语翻译人才的培养形式应该增强实用性，打破固有的翻译教学理念，加强理论在外语翻译人才培养过程中的参与度。人才是为了社会培养的，必须符合社会需求，而以往的外语翻译教学将太多精力投注在根底知识的传授上，此外外语中英语的高普及度为外语专业学生的就业增添了难度，以上因素的结合为高校外语翻译专业的开展提出了严峻的考验，同时对于传统的外语翻译人才培养形式表示了局部否认，翻译作为外语教学中的重难点，同时也是语言学科属下的一门学科，没有得到应有的重视，将这一门学科置于一个为难的境地，因此难以培养出全面型的外语翻译人才，由此可知，外语翻译人才培养形式的改革迫在眉睫，应该立即采取措施。

二．外语翻译人才培养的现状与问题

2.1外语翻译人才培养的现状

翻译是外语专业学生的必修课程，但是长久以来一直是外语教学的“短板〞，作为语言科下级的一级学科，外语翻译并没有得到足够的关注，尤其对于应用型高校的学生来说，其外语实际综合应用才能是非常重要且必要的，主要表如今听说读写译五大才能上，“译〞不仅是单独的翻译才能，更是其他才能的根底，但是目前高校外语翻译教学的现状是翻译作为一种辅助教学手段排在末位，相应的课时不够，课堂质量不高等问题长时间存在，尤其目前传统教学形式仍然处于主流位置，课堂成为教师的“独角戏〞，学生得不到理论的时机和时间，传统的翻译教学还是在教学生如何做到