菲沙研究所-ESG:神话与现实-ESG投资和资产回报(英)_第1页
菲沙研究所-ESG:神话与现实-ESG投资和资产回报(英)_第2页
菲沙研究所-ESG:神话与现实-ESG投资和资产回报(英)_第3页
菲沙研究所-ESG:神话与现实-ESG投资和资产回报(英)_第4页
菲沙研究所-ESG:神话与现实-ESG投资和资产回报(英)_第5页
已阅读5页,还剩32页未读 继续免费阅读

下载本文档

版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领

文档简介

2022

COLLECTEDESSAYS

ESG:I

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns

StevenGloberman

ABOUTTHISPUBLICATION

Copyright©2022bytheFraserInstitute.

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermissionexceptinthecaseofbriefpassagesquotedincriticalarticlesandreviews.

DateofIssue

October2022

Media

Formediaenquiries,pleasecontactourCommunicationsDepartment:604.714.4582;e-mail:communications@.

AbouttheFraserInstitute

OurmissionistoimprovethequalityoflifeforCanadians,theirfamilies,andfuturegenera-tionsbystudying,measuring,andbroadlycommunicatingtheeffectsofgovernmentpolicies,entrepreneurship,andchoiceontheirwell-being.

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns

StevenGloberman

ExecutiveSummary

ESGinvestingisaninvestmentstrategythat

incorporatesenvironmental,social,andgov-

ernance(ESG)informationintheinvestment

decision-makingprocess.Thereisagrowing

interestinESGinvesting,andthusalargeand

growingempiricalliteratureexaminingthe

returnstoESGinvesting.Atthesametime,

thedemandformoreandbetterinformation

aboutfirms’ESGactivitiesisincreasing.In

responsetothisdemand,manyjurisdictions

(e.g.,theUSSecuritiesandExchangeCom-

mission)areconsideringESGreportingman-

datestoencourageESGinvestingbyhelpingtheinvestorssmoothlyidentifyfirmswithbetterESGmetrics(greenfirms)fromtheinferiorones(brownfirms).

Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryoftheprevioustheoreticalandempiricalacademicstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns.WethenexplainhowthesefindingscanbearguablyrelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatoryESGreporting.WeonlyfocusonhowthispolicycanpotentiallychangethecostofcapitalandconsequentlygivefirmsincentivestoimprovetheirESGperformance,whichistheintendedgoalofthispolicy.

ManyclaimthatthereturntoESGinvestingisnegative.Themainconceptualframeworkthatsupportsthisclaimisthatinvestorshavenon-pecuniarypreferencesforgreenfirms,andthustheyarewillingtoacceptlowerexpectedreturnsforholdingstocksandbondsthatgreenfirmsissue.Thus,thesefirmsbenefitfromlowerfinancingcosts(costofcapital)inthecapitalmarket.Sogreenfirmscaninvestmoreandgrowmore.Moreover,brownfirmswillhaveanincentivetoimprovetheirESGpracticestolowertheirfinancingcoststoremaincompeti-tive.Ifthechannelthroughinvestors’preferencesworks,ESGinvestingmayhaveapositivesocialoutcomeaslongasempiricalevidenceconfirmsthatESGinvestingcansignificantly

2ESG:MythsandRealities

decreasetheexpectedreturns(decreasethecostofcapitalforfirms).Inthisscenario,man-datingESGreportingmaybejustifiedifinvestorshavedif-ficultyidentifyinggreenfirmsfrombrownfirms,andiffirmscanprovidebetterESGinfor-mationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.

Incontrast,manyESGadvo-

catesclaimthatthereisnotrade-offbetweenESGinvesting(doinggood)andassetreturns(doingwell).Themainconceptualframeworkthatcansupporttheirclaimisthatgreenfirmshavehigherprofit-abilityorlowerESG-relatedrisks,whileinvestorscannotreadilyidentifygreenfirmsfrombrownones.Therefore,greenassetsareunderpricedandsoprovidehigherexpectedreturnsforinvestorswhoholdthem.Inthisscenario,mandatoryESGreportingmightbejustifiedaslongasfirmscanprovidebetterandmoreESGinformationtoinvestorsundertheman-datoryregime.

Inthisessay,wefindthattheresultsofempiricalstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns(costofcapital)areinconclusive.Manystudiesfindpositiveornegativerelationships,whilemanydonotfindanysignificantrelationship.ThisresultcanshedlightontheclaimthatmandatingESGreportingcanhaveapositivesocialimpactbysystematicallychangingfirms’costsofcapital.IfthereisnoagreementonhowESGinvestingisassociatedwithrisk-adjustedinvestmentreturns(costofcapital),advocatesofmandatingESGreportingfaceaburdenofprooftoshowthatthispolicycanhaveanetpositivesocialimpact.

1.Introduction

ESGinvestingisaninvestmentstrategythatincorporatesenvironmental,social,andgov-ernance(ESG)informationintheinvestmentdecision-makingprocess.InvestorscanfindinformationabouttheESGactivitiesofthefirmsmainlythroughESGratingagencies,aswellasreportsissuedbycompanies.RatingagenciesprovideinformationtothepublicabouttheESGperformancesofthefirms.Forexample,firmswithlowercarbonemissions(E),ahigherregardforemployees’healthandsafetyintheworkplace(S),andmorediversityinleadership(G)havebetterESGratings.

Assetmanagersareincreasinglyapplying1ESGinvesting2tobuystocksandbondsoffirmsthatarealignedwithESGgoals.Asaresult,thereisalargeandgrowingempiricalliteratureexaminingthereturnstoESGinvesting.Investorscanhavedifferentincentivestoincorpo-rateESGinformationintheirinvestmentdecision-making.SomeinvestorsmayfindESG

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns3

informationfinanciallymaterial.This

materialinformationcanhelpinves-

torsbetterevaluatethefinancialrisks

andreturnsofafirm.Someinvestors

mayhavesocialobjectivesinaddition

tofinancialincentivesandwouldliketo

buythestocksandbondsoffirmswith

betterESGperformance.Bothgroups

ofinvestorswouldliketohaveaccess

torelevantinformationabouttheESG

activitiesofthefirms.

WithgrowinginterestinESGinvestinganddemandformoreandbetterinformationaboutfirms’ESGactivities,manyjurisdictions(e.g.,theU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission)areconsideringESGreportingmandatestoencourageESGinvestingbyhelpinginvestorstoidentifyfirmswithbetterESGmetrics(greenfirms)fromtheinferiorones(brownfirms).

Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryofthetheoreticalandempiricalacademicliteratureexaminingthereturnstoESGinvesting.Wethenexplainhowthesefindingscanbeargu-ablyrelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreporting.Acomprehensivecost-benefitanalysisisneededtofullyevaluatethispublicpolicy.Inthisessay,wedonotdoacost-benefitanalysisofmandatedchangestoESGreporting.Rather,wediscussaspecificpotentialsourceofbenefitthatcanarisefrompricechangesofcapitalmarketassets.3

Inapublicpolicydebate,oneshouldidentifythemarketfailurethatallegedlycreatesaneedforregulation,aswellashowtheregulationcansolvetheissue.IntheongoingdiscussionaboutmandatoryESGreporting,themainostensiblemarketfailureisthatfirmsunder-performintheirESGactivitiescomparedtothesociallyoptimallevel.Forexample,itcanbearguedthatfirmsshouldhavelowercarbonemissions(EinESG),orhigherdiversityinleadership(GinESG).Therecanbevarioussourcesofthismarketfailure.ThepotentialsourcefocusedoninthisreportisthatinvestorsarebroadlyuninformedabouttheESGperformanceoffirmsand,therefore,cannotidentifygreenfirmsfrombrownfirms.InvestorscanpotentiallyuseESGratingsthatESGagenciesprovidetoidentifygreenfirms.However,Berg,Koelbel,andRigobon(2019)documentthattheESGratingsfromthemainsixratingprovidersdisagreesubstantially.

HowcanmandatingESGreportingdrivechangebygivingfirmsanincentivetoimprovetheirESGperformance?4ThepotentialchannelthatwefocusonisthatmandatingmoreESGreportingcanmakeinvestorsbetterinformedabouttheESGperformanceofindi-vidualfirmsandtherebychangetheirinvestmentdecisionsinthecapitalmarket.Firmsraisefunds(capital)throughthecapitalmarket,whetherthroughissuingstocks,bonds,orborrowingfromfinancialinstitutions.Ifinvestorscanbetteridentifygreenfirms,theymayinvestmoreingreenfirmsanddivestfrombrownfirms.Thisreallocationininvestors’

4ESG:MythsandRealities

“ThepolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreportingcandrivechangeandthereforeimprovesocialefficiencythroughassetpricechangesinthecapitalmarket.”

portfolioscanincreasethepricesofthestocksandbondsofgreenfirms.Greenfirmsthereforebenefitfromlowerfinancingcostsinthecapi-talmarket.Hence,greenfirmscaninvestmoreandgrowrelativetobrownfirms.Moreover,brownfirmswillhaveanincentivetoimprovetheirESGpracticestolowertheirfinancingcoststoremaincompetitive.Therefore,thepolicyofmandatingmoreexpansiveESGreportingcandrivechangeandthereforeimprovesocialeffi-

ciencythroughassetpricechangesinthecapitalmarket.

HowcantheempiricalfindingsofreturnstoESGinvestingforinvestors(costofcapitalforfirms)berelevantforevaluatingthepublicpolicyofmandatoryESGreporting?WeexaminethetheoreticalliteratureonESGinvesting.Inparticular,wediscusshowvarioustheoreticalframeworksmightjustifythemandate,andwhattheseframeworkspredictforreturnstoESGinvesting.Iftheempiricaltestsdocumentedintheliteratureareconsistentwiththerelevantconceptualframework,theexistenceofanetsocialbenefittomandatoryESGreportingcouldbepotentiallyjustified.Below,wehighlighttwodominantconceptualframeworksthatcanbeidentifiedintheliterature.

Inthisessay,weprovideasummaryoftheacademicliteraturesurroundingESGinvestingtoassesswhetherthereisconclusiveevidenceontherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturns.Inthenextsection,wesummarizethetheoreticalstudiesexaminingtherela-tionshipbetweenESGinvestmentandassetreturns.Thegoalofthissectionisnottoreviewcomplicatedmathematicalmodels.Instead,wewanttosummarizethechannelsthroughwhichESGinvestingcanpotentiallyaffecttheexpectedreturnstoandcostofcapital.Insection3,wediscusstheempiricalstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvest-ingandreturns.Weconcludethattheempiricalevidenceisinconclusive.InSection4,weprovidesomeexplanationsforwhytheempiricalresultsexaminingtherelationshipbetweenESGinvestingandreturnsfindmixedresults.

InSection5,weconcludefrominconclusiveempiricalresultsexaminingreturnstoESGinvestingthatwedonotknowwhethermandatoryESGreportingcanreducethecostofcapitalforgreenfirms.Assuch,theadvocatesofmandatingESGdisclosuresshouldclarifyhowmandatingESGreportingcanhaveanynetpositivesocialimpact.

2.Theoreticalframeworks

Incontrasttotheargumentmadebysomeprominentinvestmentmanagersthat“GreenInvesting”offershigherrisk-adjustedreturnstoinvestors,manyacademicsassertthatthereturntoESGinvestingisnegative(e.g.,HongandKacperczyk,2009).5Themainconceptualframeworkthatsupportsthisclaimisthatinvestorshavenon-pecuniarypreferencesforgreenfirms,andthustheyarewillingtoacceptlowerreturnsforholdingstocksandbonds

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns5

thatareissuedbygreenfirms(Berkandvan

Binsbergen,2021).Infact,investorsshould“Ifinvestorscanmaterially

Inthisframework,ESGinvestingimpliesbet-greenfirms,thesefirmswill

increasetheassetpricesof

tersocialoutcomesonlyifinvestorstilttheirfacelowerfinancingcosts

investmentportfoliotowardgreenfirmsso(lowercostofcapital)sothat

thattheycanmateriallyincreasethestockandtheycaninvestmoreandgrow

assetpricesofgreenfirms,thesefirmswillfaceoutcomes.”

more,whichdrivesbettersocial

lowerfinancingcosts(lowercostofcapital)so

thattheycaninvestmoreandgrowmore,whichdrivesbettersocialoutcomes.Ifthechannelthroughinvestors’preferencesworks,ESGinvestingmayhavepositivesocialoutcomesaslongasempiricalevidenceconfirmsthatESGinvestingisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerexpectedreturns(lowercostofcapitalforfirms).Inthisscenario,mandatingESGreportingmaybejustifiedifinvestorscannotdistinguishgreenfirmsfrombrownfirms,andiffirmsprovidebetterESGinformationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.

Second,manyESGadvocatesclaimthattheoutperformanceofESGstrategiesisbeyonddoubt;thereisnotrade-offbetweenESGinvesting(doinggood)andassetreturns(doingwell)(Kynge,2017,September3).Themainconceptualframeworkthatcansupporttheirclaimisthatgreenfirmshavehigherprofitabilityand/orlowerESG-relatedrisks,whilethesefirmsdonotinformtheirinvestorsofthismaterialinformation.Therefore,greenassetsareunderpricedandsoprovidehigherexpectedreturnsforinvestorswhoholdthem.Inthisscenario,mandatoryESGreportingmightbejustifiedaslongasfirmscanprovidebetterandmoreESGinformationtoinvestorsunderthemandatoryregime.

ThestandardconceptualframeworktoanalyzetheinteractionbetweenESGinvestingandassetreturnsisbasedonthesingle-periodCapitalAssetPricingModel(CAPM)developedbySharpe(1964)andMossin(1966).CAPMdescribestherelationshipbetweentheexpectedreturnandtheriskofinvestinginasecurity.Themodelshowsthattheexpectedreturn,orsimplytheaveragereturn,onasecurityisequaltotherisk-freereturnplusamarketriskpremium.Themarketriskmainlyexistsbecauseeconomiccyclesareunpredictable.Iftheeconomyisinaboom,dividendsandstockpricesarehigher;iftheeconomyisinareces-sion,thedividendsandpricesarelower.Aninvestorwhobuysawell-diversifiedportfolioofstocks(e.g.,anS&P500indexfund)expectstoreceiveanexcessreturncomparedtoholdinggovernment-issuedbonds,whichprovideguaranteedcouponsregardlessofeconomiccycles.Notethatmarketriskexistseveninawell-diversifiedportfolio.TheimplicationofCAPMisthatiftheexpectedreturnofthestockoffirmA(say7percent)ishigherthanthatoffirmB(say6percent),itmeansthatfirmAisriskierwithhigherpricevolatility.BecauseoftheextrariskinstockA,theinvestorswhobuythosestocksexpecttogetanextra1percentreturn.Therefore,otherthanriskpremium,stockAshouldnotprovideanexcessreturn(Alpha).

6ESG:MythsandRealitiesAlphaisatermwidelyusedbyinvestors.Itisameasureoftheperformanceofaninvestmentafterremovingtheriskpremium.BasedonCAPM,thealphaofallstocksshouldbezero.TheextensionstoCAPM(e.g.,thethree-factorpricingmodel)incorporateriskfactorsinadditiontothemarketrisktoexplaintheexpectedreturns.Theintuitionbehindalltheseextensionsisthesame.Aslongasthereisaknownriskfactor,itisalreadyreflectedinthepriceandreturnofthestockasahigherriskpremium.Adjustingforalltheserisks,thestockshouldnotbeabletooutperformthebenchmarkindex(zeroalpha).

InthissectionwediscusstwomainchannelsthroughwhichESGinvestingcanaffect

expectedreturns:1)investors’preferencesand2)ESG-relatedrisks.ThenwediscussunderwhatconditionstheorypredictsthatESGinvestingcanprovidehigherexpectedreturns.

Investors’preferences

Investors’tasteforESGcriteriaistheprimarychannelinthetheoreticalmodelstorational-

izehowESGinvestingcanaffectexpectedreturns.Heinkel,Kraus,andZechner(2001)isthefirstpaperthatincorporatestastesforESGinanassetpricingmodel.Theauthorsassume

investmentsense…brownfirms

“Greeninvestorsboycott,inanthatgreeninvestorsdonotlikethefirmswith

Inthisenvironment,therearebrownfirms.Inthisenvironment,thereare

fewerinvestorsavailable(lessfewerinvestorsavailable(lessdemand)tohold

demand)toholdthestockofthestockofbrownfirms,causingthoseshare

brownfirms,causingthosepricestofall.Thisimpliesalowercostofcapital

sharepricestofall.”

Thiscreatesincentivesforthebrownfirmsto

followpracticestobecomegreen,whichresultsinpresumedpositivesocialoutcomes.Thelowercostofcapitalmeanslowerexpectedreturnsforgreeninvestorsinequilibrium.Yetgreeninvestorsarenotunhappybecausetheyenjoynon-pecuniaryreturns,i.e.,increasedpersonalsatisfactionfromholdinggreenstocks.

Theclaimthatgreeninvestorsgetalowerexpectedreturninequilibriumwhilegreenstocks’pricesincreasetohigherlevelscanbeconfusing.Toclarify,Iprovideasimpleexample.Sup-posethattherearetwofirms:agreenfirm(sayabatterymaker),andabrownfirm(afossilfuelfirm).Forsimplicity,supposethatbothareinitiallytradingattheidenticalstockpriceof$100.Moreover,let’sassumethattheexpectedreturnofbothisidenticalat6percent.NowassumethatinvestorsbecomeconcernedaboutESGissuesandwouldliketoholdfirmswithbetterESGratings.Theshort-termeffectofthischangeisthatthestockpriceofthegreenfirmincreasesasinvestorsbidupthepriceofthegreenfirm’ssharesinordertobuythem,andthestockpriceofthebrownfirmdropsasdemandforthosesharesdeclines.Supposethatthegreenfirmisnowpricedat$105andthebrownfirmispricedat$95.Duringtheperiodoverwhichthepriceofgreenisrisingandthepriceofbrownisfalling,investors’returnwillbehigherforthegreencompanythanforthebrowncompany.However,after

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns7

thetransitionperiod,theexpectedreturn

ofthegreenfirmfallsbelow6percent,say

to5percent,andtheexpectedreturnto

thebrownfirmrisesabove6percent,say

to7percent.

Whywillthegreenfirmhavealower

futureexpectedreturninthenewequilib-

rium?Thereasonisthat,inthenewequi-

librium,investors’desiretoholdgreen

firmsforreasonsbeyondtheirexpected

monetaryreturn.Sotheinvestorswho

holdgreenstocksarefinewithalower

monetaryreturnof5percentbecausethey

gettheequivalentofa1percentnon-monetaryreturnfrombeingsociallyresponsible.Sim-ilarly,theinvestorswhoholdbrownstocksexpecttoreceiveahighermonetaryreturnof7percenttocompensateforthenon-monetarylossof1percent.6Sobothgroupsofinvestorsgetatotalreturnof6percentinequilibrium(i.e.,afterthetransitionperiod)ifweconsiderbothmonetaryandnon-monetaryreturns.Therefore,duringtheperiodoftransitioninwhichthepreferencesofinvestorsarebeingreflectedinchangingstockprices,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks.Afterthetransitionperiod,greenstockswillunderperformthebrownstocks.Thiscanbeoneexplanationforwhytheresultsofempiricalstudiesinvesti-gatingtheeffectofESGinvestingonassetreturnsaremixed.Wediscussthisfurtherinalatersection.

BerkandvanBinsbergen(2021)arguethatESGinvestingimplieslowerexpectedreturns(costofcapital).TheyarguethatforESGinvestingtohaveanimpactitmustchangethecostofcapitalmaterially.TheyfindasimpleexpressionforthechangeinthecostofcapitalfromESGinvesting:(1)thefractionofESGinvestors,(2)thefractionofgreenstocks,and(3)thecorrelationbetweentheassetreturnsofthegreenandbrownstocks.Theycarefullyestimatetheseparametersfromdata.Theyfindthattheeffectonthecostofcapitalissmall,and,hence,theexpectedreturnsforgreeninvestorsandbrowninvestorsarealmostequal.Theyarguethattheriskandreturnofthegreenstocksandbrownstocksarehighlysimilar,sotheyarehighlysubstitutable.Aninvestorcaneasilygetthesameexpectedreturnandriskinaportfoliowithorwithoutbrownstocks.Anotherreasonforfindingasmalleffectistheirclaimthatonly2percentoftheinvestorsaregreeninvestors,whichisaverysmallfraction.

ExpectedESG-relatedrisks

Inadditiontoinvestors’preferences,riskcanalsoaffecttheexpectedreturnsforgreenorbrownfirms.IfESGisariskfactor,itcanaffecttheexpectedreturnofthestocksinadditiontootherriskfactorslikemarketrisk.Forexample,fossilfuelproducersmayfacerisksassociatedwithclimateorregulatoryshockstowhichrenewableenergyproducersareimmune.Cornell(2021)arguesthatifESGisariskfactor,brownstocksshouldhaveahigherriskpremiumcomingfromESG-relatedrisk.Investorsthatbuygreenstockswillget

8ESG:MythsandRealities

lowerexpectedreturns.YettheyarehappybecausetheyhaveaportfoliothathedgesthemagainstESG-relatedrisks.IfthereareESG-relatedrisksandinvestorsdonotknowaboutthem,thegreenstocksareunderpriced.Sothosewhoholdthemcanenjoyhigherrisk-adjustedexpectedreturns(posi-tivealpha).IfinvestorslearnthatthereareESG-relatedrisksandgreenstockscanreducethatrisk,theystartbuyingthosestockswhichimpliesanincrease

intheirstockprices.Asinthecaseofthetransitionperioddiscussedforpreferences,greeninvestorsenjoytemporaryhigherreturns.However,inthenewequilibrium,theexpectedreturnsofthegreeninvestorsarelower.YettheyarehappybecausetheyhaveaportfoliothatinsuresthemagainstESG-relatedrisks.

LuoandBalvers(2022)studythetheoreticaleffectofdivestmentinbrownstocks.Theyidentifyaboycottfactorriskpremiumandshowthatthisispositive.Pastor,Stambaugh,andTaylor(2020)alsoprovideamodelfeaturingagentswithESGpreferencesandESGinvest-ingasastrategyforahedgeagainstclimaterisk.Inequilibrium,greenassetshavenegativeCAPMalphas,whereasbrownassetshavepositivealphas.Greenassets’negativealphasstemfrominvestors’preferenceforgreenholdingsandfromgreenstocks’abilitytohedgeclimaterisk.Therefore,theexpectedreturnsofgreeninvestorsarelowerinequilibrium.

Isthereanytheorythatshowsgreenstockscanoutperformbrownstocks?

Sofar,wehavearguedthatbothinvestors’preferencesandESG-relatedrisksimplylowerexpectedreturnstoESGinvestinginequilibrium.Wealsoarguedthatduringatransitionperiodwhengreenstockpricesincrease,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks,butthere-after,brownstocksoutperformgreenstocks.Beyondthischannel,fewotherstudiestrytorationalizehowgreenassetscanoutperformbrownassetsexceptunderspecific,usuallytransitory,conditions.

UnexpectedESG-relatedrisks

Pastor,Stambaugh,andTaylor(2020)arguethatifESGconcernsstrengthenunexpectedly,greenassetscanoutperformbrownonesdespitehavinglowerexpectedreturns.Forexample,ifthegovernmentsurprisesinvestorsbyintroducingnewregulationsthatpenalizefirmswithhighcarbonemissions,thedemandforfirmswithlowcarbonemissions(goodperformanceofEinESG)increases.Thisresultsinhigherpricesforthosestocks,soduringtheperiodthatnewinformationisincorporatedintotheassetprices,greenstocksoutperformbrownstocks.Notethattheshockshouldbeunexpected.Ifitisanexpectedshock,itisalreadyreflectedinassetpricesandanESG-relatedriskpremium.Moreover,notethatthischannelagainprovideshigherreturnsforgreenassetsonlyduringatransitionperiod.

ESGInvestingandAssetReturns9

ESG,profitability,andmis-pricing

Pedersen,Fitzgibbons,andPomorski(2020)deriveamodelthatincludesinvestorswhosepreferencesdependonESGscores.Moreover,ESGscorescanbeusedasasignalforprofit-abilityofthefirms.Theyassumetherearethreetypesofinvestors:ESG-unaware,ESG-aware,andESG-motivated.ESG-unawareinvestorsarethosewhodonotknowthatESGscoresareasignalfortheprofitabilityofthefirm,sotheydonotconsiderESGscoresintheirinvestmentdecision-making.ESG-awareinvestorsknowthatthereisalinkbetweenprofitabilityandESGscores,sotheyusethisinformation.ESG-motivatedinvestorsareawareinvestorswhoalsoenjoynon-pecuniaryutilityfromholdingstockswithhighESGscores.Likepreviousstudies,iftheeconomyincludesESG-awareandESG-motivatedinvestors,ESG-motivatedinvestorsbidupthepriceofhighESG-scoringstocks.Inequilibrium,theaverageESGscoreoftheESG-motivatedinvestorsishigher,andtheirexpectedreturnsarelowercomparedtoESG-awareinvestors.IftheeconomyonlyincludesESG-awareinvestors,theexpectedreturnofstocksisindependentofESGscores.ThereasonisthatESGscoresareassumedtobeasignalofprofit,notrisk.IffirmswithhighESGscoreshavehigherprofitscomparedtothelowESGscoreones,thestockpricesoffirmswithhighESGscoreswillbehighersuchthattheexpectedreturnsoffirmswithanyESGscoreareequal.TheyarguethatthereisacaseinwhichhighESG-scoringstocksoutperformlowESG-scoringstocks.ThisisthecasewheretheeconomyhasalargeenoughfractionofESG-unawareinvestorsandESGisapositivesignalforprofitability.Iftheseassumptionshold,highESG-scoringstocksdeliverhighexpectedreturns.ThisisbecausehighESG-scoringstocksareprofitable,yettheirpricesarelowerthantheyshouldbe,leadingtorelativelyhighfuturereturns.

DisagreementinESGratings

“ThereisasubstantialliteraturedocumentingthedivergenceofESGratingsforthesamefirms.TheratingorganizationsdiffernotonlyinhowtomeasurethevariousESGcriteriabutalsoonthecriteriathataredeemedworthyofmeasurement.”

TherelationshipbetweenESGinvestment

andperformancecanalsobeambiguous

duetouncertaintyinESGratings.When

attemptingtoassesstheimpactofESGinfor-

mationoninvestmentperformanceitshould

beclearwhatismeantby“ESGinformation.”

Therearealargenumberoforganizations

attemptingtoanswerthatquestion.Liand

Polychronopoulos(2020)reportthatasof

year-end2019theyhadidentified70dif-

ferentfirmsthatprovidesomesortofESG

rankingsystem.Thisproblemwouldnotbe

sobadifalltheratingswereeffectivelysimilar,butthisisnotthecase.ThereisasubstantialliteraturedocumentingthedivergenceofESGratingsforthesamefirms.Theratingorga-nizationsdiffernotonlyinhowtomeasurethevariousESGcriteriabutalsoonthecriteriathataredeemedworthyofmeasurement.

Howdoesdisagreementam

温馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
  • 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
  • 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
  • 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
  • 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

评论

0/150

提交评论