绩效考核的困境外文翻译及原文

原文一：TheDilemmaofPerformanceAppraisalByPeterProwseandJulieProwseItwilloutlinethedevelopmentofindividualperformancebeforelinkingtoperformancemanagementinorganizations.Theoutcomesoftechniquestoincreaseorganizationalcommitment,increasejobsatisfactionwillbecriticallyevaluated.ItwillfurtherexaminethetransatlanticdebatesbetweenliteratureonefficiencyandeffectivenessintheNorthAmericanandtheUnitedKingdom)evidencetoevaluatetheHRMdevelopmentandcontributionofperformanceappraisaltoindividualandorganizationalperformance.Appraisalpotentiallyisakeytoolinmakingthemostofanorganisation’shumanresources.Theuseofappraisaliswidespreadestimatedthat80–90%oforganizationsintheUSAandUKwereusingappraisalandanincreasefrom69to87%oforganisationsbetween1998and2004reportedaformalperformancemanagementsystem(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200).Therehasbeenlittleevidenceoftheevaluationoftheeffectivenessofappraisalbutmoreonthedevelopmentinitsuse.Between1998and2004asamplefromtheCharteredInstituteofPersonnelandDevelopment(CIPD,2007)of562firmsfound506wereusingperformanceappraisalinUK.Whatisalsovitaltoemphasiseistherisinguseofperformanceappraisalfeedbackbeyondperformanceforprofessionalsandmanagerstonearly95%ofworkplacesinthe2004WERSsurvey(seeTable13.1).ClearlytheuseofAppraisalshasbeenthedevelopmentandextensionofappraisalstocoveralargeproportionoftheUKworkforceandthecoverageofnonmanagerialoccupationsandtheextendeduseinprivateandpublicsectors.Critiquesofappraisalhavecontinuedasappraisalshaveincreasedinuseandscopeacrosssectorsandoccupations.Thedominantcritiqueisthemanagementframeworkusingappraisalasanorthodoxtechniquethatseekstoremedytheweaknessandproposeofappraisalsasasystemtodevelopperformance.This“orthodox”approacharguesthereareconflictingpurposesofappraisal(Strebleretal,2001).Appraisalcanmotivatestaffbyclarifyingobjectivesandsettingclearfutureobjectiveswithprovisionfortraininganddevelopmentneedstoestablishtheperformanceobjective.Theseconflictswithassessingpastperformanceanddistributionofrewardsbasedonpastperformance(Bach,2005:301).Employeesarereluctanttoconfideanylimitationsandconcernsontheircurrentperformanceasthiscouldimpactontheirmeritrelatedrewardorpromotionopportunities(NewtonandFindley,1996:43).ThisconflictswithperformanceasacontinuumasappraisersarechallengedwithdifferingrolesasbothmonitorsandjudgesofperformancebutanunderstandingcounsellorwhichRandell(1994)arguesfewmanagershavenotreceivedtherainingtoperform.AppraisalManager’sreluctancetocriticisealsostemsfromclassicevidencefromMcGregorthatmanagersarereluctanttomakeanegativejudgementonanindividual’sperformanceasitcouldbedemotivating,leadtoaccusationsoftheirownsupportandcontributiontoindividualpoorperformanceandtoalsoavoidinterpersonalconflict(McGregor,1957).Oneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralandavoidanyconflictknownasthecentraltendency.InastudyofseniormanagersbyLongneckeretal.(1987),theyfoundorganisationalpoliticsinfluencedratingsof60seniorexecutives.Thefindingswerethatpoliticsinvolveddeliberateattemptsbyindividualstoenhanceorprotectself-interestswhenconflictingcoursesofactionarepossibleandthatratingsanddecisionswereaffectedbypotentialsourcesofbiasorinaccuracyintheirappraisalratings(Longeneckeretal.,1987).TherearemethodsoffurtherbiasbeyondLongenecker’sevidence.Thepoliticaljudgementsandtheyhavebeendistortedfurtherbyoverratingsomeclearcompetenciesinperformanceratherthanbeingcriticalacrossallratedcompetenciesknownasthehaloeffectandifsomecompetenciesarelowertheymayprejudicethejudgmentacrossthepositivereviewsknownasthehornseffect(ACAS,1996).OneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralTherearemethodsSomeratingsmayonlycincluderecenteventsandtheseareknownastherecencyeffects.Inthiscaseonlyrecenteventsarenotedcomparedtomanagersgatheringandusingdatathroughouttheappraisalperiod.Aparticularconcernistheequityofappraisalforratingswhichmaybedistortedbygender,ethnicityandtheratingsofappraisersthemselves.ArangeofstudiesinboththeUSandUKhavehighlightedsubjectivityintermsofgender(Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999)andethnicityoftheappraiseandappraiser(GeddesandKonrad,2003).Suggestionsandsolutionsonresolvingbiaswillbereviewedlater.Thesecondanalysisistheradicalcritiqueofappraisal.Thisisthemorecriticalmanagementliteraturethatarguesthatappraisalandperformancemanagementareaboutmanagementcontrol(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993).Itarguesthattightermanagementcontroloveremployeebehaviourcanbeachievedbytheextensionofappraisaltomanualworkers,professionalasmeanstocontrol.ThisdevelopstheliteratureofFoucaultusingpowerandsurveillance.Thisliteratureusescasesinexamplesofpublicservicecontrolonprofessionalssuchateachers(Healy,1997)andUniversityprofessionals(Townley,1990).Thisevidencearguestheincreasedcontrolofpublicservicesusingappraisalasamethodofcontrolandthattheoutcomeofmanagerialobjectivesignoresthedevelopmentalroleofappraisalandratingsareawardedforpeoplewhoacceptandembracethecultureandorganizationalvalues.However,thisliteratureignorestheemployeeresistanceandtheuseofprofessionalunionstochallengetheattemptstoexertcontroloverprofessionalsandstaffintheappraisalprocess(Bach,2005:306).ThisevidencearguesOneofthedifferentissuesofremovingbiaswastheuseofthetestmetaphor(Folgeretal.,1992).Thiswasbasedontheassumptionthatappraisalratingswereatechnicalquestionofassessing“true”performanceandthereneededtobeincreasedreliabilityandvalidityofappraisalasaninstrumenttodevelopmotivationandperformance.Thesourcesofraterbiasanderrorscanberesolvedbyimprovedorganisationaljusticeandincreasingreliabilityofappraiser’sjudgement.Howevertherewereproblemssuchasanassumptionthatyoucanstatejobrequirementsclearlyandtheorganizationis“rational”withobjectivesthatreflectvaluesandthatthejudgmentbyappraisers’arevaluefreefrompoliticalagendasandpersonalobjectives.Secondlythereisthesecondissueofsubjectivityifappraisalratingswheredecisionsonappraisalareratedbya“politicalmetaphor”(Hartle,1995).This“politicalview”arguesthataappraisalisoftendonebadlybecausethereisalackoftrainingforappraisersandappraisersmayseetheappraisalasawasteoftime.Thisbecomesaprocesswhichmanagershavetoperformandnotasapotentialtoimproveemployeeperformance.Organisationsinthiscontextare“political”andtheappraisersseektomaintainperformancefromsubordinatesandviewappraisesasinternalcustomerstosatisfy.Thismeansmanagersuseappraisaltoavoidinterpersonalconflictanddevelopstrategiesfortheirownpersonaladvancementandseekaquietlifebyavoidingcensurefromhighermanagers.Thisperceptionmeansmanagersalsoseeappraiseeseeksgoodratingandgenuinefeedbackandcareerdevelopmentbyseekingevidenceofcombiningemployeepromotionandpayrise.Thismeansappraisalratingsbecomepoliticaljudgementsandseektoavoidinterpersonalconflicts.Theapproachesofthe“test”and“political”metaphorsofappraisalareinaccurateandlackobjectivityandjudgementofemployeeperformanceisinaccurateandaccuracyisavoided.Theissueishowcanorganisationsresolvethislackofobjectivity?Grint(1993)arguesthatthesolutionstoobjectivityliesinpartwithMcGregor’s(1957)classiccritiquebyretrainingandremovalof“topdown”ratingsbymanagersandreplacementwithmultipleraterevaluationwhichremovesbiasandtheobjectivitybyupwardperformanceappraisal.Thevalidityofupwardappraisalmeanstheremovalofsubjectiveappraisalratings.Thisapproachisalsosuggestedtoremovegenderbiasinappraisalratingsagainstwomeninappraisals(Fletcher,1999).Thesolutionofmultiplereporting(internalcolleagues,customersandrecipientsofservices)willreducesubjectivityandinequityofappraisalratings.Thisargumentdevelopsfurtherbytheriseintheneedtoevaluateprojectteamsandincreasinglevelsofteamworktoincludepeerassessment.Thesolutionsalsointheorymeanincreasedclosercontactwithindividualmanagerandappraisesandincreasingserviceslinkedtocustomerfacingevaluations.However,negativefeedbackstilldemotivatesandplentyoffeedbackandexplanationbymanagerwhocollatesfeedbackratherthanjudgesperformanceandfailtosummariseevaluations.TherearehoweverstillproblemswithaccuracyofappraisalobjectivityasWalkerandSmither(1999)5yearstudyof252managersover5yearperiodstillidentifiedissueswithsubjectiveratingsin360degreeappraisals.Therearestillissuesonthesubjectivityofappraisalsbeyondtheareasoflackoftraining.Thecontributionofappraisalisstronglyrelatedtoemployeeattitudesandstrongrelationshipswithjobsatisfaction(FletcherandWilliams,1996).Theevidenceonappraisalstillremainspositiveintermsofreinvigoratingsocialrelationshipsatwork(Townley,1993)andthewidespreadadoptioninlargepublicservicesintheUKsuchasthenationalhealthService(NHS)isthevaluablecontributiontolinemanagersdiscussionwithstaffontheirpastperformance,discussingpersonaldevelopmentplansandtraininganddevelopmentaspositiveissues.Onefurtherconcernistheopennessofappraisalrelatedtoemployeerewardwhichwenowdiscuss.Appraisalandperformancemanagementhavebeeninextricablylinkedtoemployeerewardsincethedevelopmentofstrategichumanresourcemanagementinthe1980s.Theearlyliteratureonappraisallinkedappraisalwithemployeecontrol(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)anddiscussedtheuseofperformancerelatedrewardtoappraisals.Howevertherecentliteraturehassubstitutedthechaptertitlesemployee“appraisal”with“performancemanagement”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)andmovedthefocusonperformanceandperformancepayandthelimitsofemployeeappraisal.Theappraisalandperformancepaylinkhasdevelopedintodebatestothreekeyissues:Thefirstissueishasperformancepayrelatedtoappraisalgrowninuse?Thesecondissueiswhattypeofperformancedowereward?andthefinalissueiswhojudgesmanagementstandards?Thefirstdiscussiononinfluencesofgrowthofperformancepayschemesistheassumptionthatincreasinglinkagebetweenindividualeffortandfinancialrewardincreasesperformancelevels.Thislinkagebetweeneffortandfinancialrewardincreasinglevelsofperformancehasprovedanincreasingtrendinthepublicandprivatesector(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998).Thedrivetoincreasepublicsectorperformanceeffortandsettingoftargetsmayevenbeinconsistentintheexperiencesofsomeorganizationalsettingsaimedatachievinglong-termtargets(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007).ThedevelopmentofmeritbasedpaybasedonperformanceassessedbyamanagerisrisingintheUKMarsden(2007)reportedthatthe:Useofperformanceappraisalsasabasisformeritpayareusedin65percentofpublicsectorand69percentoftheprivatesectoremployeeswhereappraisalcoveredallnonmanagerialstaff(p.109).Meritpayhasalsogrowninuseasin199820%ofworkplacesusedperformancerelatedschemescomparedto32%inthesameorganizations2004(Kersleyetal.,2006:191).TheachievementsofsatisfactoryratingsorabovesatisfactoryperformanceaverageswereusedasevidencetorewardindividualperformanceratingsintheUKCivilService(Marsden,2007).Table13.2outlinestheextentofmeritpayin2004.Thesecondissueiswhatformsofperformanceisrewarded.Theuseofpastappraisalratingsasevidenceofachievingmerit-relatedpaymentslinkedtoachievinghigherperformancewasthepredominantfactordevelopedinthepublicservices.TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)reported“inconsistentwithinorganizationsandproblematicforcertainprofessionalorlessskilledoccupationswheregoalshavenotbeeneasilyformulated”.Therehasbeeninconclusiveevidencefromorganizationsontheimpactofperformancepayanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.Evidencefromanumberofindividualperformancepayschemesreportorganizationssuspendingorreviewingthemonthegroundsthatindividualperformancerewardhasproducednoeffectinperformanceorevendemotivatesstaff(Kessler,2000:281).Morein-depthstudiessettingperformancegoalsfollowedbyappraisalonhowwelltheywereresultedinlossofmotivationwhilstmaintainingproductivityandachievedmanagersusingimposingincreasedperformancestandards(MarsdenandRichardson,1994).AsRandell(1994)hadhighlightedearlier,thepotentialobjectivityandself-criticisminappraisalreviewsbecomeareasthatappraiseesrefusetoacknowledgeasweaknesseswithappraisersifthisleadstoareductionintheirmeritpay.Objectivityandselfreflectionfordevelopmentbecomesaweaknessthatappraisesfailtoacknowledgeasadevelopmentalissueifitreducestheirchancesofareducedevaluationthatwillreducetheirmeritreward.Thereviewofcivilservicemeritpay(Makinson,2000)reportedfrom4majorUKCivilServiceAgenciesandtheNationalHealthServiceconcludedthatexistingformsofperformancepayandperformancemanagementhadfailedtomotivatemanystaff.Theconclusionswerethatemployeesfoundindividualperformancepaydivisiveandledtoreducedwillingnesstoco-operatewithmanagement,citingmanagerialfavoritesandmanipulationofappraisalscorestolowerratingstosavepayingrewardstostaff(MarsdenandFrench,1998).Thishasclearimplicationsontherelationshipbetweenlinemanagersandappraisesandthedemotivationalconsequencesandreducedcommitmentprovideclearevidenceofthedangertolinkingindividualperformanceappraisaltorewardinthepublicservices.Employeesfocusontheissuesthatgainkeyperformancefocusbyfocusingonspecificobjectivesrelatedtokeyperformanceindicatorsratherthanallpersonalobjectives.AstudyofbankingperformancepaybyLewis(1998)highlightedimposedtargetswhichwereunattainablewitharangeof20performancetargetswithnarrowshorttermfinancialorientatatedgoals.Thenarrowfocusonkeytargetsandneglectofotherperformanceaspectsleadstotasksnotbeingdelivered.Thisfinalissueofjudgingmanagementstandardshasalreadyhighlightedissuesofinequityandbiasbasedongender(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999).ThesuggestedsolutionstoresolvedIscriminationhavebeenproposedasenhancedinterpersonalskillstrainingareincreasedequitableuseof360degreeappraisalasamethodtoevaluatefeedbackfromcolleaguesasthisreducestheuseofthe“politicalmetaphor”(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999).Onmeasureslinkingperformancetoimprovementrequireawiderapproachtoenhancedworkdesignandmotivationtodevelopandenhanceemployeejobsatisfactionandthedesignoflinkagesbetweeneffortandperformancearesignificantintheprivatesectorandfeedbackandawarenessinthepublicsector(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176).Whererisesbeinpayweredeterminedbyachievingcriticalratedappraisalobjectives,employeesarelessselfcriticalandopentoanydevelopmentalneedsinaperformancereview.Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsontheextenttowhichyouhaveagoodrelationshipwithyourlinemanager.Barlow(1989)argued`ifyougetoffbadlywithyourfirsttwomanagers,youmayjustaswellforgetit(p.515).Theevidenceonthecontinuedpracticeofappraisalsisthattheyarestillinstitutionallyelaboratedsystemsofmanagementappraisalanddevelopmentissignificantrhetoricintheapparatusofbureaucraticcontrolbymanagers(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolishappraisalsiftheyfailtodevelopandenhanceorganisationalperformance(Kessler,2000).Despiteallthecriticismandevidencethecriticshavefailedtosuggestanalternativeforaprocessthatcanprovidefeedback,developmotivation,identifytrainingandpotentialandevidencethatcanjustifypotentialcareerdevelopmentandjustifyreward(Hartle,1997).Source:JournalofAccountingResearch,Jun2009译文一：绩效考核的困境作者：彼得·布朗斯，茱莉亚·布朗斯绩效管理发展中的个人业绩与企业组织相联系，以提高组织承诺的成果的实现性，审慎评估以增加工作满意度。它将进一步研究文献的跨领域的效率和有效性议题在北美和英国的证据，以评估个人和组织绩效的人力资源开发和考核贡献。评估是充分利用企业组织人力资源的一个关键工具。绩效考核的使用分布广泛，根据1998年至2004年一个正式的绩效管理系统的报告(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200)，估计80-90％的美国组织正在使用，而英国使用比例从69%增加至87％。有很少关于在发展考核的证据，而有更多的使用效益。1998年至2004年从英国特许人事样本562，发现在英国506人使用表现评估，这是还必须强调的是越来越多地使用的表现。在2004年WERS调查中，在几乎95％的工作场所强调的关键是基于专业人员和管理人员的绩效的绩效考核反馈。显然，考核已经是不断发展和拓展，已经覆盖很大比例的英国劳动人口和非职业管理以及在私营和公共部门推广使用。考核评比继续作为绩效波动被更多的部门和行业使用。占主导地位的批判是作为一个正统的技术的管理框架，旨在纠正弱点及评估作为一个发展绩效的系统。这种“正统”的做法认为有考核冲突目的(Strebleretal,2001）。考核可以通过明确的目标激励工作人员，制定明确的培训和发展的需要，提供未来的目标来确定绩效目标。这些与过去的绩效考考核和奖励与分配的冲突是基于过去的表现(Bach,2005:301)。员工不愿意吐露任何限制和关注他们目前绩效因为这可能对绩效的影响，与相关奖励或晋升机会（NewtonandFindley,1996:43）。这些绩效冲突对于考核人来说是连续作为管理者和判定者的业绩不同角色的挑战，而是理解辅导员的兰德尔1994）认为少数管理人员没有得到执行。McGregor认为绩效考核经理不愿意考核是有典型的证据的，管理者不愿意就个人的表现和培训服务进行判断可能使士气低落，导致自己的支持和贡献个人表现欠佳，并同时避免人际冲突（McGregor,1957)。避免冲突一个后果是，以速度为中心的所有标准并避免为中心的高级管理人员倾向的冲突。由longneckeretal（1987年）对于高级管理者的研究，他们发现组织政策的影响比率60名高级管理人员，调查结果显示，通过加强个人或保护自身利益来刻意的参与政策行动时，当可能的冲突情况，在他们的评估等级比率和是由偏见或受影响的潜在来源决定的（Longeneckeret，1987）。这有Longenecker’s的证据进一步证明偏见的方法。他们的政治判断和已扭曲不自量力，一些表现能力进一步明确而不是在关键的环节和已知的额定能力，如果一些较低的判决他们可能影响作为角色整个正面影响（ACAS，1996年）。有些评级可能只包括最近发生的事件，这些都是近期的已知影响。在这种情况下，经理搜集和使用的只有在整个考核期间最近的比较事件。特别关注对绩效数据的公平性的考核，这可能通过性别，种族和考核者的阶层自身而扭曲。一些对于美国和英国的研究凸显了对于性别（Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999）考核和考核者的级别的主观性（GeddesandKonrad,2003）。建议和解决偏见的方案稍后将检讨。第二个分析是对考核激进的批判。这是更多重要管理文献中认为，评估和表现管理都是关于管理控制(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993)。Itargues它认为加强对员工行为的管理控制，可实现的对人工考核的拓展，是控制的专业手段。这发展了Foucault利用职权和监视的文献。这些文献使用像教师这样的专业人员的公共服务控制的例子(Healy,1997)和大学专业人员的(Townley,1990)。这方面的证据认为使用考核来加强对公共服务的控制，作为一种控制方法并认为，管理客观性结果忽视了考核和等级评定的发展作用，均获得人们接受和支持的文化和组织价值。然而，这种文献忽略员工阻力与利用工会来挑战试图对专业人员和工作人员在评估过程施加控制。(Bach,2005:306)消除偏见的不同议题之一是使用隐喻的测试（Folgeretal，1992年）。这是基于假设考核比率一个评估“真实”绩效的技术性问题，这需要增加考核的可靠性和有效性作为一种发展动力和绩效的工具。评价者偏见和错误的来源可以通过改进组织公平，增加考核者鉴定可靠性解决的。但有一个假设的问题，如你可以清晰描述工作要求，该组织是通过考核人从价值和政治议程自由裁量权的价值观和判定反映“理性”的目标。其次存在第二个问题是主观性，如果由考核决定的的绩效比率是由一个“政治隐喻”决定的(Hartle,1995)。这种“政治观点”认为，考核做不好是因为绩效评估者缺少训练，他们把绩效考核看成是一种浪费时间。这成为管理者必须执行，而不是作为一个潜在的改进员工绩效的一个过程。本文中的组织是“政治”的，评估师设法维持下属的绩效并视考核为内部顾客满意。这意味着管理人员使用考核，以避免人际冲突和发展战略的个人地位，并寻求一个安静的生活，避免较高的管理人员的谴责。这种看法是指管理者也看到考核者寻找好考核比率和反馈以及职业发展，通过寻求员工促进和支付手段相结合的证据.这意味着考核比率成为政治上的判断并设法避免人际冲突。在绩效的“测试”和“政治”的比喻是不准确的考核，缺乏判断雇员绩效客观性，精度偏差。这问题是组织如何能解决这种缺乏客观性？格林特（1993）认为，在对客观的解决方案的一部分，是麦格雷戈的（1957年）由再培训的经典批判和清除“向下”的管理人员评分封顶和更换多个考核者考核以消除偏见和由绩效评估的客观性基础上。向上有效性的考核意味着主观性的考核比率，这种方法还消除建议考核评分，以消除对妇女的考核(Fletcher,1999)多元化报表解决方案（内部同事，客户和收件人服务）将减少评分的主观性和考核比率的不公平。这争论的进一步发展所需要评估的项目团队和越来越多的增加团队合作水平，包括同事评估。在该解决方案的理论上，平均增加经理和加强与个别考核和联系以增加与客户服务所面临的考核。但是，负反馈仍然是伤害性很大的。通过整理反馈意见，而不是考核绩效表现的经理大量工作。然而，我们总结反馈和解释考核。这与考核的准确性仍然存在客观问题，沃克和史密瑟（1999）用360考评法五年研究了252位经理五年期间，这主观考核问题仍然在评估主体的问题超出缺乏培训等领域。在考核的贡献是密切相关员工的态度和强烈与工作满意度(FletcherandWilliams,1996)。该证据正面考核仍然在振兴工作中的社会关系方面（汤利，1993年）和大型公共服务的广泛采用，英国等作为国家卫生服务体系（NHS）是各级管理人员的宝贵贡献讨论有关其员工过去的表现，讨论个人发展计划和培训，并积极议题，进一步关注发展是开放性与员工的报酬，我们现在讨论的考核。20世纪80年代，由于战略人力资源管理的发展，考核和绩效管理已与雇员奖励密不可分。关于考核的早期文献中就将考核与员工控制(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)相联系，并讨论了有关考核奖励绩效的使用问题.然而有一部分文献已经取代了章节标题雇员“考核”与“绩效管理”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)，焦点转移到绩效和绩效激励与员工考核的限制上来。绩效与绩效工资的联系已发展为对三个关键问题的讨论：第一问题讨论绩效工资是否已经与考核发展在使用中同步进行？第二个问题是什么类型的绩效，我们应该奖励？最后的问题是谁来判断工作标准？关于绩效工资方案不断增长的影响是第一个讨论的问题，它是在增加个人的努力和物质回报之间的联系以提高绩效水平。这种个人努力和物质回报联动以提高绩效水平，证明了在公共和私营部门的发展趋势(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998)。这样促使增加公共部门的绩效努力和目标设置可能甚至在实现旨在实现长期目标的某些组织设置中会不一致(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007），通过经理的基于绩效评估的工资的优点的发展是由英国的马斯登（2007）报告中提出：考绩用作绩效工资的基础是在覆盖了非管理层员工的公共部门中的使用比率为65%，私营部门的使用比率为69%（109页）。绩效工资的使用也在增加，在1998年组织使用绩效工资的比率为20％，而在相同的组织2004年这一比率达到32%(Kersleyetal.,2006:191)。令人满意的比率或以上的绩效超过令人满意的成果平均数的将作为证据，以奖励英国公务员中个人业绩评级(Marsden,2007)。第二个问题是什么样的绩效形式应该获得奖励。对于过去绩效比率的使用是为实现与实现更高的奖赏支付的证据在公共服务中式鉴定评级绩效的主要因素。TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)关于设置业绩目标已被证明凯斯勒（2000:280）的报告“不一致的内部组织和目标模糊的组织中的某些专业问题或技术水平较低的地方”。这里有从组织对绩效工资的影响payanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.和提高表现的效率的不确定的证据。从大量的个人绩效薪酬计划报告的证据中，机构暂停或审查他们对个别表现却没有获得任何报酬的影响，甚至伤害工作人员（Kessler,2000:281)。建立绩效目标更深入的研究,紧随其后的是取决于他们的评估,是如何导致失去动力,同时保持生产率和实现管理者使用性能提高的绩效标准(MarsdenandRichardson,1994)。正如As兰德尔（1994）早前曾强调，潜在的客观性和自我批评在考核区域中，成为评核者拒绝承认评估师的弱点如果从而导致了他们的绩效工资的减少。客观性和自我反思的发展成为一个弱点，那就是考核失败作为一个发展问题，如果它减少了降低评估的机会，这将减少他们的绩效奖励。审视公务员的绩效工资(Makinson,2000)来自于英国4大公务员服务机构和公务员国家卫生服务的结论，绩效工资和存在形式绩效管理没能激励许多工作人员得出的结论是，雇员发现个人绩效工资分裂并且导致降低管理合作的意愿，管理偏好的引用，对于绩效分数降低比率以减少员工的绩效工资的问题的修复(MarsdenandFrench,1998)。这有明确含义关于一线管理人员和考核之间的关系，被动的结果并减少承诺提供明确的证据将个人绩效考核与在公共部门的奖励联系起来。雇员注重这样的问题，以获取关键绩效以集中与关键因素有关的而不是所有的个人性格相联系的具体目标为重点相关的关键绩效指标。Lewis（1998）的一个银行业绩效工资的研究强调，实施目标是一个在20个绩效目标范围内遥不可及的狭隘的短期业绩目标。这种狭隘的对重点对象关注而忽略其他绩效方面将导致工作无法实现。最后一个问题是这种判断管理标准已经突出基于性别的不公平和偏见的问题(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999)。建议的解决歧视的方案为加强人际技巧训练来增加运用360度考核的公平性并作为考核评估的方法从同事的反馈，因为这可以减少在“政治隐喻”使用(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999)。连接绩效与工作改进的措施连接绩效和连接需要更广泛的方法，加强工作设计和发展动力以及提高员工工作满意度和努力和绩效之间的联系的设计，是重要的私营部门和反馈和在公共部门的宣传(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176)。凡在工资上升由实现的关键考核目标决定的，员工缺乏自我批判和开放在任何绩效考核的发展需要中。需要讨论和解决的关键问题是取决于你与您的顶头上司是否有良好的关系。Barlow(1989)如果你说你跟的两位经理不好，你可能只是把这事给忘它（第515页）。Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsonthe关于考核继续实践的证据，他们还阐述了管理体制和发展的系统考核在战略决策控制上的应用(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolish(Barlow,1989)。在现实中，如果他们没有评估发展和提高组织绩效(Kessler,2000)，公司将会创建，审查，变更，甚至取消考核。尽管所有的批评和批评者的证据都没有显示一个过程，可以提供反馈，发展动力，确定培训和潜在的理由和证据，可以潜在的职业发展并断定奖励（Hartle,1997)。资料来源：大学会计研究所。2009年6月。原文二：PerformanceEvaluationsandEfficientSortingBy:RAY,KOROK.Muchoftheproductioninfirmstakesplaceovertime.Thispaperseekstounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationonlongprojects.Inparticular,themodelexploresthesortingeffectsofperformanceevaluations.Conductinganinterimperformanceevaluationincreasesefficiencybyprovidingtheoptiontoendprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Themainresult:Itisefficienttoallocatemoreresourcestowardstheendofaproject.Thisresultholdsunderavarietyofscenarios:whentheworkerhasunknownability,whentheoutsideoptionsvarywithoutput,andevenunderanagencyframeworkwitharisk-averseagent.Theproductionofgoodsandservicestakestime.Ittakestimetobuildcars,writesoftware,developdrugs,formulatestrategy,marketproducts,auditclients,andvaluecompanies.Infact,manyfirmstodayorganizetheirproductionintheformofprojectsthatrunforweeks,months,orevenyearsatatimebeforethefirmcansellthefinishedproductinamarket.Forexample,softwaredevelopmentrunsthroughdesign,implementation,andtestingstagesbeforefinalrelease.Thispaperexaminestheproblemofperformanceevaluationbeforeaprojectisfinished.Themainideaisthatperformanceevaluationsgenerateefficientsorting.Theyprovidethefirmwiththeoptionofendingprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Aperformanceevaluationconductedattheinterimstagesortsemployeesintotwogroups:stayorquit.Itisefficienttoquitiftheearlyreturnsareweak,andtostayotherwise.Iftheagent’searlyoutputislow,itisintheinterestofboththefirmandtheagenttodiscontinueworkandcollecttheirrespectiveoutsideoptions.Inthissense,theperformanceevaluationassignsanagenttohismostefficientuse.Theroleoftheevaluation,therefore,istoperformthissorting.Interimperformanceevaluationschangetheefficientallocationofre-sourcesovertimeinsurprisingways.Themainresultshowsthatitisefficienttoassignmoreresourcestothelaterstagesoftheproject.Theevaluationcreatesthepossibilityofterminationaftertheearlystage,whichreducesthemarginalreturnfromfirst-stageeffort,andsotheagentshadeshiseffortdownwardintheearlystage.Oncetheagentadvances,thepossibilityofterminationvanishesandthemarginalreturntoeffortrises,soheworksharder.Insum,itisefficienttostayiftheearlyreturnsarehigh,andforthosethatstay,itisefficienttoworkharder.Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymod-Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymodelsthatspananenormousliteratureinaccounting,economics,andfinance(seeBaiman[1982,1990],Indjejikian[1999],Lambert[2001],Prendergast[1999]forreviews).Agencytheoryhasenjoyedwidetheoreticalattentionoverthelast20years,andhasdramaticallyadvancedourunderstandingofperformancemeasurement.Unfortunately,itsempiricalsupportremainsmixed,asPrendergast[2002]andLazear[2003]document.Theresultsofmostagencymodelsarehighlysensitivetotheirdetails—theinformationstructure,thetimingofthegame,therestrictionsonthecontracts,etc.Sowhenthedetailsofthegamechange,evenslightly,sodothepredictionsofthemodel.Thispapertakesadifferentapproach.Thefocushereisnotonincentives,butonsorting.Iproposeasimpleandrobustefficiencymodelthatdoesnotrelyonacomplexcontractinggamewithinthefirm.Theaimistounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationtoallparties,nottheopportunisticuseofinformationbyoneside.Theanalysishereshiftsattentionawayfromdistortionsfromfirst-besttoimprovementsinfirst-best.Performanceevaluationsdon’tjustsliceupafixedpie,butmakethepieitselfbigger.Exploringthesortingeffectsofinterimperformanceevaluationsinafirst-bestworldabstractsfromconflictsofinterestsbetweenpartiesandmakesmoreapparenttheeconomicforcesdrivingtheeffortallocationdecision.Nonetheless,Ishowthatthemainresultofthemodelisstillrobustwithinanagencycontext.Inparticular,whenarisk-neutralprincipalcannotobserveeffortandcontractswitharisk-averseagent,theagent