比较商事组织法讲义课件

LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@1LawsonBusinessOrganizations比较商事组织法

法律硕士课程(法学)2比较商事组织法

法律硕士课程(法学)2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基础(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林华伟等译],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.3Bibliography3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation4Content·TheoryoftheFirmandWhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…5WhatIExpectfromyou…

5<国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要>(2010-2020)[公开征求意见稿]丰田汽车召回香港华懋集团前董事局主席龚如心遗产案AVATAR6<国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要>(2010-2020)[TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)为什么有企业/厂商?[交易\市场和企业/厂商]它们在资本市场的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(为什么代理成本在现代企业不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的调查表明,当时美国200个最大的公司中,88个是由管理人员控制的.Berle和Means认为,股东对于代理成本的监督是无能为力的,你是否同意这一看法?授权机制的优势和弊端7TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)为什么股东被称为“剩余财产的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股东表决权----→集体行为----→监督成本----→信息取得的代价(在股权分散的情况下,为什么股东都愿意做消极股东,搭便车-FreeRiders会很普遍?)如何约束代理人的机会主义行为?(代理成本是所有和控制分离的代价,第7页)8TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股价能否反映公司管理人员的懈怠或其他机会主义行为?监督机制包括哪些方面?9TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象----成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标----减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3页.[Jensen&Meckling]

！结合我国<公司法>,你如何理解我国法律是否减少了代理成本,请举例说明.10TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企业正是针对机会主义\交易成本和合同不完备的回应(p.10).当合同一方是“交易专用财产”(trade-specificassets)的所有者时,交易双方组建企业比签定合同更有效率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson11TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----权衡缔约成本和所有权成本企业所有权类型和所有权成本存在相关性.→投资者所有→雇员所有→所有者缺位当所有权成本过高的时候,没有所有者比“产权清晰”更重要.12TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保险公司与投保人的关系为例,说明公司股东与管理者的关系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits13TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投资选择是什么?在放弃全部所有权归自己所有的企业形式后,投资者会面临哪些合同关系?[NexusofContracts]作为投资者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企业社会责任的内容吗?14TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文译本???]15TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalInstitutionalArrangements在交易成本为零的条件下,制度的选择不会影响经济活动的最终效益.在交易成本不为零的现实世界里,制度的安排会在不同程度上影响交易的效益.郁光华:<公司法的本质>,法律出版社2006年版,第38页.RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.16InstitutionalArrangements在交易成FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.17FurtherReadingMaterialsRoberLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.18LegalCharacteristicsoftheCReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts19ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabiFourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]20FourCharacteristicLimitedLiCloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor21CloseCorporationvs.

Public有限责任的形成代表性论文如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).22有限责任的形成代表性论文如下：22对于公司法人人格与股东有限责任合并意义的思考公司法人人格----积极的资产区分/公司财产成为公司债权人的担保财产，为公司债权人设定优先于股东或者公司经营者的债权人受偿的浮动担保（floatingcharge），公司债权人在评估公司财产时具有比较优势股东有限责任----消极的资产区分/股东的个人财产成为股东的债权人的担保财产，降低了公司破产时的债权追讨成本，简化并实质性地稳定了股票的定价过程总体意义----便利交易另一方明确交易对象，区分公司与其股东，公司及其股东的总体融资成本得以降低23对于公司法人人格与股东有限责任合并意义的思考公司法人人格--对交易另一方的提示----来自公司法人人格与股东有限责任原则的适用共担和转嫁交易风险----债权人参与监督公司经营者隔离公司的不同经营活动与监督成本的增加——信息不对称（InformationAsymmetry）参见：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).24对交易另一方的提示----来自公司法人人格与股东有限责任原则LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作为有限责任的对价,应当要求公司服从政府管制\为顾客,雇员和相邻社区的利益考虑而决策和行事.Whatdoes“externalizationofrisk”meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?25LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreeWhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute26WhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTLimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.27LimitedLiabilityreducescostLimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美国第七巡回上诉法院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥大学法学院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的经济结构-张建伟&罗培新译),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.28LimitedLiabilityinacontextLiftingtheCorporateVeil法院为了平衡有限责任的成本和收益的尝试29LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院为了LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)

请用法经济学的方法分析上述各种方法的效率.30LimitedLiabilityPiercingthePiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment31PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloContractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]32Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheTheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLawJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssayontheJudicialRole33TheProductionofCorporationWhatConcerned:USAFederalism?Mandatory?+Enabling?+DefaultRules?34WhatConcerned:USAFederalism?StateCompetitionAllparticipantsinthedebatebelievethattheincomeproducedbythecharteringbusinessspursstatestoenactlawsthatfirmsdesire.Howdoprinciples----theshareholders----ensurethattheiragents----themanagers----behavefaithfully?35StateCompetitionAllparticipaWhynotfederaldomain?Cary’sArguments…Winter’sresponse…Romano’sfurtherobservation…36Whynotfederaldomain?Cary’sATransactionalCostExplanationFranchisetaxrevenueConstitutionalsupermajorityrequirementInvestmentsinlegalcapital37ATransactionalCostExplanatiTowardanInterestGroupTheoryof

DelawareCorporateLawTaxpayersDelawarebar38TowardanInterestGroupTheorEnablingLaws…TheCorporateCodeinalmosteverystateisan“enabling”statute….Thehandiworkofmanagersisfinalinallbutexceptionalortrivialinstances…EasterbrookandFischel,pp.96-97.

Doyouthinkitistheinvestorswhochoosewhethertoorganizeasacorporation,trust,partnership,mutualorcooperative?39EnablingLaws…TheCorporateCoAnInvisibleHandHowdoestheinvisiblehandtakeaneffectontheself-interestedmanagers?40AnInvisibleHandHowdoestheWhyisitamandatorystructureofcorporatelaw?InvestorProtectionHypothesisUncertaintyHypothesisPublicGoodHypothesisInnovationHypothesisOpportunisticAmendmentHypothesis41WhyisitamandatorystructurMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLawJudicialRole42Mandatory/EnablingBalanceinWhatConcerned:China??????43WhatConcerned:China?43WhattoCompromise?EUShouldweexpecttheemergenceofaEuropean“Delaware”withtheEuropeanCommunity’seconomicintegration?Romano,p.96.44WhattoCompromise?EUShouldwWhatLearned:Japan公司形式的调整派生诉讼45WhatLearned:Japan公司形式的调整45WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingtheCorporateVeilDerivateSuits46WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingthFutureTrends:ConvergenceandCompromise???47FutureTrends:ConvergenceandFinancingtheCorporationCliffordW.Smith,Jr.&JeroldB.Warner,OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,pp.121-128KennethLehn&AnnettePoulsen,ContractualResolutionofBondholder-StockholderConflictsinLeveragedBuyouts,pp.128-130MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOsandthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.130-13248FinancingtheCorporationCliffCont’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapitalOrganization,pp.132-138FrankH.Easterbrook,TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,pp.138-13949Cont’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheTwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalIssuingEquityIssuingDebt50TwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalAgencyCostsAgencycostofoutsideequityAgencycostofdebt51AgencyCostsAgencycostofoutAStudyonCorporateBondMaturity:PerspectivefromTransactionCostsandAgencyCosts

发行长期债券可以降低交易成本，但债券期限越长，代理成本就越高。企业在发行新债券时必须对交易成本和代理成本进行权衡，寻求最优债券期限结构。模型证明，发行企业债券时运用提前赎回条款、卖回条款、偿债基金条款和转换权等债券契约条款可以同时达到降低发债总成本和延长企业债券融资期限的目的。Transactioncostsassociatedwithbondissuescanbereducedbyissuingbondswithlongertermstomaturity.However,thelongerthetermtomaturity,thehighertheagencycostsassociatedwiththeissue.Firmsthatpursuingoptimalbondmaturitystructuremustweightransactionandagencycostsofanewcorporatebondissue.Modelsinthepaperindicatethatfirmscanmakeuseofbondcovenantssuchasthecallprovision,theputprovision,thesinkingfundprovisionandconvertibilitytoincreasethetermtomaturityofabondissueandatthesametimereducetheaggregateoftheagencycostsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithit.Xiao-kunZHOU(周孝坤),“企业债券期限结构研究―基于交易成本和代理成本视角”,<生态经济>,2007/01,pp.75-77.52AStudyonCorporateBondMatu公司的债权人交易债权人机构贷款人持有公司发出的付款证明的人53公司的债权人交易债权人53Examplesinpp.119-120Example1----ChoiceofShareholder----ProjectLExample2----ChoiceofBondholder----ProjectLExample3----withLeveragedEffect+LimitedLiabilityConcernedforShareholder----ProjectH

54Examplesinpp.119-120ExampleWhynot100percentdebt-financedfirms?P.120,Textbook.55Whynot100percentdebt-finanMajorSourcesofConflictbetweenBondholdersandStockholdersDividendPaymentClaimDilutionAssetSubstitutionUnderinvestment56MajorSourcesofConflictbetwBondCovenantsRestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyCovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrustee57BondCovenantsRestrictionsonRestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictionsonInvestmentsSecuredDebtsRestrictionsonMergers58RestrictionsontheFirm’sProRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsPp.124-12559RestrictingthePaymentofDivRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyLimitationsonDebtandPrioritySinkingFundsConvertibilityProvisions60RestrictingSubsequentFinanciSinkingFunds偿债基金为确保债券能干到期日有足够的资金以偿还债权人的本金，发行公司于债券未到期前预先按期提存的基金。偿债基金通常是存入选定的一家银行作为信托管理人，由信托管理人利用这笔基金进行各种投资，投资收益则增加偿债基金。由此可见，偿债基金相当于一笔专用基金存款。由于偿债基金不在债券发行公司掌握中，其性质是由受托人管理的公司债券持有人的资金，但在实际偿还本金之前，并不抵消债券发行公司的债务。债券发行公司应按券契约的规定提存偿债，每年提存偿债基金的终值应等于债券的本金。每年年终应根据信托管理人关于偿债基金的收支报告，确认应有投资收益或投资损失。如果偿债基金不足以清偿券本金，则就首先从一般存款户补足，然后作清偿全部公司债的会计处理。公司偿债基金应作为一项长期投资反映在年末资产负债表上，偿债基金投资收益或损失则应作为其他项目列入当年的损益表。

61SinkingFunds偿债基金为确保债券能干到期日有足CovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRequiredPurchaseofInsurance62CovenantsSpecifyBondingActiTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrusteePp.127-128信托担保协议Awrittenagreementbetweentheuserofabondandhis/herbondholders,usuallydecifyinginterestrate,maturitydate,convertibility,andotherterms.Alsocalledindenture.指一张明确记载债券持有人与发行公司双方所拥有的权利和义务的法律文件。由发行人和债券所有人达成的，通常标明利率、期日、兑换性和其他项目的书面协议，也叫契约63TheRoleoftheTrustIndentur债权人的考量期限回报风险----违约风险控制利益冲突谈判64债权人的考量期限64InternalGovernanceStructureBoardofDirectorsShareholdersVotingRightsFiduciaryDutiesExecutiveCompensationBlock-holders(OutsideShareholders)65InternalGovernanceStructureBReadings(A)OliverE.Williamson,CorporateGovernance,pp.148-155.CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&BossL.Watts,IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,pp.155-162.RobertaRomano,TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,Does“Unlawful”Mean“Criminal”?:ReflectionsontheDisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,pp.172-179.66Readings(A)OliverE.WilliamsReading…MainPointsinEachArticles…67Reading…MainPointsinEachArOliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCorporateGovernancefor?WhoaretheBODresponsiblefor?ShareholdersandotherConstituencies?OutsideShareholders’Role?Managersthemselves?68OliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCoCliffordW.Smith,Jr.

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BossL.WattsManagementIncentivesandCorporateGovernance:proorcon?69CliffordW.Smith,Jr.

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BosRobertaRomanoDerivativeSuits:SomeObservationswithEmpiricalStudiesPlaintiffs’counselsasshareholders’agents?70RobertaRomanoDerivativeSuitsJohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCriminalLaws:Convergence?Benefits/Advantagesv.DisadvantagesWhy?71JohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCFiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryDutiesinCorporateLaw?HowaboutnormalContracts?ResidualOwnersandMarginalRisks订立内容详细的合同意味着极高的成本,信义义务成为不完备合同的补充规则.72FiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryBJRDeferentialApproach(顺从路径)Incentive-compatibleContracts73BJRDeferentialApproach(顺从路径)DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRole…74DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRoReadings(B)FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.JeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.JohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.MarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.BernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.213-214.75Readings(B)FrankH.EasterbroFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.FischelFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.DoyouthinkVotingisakeyroleincorporategovernance?76FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielJeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.WhydoAmericanCorporationsintroduceDualClassCommonStock?Howdoyoucommentonitsrelationshipwithcorporategovernance?77JeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.GoJohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.WhatisProxyMechanism?Didtheauthorconcludethatproxycontextfacilitatedtheefficiencyofcorporategovernance?78JohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyCoMarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.HowwouldyouunderstandtheagencyprobleminAmericancorporategovernance?79MarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliBernardS.BlackBernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.WhowatchesWhom?80BernardS.BlackBernardS.BlaVI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl81VI.ExternalGovernanceStructCasesParamountCommunications,Inc.v.TimeInc.,571A.2d1140(Del.1990).Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews&ForbesHoldings,Inc.,506A.2d173(Del.1986).Moranv.HouseholdInternational.Inc.,500A.2d1346(Del.Ch.1988).UnocalCorp.v.MesaPetroleumCo.,493A.2d1049(Del.1988).CityCapitalAssociatesv.IntercoInc.,551A.2d787(Del.Ch.1988).82CasesParamountCommunications,AdditionalReadingMaterials…RonaldJ.GilsonandReinierKraakman,Delaware’sIntermediateStandardforDefensiveTactics:IsThereSubstancetoProportionalityReview,44BusinessLawyer247(1989).83AdditionalReadingMaterials…RVI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(A)TheoriesandEvidence反接管条例:向底竞争还是力争上游的竞争?接管是最大化了个人(目标公司股东)的权益,它是否同时可以最大化社会效益?84VI.ExternalGovernanceStruct代理成本和要约收购并购是降低代理成本的有效方式?当公司的代理成本过高时,要约收购行为给股东开除管理层的机会.兼并与敌意要约收购:哪个成本更大?公司管理层应当听任股东和相互竞争的要约收购者对投标行为自由博弈?85代理成本和要约收购并购是降低代理成本的有效方式?当公司的代理WilliamsAct任何人持有公众公司5%以上的股份时,必须提交报告,披露其持股比例和意图;而且,要约收购者必须就其财务状况和计划，提交更为详细的报告,同时,必须向公众开放其收购要约一个月.要约收购者在要约期内不得向市场另行购买股票,另外,必须以最高的交割按比例买超额售出的股份.86WilliamsAct任何人持有公众公司5%以上的股份时,A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryG.Manne,MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,pp.223-224.WhydoesaCorporate-controlmarketneeded?87A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryA.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.Jensen,Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,pp.225-228.FreeCashFlowTheoryTheRoleofDebtinMotivatingOrganizationalEfficiencyLeveragedBuyoutsandFreeCashFlowTheory88A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaeA.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers,BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,pp.228-232.Whatdidtheauthorsdemonstrateinthearticleviathreeexamples?Anexusoflong-termcontractsbetweenshareholdersandstakeholders89A.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiA.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovAmihudandBaruchLev,RiskReductionasaManagerialMotiveforConglomerateMergers,pp.232-233.Whatdrivesasubstantialnumberoffirmstoengageinconglomeratemergers?90A.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovA.TheoriesandEvidenceRichardRoll,TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,pp.233-235.91A.TheoriesandEvidenceRicharA.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientificEvidence,pp.235-242.92A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaeA.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.BrickleyandJeffryM.Netter,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidenceSince1980,pp.242-245.93A.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleiferandRobertW.Vishny,HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturntoCorporateSpecialization,pp.245-248.94A.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjai州法:反接管条例第一代反接管条例:对本州公司,州官员有出价否决权第二代反接管条例:只适用于本州公司,“控股条例”或者“公平价格条例”第三代接管条例:“企业联合条例”大约有40个州制定有不同的接管条例95州法:反接管条例第一代反接管条例:对本州公司,州官员有出VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(B)TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementinRespondingtoaTenderOffer,pp.258-261.96VI.ExternalGovernanceStruct97979898GoodLuck!!!ding0118@99GoodLuck!!!ding0118@9LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@100LawsonBusinessOrganizations比较商事组织法

法律硕士课程(法学)101比较商事组织法

法律硕士课程(法学)2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基础(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林华伟等译],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.102Bibliography3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation103Content·TheoryoftheFirmandWhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…104WhatIExpectfromyou…

5<国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要>(2010-2020)[公开征求意见稿]丰田汽车召回香港华懋集团前董事局主席龚如心遗产案AVATAR105<国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要>(2010-2020)[TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)为什么有企业/厂商?[交易\市场和企业/厂商]它们在资本市场的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(为什么代理成本在现代企业不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的调查表明,当时美国200个最大的公司中,88个是由管理人员控制的.Berle和Means认为,股东对于代理成本的监督是无能为力的,你是否同意这一看法?授权机制的优势和弊端106TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)为什么股东被称为“剩余财产的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股东表决权----→集体行为----→监督成本----→信息取得的代价(在股权分散的情况下,为什么股东都愿意做消极股东,搭便车-FreeRiders会很普遍?)如何约束代理人的机会主义行为?(代理成本是所有和控制分离的代价,第7页)107TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股价能否反映公司管理人员的懈怠或其他机会主义行为?监督机制包括哪些方面?108TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象----成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标----减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3页.[Jensen&Meckling]

！结合我国<公司法>,你如何理解我国法律是否减少了代理成本,请举例说明.109TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企业正是针对机会主义\交易成本和合同不完备的回应(p.10).当合同一方是“交易专用财产”(trade-specificassets)的所有者时,交易双方组建企业比签定合同更有效率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson110TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----权衡缔约成本和所有权成本企业所有权类型和所有权成本存在相关性.→投资者所有→雇员所有→所有者缺位当所有权成本过高的时候,没有所有者比“产权清晰”更重要.111TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保险公司与投保人的关系为例,说明公司股东与管理者的关系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits112TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投资选择是什么?在放弃全部所有权归自己所有的企业形式后,投资者会面临哪些合同关系?[NexusofContracts]作为投资者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企业社会责任的内容吗?113TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文译本???]114TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalInstitutionalArrangements在交易成本为零的条件下,制度的选择不会影响经济活动的最终效益.在交易成本不为零的现实世界里,制度的安排会在不同程度上影响交易的效益.郁光华:<公司法的本质>,法律出版社2006年版,第38页.RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.115InstitutionalArrangements在交易成FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.116FurtherReadingMaterialsRoberLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.117LegalCharacteristicsoftheCReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts118ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabiFourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]119FourCharacteristicLimitedLiCloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor120CloseCorporationvs.

Public有限责任的形成代表性论文如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).121有限责任的形成代表性论文如下：22对于公司法人人格与股东有限责任合并意义的思考公司法人人格----积极的资产区分/公司财产成为公司债权人的担保财产，为公司债权人设定优先于股东或者公司经营者的债权人受偿的浮动担保（floatingcharge），公司债权人在评估公司财产时具有比较优势股东有限责任----消极的资产区分/股东的个人财产成为股东的债权人的担保财产，降低了公司破产时的债权追讨成本，简化并实质性地稳定了股票的定价过程总体意义----便利交易另一方明确交易对象，区分公司与其股东，公司及其股东的总体融资成本得以降低122对于公司法人人格与股东有限责任合并意义的思考公司法人人格--对交易另一方的提示----来自公司法人人格与股东有限责任原则的适用共担和转嫁交易风险----债权人参与监督公司经营者隔离公司的不同经营活动与监督成本的增加——信息不对称（InformationAsymmetry）参见：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).123对交易另一方的提示----来自公司法人人格与股东有限责任原则LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作为有限责任的对价,应当要求公司服从政府管制\为顾客,雇员和相邻社区的利益考虑而决策和行事.Whatdoes“externalizationofrisk”meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?124LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreeWhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute125WhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTLimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.126LimitedLiabilityreducescostLimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美国第七巡回上诉法院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥大学法学院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的经济结构-张建伟&罗培新译),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.127LimitedLiabilityinacontextLiftingtheCorporateVeil法院为了平衡有限责任的成本和收益的尝试128LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院为了LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)

请用法经济学的方法分析上述各种方法的效率.129LimitedLiabilityPiercingthePiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment130PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloContractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]131Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheTheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMan