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Chapter8TransactionandinfluencecostsGeorgeHendrikseEconomicsandManagementofOrganisations:Co-ordination,MotivationandStrategy
Chapter8EconomicsandManageWhatisafirm?
Coase(1937)Whatisafirm?
Coase(1937)Whatisthedifferencebetweentheemployer-employeerelationshipandthecustomer-grocerrelationship?
AccordingtoAlchianandDemsetzthereisnodifference.Whatisthedifferencebetween“Ican‘punish’youonlybywithholdingfuturebusinessorbyseekingredressinthecourtsforanyfailuretohonourourexchangeagreement.Thisisexactlyallanemployercando.Hecanfireorsue,justasIcanfireorsuemygrocerbystoppingpurchasingfromhimorsuehimfordeliveringfaultyproducts.”
“Ican‘punish’youonlybywiArealisticorganisationtheoryisnotpossiblewithcomplete(contingent)contractse.g.customer–grocerrelationshipArealisticorganisationtheorFigureIV.2:Positioning
FigureIV.2:PositioningPartIV:Nexusofincompletecontracts
PartIV:NexusofincompletecBoundedrationalityThegapbetweenthecognitivecapabilitiesofthedecisionmakerandthecomplexityoftheactivity.BoundedrationalityThegapbetImplicationContractsareincomplete,i.e.circumstancesmayemergewhicharenotcoveredbythecontract.ImplicationContractsareincomIncompletenessisdueto:UnforeseeablecircumstancesCostsofwritingcontractsAmbiguityoflanguageCostsofenforcingcontractsIncompletenessisdueto:ProblemWhodecidesinunforeseencontingencies?ProblemWhodecidesinunforeseSolutionTheincompletecontractiscompletedbyallocatingtheauthoritytodecideinunforeseencontingenciestosomebody.SolutionTheincompletecontracTherearetwobehaviouralassumptionsinTCEOpportunismBoundedrationalityTherearetwobehaviouralassuTherearethree
environmentalvariablesAssetspecificityFrequencyUncertaintyTherearethree
environmentalTransactioncostsCostsofcollectinginformationTimespendonenforcingcontractsCostsofpreventingnon-complianceTransactioncostsCostsofcollOrganisationalsolutionsarechosentominimisetransactioncosts,i.e.tolimitthehazardsassociatedwithincompletecontracts.OrganisationalsolutionsarecFigure8.5:Transactioncostseconomics
SpecificityofinvestmentsDegreeofuncertaintyFrequencyOpportunismLimitedrationalityChoiceofgovernancestructureFigure8.5:TransactioncostsPossiblegovernancestructuresMarketHierarchy,e.g.firm,cooperativeHybrid,e.g.longtermcontract,franchisePossiblegovernancestructuresAssetspecificityInvestmentswhichhaveahighervaluewithinaspecificrelationshipthanoutsideit.AssetspecificityInvestmentswTypesofassetspecificityPhysicalassetspecificityHumanassetspecificityLocationspecificityDedicatedassetsBrandnameTimespecificityTypesofassetspecificityPhysSunkcostsNon-recoverablecostsSunkcostsNon-recoverablecostRelationshipspecificinvestmentsarevulnerableforexpostopportunisticbehaviour.RelationshipspecificinvestmeFundamentaltransformationAsituationwithmanypotentialsellers/buyersexanteischangedinabilateralmonopolyexpostbecauseonlyonepartyreallyinvestsinthe(specific)relationship.FundamentaltransformationAsiHold-upproblemAninvestorputshimselfinavulnerableposition,i.e.lowbargainingpower,byinvestingexanteinrelation-specificassets.Theotherpartyisabletoreceiveimprovedcontractualconditionsattheexpenseoftheinvestorbythreateningexposttoendtherelationship.Hold-upproblemAninvestorputQuasi-surplusValueofaninvestmentinthecurrentrelationshipminusthevalueofaninvestmentinthebestalternativeuse.Quasi-surplusValueofaninvesExample:
DevelopingsoftwareCostofinvestment:200Sunkcosts:KValueofinvestment:240Example:
DevelopingsoftwareCSurplus
=value–costs
=240–200=40
Quasi-surplus
=surplus+sunkcosts
=40+KSurplus
=value–costs
Figure8.1:Compositionoftherevenues
Figure8.1:CompositionoftheFigure8.2:Reservationprices/threatpointsbeforeandafterthefundamentaltransformation
SupposeK=60Figure8.2:ReservationpricesFigure8.3:Contractpricesbeforeandafterthefundamentaltransformation
Supposethatthegovernancestructureissuchthatthe(quasi-)surplusisdivided50-50.Figure8.3:ContractpricesbeStrategicsituation
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00UpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Strategicsituation
••(exantWhatisefficient?Innovate,becauseitgeneratesasurplusof40,whilenotinnovatingresultsinasurplusof0.Whatisefficient?Innovate,beWhatwillhappen?DetermineSPEWhatwillhappen?DetermineSPEHold-up
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00hold-upUpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Hold-up
••(exante)(expost)ySubgameperfectequilibriumUpstreamparty:?Downstreamparty:NoSubgameperfectequilibriumUpsHold-up
Ishold-upbad?No.Hold-upentailsjustaredistributionofthesurplus.Yes.Theprospectofhold-upmayhaveaneffectoninvestmentbehaviour.Hold-up
Ishold-upbad?Hold-upproblem
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00hold-uphold-upproblemUpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Hold-upproblem
••(exante)(exSubgameperfectequilibriumUpstreamparty:NoDownstreamparty:NoSubgameperfectequilibriumUpsEquilibriumpayoffsUpstreamparty:0Downstreamparty:0EquilibriumpayoffsUpstreampaThisequilibriumisinefficientbecauseeachpartycanearn20.ThisequilibriumisinefficienConclusion/problemThegovernancestructure50-50(‘Marketexchange’)resultsinunderinvestmentduetotheprospectof(opportunistic)hold-up.Theefficient(surplusmaximising)investmentisnotchosen.Conclusion/problemThegovernSolutionChooseanorganisationalsolution,i.e.anothergovernancestructure,whichresultsintheefficientchoiceofinvestment.SolutionChooseanorganisationConsiderverticalintegrationMarketgovernance,i.e.the‘buy’mode,resultsinproblems.Verticalintegrationgovernance,i.e.the‘make’mode,mayresultinfewerproblems.ConsiderverticalintegrationMVerticalintegrationentailsthatthecontractwillbehonoured,accordingtoWilliamson.
VerticalintegrationentailstStrategicsituationyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honorcontract?yesNoStrategicsituationyesyesNoNoUyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honourcontract?yesNoSubgameperfectequilibriumyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvImplicitassumption:
theefficientgovernancestructurewillemerge
(EfficiencyisusedasanormativeconceptinTCE.)Implicitassumption:
theeffiyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honourcontract?yesNoSubgameperfectequilibriumyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvFigure8.7:Governancestructureasafunctionofassetspecificityandthedegreeofuncertainty
Figure8.7:GovernancestructuFigure8.8:Governancestructureasafunctionofthelevelofassetspecificityandfrequency
Figure8.8:GovernancestructuFigure8.9:Governancestructurechoiceandassetspecificity
Costoforganisational
governance
structure
Assetspecificityk
0
k
1
k
2
M(k)
X(k)
H(k)
Figure8.9:GovernancestructuApplicationCoalminesandpowergenerators:QualityofcoalDesignofcombustionovenApplicationCoalminesandpowe Coalmining
Powergeneration
Powerdistribution Coalmining
PowergeneraGovernanceoftheproductioncolumn?
Supposethereisamarketbetweeneverystageintheproductioncolumn,i.e.eachstagehascompleteauthority,i.e.noverticalintegration.
Indicateauthoritybyan‘X’.Governanceoftheproductionc
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXXMarketgovernance Coalmining
Powergenera
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXExampleofverticalintegration? Coalmining
Powergenera
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXXXXXXWhatishorizontalintegration? Coalmining
PowergeGovernanceregardingcoalminesandpowergeneratorsdependsonthenumberofalternativesourcesofsupply.GovernanceregardingcoalmineComparativeanalysisEastcoastUSA:minesunderground,manysmallmines,manytransportationpossibilities,coalrelativelyhomogeneous.WestcoastUSA:surfacemining,largeeconomiesofscale(smallnumberofcompanies),fewtransportationpossibilities,coalqualitydifferencessubstantial.ComparativeanalysisEastcoastWhatdoesTCEpredict?WhatdoesTCEpredict?GovernancechoicesEastcoast:SpotcontractingWestcoast:LongtermcontractsGovernancechoicesEastcoast:PositioningofTCEregardingFundamentalwelfaretheoremCoasetheoremLawofcomparativeadvantagesPositioningofTCEregardingFuTCEemphasizesthedisadvantagesofmarkets,whilethedisadvantagesofhierarchiesreceivehardlyanyattention.
TCEemphasizesthedisadvantagDisadvantagesofhierarchyBureaucraticcostsNon-integration,i.e.thechoiceformarketexchange,isacommitmenttonotinterveneIncentivesarelessintenseinahierarchythaninamarket,i.e.theequalcompensationprincipleDisadvantagesofhierarchyBureInfluencecostsInfluencecostsHowtoassignstewardessestoflights?
Assetspecificityisnotveryhelpfulinaddressingthequestionregardingtheassignmentofstewardesses.HowtoassignstewardessestoInternallabourmarketsTheincompletenessofcontractspreventsthatallkindsofspecificcharacteristicsofajobarenotincludedandrewardedinlabourcontracts.Theseimperfectionsgiverisetoinfluencecosts.InternallabourmarketsTheincExamplesofinfluencecostsPoliticalactivitiesLobbyingDistortingormanipulatinginformation(‘performancepadding’,‘windowdressing’)ExamplesofinfluencecostsPolThereareattractiveaswellasunattractivejobsinorganisations(becauseitistooexpensivefortheemployertodesignacompletecontingentlabourcontractforeachposition).
(Attractivenesshasnomeaninginaworldwithcompletecontingentcontracts.)ThereareattractiveaswellaEachemployeehasaninterestininfluencingthedecision-makingprocesssuchthatheobtainstheattractiveposition.EachemployeehasaninterestInfluencecostsInfluencecostsarethecostsofactivitiesaimedatcapturingorganisationalrents.
InfluencecostsInfluencecostsTherearethreetypesofinfluencecostsNon-productiveuseoftimeandeffortBaddecisionsfortheorganisationduetodistortedinformationandadviceCostlyorganisationalprecautionsinordertolimitrentseekingactivitiesTherearethreetypesofinfluTherearetworequirementsfortheoccurrenceofinfluenceactivitiesSomebodyhastohavepowerInterestedorganisationalmembershavetohaveaccesstomeansinordertoinfluencethedecisionmakersTherearetworequirementsforOrganisationalresponsesAbandonthepolicyofselectiveinterventionbydivestingcertaindepartmentsLimitingtheaccesstothedecision-makingprocessReducingtherentsforwhichthepartiescompeteOrganisationalresponsesAbando1.Selectiveintervention1.SelectiveinterventionLawofforbearanceCourtsrefusejurisdictionoverinternaldisputesexceptwherefraud,illegalityorconflictsofinterestsareshown.Firmsthereforehaveaccesstofiat.LawofforbearanceCourtsrefusSelectiveinterventionSelectiveinterventionentailsthattheemployercandecidetoacertainextentwhattheemployeehastodo.SelectiveinterventionSelectivProblemsofselectiveinterventionOpportunism,bribesPersuadeormanipulatetopmanagementProblemsofselectiveintervenBureaucracymaybeattractivefromaninfluenceperspectivebecauseitdiscouragesrent-seekingactivities.
BureaucracymaybeattractiveResult
Anefficientorganisationlimitsthefreedomofchoiceof(local)decisionmakerswhenchoiceshavehardlyanimpactontheorganisation,butareimportantfromtheperspectiveofindividualorganisationmembers.Result
Anefficientorganisat2.Accesstothedecisionmakingprocess2.AccesstothedecisionmakiFigure8.14:OptimaldecisionprocessesIndividualeffectsOrganisationaleffects‘open’processes‘closed’processesFigure8.14:OptimaldecisionApplication:
assigningstewardessestoflightsPersonnelsubmitsalistofdesiredflightseverymonth.Managementhasnodiscretionregardingtheassignmentofflights.Conflictsareresolvedbyseniority.Thisdiscouragesinfluenceactivities.Application:
assigningstewar3.Reducingtherents3.ReducingtherentsApplication:
wageinequalityLimitthewagedifferencebetweenattractiveandunattractivejobs.
Moregeneral:Limitwageinequality,i.e.wagecompression.Application:
wageinequalityLRemarks
1.Whatlimitsthesizeofthefirm?Remarks
1.WhatlimitsthesiFundamentalwelfaretheoremNothing(Productionfunctionview)FundamentalwelfaretheoremNotCompletecontractingNothing(Nexusofcompletecontractsview)CompletecontractingNothingPropertyrightstheoryAlargerentityimpliesreducedincentivesforvariousparties.(Nexusofincompletecontractsview)PropertyrightstheoryAlargerInfluencecostsThenumberofinformationflowsgrowsrapidlywhentheorganisationexpands.(Nexusofincompletecontractsview)InfluencecostsThenumberofiFigure8.13:Influencecostsandthesizeofthefirm
Figure8.13:InfluencecostsaInfluencecostswillincreasemuchfasterthanthebenefitswhentheorganisationexpands.Influencecostswillincrease2.TCEversusinfluencecostsTCEfocusesonassetspecificityInfluencecostshighlightsbargainingcostsandthecostsofcentraliseddecisionmakingTCEtakesamarketfailureperspective,whiletheinfluencecostsapproachtakesanorganisationalfailureperspective2.TCEversusinfluencecostsTChapter8TransactionandinfluencecostsGeorgeHendrikseEconomicsandManagementofOrganisations:Co-ordination,MotivationandStrategy
Chapter8EconomicsandManageWhatisafirm?
Coase(1937)Whatisafirm?
Coase(1937)Whatisthedifferencebetweentheemployer-employeerelationshipandthecustomer-grocerrelationship?
AccordingtoAlchianandDemsetzthereisnodifference.Whatisthedifferencebetween“Ican‘punish’youonlybywithholdingfuturebusinessorbyseekingredressinthecourtsforanyfailuretohonourourexchangeagreement.Thisisexactlyallanemployercando.Hecanfireorsue,justasIcanfireorsuemygrocerbystoppingpurchasingfromhimorsuehimfordeliveringfaultyproducts.”
“Ican‘punish’youonlybywiArealisticorganisationtheoryisnotpossiblewithcomplete(contingent)contractse.g.customer–grocerrelationshipArealisticorganisationtheorFigureIV.2:Positioning
FigureIV.2:PositioningPartIV:Nexusofincompletecontracts
PartIV:NexusofincompletecBoundedrationalityThegapbetweenthecognitivecapabilitiesofthedecisionmakerandthecomplexityoftheactivity.BoundedrationalityThegapbetImplicationContractsareincomplete,i.e.circumstancesmayemergewhicharenotcoveredbythecontract.ImplicationContractsareincomIncompletenessisdueto:UnforeseeablecircumstancesCostsofwritingcontractsAmbiguityoflanguageCostsofenforcingcontractsIncompletenessisdueto:ProblemWhodecidesinunforeseencontingencies?ProblemWhodecidesinunforeseSolutionTheincompletecontractiscompletedbyallocatingtheauthoritytodecideinunforeseencontingenciestosomebody.SolutionTheincompletecontracTherearetwobehaviouralassumptionsinTCEOpportunismBoundedrationalityTherearetwobehaviouralassuTherearethree
environmentalvariablesAssetspecificityFrequencyUncertaintyTherearethree
environmentalTransactioncostsCostsofcollectinginformationTimespendonenforcingcontractsCostsofpreventingnon-complianceTransactioncostsCostsofcollOrganisationalsolutionsarechosentominimisetransactioncosts,i.e.tolimitthehazardsassociatedwithincompletecontracts.OrganisationalsolutionsarecFigure8.5:Transactioncostseconomics
SpecificityofinvestmentsDegreeofuncertaintyFrequencyOpportunismLimitedrationalityChoiceofgovernancestructureFigure8.5:TransactioncostsPossiblegovernancestructuresMarketHierarchy,e.g.firm,cooperativeHybrid,e.g.longtermcontract,franchisePossiblegovernancestructuresAssetspecificityInvestmentswhichhaveahighervaluewithinaspecificrelationshipthanoutsideit.AssetspecificityInvestmentswTypesofassetspecificityPhysicalassetspecificityHumanassetspecificityLocationspecificityDedicatedassetsBrandnameTimespecificityTypesofassetspecificityPhysSunkcostsNon-recoverablecostsSunkcostsNon-recoverablecostRelationshipspecificinvestmentsarevulnerableforexpostopportunisticbehaviour.RelationshipspecificinvestmeFundamentaltransformationAsituationwithmanypotentialsellers/buyersexanteischangedinabilateralmonopolyexpostbecauseonlyonepartyreallyinvestsinthe(specific)relationship.FundamentaltransformationAsiHold-upproblemAninvestorputshimselfinavulnerableposition,i.e.lowbargainingpower,byinvestingexanteinrelation-specificassets.Theotherpartyisabletoreceiveimprovedcontractualconditionsattheexpenseoftheinvestorbythreateningexposttoendtherelationship.Hold-upproblemAninvestorputQuasi-surplusValueofaninvestmentinthecurrentrelationshipminusthevalueofaninvestmentinthebestalternativeuse.Quasi-surplusValueofaninvesExample:
DevelopingsoftwareCostofinvestment:200Sunkcosts:KValueofinvestment:240Example:
DevelopingsoftwareCSurplus
=value–costs
=240–200=40
Quasi-surplus
=surplus+sunkcosts
=40+KSurplus
=value–costs
Figure8.1:Compositionoftherevenues
Figure8.1:CompositionoftheFigure8.2:Reservationprices/threatpointsbeforeandafterthefundamentaltransformation
SupposeK=60Figure8.2:ReservationpricesFigure8.3:Contractpricesbeforeandafterthefundamentaltransformation
Supposethatthegovernancestructureissuchthatthe(quasi-)surplusisdivided50-50.Figure8.3:ContractpricesbeStrategicsituation
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00UpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Strategicsituation
••(exantWhatisefficient?Innovate,becauseitgeneratesasurplusof40,whilenotinnovatingresultsinasurplusof0.Whatisefficient?Innovate,beWhatwillhappen?DetermineSPEWhatwillhappen?DetermineSPEHold-up
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00hold-upUpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Hold-up
••(exante)(expost)ySubgameperfectequilibriumUpstreamparty:?Downstreamparty:NoSubgameperfectequilibriumUpsHold-up
Ishold-upbad?No.Hold-upentailsjustaredistributionofthesurplus.Yes.Theprospectofhold-upmayhaveaneffectoninvestmentbehaviour.Hold-up
Ishold-upbad?Hold-upproblem
••(exante)(expost)yesno2020-10
50yesno00hold-uphold-upproblemUpstreampartyDownstreampartyobeyingcontract?paymentupstreaminvestorpaymentdownstreampartyInnovate?Hold-upproblem
••(exante)(exSubgameperfectequilibriumUpstreamparty:NoDownstreamparty:NoSubgameperfectequilibriumUpsEquilibriumpayoffsUpstreamparty:0Downstreamparty:0EquilibriumpayoffsUpstreampaThisequilibriumisinefficientbecauseeachpartycanearn20.ThisequilibriumisinefficienConclusion/problemThegovernancestructure50-50(‘Marketexchange’)resultsinunderinvestmentduetotheprospectof(opportunistic)hold-up.Theefficient(surplusmaximising)investmentisnotchosen.Conclusion/problemThegovernSolutionChooseanorganisationalsolution,i.e.anothergovernancestructure,whichresultsintheefficientchoiceofinvestment.SolutionChooseanorganisationConsiderverticalintegrationMarketgovernance,i.e.the‘buy’mode,resultsinproblems.Verticalintegrationgovernance,i.e.the‘make’mode,mayresultinfewerproblems.ConsiderverticalintegrationMVerticalintegrationentailsthatthecontractwillbehonoured,accordingtoWilliamson.
VerticalintegrationentailstStrategicsituationyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honorcontract?yesNoStrategicsituationyesyesNoNoUyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honourcontract?yesNoSubgameperfectequilibriumyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvImplicitassumption:
theefficientgovernancestructurewillemerge
(EfficiencyisusedasanormativeconceptinTCE.)Implicitassumption:
theeffiyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvest?200200020020MarketVerticalintegrationGovernancestructurechoiceDownstreamparty-1050Honourcontract?yesNoSubgameperfectequilibriumyesyesNoNoUpstreaminvestorInvFigure8.7:Governancestructureasafunctionofassetspecificityandthedegreeofuncertainty
Figure8.7:GovernancestructuFigure8.8:Governancestructureasafunctionofthelevelofassetspecificityandfrequency
Figure8.8:GovernancestructuFigure8.9:Governancestructurechoiceandassetspecificity
Costoforganisational
governance
structure
Assetspecificityk
0
k
1
k
2
M(k)
X(k)
H(k)
Figure8.9:GovernancestructuApplicationCoalminesandpowergenerators:QualityofcoalDesignofcombustionovenApplicationCoalminesandpowe Coalmining
Powergeneration
Powerdistribution Coalmining
PowergeneraGovernanceoftheproductioncolumn?
Supposethereisamarketbetweeneverystageintheproductioncolumn,i.e.eachstagehascompleteauthority,i.e.noverticalintegration.
Indicateauthoritybyan‘X’.Governanceoftheproductionc
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXXMarketgovernance Coalmining
Powergenera
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXExampleofverticalintegration? Coalmining
Powergenera
Coalmining
Powergeneration
PowerdistributionXXXXXXXWhatishorizontalintegration? Coalmining
PowergeGovernanceregardingcoalminesandpowergeneratorsdependsonthenumberofalternativesourcesofsupply.GovernanceregardingcoalmineComparativeanalysisEastcoastUSA:minesunderground,manysmallmines,manytransportationpossibilities,coalrelativelyhomogeneous.WestcoastUSA:surfacemining,largeeconomiesofscale(smallnumberofcompanies),fewtransportationpossibilities,coalqualitydifferencessubstantial.ComparativeanalysisEastcoastWhatdoesTCEpredict?WhatdoesTCEpredict?GovernancechoicesEastcoast:SpotcontractingWestcoast:LongtermcontractsGovernancechoicesEastcoast:PositioningofTCEregardingFundamentalwelfaretheoremCoasetheoremLawofcomparativeadvantagesPositioningofTCEregardingFuTCEemphasizesthedisadvantagesofmarkets,whilethedisadvantagesofhierarchiesreceivehardlyanyattention.
TCEemphasizesthedisadvantagDisadvantagesofhierarchyBureaucraticcostsNon-integration,i.e.thechoiceformarketexchange,isacommitmenttonotinterveneIncentivesarelessintenseinahierarchythaninamarket,i.e.theequalcompensationprincipleDisadvantagesofhierarchyBureInfluencecostsInfluencecostsHowtoassignstewardessestoflights?
Assetspecificityisnotveryhelpfulinaddressingthequestionregardingtheassignmentofstewardesses.HowtoassignstewardessestoInternallabourmarketsTheincompletenessofcontractspreventsthatallkindsofspecificcharacteristicsofajobarenotincludedandrewardedinlabourcontracts.Theseimperfectionsgiverisetoinfluencecosts.InternallabourmarketsTheincExamplesofinfluencecostsPoliticalactivitiesLobbyingDistortingormanipulatinginformation(‘performancepadding’,‘windowdressing’)ExamplesofinfluencecostsPolThereareattractiveaswellasunattractivejobsinorganisations(becauseitistooexpensivefortheemployertodesignacompletecontingentlabourcontractforeachposition).
(Attractivenesshasnomeaninginaworldwithcompletecontingentcontracts.)ThereareattractiveaswellaEachemployeehasaninterestininfluencingthedecision-makingprocesssuchthatheobtainstheattractiveposition.EachemployeehasaninterestInfluencecostsInfluencecostsarethecostsofactivitiesaimedatcapturingorganisationalrents.
InfluencecostsInfluencecostsTherearethreetypesofinfluencecostsNon-productiveuseoftimeandeffortBaddecisionsfortheorganisationduetodistortedinformationandadviceCostlyorganisationalprecautionsinordertolimitrentseekingactivitiesTherearethreetypesofinfluTherearetworequirementsfortheoccurrenceofinfluenceactivitiesSomebodyhastohavepowerInterestedorganisationalmembershavetohaveaccesstomeansinordertoinfluencethedecisionmakersTherearetworequirementsforOrganisationalresponsesAbandonthepolicyofselectivein
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