组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02-Positioning课件

Chapter2

PositioningGeorgeHendrikseEconomicsandManagementofOrganisations:Co-ordination,MotivationandStrategy

Chapter2EconomicsandManagemFigure2.1:SchemeofthoughtPlayersChoicesPayoffsDescriptiveanalysisPrescriptiveanalysisDegreeofrationalityBehaviouralhypothesesEquilibriumTestablehypothesesAdviceBehaviouralassumptionsRulesInformationstructureProblemFigure2.1:SchemeofthoughtPFigure2.2:BehaviouralassumptionsandorganisationtheoriesFigure2.2:BehaviouralassumpViewsofthefirmTechnologicalContractual/judicialPsychologicalSociologicalBiologicalHolisticWhatisafirm?ViewsofthefirmWhatisafiGametheoryAunifiedanalyticalstructureforstudyingallsituationsofconflictandcooperationorAtoolformodellingmultipersondecisionsituationsGametheoryNon-cooperativegametheoryAnon-cooperativegameconsistsof5ingredients:

PlayersActionsPayoffsInformationstructureRulesofthegameNon-cooperativegametheoryAn1.PlayersNumberofplayersTypesGovernmentFirmConsumerCountryStudentPoliticalparty1.PlayersNumberofplayers2.Actions/strategiesEnvironmentalpollutiongamePCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?Pollute?2.Actions/strategiesEnvironThegametreeANodeindicatesthataplayerhastomakeadecision.ABranchrepresentsachoiceoraction.ThegametreePossiblechoices/actions:Firm:PandCGovernment:IandN组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02-Positioning课件StrategyAspecificationofanaction/choiceforeachpossiblehistory/contingency/situationwhichmightoccur,giventheinformationstructure.orSpecificationofanaction/choiceforeachobservablehistoryofthegame.StrategyAspecificationofanPossiblestrategiesofthegovernmentare:(I,I)(I,N)(N,I)(N,N)Possiblestrategiesofthefirmare:PCPossiblestrategiesofthegov3.PayoffsEnvironmentalpollutiongameCostsofinspection2Benefitofpollutionforfirm:4Feefordetectingpollution:53.PayoffsEnvironmentalpollutPCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?Pollute?-13400-200PayofffirmPayoffGovernmentWhatwillhappenintheenvironmentalpollutiongame?PCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?PEquilibriumNashequilibrium:

apayoffmaximisingstrategyforeachplayer,giventhechoiceofstrategyofallotherplayers.EquilibriumGamerepresentationsExtensiveform:treediagramStrategicform:matrixGamerepresentationsExtensiveEnvironmentalpollutiongameinstrategicformEnvironmentalpollutiongameiDeterminingNEinstrategicformDeterminingNEinstrategicfoNashEquilibriumFirm:CGovernment:(I,N)NashEquilibriumFirm:C4.Informationstructure4.InformationstructureFirmGovernmentEnvironmentalpollutiongame(informationsetadded)PCININ-140030-20FirmGovernmentEnvironmentalpoTheovalrepresentsaninformationset.Governmentdoesnotknowwhichactionistakenbythefirmwhenithastodecide.TheovalrepresentsaninformaAspecificationofanactionforeachobservablehistoryofthegameor

Aspecificationofanactionforeachinformationset.

StrategyAspecificationofanactionfWhatarethestrategiesofFirmandGovernment?Firm:PCGovernment:INWhatarethestrategiesofFirGovernmentFirmINP(-1,3)(4,0)C(0,-2)(0,0)GovernmentFirmINP(-1,3)(4,0)NEdeterminationNEdeterminationConclusionsEquilibriumchangeswhentheinformationstructurechanges.Circling:itcanbeshownthateachplayerwillchooseeachstrategywithacertainprobability,i.e.endogenousuncertainty.ConclusionsEquilibriumchangesSubgameperfectequilibriumTobeusedwhenthereiscompleteinformation.SubgameperfectequilibriumToExtensiveformCNRSRS-11-1-100-41-50FrankCookie?AnnRun?CookieextractiongameExtensiveformCNRSRS-11-1-100-组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02-Positioning课件NashequilibriaFrank:CAnn:(S,R)andFrank:NAnn:(R,S)andFrank:NAnn:(S,S)NashequilibriaFrank:CConclusionAlmosteverythingcanhappenConceptofNashequilibriumdoesnotalwayspointtoauniquepairofstrategiesConclusionAlmosteverythingcThereissomethingpeculiaraboutNEFrank:CAnn:(S,R)ThereissomethingpeculiarabAnnextractsacookiefromFrank(,i.e‘FrankchoosesC’)bythreateningtorunaway(,i.e‘AnnchoosesRasaresponsetoNbyFrank’whichisrepresentedbythestrategy(.,R)).

AnnextractsacookiefromFraNo.IfFrankchoosesN,thanAnnearns-5whenshechoosesR;0whenshechoosesS.IsthisthreatbyAnncredible?No.IsthisthreatbyAnncreSubgameperfectequilibriumMotivation:Anequilibriumconceptwhichdoesnotallownon-crediblethreats.SubgameperfectequilibriumMotCookieextractiongameSPEismosteasilydeterminedbyusingtheextensiveform.Solutionmethod:Startatthebottomofthetreeandworkyourwayupward(‘Backwardinduction’).CookieextractiongameSPEismCNRSRS-11-1-100-41-50FrankCookie?AnnRun?SPE:Frank:N; Ann: (S,S)

CNRSRS-11-1-100-41-50FrankCookExamplesofrules:SportPaymentschemesElectionsContractsCorporatecharters…5.RulesExamplesofrules:5.RulesTimingofdecisionsDecisionsaredepictedassimultaneouswheneithertheotherchoicecannotbeobservedortheobservationlagislong.Decisionsaredepictedassequentialwhenthetimebetweenstrategychoicesissufficientlylong.TimingofdecisionsDecisionsaMcKelvey-theorem

Everypossibleoutcomeofademocraticdecisionprocesscanbeestablishedbyanappropriatechoiceofthelayersinadecisionprocedure.McKelvey-theorem

EverypossiblManagementimplicationsofnon-cooperativegametheoryChangeoneormoreofthe5ingredientsinordertoobtainamoreattractiveequilibrium.ManagementimplicationsofnonChapter2

PositioningGeorgeHendrikseEconomicsandManagementofOrganisations:Co-ordination,MotivationandStrategy

Chapter2EconomicsandManagemFigure2.1:SchemeofthoughtPlayersChoicesPayoffsDescriptiveanalysisPrescriptiveanalysisDegreeofrationalityBehaviouralhypothesesEquilibriumTestablehypothesesAdviceBehaviouralassumptionsRulesInformationstructureProblemFigure2.1:SchemeofthoughtPFigure2.2:BehaviouralassumptionsandorganisationtheoriesFigure2.2:BehaviouralassumpViewsofthefirmTechnologicalContractual/judicialPsychologicalSociologicalBiologicalHolisticWhatisafirm?ViewsofthefirmWhatisafiGametheoryAunifiedanalyticalstructureforstudyingallsituationsofconflictandcooperationorAtoolformodellingmultipersondecisionsituationsGametheoryNon-cooperativegametheoryAnon-cooperativegameconsistsof5ingredients:

PlayersActionsPayoffsInformationstructureRulesofthegameNon-cooperativegametheoryAn1.PlayersNumberofplayersTypesGovernmentFirmConsumerCountryStudentPoliticalparty1.PlayersNumberofplayers2.Actions/strategiesEnvironmentalpollutiongamePCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?Pollute?2.Actions/strategiesEnvironThegametreeANodeindicatesthataplayerhastomakeadecision.ABranchrepresentsachoiceoraction.ThegametreePossiblechoices/actions:Firm:PandCGovernment:IandN组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02-Positioning课件StrategyAspecificationofanaction/choiceforeachpossiblehistory/contingency/situationwhichmightoccur,giventheinformationstructure.orSpecificationofanaction/choiceforeachobservablehistoryofthegame.StrategyAspecificationofanPossiblestrategiesofthegovernmentare:(I,I)(I,N)(N,I)(N,N)Possiblestrategiesofthefirmare:PCPossiblestrategiesofthegov3.PayoffsEnvironmentalpollutiongameCostsofinspection2Benefitofpollutionforfirm:4Feefordetectingpollution:53.PayoffsEnvironmentalpollutPCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?Pollute?-13400-200PayofffirmPayoffGovernmentWhatwillhappenintheenvironmentalpollutiongame?PCIINNFirmGovernmentInspect?PEquilibriumNashequilibrium:

apayoffmaximisingstrategyforeachplayer,giventhechoiceofstrategyofallotherplayers.EquilibriumGamerepresentationsExtensiveform:treediagramStrategicform:matrixGamerepresentationsExtensiveEnvironmentalpollutiongameinstrategicformEnvironmentalpollutiongameiDeterminingNEinstrategicformDeterminingNEinstrategicfoNashEquilibriumFirm:CGovernment:(I,N)NashEquilibriumFirm:C4.Informationstructure4.InformationstructureFirmGovernmentEnvironmentalpollutiongame(informationsetadded)PCININ-140030-20FirmGovernmentEnvironmentalpoTheovalrepresentsaninformationset.Governmentdoesnotknowwhichactionistakenbythefirmwhenithastodecide.TheovalrepresentsaninformaAspecificationofanactionforeachobservablehistoryofthegameor

Aspecificationofanactionforeachinformationset.

StrategyAspecificationofanactionfWhatarethestrategiesofFirmandGovernment?Firm:PCGovernment:INWhatarethestrategiesofFirGovernmentFirmINP(-1,3)(4,0)C(0,-2)(0,0)GovernmentFirmINP(-1,3)(4,0)NEdeterminationNEdeterminationConclusionsEquilibriumchangeswhentheinformationstructurechanges.Circling:itcanbeshownthateachplayerwillchooseeachstrategywithacertainprobability,i.e.endogenousuncertainty.ConclusionsEquilibriumchangesSubgameperfectequilibriumTobeusedwhenthereiscompleteinformation.SubgameperfectequilibriumToExtensiveformCNRSRS-11-1-100-41-50FrankCookie?AnnRun?CookieextractiongameExtensiveformCNRSRS-11-1-100-组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02-Positioning课件NashequilibriaFrank:CAnn:(S,R)andFrank:NAnn:(R,S)andFrank:NAnn:(S,S)NashequilibriaFrank:CConclusionAlmosteverythingcanhappenConceptofNashequilibriumdoesnotalwayspointtoauniquepairofstrategiesConclusionAlmosteverythingcThereissomethingpeculiaraboutNEFrank:CAnn:(S,R)ThereissomethingpeculiarabAnnextractsacookiefromFrank(,i.e‘FrankchoosesC’)bythreateningtorunaway(,i.e‘AnnchoosesRasaresponsetoNbyFrank’whichisrepresentedbythestrategy(.,R)).

AnnextractsacookiefromFraNo.IfFrankchoosesN,thanAnnearns-5whenshechoosesR;0whenshechoosesS.IsthisthreatbyAnncredible?No.IsthisthreatbyAnncreSubgameperfectequilibriumMotivation: