2023全球宏观展望（英文）-高盛

/research/hedge.html.nGlobalgrowthslowedthrough2022onadiminishingreopeningboost,fiscalandmonetarytightening,China’sCovidrestrictionsandpropertyslump,andtheRussiaUkrainewarWeexpectglobalgrowthofjust1.8%in2023,asUSntrastswithaEuropeanrecessionandabumpyreopeninginChinanTheUSshouldnarrowlyavoidrecessionascorePCEinationslowsfrom5%nowto3%inlate2023witha½ppriseintheunemploymentrate.Tokeepgrowthbelowpotentialamidststrongerrealincomegrowth,wenowseetheFedhikinganother125bptoapeakof5-5.25%.Wedon’texpectcutsin2023.nHowcancoreinflationfallsomuchwithsuchasmallemploymenthit?Thereason,wethink,isthatthiscycleisdifferentfrompriorhigh-inflationperiods.Firstpostpandemiclabormarketoverheatingshowedupnotinexcessiveemploymentbutinunprecedentedjobopenings,whicharemuchlesspainfultounwind.Second,thedisinflationaryimpactoftherecentnormalizationinsupplychainsandrentalhousingmarketsstillhasalongwaytogo.Andthird,long-terminflationexpectationsremainwell-anchored.incomehitfromsurgingenergybills.ButweexpectonlyamilddownturnassalreadymanagedtocutRussiangasimportswithoutcrushingactivityandislikelytobenefitfromthesamepost-pandemicimprovementsthatrisksofadeepdownturnandpersistentinflation,wenowexpecthikesthroughMaywitha3%ECBpeak.nChinaislikelytogrowslowlyinH1asanAprilreopeninginitiallytriggersanbutshouldacceleratesharplyinautiousbecauseofthelongslideinthepropertymarketaswellasslowerpotentialgrowth(reflectingweaknessinbothdemographicsandproductivity).dhikingrateswellbeforetheirDMpeers.Whilenonehasclearlyachievedasoftlandingyet,activityhasbeenresilientandinflationisnowcomingdowninsomecountriesespeciallyBrazilCEEisinamoredifcultpositionbecauseofitscommodityexposure,highinflation,andongoingmonetarytightening.m+1(212)357-4172|daan.struyven@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC+1(646)446-3905|yulia.zhestkova@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCInvestorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgotoNovember2Globalgrowthslowedsharplythrough2022onadiminishingreopeningboost,fiscalandmonetarytightening,China’songoingCovidrestrictionsandpropertyslump,andtheenergysupplyshockresultingfromtheRussia-Ukrainewar.Weexpecttheworldtocontinuegrowingatabelow-trendpaceof1.8%in2023,withamildrecessioninEuropeandabumpyreopeninginChinabutalsoimportantpocketsofresilienceintheRealRealGDPGrowthPercentChangeyoy2022..GSConsensusAnnualAverage2023..GSConsensus2024..GSConsensusQ4/Q42023SNext4Quarters2022Q4-2023Q3SPotentialS.3.23.0.0....EuroAreaGermanyFrancealySpainJapanCanadaChinaIndiaBrazilRussiaWorldNote:Allforecastscalculatedoncalendaryearbasis.2022-2024areGSforecasts.PotentialgrowthisthemedianofGSestimatesfor2023-25fortheUS,JapanandCanada,ourlong-runestimatefortheEuropeaneconomiesand2023forEMeconomies.IMFforecastsusedforIndia2023and2024consensuswhenquartersnotavailableinBloomberg.TheglobalgrowthaggregatesusemarketFXcountryweights.Percentchange,yearago02.52.0Percentchange,yearago02.52.0BloombergConsensus0change,yearagocent.0US2023RealGDPGrowthForecasts2.52.0550Inthepastyear,USgrowthhasslowedtoabelow-potentialpaceofabout1%becauseminishingreopeningboostdecliningrealdisposableincomedrivenbyscalrytighteningInourforecastgrowthremainsatroughlythispacein2023.Unlikeayearago,whenourforecastforboth2022and2023wasbelowconsensusbecauseweexpectedanegativeimpactofmonetaryandespeciallyfiscaltightening,ourcurrent2023forecastiswellabovesusExhibitJan-2022Apr-2022Jul-2022Oct-2022Ourdisagreementwiththeconsensusisevenmorevisiblewhenwefocusonrecessionprobabilities.AsshowninExhibit3,weestimatea35%probabilitythattheUSeconomyentersrecessionoverthenext12months,wellbelowthemedianof65%amongtheforecastersinthelatestWallStreetJournalsurveyandtowardthebottomoftherange.November4entEstimatedentEstimatedUSRecessionProbability(Next12Months),WallStreetJournalOctober2022ForecasterSurveyGSForecast:35%4000ConsensusMedianConsensusMedianForecast:65%400001020304050NumberofForecastersWhyisourrecessionprobability—whilemorethantwiceashighastheunconditionalprobabilityofenteringrecessioninanygiven12-monthperiod—stillclearlybelow50%?OneimmediatereasonisthattheincomingactivitydataarenowhereclosetonceGDPreportshowedannualizedgrowthinQnonfarmpayrollsgrew261kinOctober,andtherewere225kinitialjoblessclaimsintheweekofNovember5.Morefundamentally,therearestrongreasonstoexpectpositivegrowthincomingquarters.Tobesure,thetighteninginfinancialconditionsisweighingheavilyongrowth,tothetuneofnearly2ppatpresent.ButrealdisposablepersonalincomeisreboundingfromtheplungeseeninH1—whenfiscaltighteningandsharplyhigherinflationtooktheirtoll—toapaceof3%+overthenextyear(Exhibit4).Andwhiletherearerisksonbothsides,wethinktherealincomeupturnislikelytobethestrongerforceaswemovethrough2023,especiallybecausethefinancialconditionsdragwilllikelydiminishassumingFedofficialsdonotdeliverdramaticallymoretighteningthanthentlypricingNovember52.0RealUSGDPGrowthImpulsefromGSFCI,2.030252050-5-10-1530252050-5-10-153-2.0RealUSGDPGrowthImpulsefromGSFCI,2.030252050-5-10-1530252050-5-10-153-QuarterCenteredMovingAverage-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0--0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0-2.52341234123202120222023Note:TheimpulsesassumethattheFCIstaysflatafterNovember15,2022.PercentagepointsPercentagepointsPercentchangevs.Dec.2020PercentchangePercentagepointsPercentagepointsHouseholdDisposableIncomeTransfers(Nominal)OtherIncome(Nominal)InflationRealDisposableIncome 2021MarNovSep2021MarNovSepMayJulJan2022NovSepMay2022NovSepMayMarJanJul2023NovSep2023NovSepMayMarJanJulButthemostfundamentalquestionisthis:howcantheFedbringdowninflationby2percentagepointsoverthenextyearwithonlya½ppincreaseintheunemploymentrate(Exhibit5)?Doesn’tthisflyinthefaceoftheexperiencefrompriorhigh-inflationepisodesmostnotablythesthatendedwithamuchbiggerincreaseinunemployment?Ouransweristhatthiscycleisdifferentfrompriorhigh-inflationperiods.Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Note:DashedlinesindicateGSforecasts.Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Note:DashedlinesindicateGSforecasts.Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Percentchange,yearPercentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearagoPercentUSUnemploymentRateUSCorePCEInflation76677665556664445553334442221133113Thefirstreasonwhythiscycleisdifferentisthatpost-pandemiclabormarketoverheatingshowedupnotinexcessiveemploymentbutinunprecedentedjobopenings.AsshowninExhibit6,jobopeningssurgedin2020-2021asemployerssoughttokeepupwiththestrongesteconomicrecoveryonrecordamidstcontinuingCovidfearsandexceptionallygenerousunemploymentbenefits.However,employmentasashareofthelaborforceonlyrosetoroughlythepre-pandemiclevel,notabove.November6(Andemploymentrelativetotheworking-agepopulationremainsbelowthePercentoflaborforceUSPercentoflaborforceUSLaborDemandJobOpeningsHouseholdEmployment200620082010201220142016201820202022Now,however,theenvironmentlooksverydifferent.Demandhasslowed,thenetshavenormalizedandexcesssavingsarecomingdown.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthatjobopeningsandourjobs-workersandminustotallaborsupplyarecomingdownquicklyBasedontimelyjobopeningsmeasuresfromLinkupandIndeed,weestimatethatthejobs-workersgaphasdeclinedfromapeakofnearly6milliontojustover4million,nearlyhalfofthewaytothe2mnlevelrequiredtoslowwagegrowthtoaratecompatiblewiththeinflationtarget(Exhibit7,leftpanel).Partlybecauseofthereductioninthejobs-workersgap,timelymeasuresofnominalwagegrowth,positionadjustedaveragehourlyearningsandourmonthlywagesurveycomposite,haveslowedtolevelsconsistentwith4½%wagegrowth(Exhibit7,rightpanel).November7MillionsMillionsUSJobs-WorkersMillionsMillions6543210-1-2-3-4dGSEstimateTSJobOpeningsJobs-WorkersGap:AlternativeJobOpenings6543210-1-2-3-4Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-22May-22Sep-22IndexPercentchangeIndex87 EmploymentCostIndex*(Left)877060AverageHourlyEarnings(Composition-Adj)**(7060 MonthlyWageSurveys***(Right)650540430321210-10-1020082010201220142016201820202022RichmondFedservices,NYFedservices(SAbyGS),KansasFedservices,andNFIB.Whereavailable,weaveragecurrentandexpectedwagechangesforeachsurvey.ValuesbeforetheintroductionofThesecondreasonwhythiscycleisdifferentisthattherecentnormalizationinsupplyinsandrentalhousingmarketsisasourceofdisinationnotseeninprevioushighinationepisodessuchasthe1970s,anditisonlybeginningtoshowupintheofficialnumbers(Exhibit8).Onthegoodsside,theongoingrotationfromgoodstodinghealingsupplychainsandreboundinginventorylevelsshouldputdownwardpressureoncoregoodsprices.Ontheservicesside,askingrentsonnewleaseshavedeceleratedsharplyaftertheone-timejumpinrentsrelatedtotheworkfromhome-relatedincreaseindemandforspace.TheOctoberCPIreportsuggeststhatthelaggingmeasureofsequentialmonthlyofficialCPIshelterinflation—whichcapturesinflationwilllikelyrisethroughnextspringasrentsoncontinuingleasescatchuptohighermarketrates,itissettoslowthereafter.November84093020603-10-2004093020603-10-200Z-ScoreZZ-Score4Supplier4SupplierDeliveryTimes,AverageofBusinessSurveyssinessSurveys3222111000-1-1-1201220142016201820202022Percentchange,annualratemonthlyPercentPercentchange,annualratemonthlyApartmentApartmentList:AskingRents,SAbyGS(Left)CPI:RentofPrimaryResidence(Right)201720182019202020212022Thethirdreasonisthatlong-terminflationexpectationsremainwell-anchored,especiallyrelativetothe1970s.Thisistrueforeachoftheavailablemeasures,namelythoseysofhouseholdssurveysofeconomicforecastersandinflation-protectedbonds.Measuresofshort-terminflationexpectationsremainrelativelyhigh,butmuchofthisprobablyreflectsthespikeincommoditypricesandshouldwaneifcommoditypricesleveloff.ThefactthatinflationhasonlybeenhighforashortandunusualpandemicperiodalsosuggeststhatelevatedinationisnotrenchedExhibitPercentPercentUSLong-RunInflationExpectations10UniversityofMichiganSurvey,Next5-10Yearsattion87654Reopening3Average,2000-20192vid109876543210atoderationPercent9PercentPercentShareofMonthsinPrior10YearsPercentPercentYoYCorePCEAbove2.5%100100100606604040402020200001979198419891994199920042009201420192024197019801990200020102020Takentogether,weexpectyear-over-yearcorePCEinflationtodeclinefrom5.1%inSeptemberto2.9%inDecember2023(Exhibit10).Weexpectsupply-constraineddurablegoodswithstillelevatedmargins,suchasusedcars,todrivenearlyhalfofNovember9Apr-19Jul-Apr-19Jul-19Oct-19Jan-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24Jul-24Oct-24Percentchange,yearagoPercentchange,yearago4 ContributionstoYear-on-YearCorePCEInflationSupplySupply-Constrained*OtherGoodsTravelOtherServicesHealthcareShelterGSForecastGSForecast6543210*New,used,andrentalcars,furniture,sportingequipment,householdappliances,sportsandrecreationalvehicles,andvideo,audio,photo,andinfo.equipment.OnemightassumethatourrelativelyoptimisticinflationforecasttranslatesintoarelativelydovishFedcallButthatassumptionwouldbewrong.Thereasoncomesbacktotheinterplaybetweenrealincomeandfinancialconditions.Asrealincomerecovers,anegativeFCIgrowthimpulseisrequiredtokeepgrowthbelowpotentialandebalancingthelabormarketHoweverthenegativeFCIimpulseonsequentialgrowthwilllikelydiminishfromitscurrentdragofaround2ppannualizedbecauseitdependsonthechangeinratherthanthelevelof,financialconditions(Exhibit4,rightpanel).Asaresult,andevenunderourrelativelyoptimisticinflationdditionalratehikesofatleastasmuchasmarketsarenowpricingarelikelyrketadjustmentgoingFollowingtheFCIeasingoverthepastmonthwenowexpectanadditionalbpofFedratehikesvs0bppreviously)withadownshiftinthehikingpaceto50bpinDecember,andthreesmaller25bphikesinFebruaryMarchandnowalsoMay.Ournew5-5.25%peakfundsrateismodestlyentent.50RateHikesatFOMCMeetings25bp15bp5bp25bp33bp25bp25bp15bp5bp25bp33bp25bp54bp.48%50bp75bp4.54.03.53.02.52.01.51.00.50.0Sizeofratehike75bpFOMCEstimateofLonger-RunRate75bp75bp04.54.0502.52.050bp50bpGSForecastGSForecastMarketPricing25bp0.50.02023EndMarMay2023End2022Witharesilientlabormarketandstillelevatedinflation,wedon’tseeanyratecutsin2023unlesstheeconomyentersrecessionafterall.Inourno-recessionforecast,theFedonlyimplementsafirstgentle25bpcutin2024Q2.Thisbaselineof“highratesforlonger”wouldagainillustratehowdifferentthiscycleisasthefirstFedcutinthemedianhikingcyclehashistoricallycomeroughlysixmonthsafterthelastbablyinrecessionThereasonforthisisthemuchbiggerandmoredrawn-outincreaseinhouseholdenergybills,whichshouldboostheadlineinflationtopeaksof12%intheEuroareaand11%inthenintheUSExhibitleftpanelInturn,highinflationissettoweighonrealincome,consumption,andindustrialuctionWeforecastfurtherdeclinesinrealincomeofintheEuroareathroughQand3%intheUKthrough2023Q2,beforeapickupinH2(Exhibit12,rightpanelTheplungeintimelyandforward-lookingsurveysofgas-intensiveEuropeanindustriessuchaschemicalsandmetalsalsosuggeststhatrisingenergycostswilllowerproduction(Exhibit13).Asaresult,welookforcumulativedeclinesinrealGDPofKQQepEuropeandownturnbarringaverycoldwinterthatimposesmoresevereenergyrationingontheindustrialsectorinordertokeeppeoplewarmintheirhomes.opehascutRussiangasimportsbyandtotalgasconsumptionby20-25%withoutcrushingaggregateactivity.Infact,mostofthehardeconomicdata(asopposedtothesurveys)continuetoholdupremarkablywellsofar,withindustrialionmovingsidewaysrealGDPstillupintheEuroareainQthoughdowndlabormarketsholdingupsofarWethinkthereasonforthisresilienceisthathouseholdenergysavingsandsubstitutiontootherenergysourceshavehelpedabsorbthecollapseinRussiangasimports.AlongtoragereducedTTFgaspricesby60%fromtheirpeak,andreduceddownsideriskfromaverycoldwinter.Moreover,Europeislikelytobenefitfromthreesimilarpost-pandemicsourcesofethatarehelpingtheUSavoidrecessionaltogetherFirstExhibitshowsthattheriseinGermanproductionofchip-intensiveitemsandcars—wherepandemicecksarestilleasinghasapproximatelyoffsettheongoingdeclineinenergy-intensiveproduction.32103210Total(Left)25US:RevolvingConsumerCreditUK:CreditCardLendingEuroArea:32103210Total(Left)25US:RevolvingConsumerCreditUK:CreditCardLendingEuroArea:ConsumerCreditUpto5Years250505202000009595909055858500-5-58080-10-107575PercentchangesinceDec.PercentchangesinceDec.2019GermanIndustrialProductionAutomotiveSector(Right)Gas-IntensiveSectors(RightGas-IntensiveSectors(Right)Chip-IntensiveSectors(Right)Jan-22Feb-22Mar-22Apr-22May-22Jun-22Jul-22Aug-22Sep-22Secondanydeclineinthehouseholdsavingratewouldsupportconsumerspending,ashappenedintheUSwhenrealincomeplungedinearly2022.Exhibit15pointstoroominEuropeforsavingratestofallandforconsumercreditgrowthtopickup(althoughlimitedexcesssavings).Third,whilethebulkofreopeninggainsarebehindus,Europeisstillbenefitingsomewhatfromareboundintheservicesector.pointspointsPercentageChangeintheHouseholdSavingRatePercentageDecember2019=100ConsumerCreditDecemberpointspoints1010Since20191010 EuroArea201820192020202201820192020202120152016201720182019202020212022Whilenear-termrisksofadeeprecessionhaverecededsomewhatandourcommoditystrategistsnowlookforamorelimitedriseinEuropeangaspricesnextsummer,wedon’texpectGDPtoreboundsharplyinEuropeonceitexitsamildrecession.Themainreasonisthatenergypriceswilllikelystayhighuntilsufficientnewenergysupplyand/ormajorefficiencygainsmaterialize.Moreover,fiscalpolicyturnsshouldturnintoadragfromthesecondhalfof2023onwards.atingboththeresilienceinincomingharddataandourlesselevatedpathforehavenudgedupourEuroareagrowthforecasttofrom-0.4%previously).WhataboutEuropeancoreinflation?AlthoughcommoditiesdrovetheinitialheadlinesurgepricepressureshavebroadenedsignicantlyacrosscorecategoriesinboththeEuroareaandtheUKfollowingupsideinationsurprises(Exhibit16,leftpanel).Infact,UKcorepricepressuresarenowthebroadestacrosstheG10,withaperfectstormoftheUSGiventhisstrongmomentum,weexpectEuroareacoreinflationtoedgeupfurthertoauallydecliningtojustabovebyend-2023ongoodsdisinflation.IntheUK,wethinkthatcoreinflationispeakingrightaroundnowandwillalsodeclineto3%byend-2023.Givenreducedrisksofdeeprecessionandpersistentinflationarypressures,wenowexpecttheECBtohikethroughMaywithanadditional150bpofratehikestoapeakdepositrateof3%(vs.2.75%previously).Alongwiththereductioninnear-termheadlineinflationpressuresfromgasprices,theemphasisonsubstantialratehikessofarincreasesourconvictionthattheECBwillstepdownthepaceto50bpinDecember,inparallelwiththeFed.Wemaintainourforecastforasecond50bphikeinFebruarybut,giventhefirmerdemandoutlook,nowlookfortwoadditionalsmaller25bphikesattheMarchandMaymeetings.Therisksaroundourpeak3%ECBratearetwo-sided,withupsideriskfrompotentiallymorepersistentcoreinflationanddownsideriskfromibleareupinsovereignriskinItalyGiventhetightlabormarket,highwagepressures,andfirminflation,weexpecttheBoEtohikeBankRatebyanadditional150bptoaterminalrateof4.5%.00Our2023ChinaoutlookisastoryoftwohalveswithslowgrowthinthefirsthalffollowedbyamorepronouncedreboundinthesecondhalfastheeconomyreopensinplaceduringthewinterInfact,therecentsharpriseincasesledustohaveasignificantlybelow-consensusQ4estimateof1.2%annualized.Percentchange,quarterlyPercentchange,quarterlyannualrateChinaRealGDPquarterlyannualrate121121086BloombergConsensusBloombergConsensus86444222Q42022Q1Q22023Q3Q4ughtheleadershiphasclearlysignaledthatitaimstoexitZCPwedonotexpectactualreopeningtostartuntilApril.Thebasicreasonforthisisthatmedicalandcommunicationpreparationswilltaketime.Lessthan70%ofthe60+agegroupinExhibitanddatafromHongKongshowthattheunvaccinatedelderlyremainatseriousriskofsevereoutcomes.Asaresult,Chinawillneedtosignificantlyrampupitsvaccinationpacefromthecurrent100k/daybeforereopeningcansafelybeginPercentBedsper100kpeopleofpopulation35403530252050IndicatorsPercentBedsper100kpeopleofpopulation35403530252050IndicatorsofCovidHealthRiskUnvaccinatedElderly*(left)30252050252050ICUBeds(right) ChinaHKJapanUSChinaGermanyUS*MainlandChina(3dosesofChinesevaccine),HongKong(2dosesofmRNAvaccineor3dosesofChinesevaccine),Japan,Spain,andtheUS(2dosesofmRNAvaccine).MillionsMillionsperdayDailyCovid-19VaccinationsAdministeredMillionsMillionsperday(7-DayMovingAverage)2522550Jan-2021Jun-2021Jan-2021Jun-2021Apr-2022Nov-2021DespiteourAprilreopeningbaseline,weforecastQ2growthofjust2%annualizedonourassumptionthatreopeninginitiallytriggersanincreaseininfectionsthatkeepsHongKongduringthefirstquarterofexitingZCPalsosupportsoursoftQ2forecast.Incontrast,welookforameaningfulreopeninggrowthboostinH2,whichwilllikelyextendinto2024.AsZCPiscurrentlystillsubtractingabout4-5%fromthelevelofntialroomforacyclicalreboundasimmunitylevelsriseandmosthouseholdslearntolivewiththevirus.veconsensusourQandQforecastsofandannualizedarenotspectacularrelativetootherinternationalreopeningexperiences.ThisisbecauseweexpectacontinueddragfromCovidcautionaswellasotherheadwinds,somecyclicalandsomemorestructural.Onthecyclicalside,fiscalpolicyissettotightenifthedomesticeconomyrebounds,lobaldemandfortechhousing,andCovid-relatedproductsslowsfurther.Onthestructuralside,weseethecontractionofthepropertysectorandUSchipexportrestrictionsasmulti-yeardrags.Weestimatethattheongoingslideofthepropertysectorwillsubtractaround-1½ppfromgrowthnextyearasitcontinuestodeleverandcedemographicheadwindsExhibit242420208844024242020884400PercentagepPercentagepointsChina:HousingContributiontoAnnualGDPGrowthpoints3210-23ConstructionConsumptionFiscalRealEstateServicesUpstreamEffectsTotal20112015201920232027321023lionMilionNewApartmentsNeededEachYearinUrbanChinaDemandDemandSources:PropertyInvestmentReplacementDemographic*Total20102015202020252030203520402045*Demographicdemandsourcesincludeurbanization,populationgrowth,andhouseholdsizegrowth.WerecentlyalsoestimatedthatthenewUSrestrictionsonexportsofadvancedchips(andtheequipmentandsoftwaretoproducethem)toChinawillsubtractabout¼ppevelofGDPassumingUSpolicymakersareseriousaboutimplementation.Thisreflectsreducedproductionincomputers.Therelativelymutedreboundinaggregatedemand—coupledwiththerelativelylimitedriseininationduringreopeninginotherAsianeconomiesalsodrivesourbenignforecastfor2023inflationandmonetarypolicy.Specifically,weexpectcoreCPItopickuponlyslightlyfrom0.7%to1.2%nextyear,andthepolicyratetostayflatatjust2%.Althoughwedoseeasharperreopeningboostin2023H2and2024H1thanotherecastersourlongrunChinaviewsremainstructurallybelowconsensusExhibitWeestimatethatmuchoftheslowdowninactualChinagrowthinrecentyearscorrespondstoaslowdowninpotentialgrowthtoonly4.2%in2023.Weestimatethattrendgrowthwillslowfurthertojustabove3%overthenextdecadeonweaknessinbothdemographicsandproductivity,andthelongslideinthepropertymarket.Percentchange,yearPercentchange,yearagoChinaRealGDPForecastsyearayear66655544433Consensus*2