《国际经济关系》Chapter8

Chapter8OilandPoliticsBecauseofitssignificantrolesasafuelformodernindustrialeconomiesandformilitaryforces,petroleumhasbeenthesubjectofdomesticandinternationalpolitics.Overtheyears,countrieshavesoughttogaincontrolofpetroleumresourcesandtomanagetheuseofthoseresourcesfortheirownpolitical,military,andeconomicbenefit.一、CorporateOligopoly二、TheOPECsystem三、OtherOPECS四、OPECindecline五、EraofGlobalization六、Oilinthetwenty-firstcenturyCORPORATEOLIGOPOLY–

sevensisterKnownasthesevensisters,thesecompaniesdominatedtheirhomemarketsthroughverticalintegration,thatis,controllingsupply,transportation,refiningandmarketingaswellasexplorationandrefiningtechnologies.Thesecompaniesalsoworkedtogethertocontrolinternationalsuppliesofpetroleumbykeepingoutcompetitors;enteringintoaseriesofcooperativeventures,suchasjointproductionandrefiningarrangementsandlong-termsupplyagreement;andrefrainingfrompricecompetition.(1)Thesevensisters,alsoknownasthemajors,continuedoutsidethecommunistworldfromwellheadtorefiningtransportation,andmarketing.Theyblockedothercompaniesfromenteringupstreamoperationssuchascrudeoilexplorationandproductionbylockinginconcessionagreementswithmanyoil-richareasandbythelongleadtimesrequiredforfindinganddevelopingoilinterritoryunclaimedbythemajors.(2)overtime,changesintheinternationaloilindustry,theoil-producingstates,andtheoil-consumingdevelopedcountriesunderminedthedominanceofthesevensisters.(3)Asaresult,thesevensisterswerenolongerabletorestrictsupplyandmaintainthepriceofoil.(4)Atthesametime,producergovernmentsbegantocooperatewitheachother.THEOPECSYSTEM一、Negotiation二、TheFirstOilCrisis三、StableOPECManagement四、TheSecondOilCrisisNegotiation(1)Inthe1970s,thesechangesenabledOPECtoassumeownershipofoilinvestmentsandtherebytakecontrolofoilprices.TheOPECrevolutionwastriggeredbyLibya.(2)inDecember1970,OPECfollowedtheLibyanexampleandcalledforanincreaseinthepostedpriceofandincometaxesonoil.(3)NegotiationsbetweenOPECandtheoilcompaniesbeganonOctober8,1973.Thefirstoilcrisis–unilateralpowerThefourthArab-IsraeliwarhadbegunonOctober6,twodaysbeforetheoiltalksbegan.Aftertheautumnof1973,oilpriceswerecontrolledbyOPEC.Withthedeclineofthecompanies,theNorthernconsumergovernmentstriedbutfailedtoagreeonacommonpolicytowardtheproducer.Aftertheconference,consumergovernmentswenttheirownways.StableOPECManagementForfiveyears,OPECundertheleadershipofSaudiArabia,managedtheinternationaloilsystem.Inperiodsofexcesssupply,SaudiArabiamaintainedtheOPECpricebyabsorbingalargeshareofthenecessaryproductionreductions.Thus,SaudiArabiaandtheotherGulfstatesdidnotwantapricehighenoughtojeopardizethefutureofanoil-basedenergysystemandtheviabilityoftheworldeconomy.Apropitiousenvironmentalsocontributedtostability.Politicalfactorsalsoenhancedstability.ThesecondoilcrisisBy1978,however,thepoliticalandeconomicenvironmenthadbecomehighlyunstable,andwillingnessoftheSaudistomanagethepriceandtoensurethesupplyofoilhaddiminished.Theeventthatcreatedaworldshortageofoilanddisorderintheworldoilmarketswasthe1978revolutioninIran.Asmarketconditionsdisintegrated,theforeignpoliciesoftheWest,particularlythoseoftheUnitedStates,weresubstantiallyweakened.OTHEROPECSThesuccessofoilproducersinthe1970sledtoarevolutioninthethinkingofSouthernrawmaterialproducers.EconomicvulnerabilityofconsumerssetthestageforOPEC’saction.Anothernewdevelopmentstemmednotfromconfidencebutfromdesperation.Becauseofthelong-termelasticityofdemandandsupply,thesuccessfulsurvivalofacartelgenerallydependsontwocomplexfactors.In1974and1975,aseconomicactivityintheindustrializedcountriesdeclined,thedemandforindustrialrawmaterialsfellprecipitously.OPECINDECLINEInthe1980s,OPECbegantofacemanyoftheproblemsencounteredbyotherproducercartels.OPEC’sdifficultiesstemmedfromitssuccess.TheImpactofHigherOilPricesSuppliesincreased.Higheroilpricesattractednewsupplierstotheinternationalmarket.Severallargereservoirsofnewoilinthedevelopedcountriescameintofulloperation.Trendsinthedevelopingcountriesweredifferentfromthoseinthedevelopedcountries.Shiftingsupplyanddemanddepressedoilprices.ThechangingpatternofoilproductionandconsumptionincreasedOPEC’smanagementproblemsandunderminedthecartel’scohesion.TheexpandedvolumeofoiltradedonthespotmarketmadeitmoredifficultforOPECtomonitoritsmembers’oiltransactionsandthusaggravatedOPEC’sprice-managementproblem.OilPriceWarsBeginningintheearly1980s,OPECfoughtalosingbattletomaintaincontroloverthedecliningpriceofoil.ThenewproductionreductionschemeslowedbutdidnotstopthedeclineinOPEC’spowerasaprice-settingcartel.In1986,OPECagreedonnewproductionreductionsandquotasandonanewpricetargetof$18perbarrel.EconomicandpoliticalconflictscontinuedtothreatenOPEC’sabilitytoimplementconcertedproductionreductions.IntheabsenceofOPECdiscipline,somecartelmemberssoughttoprotectthemselvesfrompricecompetitionbybuyingrefiningandmarketingoperationsinthemajoroil-consumingcountries.Theeventsofthe1980sthusledtoamajorchangeinOPEC’spowerasaprice-settingcartel.ERAOFGLOBALIZATIONAswehaveseen,OPECwasseverelyweakenedbynewnon-OPECsourcesofoilandbyinternalconflicts.Thefragmentedoilindustrywasunabletocontrolpricesbylimitingorincreasingsupply.Cooperationamongthedevelopedcountriesonoilissuesremainedweakandadhoc.TheGulfWarTheGulfWardramaticallysymbolizedtheinabilityofOPECtomanagetheinternationaloilsystem.ThewardemonstratedthecriticalimportanceofMiddleEasternoilfortheNorth.In1989and1990,IraqandKuwaitwereonoppositesidesofasignificantconflictwithinOPEC.KuwaitrefusedtogoalongwiththeproductionquotaassignedtoitbyOPECinthelate1980s.WhilenumerousfactorsmotivatedtheUnitedStatesanditsalliestoreactstronglytotheinvasionofKuwait,concernaboutoilwasoneofthemostimportant.Furthermore,becauseOPEC’sshareoftheworldoilmarketwassmaller,pricemanagementincreasinglyrequiredthecooperationofnon-OPECproducers.OilMarketsandtheRevivalofOPECBytheendofthetwentiethcentury,oilmarketscametoresemblethoseofothercommodities:highlyvolatileandsubjecttoswingsinsupplyanddemand,butstillsubjectattimestotheactionsofasmallnumberofproducers.Theproblemwasnotashortageofpetroleumintheworld,asnewfieldswerediscoveredandolderfieldsweremademoreproductivethroughtechnology.Investmentwasalsocomplicatedbyenvironmentalregulation,whichraisedcostsofexplorationandexploitationforenergycompaniesintheUnitedStatesandotherindustrializedcountries.Otherenvironmentalconcernsfocusedonthedegradationofbiologicallyrichlandscapes.Politicalfactorsalsohinderedinvestment.TimeandamorepragmaticapproachinWashingtonandMoscowhealedmanyofthesefriction.EconomicSanctionsEconomicsanctionswereanotherpoliticalfactorshapingoilinvestment,production,andtradeinthe1990s.NationalandmultilateraleconomicsanctionsonIraq,andLibyapreventedtheseproducersfromexportingtheiroilinanyquantityanddeterredinvestmentinfutureexplorationandproductioninthosecountries.In1996,theUSCongresspassedtheIran-LibyaSanctionsAct(ILSA).TheILSAcalledforimpositionofsanctionsonforeigncompaniesthatmadeinvestmentsofmorethan$20millionthatdirectlyandsignificantlycontributedtoIran’sabilitytodevelopitsoilandgasresources.USregulationsalreadyimposedtheserestrictionsonUSfirms.DespitethesuspensionofUNsanctionsonLibyain1999,USsanctionsundertheILSAremainedinplace.In2001,presidentGeorgeW.BushsignedlegislationextendingtheILSAforanotherfiveyears.Demandforoilinthe1990sGlobaldemandforpetroleumincreasedsteadilyinthe1990s.Meanwhile,developingcountriesconsumedever-greaterquantitiesofpetroleumtofueldevelopment.China,whichwasshortofhydrocarbonresources,posedaparticularchallenge.Chinabecameanetimporterofoilin1993.afterthatdate,chinabecamethethirdlargestoilimporteraftertheUnitedStatesandJapan.OPECandSaudiArabiaInthe1970sand1980s,SaudiArabiauseditsmassiveoilearningstosupportitseconomy,socialservice,andforeignpolicyaswellastoaccumulatelargefinancialreserves.Bythe1990s,loweroilprices,risingcostsofinefficientdomesticindustriesandofservicesforarapidlygrowingpopulation,andtheburdenofforeignandmilitaryexpenditureshadtakentheirtoll.TheSaudidilemmabecameclearin199