欧盟反倾销政策-外文文献翻译

1、欧盟反倾销政策欧盟部署的传统贸易政策措施为保护本国工业产品的市场中的重要性正在下降。关税的总体水平相当低，将会开始在关贸总协定的乌拉圭回合之后进一步实施。对进口的数量限制由关贸总协定的合作伙伴国家根据该协议禁止，对于仍然存在的限制，在纺织部门，一个计划尽管是长期的，撤销已获通过。甚至在著名的所谓的“灰色地带”的措施，如“自愿”出口限制协议，这使不良进口在减少，关贸总协定所规定的规则，面对的是更严格处罚，世界贸易组织（世贸组织）。正是在这种背景下，反倾销作为一种合法的战略打击的政策日益引起关注，迈向自由贸易的趋势。在一多边贸易最惠国地位和平等对待所有会员国为基础的系统的背景下，反倾销政策，为使“

2、法律障碍，不公平的方法” 合法化，使一个国家，以提高价格，从而阻碍，给一个不受欢迎的进口国非常恰到好处的，差别待遇的风格。人们越来越多地宣称，欧盟反倾销政策正在越来越少的使用的不公平贸易做法而不是作为保护主义的工具。反倾销程序的先决条件从一开始关贸总协定条约作出了规定（第六条）把反倾销规则作为一种对不公平贸易做法的追索权的手段。这个条件适用于反倾销程序，在乌拉圭回合里被进一步指定。为了提高立法的一致性，“游戏规则”已变得更为精确。在这项修正案后，欧盟反倾销条例也做出了变化。 跟以前的情况一样，它严格面向关贸总协定文本。一个重要因素在程序里发挥作用，尽量公平尽量透明；欧盟注意到出版的所有阶段，这

3、项规定的帐户诉讼。如果欧盟委员会取认为，反倾销措施的应用程序包含足够的证据证明倾销与损害由此产生，它启动了反倾销调查。这是必须指出的是，公布这些案件中，反倾销调查实际执行，而不是那些它已拒绝的个案。为了征收反倾销措施委员会必须表明：1.发生在进口倾销价格2.造成或有威胁造成实质性损害在进口国一个行业3.干预是社会的利益。至于最后一点，新规例明确国家所有的利益都被认为是“包括国内产业的利益和用户和消费者”（第21条）。同时，文章协议特别重视恢复“有效”的竞争，规定该措施虽然不会毁坏倾销和经济损失的证据，制定施加相当含糊。在在旧规例这只是该社区联合干预的普遍利益的损害性倾销提到的案件。“短期的工业

4、用户和消费者低价格的利益进行加权对进口的倾销中的收缩，部门或整个产业消除工业和社会成本方面的有害影响。”这还有待观察消费者的利益是否会得到更大的代价，跟以前的情况比。鉴于消费者远远不如生产者组织在民族和社区水平，有一些表面的假设，他们对欧盟贸易政策的影响将发生根本性改变的表面理由。中心问题是确定什么时候反倾销已经发生。一个产品被列为“倾销”时，比原产地更低的价格出售给国外。欧盟采取了对出口价格非常精确的计算规定，比较正常价值和公平价格。然而，在具体案件中，它的计算不能得到有效的审查。一般来说，计算是基于价格出口商或生产商在不同市场或在其在非市场经济情况下，正常价值是通过参考价值和理想价值来计算

5、的。然而，价格差异是一种理性的，实际上即使是必要时，策略是一个改变市场情况的确定因素。如果一个戒备森严的国内市场的通行证被一家公司获得垄断，出口价格在公开市场中的竞争将不可避免地降低难度。这是理性的，从一个利润最大化的角度来看，所提供的固定费用较低的价格范围在国内销售和国外销售至少包括可变成本。价格差异在欧盟内部本身非常明显，而事实上这是提出创建欧洲单一市场的争议之一。即使是现在，来自证监会的压力，尽管欧盟汽车制造商等等，考虑在会员国征收的税收的帐户，并区分不同层次的产品售价。作为倾销造成损害的手段，国内行业市场份额的损失,对价格和产出的巨大压力，就业，盈利能力和生产力下降造成的审查。这是非常

6、困难的。然而也孤立了倾销等负面影响，例如那些有周期性，结构性或汇率相关性的损坏。持续的损伤评估是至关重要的中心和“倾销”相比，其他“正常”的进口和国内生产的进口增长率。在任何情况下，反倾销措施只出现在各公司与市场支配地位的情况是合适的。反倾销措施所采取的形式发起反倾销调查委员会可征收临时反倾销税，但是从程序的启动时长，不少于60天并不多于九个月。这是1994年三月安理会多数通过决定的。这样的职务通常适用五年。之后自动失效，除非进行检讨，申请由社区生产者规定，责任应予以保留。对个体生产者在反倾销诉讼的倾销幅度是根据个人的基础计算的，并有责任要求，以避免损伤修复。该委员会报告说，1988年至199

7、2年的反倾销税平均只有约一半的倾销幅度平均（40），即使这标志着在价格显著增加。此外，必须承认，在1995年许多反倾销关税是在50以上，有的甚至达到了超过100（来自中国的登山鞋）。一个超过90的关税被强加在电视摄像系统和某些来自日本的电子微动。反倾销诉讼，也可以终止该出口商收取的最低价格的承诺。然而，1992年和1993年该委员会并不完全终止在此基础上进行的任何法律程序，1994年只有两个（俄罗斯和立陶宛）。在一些情况下，接受价格承诺的有一些公司，而在同一时间关税是强加给其他公司。欧盟也频繁的追溯征收反倾销关税，是否遵守了价格承诺。不管用什么方法，结果是更高的进口价格。不同的是，价格的承诺使

8、外国供应商扩大他们的利润，然而，有关税的情况下是强加的，这是笔额外的欧盟税收利益。量化欧盟反倾销行动通常，反倾销行动的程度，是建立在法律程序的数量上的。这样的分析，然而，进口量的影响也将予以考虑。 1990年至1995年欧盟发起200多起反倾销调查，涉及44个国家（附表一）。除了1993年，进口下降，近年来发起反倾销诉讼数量一直保持相对稳定约40起。他们已经越来越多地针对南部和东南亚的发展中国家。反对苏联继承国联盟是由于在独立人数增加状态。即使只有部分的调查实际上导致了（临时或永久）征收反倾销税或接受价格承诺，仅仅威胁的诉讼创造了一个不确定的气氛。总体而言，欧洲货币单位价值在1994年进口九十

9、亿是受到反倾销行动的影响。这是等价借予的工业产品进口24来自非，欧盟国家3.5的进口来自国家影响。虽然从欧盟的角度来看幅度订单边际，当从出口国的角度来看，他们出现在一个完全不同的光线。表一由欧盟发起的反倾销调查数目国家199019911992199319941995欧洲自由贸易联盟11-美国1-111-日本35-12-中欧和东欧25135108CIS2110354波罗的海诸国1-1-欧洲协定-42254东南欧其它国家41-1-发展中国家32823132728地中海91312-拉丁美洲6-1111东/南它-21-1总计4320392143371）苏联分别。 2）保加利亚

10、，捷克斯洛伐克联邦共和国和旧捷克斯洛伐克，波兰，罗马尼亚，匈牙利。3）南斯拉夫或其继承国，阿尔巴尼亚。来源：反倾销欧盟委员会的报告，欧共体官方公报反倾销行动影响国家所有的欧盟进口受到反倾销。在1994年的行动中，将近一半（45亿埃居）来自日本，其次韩国（15亿埃居）。跟选定的欧盟市场出口国家相比，各自的份额遭受反倾销行动，下面的数据提出了进口。另一方面，反倾销的发生率是衡量工业从该国出口的问题（进口覆盖比率），之后，巴基斯坦和韩国受到重创。1994年，几乎是他们出口到欧盟的第五次反倾销行动，17和15的格鲁吉亚和白俄罗斯的数字几乎一样高。在各国各自的情况下，其出口集中于少数商品，反倾销行动对这

11、些产品的一些影响是更大的意义远远高于出口国家。进口覆盖率约8，日本，乌克兰和土耳其也相对沉重打击的反倾销行动。其中南部和东南亚国家，印度，印度尼西亚和泰国的出口也受到了影响到高于平均水平的程度（约5），然而中国的工业出口刚刚超过3。该组国家的异质性显着特别是反倾销行动影响的证据的精密仪器与此部署，是不是主要针对国营贸易国家，也没有专门针对实力较弱的贸易伙伴，追索权始终作出反倾销行动中的激烈竞争威胁，无论哪个国家的出现。商品类别的影响 欧盟反倾销行动集中于少数商品类别。引人注目的是高进口覆盖率已确定（1994），纺织品的数量（棉，合成或人造纺纤维，纺材料和丝绸），商品组石头，泥土和水泥，化肥和电

12、子（附表二）。在大多数情况下，这些地区是指那些在任何情况下，享受最高级别的保护。在这些欧盟地区的正常关税高于平均水平（除了丝绸和石块，泥土和水泥），在乌拉圭回合达成的削减了，不显着高于其他地区。反倾销行动对其他八个商品受影响的群体而言高于平均水平，这一行动的相关性不太清楚，其中，有几个类别相对低关税。 反倾销诉讼很明显的在1994年对纺织部门的各个领域是一个新的发展，以数量限制在多纤维协定进行审议，然后才提供最好的保护。最近的反倾销诉讼也不能被视为一项预防措施来反对自由化的步骤。在此过程中乌拉圭回合的实施，纺织行业纳入新的关贸总协定制度：在开始阶段，欧盟并不需要开放市场，因为它已经符合要求。显

13、然欧洲生产商协会正在大力竖立在大多数情况下新的障碍，除了现有的数量限制。大部分反倾销行动在纺织部门对于有问题的商品的法律程序面对数量限制与受影响国家。然而，这些已被固定在吨，从而使出口国， 随着1993年面临需求的疲软。企图通过降低价格以确保他们在充分利用其配额。因此，在1994年他们不得不面对反倾销诉讼。因此，欧盟又增加了一个新的行业纺织以前的反倾销位焦点在化工，电子，钢铁，1994年的调查是针对主要针对棉织物，来自印度，印度尼西亚，巴基斯坦和泰国的面料合成纤维纺制成纤维，床上用品和聚酯。1995年也是，它主要是南部和东南部的亚洲国家更具体的第二代的新人而不是“老虎”，新的反倾销诉讼的矛头，

14、比起纺织品电子产品越来越被尊重。展望新法规规定的关贸总协定条款反倾销诉讼。虽然这令程序更加透明，并增加了禁止任意行动的保护，欧盟委员会对倾销和比较价格的规定计算仍然留有相当大的回旋余地。此外，我们有理由相信，新的关贸总协定实际上是限制等措施，由反倾销措施的手段单方面保护，将用于合法化有选择性的。鉴于其他非关税贸易壁垒作出更困难的部署，反倾销措施可能日益成为贸易保护主义的首选工具。关税提高新关贸总协定仍在准许不受欢迎，因为他们打击所有供应商，因此更难以实施，必须是“付出”的补偿形式在其他领域。欧盟的情况，额外的五花八门的非关税贸易壁垒的个人会员国已成为不能从手术的中清醒过来，单一欧洲市场和相关的

15、内部边界管制取消。重新开始新的反倾销诉讼，去年开始对大量证据欧盟将继续部署，为避免一个非常具体的手段低价销售或迅速扩大进口。这会影响的不仅欧盟消费者消费品价格上涨，而且工业公司加工的进口货物，其竞争能力是用于降低支付更高的价格，作为回报，他们可能会再呼吁保护措施。更为严重的，这实际上是对有销售的机会的出口国 “惩罚”的反倾销税的征收。这一点尤其对这些国家个案，欧盟构成最重要的销售市场特别是中部和东部欧洲国家和土耳其也为那些对出口的集中反倾销措施影响的商品。他们遭受的外汇收入，他们需要发展自己的经济损失，从而常常有机会购买在欧盟生产的投资品。表二 欧盟进口工业产品反倾销行动发生率19921993

16、1994总计商品类别受反倾销协定总计商品类别受反倾销协定总计商品类别受反倾销协定工业国6.2美国日本中欧和东欧独联体和波罗的海国家立陶宛俄罗斯乌克兰白俄罗斯15.1哈萨克斯坦乔治亚-欧洲协定波兰捷克共和国捷克斯洛伐克联邦共和国-斯洛伐克共和国-匈牙利罗马尼亚保加利亚其他东南欧Slowenia克罗地亚马其顿-发展中国家地中海土耳其突尼斯埃及拉丁美洲巴西墨西哥委内瑞拉-东南亚中国10.1印度印度尼西亚巴基斯坦-泰国韩国15,1台湾马来西亚香港新加坡6.1总计European Union Anti-dumping PoliciesThe traditional trade-policy measur

17、es deployed by the EU to protect its markets for industrial goods are declining in importance. The general level of tariffs is rather low and is set to fall further in the wake of the implementation of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Quantitative restrictions on imports from GATT partner countries 1

18、are banned under the Agreement and, for the restrictions still in existence in the textile sector, a schedule, albeit a long-term one, for abolition has been agreed. Even the popular so-called grey area measures, such as voluntary export restraint agreements, which enabled undesirable imports to be

19、curtailed in the face of the rules imposed by the GATT, are to be more stringently punished within the framework of the newWorld Trade Organisation (WTO). It is against this background that attention has increasingly been drawn to anti-dumping policies as a legitimate strategy against the trend towa

20、rds free trade. Against the background of a multilateral trade system based on most-favoured nation status and equal treatment of all member countries, anti-dumping policies, legitimised as a legal obstacle to unfair methods, enable a country to raise the price of, and thus hinder, undesired imports

21、 in a very precise, discriminatory fashion. It is increasingly being claimed that EU anti-dumping policies are being used less as a corrective for unfair trade practices than as an autonomous instrument of protectionism. Preconditions for anti-dumping proceduresFrom the very outset the original GATT

22、 Treaty made provision (in Article VI) for anti-dumping regulations as a means of recourse against unfair trade practices. The conditions applying to anti-dumping procedures were specified further in the Uruguay Round. The rules of the game have been rendered more precise in order to improve legisla

23、tive consistency and to ensure in both material and institutional terms that the authorities behave fairly vis gt vis the parties involved. In the wake of this amendment, changes were also made to the EC anti-dumping regulation. As was the case previously, it is oriented strictly towards the GATT te

24、xt. A significant element in making the procedure as fair as possible is its transparency; the EC takes account of this requirement by publishing all the stages of the proceedings. 6 If the European Commission takes the view that an application for anti-dumping measures contains sufficient evidence

25、of dumping and the injury resulting from it, it initiates an anti-dumping investigation. It is to be noted, however, that it only announces those cases in which an anti-dumping investigation is actually implemented and not those cases it has rejected.In order to impose anti-dumping measures the Comm

26、ission must then show that:a) imports are occurring at dumping prices thatb) cause or threaten to cause material injury to an industry in the importing country, andc) intervention is in the interest of the Community.As regards the last point, the new regulation explicitly states that all interests a

27、re to be considered, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers (Article 21). At the same time, the article accords special importance to restore effective competition, and the provision requiring that measures not be imposed despite evidence of dumping and economic dam

28、age are formulated rather vaguely. In the old regulation it was merely the general interest of the Community in joint intervention in cases of injurious dumping that was mentioned. The short-term benefits of low prices for industrial users and consumers are weighted against the injurious effects of

29、the dumped imports in terms of the industrial and social costs of the contraction or elimination of firms, sectors or whole industries. It remains to be seen whether consumer interests will in fact be given greater consideration than was previously the case. Given that consumers are far less well or

30、ganised than producers at both national and Community level, there are few prima facie grounds for supposing that their influence on EU trade policy will change fundamentally. The central problem, however, is determining when dumping has occurred. A product is considered as being dumped when it is s

31、old abroad at a lower price than in its country of origin. The EU has adopted very precise provisions on the calculation of export price, normal value and fair price comparison, ll In concrete cases, however, its calculations cannot be effectively scrutinized. Generally, the calculation is based on

32、prices of exporters or producers in various markets or on their costs; in the case of non-market economies the normal value is calculated with reference to prices or a constructed value in a market economy third country. Yet price differentiation is a rational, indeed even a necessary, strategy - on

33、e determined by varying market situations. If a heavily protected domestic market permits a fwm to earn monopoly rents, export prices on open markets in which competition is tougher will inevitably be lower. This is rational from a profit-maximisafion perspective, provided the fixed costs are covere

34、d by domestic sales and foreign sales at the lower prices at least cover variable costs. Price differentiation is very pronounced within the EU itself, and indeed this was one of the arguments put forward for the creation of the Single European Market. And even now, and in spite of pressure from the

35、 Commission, EU automobile producers, among others, take account of the different levels of taxation imposed in the Member States and differentiate their prices accordingly.As a means of showing that dumping has caused injury, market share losses by domestic industry, significant pressure on prices

36、and the resultant decline in output, employment, profitability and productivity are examined. It is extremely difficult, however, to isolate the damage caused by dumping from other negative influences, e.g. those of a cyclical, structural or exchange-rate-related nature. Of central importance in eva

37、luating the injury sustained are the volume and rate of growth of the dumped imports compared to other normal imports and to domestic output. In any case, anti-dumping measures only appear to be appropriate in the case of firms with a dominant market position. The form taken by anti-dumping measures

38、On initiating anti-dumping investigations the Commission may impose provisional anti-dumping duties, but no sooner than 60 days from the initiation of proceedings and for a maximum of nine months, m It is the Council that decides on definitive duties since March 1994 by simple majority. Such duties

39、generally apply for five years and expire automatically, unless a review applied for by Community producers establishes that the duty should be maintained. In anti-dumping proceedings against individual producers the margins of dumping are calculated on an individual basis, and the duty required to

40、avert injury fixed. The Commission reports that between 1988 and1992 the anti-dumping duties averaged only about half the average margin of dumping (40%), although even this marks a significant increase in prices. Moreover, it must be recognised that in 1995 many anti-dumping duties were above 50%,

41、and some even reached in excess of 100% (on espadrilles from China). A duty of more than 90% was imposed on TV camera systems and certain electronic microswitches PROMs) from Japan. Anti-dumping proceedings can also be terminated by an undertaking by the exporters to charge minimumprices. However, i

42、n 1992 and 1993 the Commission did not terminate any proceedings exclusively on this basis and in 1994 just two (Russia and Lithuania). In a number of cases, price undertakings were accepted from some of the firms involved while at the same time duties were imposed on the other firms. Frequently the

43、 EC also imposes anti-dumping duties retroactively if it takes the view that price undertakings made have not been adhered to. Whatever the method used, higher import prices result. The difference is that price commitments enable foreign suppliers to widen their margins, whereas, in cases where a du

44、ty is imposed, this extra revenue benefits the EC. Quantifying EU anti-dumping actionsUsually the extent of anti-dumping actions is established on the basis of the number of proceedings. In this analysis, however, the volume of the imports affected will also be considered. Between 1990 and 1995 the

45、EU initiated more than 200 anti-dumping investigations, affecting countries (cf. table 1). With the exception of 1993, in which imports were depressed, the number of anti-dumping proceedings initiated has remained relatively constant in recent years at around Increasingly they have been directed at

46、southern and south-east Asian developing countries. The rise in the number of cases opened against successor states to the Soviet Union is due to the increase in the number of independent states. Even though only some of the investigations actually lead to the imposition of (provisional or definitiv

47、e) anti-dumping duties or the acceptance of price undertakings, the mere threat of proceedings creates a climate of uncertainty.Overall, in 1994 imports valued at ECU 9 billion were affected by anti-dumping actions; 3 this is equiva-lent to 2.2% of all industrial goods imports 24 from non-EU countri

48、es and 3.5% of the imports from the countries affected. While the orders of magnitude are marginal from the point of view of the EU, they appear in a totally different light when seen from the perspective of the exporting countries.Countries affected by anti-dumping actionsOf all the EU imports subj

49、ect to anti-dumping actions in 1994, almost half (ECU 4.5 billion) came from billion). The positions of selected export countries on the EU market compared with their respective shares of the imports subjected to anti-dumping actions are presented in the following figures. If, on the other hand, the

50、 incidence of anti-dumping actions is measured against total industrial-good exports from the country in question (import coverage ratios), then Pakistan and South Korea were hardest hit in 1994: almost a fifth of their exports to the EU were affected by anti-dumping actions; at 17% and 15% the figu

51、res for Georgia and Belarus were almost as high (cf. table 2). In the case of countries whose exports are concentrated on a small number of commodity groups, antidumping actions against some of these products are of far greater significance than for countries whose exports are more highly diversifie

52、d. With import coverage ratios of around 8%, Japan, the Ukraine and Turkey were also relatively hard hit by anti-dumping actions. Among the southern and south-east Asian countries, India, Indonesia and Thailand, exports were also affected to an above-average extent (around 5%), whereas only just ove

53、r 3% of Chinas industrial-good exports were Affected. The marked heterogeneity of the group of countries particularly affected by anti-dumping actions is evidence of the precision with which this instrument is deployed, k is not primarily directed against statetrading countries, nor specifically aga

54、inst weak trading partners: recourse is consistently made to anti-dumping actions in the face of the threat of tough competitionfrom whichever country that comes.Commodity groups affected by anti-dumping actionsEU anti-dumping actions are concentrated on a small number of commodity groups. Strikingl

55、y high import coverage ratios were identified (1994) for a number of textiles (cotton, synthetic or artificial spun fibres, spun material and silk), the commodity group stone, earth and cement, fertilisers and electronics (el. table 3). In most cases these areas are those which in any case enjoy the

56、 highest levels of protection: in these areas the normal EU duties are above average (with the exception of silk and the group stone, earth and cement), and the reductions agreed in the Uruguay Round were less significant than in other areas. In the case of the other eight commodity groups affected

57、to an above-average extent by anti-dlumping actions, this correlation is less clear;, among them are several categories with relatively low duties. The very pronounced concentration of anti-dumping proceedings in 1994 on various areas of the textile sector is a new development, as the quantitative r

58、estrictions under the Multi-Fibre Agreement were until then considered to offer the best protection. Nor can the recent antidumping proceedings be seen as a precautionary measure against steps towards liberalisation in the course of the implementation of the Uruguay Round and the incorporation of th

59、e textile sector into the new GATT regime: in the fast phase the EU does not need to liberalise, because it already meets the requirements. Clearly the branch associations of European producers are making great efforts to erect new barriers, in most cases in addition to the existing quantitative res

60、trictions. Most of the anti-dumping proceedings in the textile sector affected countries facing quantitative restrictions with respect to the commodities in question. These, however,had been fixed in tonnes, so that the exporting countries, faced with the weakness of demand in 1993, had clearly atte