内部控制l论文相关 外文翻译

1、.审计委员会、董事会和内部控制重大缺陷的整治Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control译文：本研究探讨审核委员会和董事会的有效性是否与公司的内部控制的重大缺陷修复的及时性有关。选取的样本包括从2003年7月至2004年12月编报公司根据的“萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法案”第302节披露的至少一种重大弱点。采用Logistic回归分析发现，较大的审计委员会，审计委员会，更大的非会计财务专业知识，以及更多的独立委员会的企业更容易及时地修复重大缺陷。这些结

2、果表明，审计委员会及董事会对监督整治重大缺陷发挥了重要作用。总的来说，这项研究有助于我们了解审计委员会和董事会根据萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法案“的制度的有效性。这项研究还确定了整治重大缺陷及时性的重要决定因素，这是提高财务报告质量和恢复投资者信心的关键。研究表明，审核委员会的质量与该公司的内部控制的质量呈正相关。克里希南（2005）使用的样本公司，改变了审计师在1994-2000年期间发现，独立审计委员会和审计委员会的财务专业知识是不太可能与内部控制的问题有相关性。 Zhang等人（2007）使用在“萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法”颁布后披露内部控制缺陷的样本公司，发现这些企业更可能有财务专业知识少的审计

3、委员会。如果审计委员会的质量与内部控制的质量有关，似乎有理由相信，一个更有效的审计委员会将确保及时修复重大缺陷，以保持内部控制的有效性。一个有效的审计委员会可以直接进行，通过审查财务和会计人员的会计程序和控制来监督公司的控制。当发现重大弱点，有效的审计委员会，更可能采取实用的方法，并和审计师讨论如何整治重大缺陷。通过努力跟进有关建议，以改善内部控制和监测整治力度的进展，一个更有效的审计委员会可能导致重大缺陷的及时整治。虽然审计委员会在监督整治重大缺陷中发挥了重要作用，但在整治过程中，董事会可以提供增量的监督。在大型企业中，机构发生冲突通常是由于所有权和控制权的分离。为了处理这些冲突和保障股东的

4、利益，董事会要发挥其监督作用，监督高层管理人员，监督内部控制系统，确保财务报告的质量。由于重大缺陷给了管理一个从事不一致行为的机会，董事会能够履行其受托责任的监督管理，确保管理层迅速采取行动，修复重大缺陷和维护内部控制质量。有研究表明，董事会可以通过激进的会计（德赛等，2006）推翻该公司的高层管理人员。如果董事会对类似的高层管理人员因内部控制失败进行纪律处分，这可能对高层管理人员造成了强大的压力来及时整治重大缺陷。一个更有效的董事会很可能在管理和监督管理的行为方面有更强的影响力的。例如，有研究表明，一个更有效的板可以阻止管理行为导致的欺诈行为以及SEC的执法行动（1996年迈克尔 - 比斯利

5、.德肖等。1996年）。魏斯巴赫（1998）也认为，一个更有效的董事会可以减少CEO财务表现不佳的可能性。因此，我期望一个更有效的董事会对重大缺陷进行及时整治。 “萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法”的两个重要方面是与财务报告相关的内部控制的质量和公司治理机制的有效性。本研究发现，较大的非会计财务专业知识的审计委员会，以及更多的独立委员会的企业更容易及时整治重大缺陷。结果有一定的影响。首先，虽然各大交易所要求审计委员会有至少3名董事，本研究的结果表明，公司可以扩大其审计委员会，加强内部控制的监测。关于金融知识的定义，根据萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法案“407的争议，这项研究表明，无财务专业知识的审核委员会成员，

6、提高了监测的重大缺陷的整治。因此，非会计财务专业知识对于审计委员会成员的专业的治理知识是一种宝贵的组成部分。这一发现到最后得到“萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法”的支持，规定扩大定义的财务专业知识，包括非会计知识。本研究具有一定的局限性。首先，现有的研究表明，有效的审计委员会的公司不太可能有内部控制问题（克里希南2005年，张等人，2007年）。在本研究的样本包括有重大缺陷的公司，从而可能偏向于赞成相对无效的审计委员会的公司。缺乏足够的审计委员会特征的变化也可以对这些特性的发现显著成效。此外，公司披露的重大缺陷，这是加速编报公司限制本研究的结果的普遍性。然而，以前的研究也限制设置测试审计委员会的影响，例

7、如，审计师变更的的公司（克里希南2005年）和强调财政上的公司（Car cello和Neal2000）。第二，公司终止其证券登记或延迟提交的10-K报告被排除在样本。此外，这些公司将如何影响本研究的结果目前尚不清楚。第三，进行的各种测试的统计力量可能是由于小样本的大小。当这加强了发现重要变量的统计力量时，它的工作原理为他人反对发现统计学上的显著成效。最后，这是一个研究的关联，而不是因果关系。这可能是与内部控制质量和治理特征的不可观测的因素推动的结果。这个问题通过增加在“萨班斯 - 奥克斯利法案期间（阿什博斯凯夫等人2007b; Doyle等人，2007年b）被发现的影响内部控制质量的各种控制变

8、量后缓解了。 原文：Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control This study examines whether the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board of director

9、s is associated with firms timeliness in the remediation of material weaknesses in internal control. The sample comprises accelerated filers that disclosed at least one material weakness from July 2003 to December 2004 under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . Using logistic regression analyses,

10、 I find that firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater non-accounting financial expertise, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate material weaknesses in a timely manner. These results show that the audit committee and the board play an important role in moni

11、toring the remediation of material weaknesses. Overall, the study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regime. The study also identifies important determinants of firms timeliness in the remediation of material weakne

12、sses, which is key to improving financial reporting quality and restoring investor confidence. Studies have shown that the quality of the audit committee is positively associated with the quality of the firms internal controls. Krishnan (2005) uses a sample of firms that changed auditors over the pe

13、riod 1994-2000 and finds that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with internal control problems. Zhang et al. (2007) use a sample of firms that disclosed internal control deficiencies after the enactment of Sarban

14、es-Oxley Act and find that these firms are more likely to have audit committees that have less financial expertise. If audit committee quality is associated with the quality of internal controls, it seems reasonable to believe that a more effective audit committee will ensure timelier remediation of

15、 material weaknesses in order to maintain the effectiveness of internal controls. An effective audit committee can directly engage in overseeing the firms controls by reviewing ternal accounting procedures and controls with the financial and accounting staff. When material weaknesses are detected, a

16、n effective audit committee is more likely to take a hands-on approach and discuss with the internal and external auditors on how to remediate material weaknesses . By diligently following up on recommendations to improve internal controls and monitoring the progress of the remediation efforts close

17、ly, a more effective audit committee is likely to result in timelier remediation of material weaknesses . Although the audit committee plays an important role in monitoring the remediation of material weaknesses , the board of directors can provide incremental oversight on the remediation process. W

18、ithin large corporations, agency conflicts arise due to the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 1983). To deal with these conflicts and to protect shareholders interests, the board assumes an oversight role that involves monitoring top management, approving the corporations strategy

19、, monitoring the internal control system, and ensuring the quality of financial reports. Because material weaknesses open a window of opportunity for management to engage in incongruent behaviors, the board can discharge its fiduciary duties in monitoring management by ensuring that management take

20、prompt actions to remediate material weaknesses and maintain internal control quality. Studies have shown that the board can oust top management from the firm for aggressive accounting (Desai et al. 2006). If the board imposes similar disciplinary actions on top management for internal control failu

21、res, this can create a strong pressure for top management to remediate material weaknesses promptly. A more effective board is likely to have a stronger influence on management and monitor the actions of management. For instance, studies have shown that a more effective board can deter managerial ac

22、tions leading to frauds and SEC enforcement actions (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996). Weisbach (1998) also finds that a more effective board increases the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor financial performance. Hence, I expect a more effective board to result in timelier remediation of mater

23、ial weaknesses. Two important aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act are the quality of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. This study finds that firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater non-accounting financial expertis

24、e, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate material weaknesses in a timely manner. The results have some implications. First, although the major exchanges require audit committees to have at least three directors, the results of this study suggest that firms can enhance the monitori

25、ng of internal controls by expanding their audit committees. With regard to the controversies over the definition of financial expertise under Sarbanes-Oxley Act 407, this study shows that the non-accounting financial expertise of the audit committee members enhances the monitoring of material weakn

26、esses remediation. Hence, non-accounting financial expertise is a valuable component of the governance expertise of the audit committee members. This finding lends support to the final provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which expand the definition of financial expertise to include non-accounting expe

27、rtise. This study has certain limitations. First, prior studies show that firms with effective audit committees are less likely to have internal controls problems (Krishnan 2005; Zhang et al. 2007). The sample in this study comprises firms with material weaknesses and may thus be biased in favor of

28、firms with relatively ineffective audit committees. The lack of sufficient variation in audit committee characteristics can also work against finding significant results for these characteristics.Furthermore, using firms that disclose material weaknesses and that are accelerated filers limit the generalizability of the results of this study. However, prior studies have also used restricted settings to test the effect of audit committeesfor example, auditor change firms (K