物流成本 外文翻译 英文文献 分销渠道中的物流服务.doc

文献出自：Rabinovich E, Knemeyer A M, Mayer C M. Why do Internet commerce firms incorporate logistics service providers in their distribution channels?: The role of transaction costs and network strengthJ. Journal of Operations Management, 2007, 25(3): 661-681.Why do Internet commerce firms incorporate logistics service providers in their distribution channels: The role of transaction costs and network strengthAbstractThe Internet has redefined information-sharing boundaries in distribution channels and opened new avenues for managing logistics services. In the process, firms have started to incorporate new service providers in their commercial interactions with customers over the Internet. This paper studies conceptually and empirically why Internet commerce firms (ICFs) have established relationships with these providers. Focusing on logistics services in outbound distribution channels, we rely on transaction cost theory to reveal that low levels of asset specificity and uncertainty drive Internet commerce firms to establish these relationships. Moreover, we apply strategic network theory to show that Internet commerce firms seek these providers because they offer access to relationship networks that bundle many complementary logistics services. In addition, logistics service providers make these services available across new and existing relationships between the Internet commerce firms, their customers, and their vendors.1. IntroductionThe growth of electronic commerce has driven Internet commerce firms (ICFs) retailers and other organizations that market products over the Web to increasingly share market demand data with other firms so as to enrich the order fulfillment services they offer to customers (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002). Along these efforts, ICFs have started seeking logistics service providers to tap into resources and skills that could improve their fulfillment capabilities (Dutta and Segev, 1999).These logistics service providers are not simply variants of transportation companies, and as such, they are not to be confused with what are known nowadays as third party logistics (3PL) firms. They offer logistics services, of course, but they could also enable ICFs to leverage other distribution parties logistical resources and skills in order to fulfill their customer orders more effectively. They may use their assets to take care of product returns, for instance, or work with established carriers on “last-mile” deliveries. Or their value may be primarily in managing order information shared among distribution partiese.g., centralizing inventory data, especially when products are being shipped directly from upstream echelons in the distribution channel. Logistics service providers such as Parcel Direct, for instance, participate in this kind of activity to ultimately assist ICFs in consolidating orders for drop-shipping to their customers.Past research has identified the relationships with these logistics service providers in offline settings and has positioned them within logistics triads (Larson and Gammelgaard, 2001) and extended-enterprise logistics systems (Stock et al., 2000). Yet, what is ground-breaking about these relationships for an ICF is that they are driven by their potential to (1) generate low transaction costs, (2) bundle complementary logistics services, and (3) expand the availability of those services across customers, vendors, and “last-mile” delivery companies, such as UPS (Amit and Zott, 2001).The goal of this study is to conceptualize and empirically assess how these drivers shape ICF managements decisions to develop mechanisms to form and manage dyadic exchanges between their firms and focal organizations offering logistics services in outbound distribution channels. Prior literature has used the term “governance” to define these mechanisms (Barney, 1999, p. 138) and has delineated governance decisions through which a firm can infuse order in exchanges with a focal provider where potential conflicts threaten to undo or upset opportunities to realize economic gains (Williamson, 1999, p. 1090). These decisions center on the extent to which firms rely on a particular governance mode for a service. Since our research context focuses on outbound distribution channels, we define such reliance as the proportion of Internet orders for which a governance mode is used for a service supporting the fulfillment of those orders. This definition is consistent with that used by John and Weitz (1988) for distribution in an offline setting.Our conceptualization and empirical assessment are unique because they recognize that governance in an exchange between an ICF and a focal logistics service provider is embedded within a networked structure that also comprises a broader collection of relational links among other distribution-channel members (Chen and Paulraj, 2004andJones et al., 1997). In this context, our research is primarily concerned with ICFs reliance on networked governance structures. These structures have been defined as economic forms of organization that are built on reciprocal exchange patterns, enabling firms (in this case, ICFs) to obtain resources and services through dyadic relationships with other organizations (i.e., focal logistics service providers), as well as through broader relational links where these relationships exist ( Powell, 1990andGulati, 1998).To fulfill the goal of this study, Section 2 positions our research in the strategic- and operations-management literatures. Also, it develops the theoretical foundation and hypotheses that articulate a decision-making framework for ICF reliance on networked governance structures for logistics services. Section 3 discusses methodological issues pertaining to the data collection and the operationalization of the constructs developed as part of the theoretical framework presented in Section 2. We analyze the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 with a presentation of findings, academic and practical contributions, and future research opportunities stemming from our study.2. Theoretical frameworkBecause networked governance structures are based on linkages among interdependent firms (Powell, 1990), they constitute an alternate form of exchange (Spulber, 1996) that expands two traditional forms: perfectly competitive markets and vertically integrated hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). Theoretically, decisions to adopt such exchanges rest on costs potentially incurred by ICFs when they establish market-based linkages with focal providers to manage i.e., plan, organize, operate, and control logistics services (Madhok, 2002). However, these decisions are also linked to scale, skills, and resources that ICFs may obtain in broader networks of services and entities accessible through their relationships with focal providers (Doz and Hamel, 1998andGulati, 1998).Consequently, our assessment of these decisions integrates two distinct theoretical perspectives: transaction cost theory and strategic network theory. Transaction cost theory helps us understand how efforts and risks in establishing links with focal logistics service providers are related to expenditures that impact ICFs reliance on these specialists. Through strategic network theory, and in accordance with its definition, we can establish how the access offered by focal logistics service providers to networked governance structures shapes ICFs relationships with the providers (Granovetter, 1973).This integration adds to extant literature that has independently relied on transaction cost and strategic network theories to conceptualize similar phenomena at a strategic level (e.g., Eccles, 1981, Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Granovetter, 1992andJones et al., 1997). The integration builds on work by Amit and Zott (2001), who used exploratory case studies to apply these theories to an Internet setting and concluded that neither of these theories can fully explain by itself value creation across different governance structures present in Internet business models. Therefore, Amit and Zott (2001) posit that transaction cost and strategic network theories complement each other in explaining the emergence of governance structures in Internet settings.Individually, transaction cost theory focuses on an exchange between two parties (e.g., an ICF and a focal logistics service provider) as a discrete event that is valuable by itself, as it reflects the choice of the most efficient governance form and hence contributes to lower the exchange costs incurred by one of the parties, i.e., the ICF. Strategic network theory complements transaction cost theory because it considers the individual dyadic exchange collectively with other relational links that may accompany that exchange (Amit and Zott, 2001). This does not mean, however, that strategic network theory would become the dominant research view, thus rendering transaction cost theory irrelevant. By articulating a framework necessary to define the choice regarding the most efficient governance form in the exchange between an ICF and its focal provider, transaction cost theory would actually pave the way for strategic network theory to define whether resources and services available through other links surrounding the ICFprovider exchange would confirm or modify that choice (Amit and Zott, 2001).Within operations management, our assessment of these theories answers calls by researchers to offer a better understanding of (1) decision-making mechanisms behind the development of relationships between firms (Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998) and (2) managerial decisions concerning logistics operations in inter-firm relationships (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). As a result, our research contributes to the operations-management literature because it offers a more detailed understanding as to why firms, in this case ICFs, utilize alternative structures to incorporate solution specialists, in general, and logistics service providers, in particular, into their distribution channels.Moreover, in studying decisions about the management of inter-firm exchanges, our research conceptualization follows that introduced by Choi et al. (2001) and Choi and Hong (2002), who advocated that operational decisions around inter-organizational exchanges be positioned within larger networks of firms. However, by focusing on logistics services necessary to carry out the fulfillment of customer orders, we extend those conceptualizations from a manufacturing context to a service setting. This allows us to study not only cost considerations, but also value-adding parameters in decisions to incorporate networked governance structures to connect with other distribution-channel members.Our assessment of decisions by ICF management to form networked governance structures also contributes to literature in service operations management. With the advent of Internet commerce, experts predicted that greater opportunities for information interaction between ICFs and other distribution-channel members would lead to greater efficiency in the performance of distribution-channel services (Benjamin and Wigand, 1995). In theory, this efficiency would inevitably compel ICFs to lower their prices to compete with other organizations. Otherwise, ICFs would likely succumb to price-aggressive competitors who would be able to offer these same services to customers at relatively lower costs (Giaglis et al., 2002).In fact, Dell Computers and other ICFs have succeeded at increasing the efficiency of their distribution channels by offering wide product variety at low prices. However, evidence suggests that other ICFs have chosen not to rely exclusively on low prices to compete and instead have obtained price premiums by offering services with the support of providers in areas such as logistics (Maltz et al., 2004). After all, through logistics services, providers can add value to Internet transactions by allowing customers to obtain exact product specifications that match their needs (Boyer et al., 2002). Moreover, Internet customer satisfaction (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2005), loyalty (Heim and Sinha, 2001), and, thus, willingness to ultimately pay price premiums (Rabinovich and Bailey, 2004) are likely to be related to the availability of those services.中文翻译为什么网络电子商务公司将其分销渠道中的物流服务归于交易成本的作用和网络的力量摘要：互联网重新定义了信息共享边界的分销渠道和物流管理服务开辟了新的途径。在这个过程中，公司已经开始把新的服务提供商在他们的商业在互联网上与客户互动。本文研究的概念上和经验的互联网电子商务公司（ICFS）与这些供应商建立了合作关系。专注于物流服务，在出站的分销渠道，我们依靠交易成本理论表明，水平低的资产专用性和不确定性驱动的互联网电子商务公司要建立这些关系。此外，我们实施战略网络理论表明，互联网电子商务公司提供许多互补的物流服务捆绑的关系网络，寻求供应商，因为他们。此外，物流服务供应商提供这些服务跨越新的和现有的互联网电子商务公司，他们的客户和他们的供应商之间的关系。1.介绍电子商务的增长推动了互联网电子商务公司（ICFS） - 零售商和其他机构越来越多地分享市场的产品通过Web - 与其他公司的市场需求数据，以丰富他们提供给客户的订单执行服务（Frohlich和威斯布鲁克，2002）。随着这些努力，ICFS已经开始寻求物流服务供应商进军资源和技能，可以提高他们的履行能力（Dutta和塞格夫，1999年）。这些物流服务供应商不能简单地运输公司的变种，正因为如此，他们现在被称为第三方物流（3PL）公司是不被混淆。当然，他们提供物流服务，但他们还可以使ICFS利用其他分销各方的后勤资源和技能，以更有效地履行他们的客户订单。产品的回报率，例如照顾，或与既定的“最后一英里”的交付运营商，他们可以利用自己的资产。或者他们的价值可能主要在订单信息共享之间的分布各方，例如管理，集中库存数据，特别是当产品被运往在分销渠道直接从上游梯队。物流服务供应商，如包裹直接，例如，参加这样的活动，最终协助ICFS在巩固他们的客户订单下降，航运。过去的研究已经确定了脱机设置这些物流服务供应商的关系，他们在物流黑社会（拉尔森和Gammelgaard，2001年）和扩展企业的物流系统（Stock等人，2000）。然而，什么是这些关系的ICF是突破性的，他们都在为自己的潜力：（1）生成低交易成本，（2）捆绑互补性的物流服务，及（3）扩大客户提供这些服务的整个，供应商和“最后一公里”的快递公司，如UPS（Amit和Zott，2001年）。本研究的目的是概念化和实证评估这些驱动程序的形状ICF管理层的决定是如何建立机制，形成二元之间的交流和管理他们的公司提供物流服务，在出站的分销渠道和联络组织。之前的文献中使用了“管理”一词来定义这些机制（巴尼，1999年，第138页），并划定了管理决策的公司注入秩序的交流与重点供应商，潜在的冲突威胁撤消或不高兴的机会实现经济收益（威廉姆森，1999年，1090年）。这些决定公司在何种程度上依赖于一个特定的治理模式的服务中心。由于我们的研究内容集中在出站的分销渠道，我们定义这种依赖的治理模式，用于支持履行这些订单的服务网络订单的比例。这个定义是一致的分布由约翰和Weitz（1988）为在脱机设置。我们的概念化和实证评估是独一无二的，因为他们认识到，治理被嵌入到一个网络结构，还包括其他分销渠道成员关系之间的联系，更广泛的收集（陈和Paulraj在ICF和重点物流服务供应商之间的交流， 2004年，Jones等人，1997）。在这种情况下，我们的研究主要关注的与ICFS依赖网络的治理结构。这些结构都被定义为经济的组织形式，是建立在相互交换模式，使企业（在这种情况下，ICFS）获得的资源和服务，通过与其他组织（如重点物流服务供应商）的二元关系，以及通过这些关系存在的更广泛的关系链接（鲍威尔，1990年和古拉蒂，1998年）。为了完成这项研究的目标，我们的研究第2个位置的战略和运营管理文献。此外，它的发展的理论基础和假设，阐明一个决策网络治理结构的框架为ICF依赖于物流服务。第3节讨论的方法问题，有关的数据收集和运作的第2节中提出的理论框架的一部分开发的结构。在第4节，我们分析了实证结果。最后，我们的结论在第5节的调查结果，学术界和实际贡献和未来的研究机会，从我们的研究带来演示。2.理论框架由于网络的治理结构，根据之间的联系，相互依存的企业（鲍威尔，1990年），它们构成了另一种形式的交流（Spulber，1996年），扩大两个传统的形式：完全竞争市场，垂直整合的层次结构（威廉姆森，1975）。从理论上讲，决定采用这样的交流，其余的成本可能所产生的ICFS时，建立以市场为基础的联系与联络供应商管理 - 即计划，组织，运作和控制 - 物流服务（Madhok，2002年）的。然而，这些决定也与ICFS可能会获得更广泛的网络服务和实体可以通过与重点供应商的关系（打和Hamel，1998年和古拉蒂，1998年）的规模，技能和资源。因此，我们评估这些决策集成了两个不