公司治理优秀研究生定稿

硕 士 学 位 论 文论文题目：管理层持股与公司绩效关系的实证研究 Empirical Research on Relation Between the Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance作者姓名：李井林作者学号：2008140007指导教师：杜晓光 教授论文密级：专业名称：企业管理单位年级：管理学院 2008 级完成日期：2011 年 6 月渤海大学研究生学院1管理层持股与公司绩效关系的实证研究中 文 摘 要管理层持股作为一种有效解决企业委托代理问题的长效激励机制，在西方发达国家得到了广泛应用。在我国，随着上市公司股权分置改革的推进和股权激励相关政策的出台，管理层股权激励也将越来越普遍。在此背景下，本文通过研究管理层持股与公司绩效之间的相关性、因果性和影响因素，希望为今后的管理层股权激励政策提供一些有益的建议。在采用因子分析法计算出公司绩效综合得分值的基础上, 本文通过相关分析、曲线估计和路径分析来检验上市公司管理层持股和公司绩效之间的关系。基本研究思路为：首先，概述了我国管理层股权激励政策的实施背景，以期建立适合我国国情的实证研究模型；其次，对国内外有关管理层持股与公司绩效的文献进行了回顾与评述，并对股权激励的相关理论与假说进行了具体阐述，为提出管理层持股与公司绩效的相关假设打下基础；然后，对管理层持股与公司绩效进行了实证研究，通过对 2008 年 A股上市公司样本数据的分析，得到了管理层持股和公司绩效相互影响，但为微弱的正相关关系；管理层持股具有内生性；资产负债率、公司规模、股权集中度和企业产权性质会在不同程度上影响管理层持股和公司绩效的结论；最后，对上市公司有效发挥管理层股权激励效应提出了政策建议，并指出了本论文的研究局限及进一步的研究方向。关 键 词管理层持股；公司绩效；激励效应；内生性；实证研究2EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON RELATION BETWEEN THE MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCEABSTRACTAs the long-term incentive mechanism, managerial ownership tackles with principal-agent problems in companies effectively，and has been widely implemented in western developed countries. Meanwhile，more and more Chinas listed companies are becoming interested in managerial ownership for the reform of non-tradable shares and the promotion of ownership incentive policy. In this context, this article analyzes the relations between the managerial ownership and corporate performance about listed companies in our country，including their cause and effect and affect factors, in order to supply some advices for ownership incentive policy.Based on corporate performance composite scores calculated by factor analysis, this paper tests the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance, through the relevant analysis, curve regression analysis and path analysis. Its general ideas are: Firstly, describes the Chinas managerial ownership incentive policy research background, to build empirical research models suitable for Chinas national conditions; Secondly, reviews related literatures about the relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance of domestic and foreign companies, and specifically addresses the equity incentive related theory and hypothesis, to lay foundation for making relate supposes about managerial ownership and corporate performance; Thirdly, makes empirical research on managerial ownership and corporate performance by analyzing 2008 A-share listed companies data, and concludes that there is mutual influence between managerial ownership and corporate performance, but the positive correlation is weak; managerial ownership is endogenous; the asset-liability ratio, company size, ownership concentration and enterprise ownership nature affect to different degrees the managerial ownership and corporate performance; At last, makes suggestions for implementing equity incentive effectively, and notes the inadequacy of the present paper and the direction of further research. KEY WORDSmanagerial ownership；corporate performance；effect of incentive；endogenous; empirical research3目 录1 绪 论 .11.1 研究背景及意义.11.1.1 研究背景.11.1.2 研究意义.21.2 研究内容和研究方法.31.2.1 研究内容.31.2.2 研究方法.41.3 主要创新点.52 管理层持股与公司绩效关系研究综述.62.1 国外研究综述.62.1.1 管理层持股与公司绩效相关论.62.1.2 管理层持股与公司绩效不相关.72.2 国内研究综述.82.2.1 管理层持股与公司绩效相关论.82.2.2 管理层持股与公司绩效不相关.92.3 国内外研究评述.103 管理层持股与公司绩效关系的理论分析.123.1 管理层持股与公司绩效关系的理论基础.123.1.1 委托代理理论.123.1.2 人力资本理论.123.1.3 激励相容理论.133.2 管理层持股与公司绩效关系的相关假说.143.2.1 利益趋同假说.143.2.2 经营者防御假说.144 管理层持股与公司绩效关系实证研究设计.164.1 研究样本及数据来源.164.2 研究假设.164.3 研究变量设定.184.3.1 因果关系变量.184.3.2 控制变量.1844.4 模型构建与研究方法选择.185 管理层持股与公司绩效关系的实证分析.205.1 描述性统计分析.205.2 实证结果及其分析.225.2.1 我国上市公司管理层持股与公司绩效的相关性检验.225.2.2 我国上市公司管理层持股与公司绩效的非线性关系检验.255.2.3 我国上市公司管理层持股与公司绩效的路径分析.266 研究结论与政策建议 .316.1 研究结论.316.2 政策建议.336.2.1 宏观层面建立良好的企业外部治理环境.336.2.2 企业层面完善企业内部治理机制.346.2.3 管理者层面增强管理者自身的信托责任.356.3 研究局限及进一步研究方向.35参考文献 .37附录 公司绩效综合得分计算 .40致 谢 .44攻读硕士期间发表的学术论文和研究成果 .455Contents1 Introduction 11.1 Research background and Significance11.1.1 Research background11.1.2 Research significance 21.2 Research contents and Methods 31.2.1Research contents 31.2.1Research methods41.3 Primary innovation 52 Review of the articles about the relation between managerial ownershipand corporate performance62.1 Review of international studies 62.1.1Relevance research about managerial ownership and corporate performance62.1.2Irrelevance research about managerial ownership and corporateperformance72.2 Review of domestic studies82.2.1Relevance research about managerial ownership and corporateperformance82.2.2Irrelevance research about managerial ownership and corporateperformance92.3 Summary of international and domestic studies103 Theoretical analysis of the relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance123.1Theoretical basis of the relation between managerial ownership andcorporate performance123.1.1 Principal-agent theory123.1.2 The theory of human capital123.1.3 Incentive alignment argument theory133.2 Related hypothesis of the relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance143.2.1 Convergence of interests hypothesis 1463.2.2 Managerial entrenchment hypothesis144 Design of empirical research on the relation between managerial ownershipand corporate performance164.1 Research sample and Data164.2 Research supposes164.3 Selections of research variables184.3.1 Cause and effect variables184.3.2 Control variables184.4 Models built and Selections of research methods 185 Empirical analysis of the relation between managerial ownership andcorporate performance205.1 Descriptive statistic analysis of related variables205.2 Empirical conclusions and analysis225.2.1 Correlations test on managerial ownership and corporate performance inChinas listed companies225.2.2 Non-linear test on managerial ownership and corporate performance inChinas listed companies255.2.3 Path analysis on managerial ownership and corporate performance in Chinas listed companies266 Study conclusions and Suggestions316.1 Research conclusions316.2 Suggestions336.2.1Macro-levelestablish good e2nterprise external governanceenvironment336.2.2 Enterprise levelimprove enterprise internal governance mechanism346.2.3 Manager levelstrengthen the fiduciary