2024 年非洲经济发展报告（英）-180正式版

UNITEDNATIONSCONFERENCEONTRADEANDDEVELOPMENT

2024Economic

developmentinAfricareport

UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential

Boostingregionalmarketsand

reducingrisks

Geneva,2025

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UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2024

ISBN:978-92-1-003413-5

eISBN:978-92-1-107032-3

ISSN:1990-5114

eISSN:1990-5122SalesNo.E.25.II.D.5

EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024

UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:Boostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisks

Acknowledgements

EconomicDevelopmentinAfrica2024:UnlockingAfrica’sTradePotential–BoostingRegional

MarketsandReducingRisksoftheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment

(UNCTAD)waspreparedbyHabibaBenBarka(teamleader),ChristineAwiti,GraceGondwe

andAnjaSlany,undertheoverallsupervisionofPaulAkiwumi,DirectoroftheDivisionforAfrica,

LeastDevelopedCountriesandSpecialProgrammes,andJuniorDavis,HeadofthePolicy

AnalysisandResearchBranch.ResearchsupportwasprovidedbySvenJaggiandLinShi.

AdministrativesupportwasprovidedbyEvelynBenítezandElenaStroganova.

UNCTADgratefullyacknowledgesthesubstantivecontributionsofAbbiM.Kedir,Universityof

Sheffield,UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland,andWimNaudé,Rheinisch-

WestfälischeTechnischeHochschule,AachenUniversity,Germany.

Ahybridmeetingwasheldon11June2024toconductapeerreviewofthereport.Itbrought

togetherspecialistsinthefieldsoftradeandinvestments,politicaleconomy,regionalintegration,

enterprisedevelopment,financialmarketsandriskmanagement.Thefollowingexpertstook

partinthemeeting:Jean-PaulAdam,OfficeoftheSpecialAdviseronAfricatotheSecretary-

GeneraloftheUnitedNations;MonaFaridBadran,CairoUniversity,Egypt;DanielCash,United

NationsUniversityCentreforPolicyResearch;KarimElAynaoui,HinhDinh,KarimElAynaoui,

SaloiElYamani,FatimaEzzahraMengoubandIsabelleTsakok,PolicyCentrefortheNewSouth,

Morocco;NaseemJaved,ExpothonWorldwide;SergiiMeleshchuk,InternationalMonetary

Fund;JeremiahNyambinya,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Italy;NkechiS.Owoo,University

ofGhana,Ghana;SanjayPatnaik,BrookingsInstitution,UnitedStatesofAmerica;Vincent

Rouget,ControlRisks;MustaphaSadniJallab,WorldTradeOrganization;SampawendeJules

A.Tapsoba,AfricanExport–ImportBank;FionaTregenna,UniversityofJohannesburg,South

Africa;andKomiTsowou,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.

ThefollowingUNCTADcolleaguesprovidedhelpfulinputsandcommentsduringvariousreview

processes:LisaBorgatti,TheresaCarpenter,MussieDelelegn,HamedElKady,Elizabeth

Gachuiri,KeithLockwood,LudovicaPoponcini,MesutSaygili,StefanieWestandAnidaYupari.

ThereportwaseditedbyLucyDeleze.Coverdesignanddesktoppublishingwereundertaken

bytheUNCTADCommunicationandExternalRelationsSection.

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Tableofcontents

Acknowledgementsiii

Forewordix

Abbreviationsxi

Notexii

ChapterI

ThedynamicsofshockexposureandvulnerabilityacrosscountriesinAfrica1

Introduction3

NavigatingthroughuncertaintiesandriskperceptionsinAfrica4

ExposuretoshocksinAfrica13

Vulnerabilitytoshocks24

Priorityareasforbuildingbulwarksagainstrisk36

Conclusion38

ChapterII

Monitoringeconomicvulnerabilitieswhentrading

andinvestingacrossAfrica41

Introduction43

Tradepatternsduringasystem-widecrisis45

Macroeconomicdriversofeconomicvulnerability51

Economicvulnerabilityintimesofglobalshocks63

Conclusion70

ChapterIII

Maximizingtraderesilienceandregionalmarket

benefitsinAfrica71

Introduction73

Regionalvalueaddedtradenetworks:Ameanstoreduce

potentialrisksfromglobalshocks74

Resilienceinconnectivity:Thepotentialofregionalintegration87

Conclusion103

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ChapterIV

BuildingresilienceinAfricanbusinessesandcross-bordertransactions105

Introduction107

Firm-relatedrisksandopportunities107

Valueandresiliencethroughtheenergy,infrastructureandtradenexus120

InsightsfromSouthAfrica:Dynamicsofrisksandcapabilities

forexportingfirms124

Maximizingthebenefitsofcross-bordertransactionsinAfrica

throughfinancialhedgingandenterpriseriskmanagement129

Conclusion135

ChapterV

Conclusionsandrecommendedpolicyactions137

Introduction139

Considerationsforpolicyguidance141

Enhancingmacroeconomicstabilitytolowereconomic

vulnerabilitytoshocks141

Optimizingregionalmarketopportunitiestoreducetrade-relatedrisks144

Strengtheninginstitutionalandorganizationalsettingstomitigate

riskstocross-bordertransactions148

References155

Databases166

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Boxes

BoxI.1Methodology11

BoxII.1UNCTADsovereigndebtlifecycle:InsightsfromGhana57

BoxII.2Exchangerates:ThecaseofSouthAfrica64

BoxII.3Ethiopia:Anopportunityincrisis68

BoxIII.1Valueaddedtradenetworkmeasures78

BoxIII.2Methodology:Infrastructure–industrialoutput88

BoxIV.1Opportunitiesinintra-Africaninvestmentandrelatedinstruments114

BoxIV.2Creatingopportunitiesthroughforeignexchangehedgingpractices119

BoxIV.3Random-effectsprobitestimatesoftheexportstatusoffirms

inSouthAfrica126

BoxIV.4Derivatives131

BoxIV.5InsightsfromVietNam:Reapingthebenefitsofprivatecapitalflows..133

Figures

FigureI.1Theworlduncertaintyindex:Africaandglobalaverages,1990–20245

FigureI.2Interconnectingexposureandvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks9

FigureI.3Exposuretopoliticalshocks,bycountry15

FigureI.4Exposuretoeconomicshocks,bycountry17

FigureI.5Exposuretodemographicshocks,bycountry19

FigureI.6Exposuretoenergyshocks,bycountry21

FigureI.7Exposuretotechnologyshocks,bycountry23

FigureI.8Exposuretoclimateshocks,bycountry25

FigureI.9Economicvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry28

FigureI.10Governancevulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry30

FigureI.11Connectivityvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry32

FigureI.12Socialvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry34

FigureI.13Energyvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry35

FigureI.14Climatechangevulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry37

FigureII.1HistoricalviewofshockstotheeconomyofAfrica:

Averagegrossdomesticproductgrowth44

FigureII.2TopAfricanmerchandiseexports,2019–202146

FigureII.3LeadingAfricanmerchandiseimports,2019–202148

FigureII.4Moreexportproductsassociatedwithdiversification49

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FigureII.5Countriesthatconvergedtowardtheworldpattern,

Exports:1995–202350

FigureII.6Disruptionofinvestmentscausedbyshockstotheeconomy

inAfrica:Averagegrossfixedcapitalformationgrowthrate51

FigureII.7State-ownedinvestors,byleadingAfricancountries52

FigureII.8Weightedaveragegrowthingrossdomesticproduct,

bycommodityexportgroup53

FigureII.9Averagefiscalbalancedeviations,2010–201955

FigureII.10Overviewoffiscalbalancedeviationperformance,

bycountry,2010–201956

FigureII.11Inflation-moderatedgrowthingrossdomesticproduct

formineral-,metal-andfuel-dependentexporters61

FigureII.12Impactofglobalshocksonpricesandeconomiesofagriculture-

dependentexportingcountriesinAfrica,2000–202462

FigureII.13Priceeffectsonnon-commodity-dependentexporteconomies63

FigureII.14Parallelmovementbetweenfuelpricesandgrowthingross

domesticproductforfuel-dependentexporters,2000–202466

FigureII.15Trade-in-servicesexportersadverselyaffectedduring

thepandemic:Average2019–202167

FigureII.16Ethiopia:Effectsofweather-relatedshockson

anagriculturalcommodityexporter69

FigureIII.1Principalglobalpartnersinthevalueaddedtradenetwork,202276

FigureIII.2Intra-Africanvalueaddednetworkmetrics79

FigureIII.3Intra-Africanvalueaddedtradenetwork:

Manufacturingsector,selectedyears83

FigureIII.4CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfricavalueadded

tradenetwork:Manufacturingsector,202286

FigureIII.5TheevolutionofconnectivityinAfrica,2005–202287

FigureIII.6Transportandinformationandcommunicationstechnology

infrastructurecompositeindices,202292

FigureIII.7CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica:

Impulseresponsefunction95

FigureIII.8Averagenon-tarifftradecostsamongandbetween

regionaltradingblocsinAfrica97

FigureIII.9Averagetradefacilitationperformance,2017and202299

FigureIII.10Logisticsperformance,bycountry,2012–2022102

FigureIV.1Resiliencetoshocksinselectedcountries108

FigureIV.2Bilateralinvestmenttreatiesandtreatieswithinvestment

provisionssignedbycountriesinAfrica113

FigureIV.3BusinessenvironmentobstaclesfacedbyAfricanfirms,2023117

FigureIV.4Accesstoelectricity,bycountry,2022122

FigureIV.5MainobstaclesfacedbySouthAfricanfirms,selectedyears125

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Tables

TableI.1Componentsoftheexposuretoshocksframework,13

TableI.2Componentsofthevulnerabilitytoshocksmeasure26

TableI.3Majorareasofvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry39

TableIII.1Outdegreeandindegreecentralitiesinthemanufacturing,

serviceandprimarysectors,2012and202280

TableV.1Strategicstepsandkeyactionsforinstitutionalizing

enterpriserisk-managementpracticesinAfrica153

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Foreword

Theworldisinpolycrisis,andAfricaisonthefrontlineofexposure.Thesameglobalshockhas

verydifferentimpactsdependingonthelocation.Resilienceisthedifferencebetweentheshock

andtheimpact;howtobuildresilienceinAfricaisthefocusofthisreport.Recentcriseshave

hitthecontinentdisproportionately.Buildingresiliencewillallowthecontinenttoreapthemany

opportunitiesofferedbyitsfuture.

Thoughexposurevariesbycountry,Africaneconomiesarepersistentlyexposedtoarangeof

externalshocksduetocommodity-dependency,highlevelsofdebtandlimitedtechnological

infrastructureandconnectivity.AbouthalfofallAfricancountriesreliedonoil,gasormineralsfor

over60percentoftheirexportearningsin2023.Globaltraderoutedisruptionshaveexposedthem

tosignificantlyhighershippingandtradecosts.In2024,Africanshippingrateswere115percent

abovepre-COVID-19(coronavirusdisease)pandemiclevelsanddoublethe2023averagecosts.

Atthesametime,officialdevelopmentassistancetoAfricadeclinedby4.1percentin2022,while

Africa’saverageborrowingcostincreasedto11.6percent,8.5percentagepointshigherthanthe

risk-freerateofthebenchmarkoftheUnitedStates.

Thisyear’sEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024:UnlockingAfrica’sTradePotential–

BoostingRegionalMarketsandReducingRiskspresentssomeimportanttoolsinthiscontext.

ThisincludesacomprehensiveframeworktohelpAfricancountriesanalysethenatureoftheir

ownexposuretoshocks,withaparticularfocusontradeandinvestment.Wealsoprovidean

evidence-basedanalysisthathighlightshowregionaltradecanincreasethecontinent’sresilience.

Therearefivetakeawaysfromthisreport.

First,theargumentthateconomicdiversificationservesasastrongbufferagainsteconomic

shocksremainsrelevant.ThisisparticularlytrueforAfricaneconomiesthatdependonalimited

numberoftradepartners.Africahasfivemaintradingpartnersaccountingforover50percent

ofallitsimportsandexports.

Second,despitesixdecadesofgrowthingrossexports,Africa’sintegrationintohighvalueadded

segmentsofglobalsupplychainsremainslow.Only16of54Africancountriessourcemore

than0.5percentoftheirintermediateinputsfromwithinthecontinent.Betterinfrastructureand

leveragingtheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeAreacanimproveregionalmarketparticipation

anddrivepositiveoutcomes.

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Third,improvingtheoperationalenvironmentisvitalforAfricanbusinesses,particularly

microenterprisesandsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Lessthan50percentofthe

populationhasreliableelectricityaccess,whichraisescostsandlimitsvaluechainintegration.

Relianceonfossilfuels,over50percentoftheenergysupply,heightensrisksamidglobal

energytransitions.RecentgrowthinrenewableenergyinvestmentinAfrica(estimatedat$15

billionin2023)remaindirelylowcomparedtoglobalrenewableenergyinvestment,atabout2.3

percentofthetotal.

Fourth,polycrisiscreateseconomicuncertaintyanddiscouragestradeandinvestment,thus

hamperinglong-termdevelopmentprospects.In2023,flowsofforeigndirectinvestmentto

Africadeclinedby3percent,toatotalstockof$53billion.Deeperregionalintegrationcanhelp

reversethetrend.Lastyear,between13and20percentofinternationalprojectsfinancedin

AfricawerefundedbyAfricaninvestorsthemselves.

Finally,thereportprovidessomekeypolicyrecommendationstoAfricanGovernments.This

includesenhancingthelegalandregulatoryenvironment,leveragingrobustriskmanagement

tools,regionalcooperationandstrategicinvestmentsininfrastructureandtechnologytoensure

smoothtradeandimprovedconnectivity.

IhopethatthiseditionoftheEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReportwillserveasavaluable

toolforpolicymakersandinspireurgentactionintheseurgenttimes.

RebecaGrynspanSecretary-GeneralofUNCTAD

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Abbreviations

COVID-19coronavirusdisease

GDPgrossdomesticproduct

ICTinformationandcommunicationstechnology

OECDOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

SMEsmallandmedium-sizedenterprise

UNCTADUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment

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Note

DollarsareUnitedStatesdollars.

Useofadashbetweenyears(forexample,2000–2005)signifiesthefullperiodinvolved,

includingtheinitialandfinalyears.

Alllinkswereaccessedon19September2024.

xii

Economicdevelopment

inAfricareport2024

ChapterI

Thedynamicsof

shockexposure

andvulnerability

acrosscountries

inAfrica

EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024

UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:Boostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisks

Introduction

Theissueof“globalpolycrisis,”or“thecriticalinvestmentstowardsustainable

causalentanglementofcrisesinmultiple

globalsystemsinwaysthatsignificantly

degradehumanity’sprospects”(Lawrence

developmentamidtighteningcredit

conditionsandrisingexternalfinancingcosts

(UnitedNations,2023a).Thetightening

etal.,2024),hasrecentlyresurfacedand

intensifiedtheheateddebateoverthe

potentialtoleverageeconomicandtrade

ofborrowingconditionsandstrained

governmentliquidity,coupledwiththe

complexityofinflationarydynamics,including

opportunitiesfortransformationinAfrica.

AccordingtoColumbiaUniversityhistorian

AdamTooze,inapolycrisis“theshocksare

disparate,buttheyinteractsothatthewhole

isevenmoreoverwhelmingthanthesum

oftheparts”(Lähde,2023).Apolycrisisis

asituationinwhichmultiplecrises,suchas

climatechange,biodiversityloss,economic

instabilityandsocialinequality,interact,

creatingacomplexandoftenunpredictable

scenarioofinterrelatedcrises,predicaments

andviciouscycles.Thesecrisesare

interconnectedsothatthecombinedimpact

isgreaterthanthesumoftheirindividual

effects.Further,theconcepthighlightsthe

systemicnatureofglobalchallengesand

thedifficultyinaddressingtheminisolation.

Today’sglobalpolycrisis,whichisgenerated

byshocksandcrisesoccurringatdifferent

levels(local,national,regionaland

international)anddisruptsvariousdomains

andsystems(health,financial,economic,

politicalandenvironmental),isnotnew.

Someofthepastglobalcrisesincludethe

oilshocksofthelate1970s,whichcreated

globalenergyshortagesandcontributed

tostagflationinmanyeconomies.Another

exampleofapastglobalcrisisisthe2008–

2009globalfinancialandeconomiccrisis,

hikesinenergyandfoodcommodityprices

andassociateddemandandsupply-side

crises,occuratatimewheneconomies

andregionsarefarmoreinterconnected

andsynchronizedthaneverbefore.This

bringstheadditionalriskofspilloverorthe

accelerationofcrisisevents,especiallyinthe

currentinterlinkedarchitectureofeconomic,

financialandsocietalsystemsattheglobal

level,whichcanfacilitateoramplifythe

phenomenonofstresses(shocksorimpacts

ofcrisisevents)withsystemsaffecting

eachotherorcreatingstressesindifferent

systems.Forinstance,globalenergyprice

shocksstressglobaltransportationandfood

systems,creatinginflationarypressuresand

highinterestrates.Theresultingstressesin

therealeconomyandglobalbankingsystem

couldincreasecapitalcosts,impacting

productivityandreturns.Whilepolicymakers

andregulatorsattempttocontainor

reversepressuresfromvolatilityinfoodand

energyprices,lowerwagesandincome,

anddecliningsavingsandinvestment,the

slowdownofeconomicactivitiesdueto

thisentanglementofstresseswouldhave

exposedalreadyvulnerablebusinesses

andpeople.Thiscancreatesocial

tensionsandproducesystemicrisk.

Apolycrisisisa

situationinwhich

multiplecrises,

interact,creating

acomplex

andoften

unpredictable

scenarioof

interrelated

crises

whichintersectedwithoilsupplyconstraints

andfoodpricevolatilityandfurtherstressed

financial,production,supplyandoperating

Thecentralityoftheinterconnectivity

oftoday’sglobalsystemsinfuelling,

acceleratingoramplifyingcrisisevents

systems(Lawrenceetal.,2024).

However,thecurrentglobalpolycrisisis

unprecedentedinsomeways.Forinstance,

thehealth,socialandeconomiceffects

ofthecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)

pandemiclingerstillandchallengetheability

ofmanydevelopingcountriestomake

isalsoevidentthroughthecomplexity

ofgeopoliticalstressesandtheir

accompanyingdistressandspilloverinto

othersystems.ThewarinUkraineshows

howgeopoliticalstressescangenerate

stressesindifferentsystems,forexample,

globalenergy,foodandfinancesystems.

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EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024

UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:Boostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisks

TheUnitedNationsGlobalCrisisResponse

GrouponFood,EnergyandFinance

reported,duringtheearlymonthsofthe

warinUkraine,thedevastatingimpactof

conflictonalreadytightglobalfood,energy

andfinancialmarkets(UNCTAD,2022a).

Thereportfocusesontheoptimization

ofregionalmarketbenefitstostrengthen

marketresiliencetospecificshocksand

vulnerabilitiesandexploresthediverse

traderisksinAfricastemmingfromahostof

economic,political,environmental,energy,

Whentwocountries,namelytheRussian

FederationandUkraine,thatprovideabout

30percentoftheworld’swheatandbarley,

technologicalandlogisticalchallenges.The

reportunderscorestheimportanceofrobust

riskmanagement,regionalcooperation

Optimization

ofregional

market

strengthens

marketresilience

tospecific

shocksand

vulnerabilities

25percentofitsmaizeandover50per

centofitssunfloweroilareinconflict,and

oneofthemistheworld’stopnaturalgas

exporterandsecond-largestoilexporter,

theimpactsonspecificcommodityprices

becomesignificant,withfoodprices

increasingbyabout34percent,crudeoil

pricessurgingbyabout60percentand

gasandfertilizerpricesmorethandoubling

(UnitedNations,2022a).Asthesefoodand

energypressuresinteractedwithongoing

stressesinglobalsupplychainsandfinancial

andstrategicinvestmentsininfrastructure

andtechnology.Italsohighlightsbest

practicesacrossthecontinent,showinghow

countriesandbusinesseshaveeffectively

addressedthesechallengestounlock

newopportunities.Byprovidingadetailed

analysisofthetradeenvironment,potential

risksandde-riskingstrategies,thisreport

aimstoequipstakeholderswiththeinsights

neededforinformeddecision-making.

Ultimately,itseekstofostersustainable

economicgrowthandsharedprosperityin

markets,manyeconomieswereaffectedby

inflationarypressures,heightenedmarket

volatilityandtighteningmonetaryconditions.

Africabyleveragingthecontinent’sunique

strengthstomaximizeregionalmarket

benefits.TheAfricanContinentalFreeTrade

Thisyear’sEconomicDevelopmentin

AfricaReport:UnlockingAfrica'sTrade

Potential:BoostingRegionalMarkets

andReducingRisksexaminesoptimal

strategiesforcountriesinAfricaand

theprivatesectortomitigatetrade

risksassociatedwiththeuncertainties

createdbythisglobalpolycrisis.

Area,launchedin2021,marksacrucialstep

towardseconomicintegrationinAfrica.With

itsyouthfulpopulation,abundantresources

andgrowingpoliticalstability,Africaoffers

vasttradeopportunities.However,realizing

theseopportunitiesrequiresnavigatinga

complexlandscapeofrisksandchallenges.

Navigatingthroughuncertainties

andriskperceptionsinAfrica

Whennavigatingtheseglobalcrisesand

uncertainties,Governments,companiesand

individualsarerequiredtointernalizethem

makingandtransactions,forexample

people’sdecisionstopurchaserealestate;

companies’strategicchoicesaboutbuilding

bydeployingtoolstotrackandassesstheir

potentialimpact,adjusttothenewways

inwhichtheydisruptsystems,adoptmore

newfactories,investingincapitalequipment

andhiringworkers;orGovernments’policy

choicesconcerningpublicexpenditureand

flexibilityandmitigatetheiradverseeffectsby

havingcontingencyplansinplaceandbeing

abletoactfasterandreducetheriskof

revenues(forinstance,taxpolicies).These

uncertaintiesareperceivedtobehigher

infrequencyandintensityinemerging

mistakes(Bloometal.,2022).Bloom(2023)

maintainsthatuncertaintiesaffectdecision-

marketsandlow-incomecountriesthan

inadvancedcountries(Ahiretal.,2022).

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EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024

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Usingtheworlduncertaintyindex1as

aproxytocapturethelevelsofglobal

uncertaintyrelatedtoeconomicand

politicaleventsindicatesthatthelevelsof

uncertaintyhaveincreasedsignificantlysince

2012andspikedsharplyasaresponse

toorduringglobalepisodesofshocks

orcrises(figureI.1).Thehigherlevelsof

uncertaintyfortheaverageofcountriesin

Africa,comparedtotheglobalaverage,

canbeexplainedbythecompounded

effectsofdomesticpoliticalshockssuchas

shocks(Ahiretal.,2022).FigureI.1shows

theworlduncertaintyindexfrom1990to

2023.Duringrecentepisodesofglobal

crises,suchasthe2014–2016oilprice

shockandthe2019–2020COVID-19

pandemic,Africawassubjecttohigher

levelsofuncertaineconomicandpolitical

situations,althoughthetrendfollowed

theglobalaverageintermsofspikeand

dip.Thesynchronizationoftheindices

forAfricaandtheworldaverageduring

thoseperiodscanbepartlyexplained

Duringrecent

episodesof

globalcrises

Africawas

subjectto

higherlevels

ofuncertain

economic

andpolitical

situations

coupsd’étatandconflicts,oraggravated

bytheirvulnerabilitytonaturaldisasters

andtheirlowcapacitytomanageexternal

bythefactthatcountriesinAfricawere

moreconnectedtotherestoftheworld.

FigureI.1

Theworlduncertaintyindex:Africaandglobalaverages,1990–2024(Index)

80000

70000

60000

50000

GulfWar

Tradetensions,

UnitedStatesofAmericarecessionincludingChina

andattacksintheUnitedStatesonandtheUnited

Financial

11September2001States,andGeopolitical

creditcrunch

“Brexit”

tensionsand

collapseof

United

SovereignStates

SiliconValley

debtcrisispresidential

Bank,Signature

IraqwarandCOVID-19BankandCredit

inEuropeelections

outbreakofseverepandemicSuisse

acuterespiratory

UnitedStates

syndrome

scalcliffand

sovereign

debtcrisisin

Europe

FederalReserveSystemWarin

tighteningandpoliticalriskUkraine

inGreeceandUkraine

“Brexit”

40000

30000

Africa

20000

World

10000

0

199019921994199619982000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024

Source:UNCTAD,basedondatafromtheworlduncertaintyindex,2024.

Note:TimeseriesofworlduncertaintyindexaveragesforAfricaandtherestoftheworldfromthefirstquarterof

1990tothefirstquarterof2024.Actualdatafromthefirstquarterof1990tothefirstquarterof2024,comparing

theaverageindexvalueforAfricawiththeglobalaverage.

1TheworlduncertaintyindexwaslaunchedbytheInternationalMonetaryFundin2020tomeasureand

comparequarterlythelevelofuncertaintyacross1