被安全化的美国半导体产业政策研究报告

2022NO.6(总第56期)复旦发展研究院复旦大学网络空间国际治理研究基地复旦大学国家发展与智能治理综合实验室被安全化的美国半导体产业政策研究报告2 1 1 3 5 6 8 10 15 16（二）中美战略竞争被“简单化”，美国将半导体产业塑造为对华战略竞争的 20 26 28 29（二）美国在半导体联盟中的影响力，不足以促使盟伴在“美国优先”的前提 31（三）拜登政府对华半导体制造能力“过度封锁”的倾向，不符合盟友及设备 33 351代化之外，美国开始逐步防范中国科技企业所谓的“网络间谍”与“网络攻击”战略竞争的框架下，进一步明确将“美国对华的科技优势”纳入了“国家安全”浓缩成为一个对华安全竞争的符号，以能够在国内外发挥政治动员的杠杆作用，动政府更好的完成美国自身特定战略资源的整合和完善。由此，“半导体产业”眼下，拜登政府的半导体战略呈现出“弱他”与“自强”并重的“两面性”2今天的美国已经不具备三十年前的曾经拥有过的压倒性的国家实力与战略3知以及预期塑造方面的效果最终难以实质性的2.中美战略竞争带来的霸权地位失落诱发的国家安全焦虑加剧了美国在认4加“简单化”的认定只要通过一系列政策就能在较短时间内以较低成本“成功”5的深度嵌套，使得美国完全复制对苏冷战策略变得不可能。保障美国经济增速，6（JohnNegroponte）在向参议院情报特别委员会（SenateSelectCommitteeOn1“RicewarnsChinaoverbuildupofi/nation-world/rice-warns-china-over-buildup-of-its-2JohnNegroponte,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencefortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,February2,2006./files20060202_testimony.pdf3QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February6,2006./Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-7ⅆⅆ4“RevisionsandClarificationofExportandReexportControlsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC);NewAuthorizationValidatedEnd-User;RevisionofImportCertificateandPRCEnd-UserStatementRequirements,”FederalRegister,June192007./docevisions-and-clarification-of-export-and-reexport-controls-for-the-peoples-republic-of-c5EvanMedeirosetal.,ANewDirectionn,2005),pp.217-218.6“N.S.A.BreachedChineseServersSe014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-per7MichaelMcConnell,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCommunrvicesCommittee,27February2008./files/documents/Newsrstimony.pdf8断增加。82011年10月，美国国家反间谍执行局（OfficeoftheNational美国知识产权与经济利益，对国家安全最具“侵略性”的经济间谍（economic市场的持续渗透，并加强关注中国电信企业的不公平贸易行为。118DennisBlair,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheIntelligenceCoCommittee,10March2009.https://wwwpdf9/sites/default/files/article/attachments/us-counterintelligence-2011-foreign-spies-stealing-us-economic-secrets-cyberspace.pdf10/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20120216_SASC%20Final%20Unclassified%20-%202012%20ATA%20SFR.pdf;/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/2013_03_12_SSCI_Worldwide_Threat_Assessment.pdf;/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SSCI_29_Jan.pdf;/files/documentASC_FINAL.pdf;/files/documents/SASC_11MikeRogers,DutchRuppersberger,“InvestigativeReportontheU.S.NationalSecurityIssuesPosedbyChineseTelecommunicationsCompaniesHuaweiandZTE,”Washington,D/sites//files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf9“先入为主、绝不信任、有罪推定”的原则，并呈现出“严密监13BruceEinhorn,“Huawei’sBusinessDealFlo14“CommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates(CFIUS)ConcernsCausePartiestoAbandonTransaction,”July72010./insights/publications/committee-on-foreign-iin-the-united-states-cfius-concerns-cause-parties-to-abandon-transaction-july-7-15“MotorolasuesHuaweifortradesecrettheft,”July222010./article/us-motorola-huawei-idUSTRE66L017“StatementbythePressSecretaryonH.R.933”,March26,2013.https://obamawhitehouse.archivesthe-press-office/2013/03/26/statement-press-secreta技术系统。18 战略视阈下的中美关系日益消极，20而美国国内对华科技实力及相关企 冷战后对华实施流动策略所期待的。21即，结束对华战略接触以及放弃“塑造”18/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/933/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR933%22%2C%22HR933%22%5D19TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategy,February2015,p.4.https://nssarchive.us/wp-contds/2020/04/2015.pdf.21DanBlumenthal,“TheThreeWaysWeGetChinaandItsNeighborsWrong,”htorg/articles/danblumenthal/three-ways-get-china-neighbors-wrong/;SteinRingen,“HowtheWestgotChinawrong,”/comment/insight-opinion/article/2023935/how-west-got-china-wrong些进展也为我们的对手提供了新的军事能力……物联网（IoT）正在将数十亿的仍然是经济和军事的核心，但由于技术高原和其他国家的投资，新一代半导体并称中国通过网络间谍及其他恶意行为窃取美国的专有技术和早期阶段的创新一方面，调整美国出口管制体系，对中国整体性地扩大管制物项的范围。foundationaltechnologies）的出口管制，旨在补充被美国政府认为对国家安全至22DanielCoats,StatementfortheRecordWorldwideThretySenateArmedServicesCommittee,May23,2017./f23FederalRegister/Vol.82,No.163/Thursday,August24,2017./sites/dcement/301Investigations/FRN%20China301.pdf24TheWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,December2017,p.25,http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf.2550U.S.C.§4817(a)(b);ECRA§1758(a)(26“BISAnnouncesReviewofEmergingTechnologyControlsandSeeksPublicComment,”Novermber20,2018./bis-announces-review-of-emerging-technology-controls-and-s27/documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/reviewhnologies28/documents/2019/05/23/2019-10778/implementation-of-certain-new-controls-on-emerging-technologies-agreed-at-wassenaar-arr29/documents/2020/06/17/2020-11625/implementation-of-the-february-2020-australia-group-intersessional-decisions-addition-30/documents/2020/10/05/2020-18334/implementation-of-certain-new-controls-on-emerging-technologies-agreed-at-wassenaar-arr业与安全局除了将38家华为的附属公司列入节点（包括极紫外光技术）的产品或技术。35进入美国的国防电信网络;36而2018年8月，其签署的“2019财年国防授权法”31/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-o32/documents/2019/08/21/2019-17921/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-entries-on-the-entity-l33U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceAddressesHuawei’sEffortstoUndermineEntityList,ctsProductsDesignedandProducedwithU.S.Technologies,”https://2017-2021./news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restr34U.S.DepartmentofCommerc,“CommerceDepartmentFurtherRestrictsHuaweilogyandAddsAnother38AffiliatestotheEntityList,”https://2017-2021./news/press-rels/2020/08/commerce-department-further-restricts-huawei-access-us-technology-a35/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-36/bill/115th-congress/housebill/2810?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAA%22%2C%22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&InvestmentRiskReviewModernizationActof2018）的通过，也委员会（CFIUS）的管辖权限，要求对中美之间涉及关键技术、关键基础设施、委员会以数据安全为由，阻止蚂蚁金服收购美国金融科技公司速汇金普专门发布了两道行政命令，也是以国家安全为由，禁止美国公司或个人与37/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22FY2018+NDAA%22%2C%22FY2018%22%2C%22NDAA%22%5D%7D&s=1&38“CFIUSBlocksAlibaba’sAttemptedAcquisitionofMoneyGram,CitingDataSafetyConcerns,”January2,2018./cfius-blocks-alibabas-attempted-acquisition-moneygram-citing-data-saf39“HowGrindrbecameanationalsecurityissue,”March28,2019.https://www.reuters.r-m-a-beijingkunlun-idUSKCN40https://2017-2021./the-clean-network/index.ht41/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posedaking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency;/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17700/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-wechat-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency而今，拜登政府继承了特朗普执政时期美国在关键与新兴技术领域对华的打压与强化美国本土产业基础、供应链韧性等政策目标相互捆绑、并行推进。（whole-of-governmentapproach）评估关IPP评论》2022年8月。https://m43TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAddressShort-TermSupplyChainDiscontinuities,”/briefies/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-disconti44TheWhiteHouse,“Biden-HarrisAdministrationAnnouncesSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForcetoAddressShort-TermSupplyChainDiscontinuities,”/briefies/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-disconti45TheWhiteHouse,“TheBiden-HarrisPlantoRevitalizeAmericanManufacturingandSecupplyChainsin2022,”/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/24/the-biden-harris-plan-to-revitalize-american-manufacturing-and-secure-critical-supply-chains-in-2022/胁迫的有力支撑。（一）中美战略竞争加速了美国对半导体产业的“安全化”46数字经济涉及数字产业化、产业数字化两大部分。前者涉及电子信息制造业、信息通信业、互节点主要依赖单一区域来源的供应。例如，硅片（Siliconwafers）、光刻胶与集成器件制造商（IDM）更是合计占全球半导体销售份额的近一半。47但是，47芯片类型的供应商有三类：集设计、制造、封装和市场销售为一体的公司，为集成器件制造商（IDM为其他芯片供应商制造电路芯片，称为代工厂（Foundry做设计和晶圆市场的公司，其从晶圆工厂购买ces/global-wafer-capacity/report-contents/.te-of-the-u-s-semiconductor-indu50“STRENGTHENINGTHEGLOBALSEMICONDUCSIA./strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-sup/51CRS,U.S.SemiconductorManufacturing:IndustryTrends,GlobalCompetition,Federa/product/pd52DepartmentofDefense,DefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonHighPerformanceMicrochipSupply,December2005,pp.96./sti/pdfs/ADA435563.pdf53KirstenBaldwin,PolicyPerspective:TheCurrentandProposedSecurityFramework,DepartmentofDe54KristenBaldwin,Long-TermStrategyforDODAssuredMicroelectronicsNeedsandInnovationforionalEconomicCompetitiveness,DOD,October24,2018,p.19.https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudap/ndia/2018/systems/Wed_21335_Baldwin55/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-chai56技术革命浪潮的增长效能由其在连接+能源+材料三重维度的技术变迁及其所形成的净创造效应所决定。在每一轮技术革命浪潮中，最先实现信息+能源+材料三重维度协同“合奏”的国家，则会成为新57TheWhiteHouse,“NationalStrategyforCriticalandEmergingTechnologies,”https://trumpwhitehouse./wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Strategy-for-C58NSTC,“CRITICALANDEMERGINGTECHNOLOGIESLISTUPD/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Upda59PCAST,EnsuringLong-TermU.S.LeadershipinSemiconductors/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf60CRS,Semiconductors:U.S.Industry,GlobalCompeti/product/pdf作为其总统任期的基石。62而美国对全球半导体供应链及半导体对新一轮技术创新与产业变革的非凡价值，在这四大因素的共同促使62JosephBiden,“WhyAmericaMustLeadAgain–RescuingU.S.ForeignPolicyAfterTrump,”http://deutsch-chinesisches-forum.de/images/thinktank/20201114/Why%20America%20Must%20Lead%20Agai63美国在芯片核心技术和高端研发的控制、对主要半导体企业融资渠道和股权结构美国半导体产业的条款，在后续“2021美国创新与竞争法案”（UnitedStates64/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3832?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.22%2C%22S.%22%2C%223832%22%5D%7D&s=3&r=6；/bill/116th-congresbill/6978?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr6978%22%2C%22hr6978%22%5D%7D&s=4&65track.u66track.u67/bill/116th-cCHIPSforAmerica亿美元给“美国劳动力与教育芯片基金”（CHIPSforAmericaWorkforceand若将拜登政府强化对华半导体制造技术的封锁视为维持美国既有的“控制68track.us/拜登政府试图将半导体产业的关键环节部署在具有相同价值观的“友好国Manufacturing,andFosterin美国应深化与盟友、伙伴的合作，共同塑造一个弹性的半导体供应链。69体战略利益的半导体供应链体系，而非以商业利益最大化为原则重塑半导体供69/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf拜登与七国集团（G7）领导人宣布启动“全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系”71TheWhiteHouse,“ADeclarationfortheFutureoftheInternet,”/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_Launch-Event-Signing-Version72/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and73/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-stralia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnersh74/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/quad-principles-on-technology-design-development-governance-an75/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-le76/documents/2022/04/06/2022-07211/request-for-public-comments-on-supply-chain-issues-to-support-the-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council#:~:text=With%20regard%20to%20semiconductors%2C%20on%20September%2029%2C%202021%2C,the%20supply%20chain%20through%20diversification%20an77WIPO,“GlobalInnovationIndex2021,”/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.puary2022./files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2钩给中美战略互动造成的附带损害。79拜登政府认为，美国需要可以对杠杆，让美国赢得时间采取力所能及的措施确保其技术的领先。79SammSacks,“China:ChallengestoU.S.Commerce,”/s9ED0E-7D00-4DDC-998E-B99B2D80/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf81JonBateman,U.S.—ChinaTechnological“Decoupling”:AStrategyandPolicypril25,2022./2022/04/25/u.s.-china-technological-decoupling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897半导体技术封锁，以显示自身依旧对华具有相当的战际合作这五个方面的共同努力。83从目前的路径看，美国主要是通过联邦拨款，83GAO,SemiconductorSupplyChain:PolicyConsiderationsfromSelectedExpertsforReducingRisksandMitigatingShortages,Jul26,2022./products/ga84/strengthening-the-global-semiconductor-supply-ch85/nistpubs/SpecialPubli86/publications/reports/rewire-semiconductors-and-u-间，美国所有行业的先进制造业工作岗位在私营部门中的比例从7.5%下降到的则是从事设计、研发工作的半导体工程师。拜登政府将美国的盟友、伙伴视为最大的战略资产，并着力通过“阵营化”87/News/Releases/Release/Article/2472854/dod-releases-industrial-ca88/sites/default/files/2022-02/ICT%20Supply%20Chain%20Report_2.pdf89WillHunt,RemcoZwetsloot,TheChipmakers:U.S.StrengthsandPrioritiesforductorWorkforce,September2020./wp-contenters-SIA-slides41-Read-Only.p连开工，该项目包括建设一座新的晶圆工厂。对于美国正着手组建的“CHIP4”劳。台积电前法务长、现美国科技企业Nantero独立董事杜东佑（RichardL米及以下半导体制造设备的基础上，美国将限制出口的技术范围上升至生产1490Chi-hungWei,