半导体供应链中新兴的弹性-BCGSIA-2024-WN8

EMERGINGRESILIENCE

INTHESEMICONDUCTOR

SUPPLYCHAIN

MAY2024

RAJVARADARAJAN/IACOBKOCH-WESER/CHRISRICHARD/JOSEPHFITZGERALD/JASKARANSINGH/MARYTHORNTON/ROBERTCASANOVA/DAVIDISAACS

AboutBostonConsultingGroup(BCG)

BostonConsultingGroup(BCG)isaleadingglobalmanagementconsultingfirm,with

officesinover50countries.BCGpartnerswithleadersinbusinessandsocietytotackle

theirmostimportantchallengesandcapturetheirgreatestopportunities.BCGwasthe

pioneerinbusinessstrategywhenitwasfoundedin1963.Today,wehelpclientswithtotal

transformation—inspiringcomplexchange,enablingorganizationstogrow,buildingcompetitive

advantage,anddrivingbottom-lineimpact.

AbouttheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)

TheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)isthevoiceofthesemiconductorindustryinthe

US,oneofAmerica’stopexportindustriesandakeydriverofAmerica’seconomicstrength,

nationalsecurity,andglobalcompetitiveness.Thesemiconductorindustrydirectlyemploys

morethan300,000workersintheUnitedStates,andUSsemiconductorcompanysalestotaled

$264billionin2023.SIArepresents99percentoftheUSsemiconductorindustrybyrevenue

andnearlytwo-thirdsofnon-USchipfirms.Throughthiscoalition,SIAseekstostrengthen

leadershipofsemiconductormanufacturing,design,andresearchbyworkingwithCongress,

theAdministration,andkeyindustrystakeholdersaroundtheworldtoencouragepoliciesthat

fuelinnovation,propelbusiness,anddriveinternationalcompetition.

AbouttheAuthors

RajVaradarajanisaSeniorPartnerEmeritusofBostonConsultingGroup.Hehasauthored

severalreportsonthesemiconductorindustryatBCGandincollaborationwiththeSIA.You

maycontacthimasthecorrespondingauthorbyemailatVaradarajan.Raj@.

IacobKoch-WeserisanAssociateDirectorforGlobalTradeandInvestmentintheBostonoffice

ofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatkoch-weser.iacob@.

ChrisRichardisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheDenverofficeofBostonConsulting

GroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunicationspractice.

Youmaycontacthimbyemailatrichard.christopher@.

JosephFitzgeraldisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheSanFranciscoofficeofBoston

ConsultingGroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunications

practice.Youmaycontacthimbyemailatfitzgerald.joseph@.

JaskaranSinghisanAssociateintheDallasofficeofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmay

contacthimbyemailatsingh.jaskaran@.

MaryThorntonistheVicePresidentofGlobalPolicyattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.

Youmaycontactheratmthornton@.

RobertCasanovaistheDirectorofIndustryStatisticsandEconomicPolicyatthe

SemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontacthimatrcasanova@.

DavidIsaacsistheVicePresidentofGovernmentAffairsattheSemiconductorIndustry

Association.Youmaycontacthimatdisaacs@.

Acknowledgments

ThisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthecontributionsofourBCGColleagues

RamiroPalma,ThomasLopez,TreySexton,CeciJoyPerez,andPeiluChen,andourSIA

colleaguesJenniferMengandAlexGordon.

2

Contents

4

ExecutiveSummary

6

Introduction

8

TheExpansionof

GovernmentIncentives

10

Resilienceinthe

SemiconductorSupplyChain

22

LookingAhead—thePathway

toGreaterResilience

27

FutureNeedsoftheIndustry

28

Appendix

3

ExecutiveSummary

T

herearestrengthsandvulnerabilitiesin

theglobalsemiconductorsupplychain.

OurApril2021report1illustratedthatthe

globallyintegratednatureofthesemiconductor

supplychainhasrealized$45billion–$125billionin

costefficiencieseachyear,contributingtoprices

35%–65%lowerthantheywouldotherwisebewith

fullylocalizedsupplychains,resultinginenhanced

adoptionofdownstreamproductsandservices.

Butwealsoshowedthattheindustryhasbecome

vulnerabletogeographicconcentration—withatleast

50pointsacrossthesupplychainwhereoneregion

heldover65%ofglobalmarketshare.Disruptions,

suchaspandemics,naturaldisasters,materials

shortages,orconflicts,couldsubstantiallyimpact

theglobalchipsupplychain.

Governmentsandcompaniesaretakingconcerted

actiontoincreaseresilience.TheUSCHIPSAct,

signedintolawinAugust2022,committed$39

billioningrantincentivesanda25%investmenttax

credit(ITC)forsemiconductormanufacturing.

TheEuropeanUnion(EU)unveiledtheEuropean

ChipsAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethirdphaseof

itsIntegratedCircuit(IC)IndustryInvestmentFund,

andvariousotherincentiveprogramsemergedor

expandedinTaiwan,SouthKorea,Japan,India,and

othercountries.Inparallel,companieshavemade

significantinvestments,inbothestablishedandnew

regions.Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivate

sectorinvestmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,

comparedwith$720billioninthe10yearsprior

toenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–2022).The

USisprojectedtocapture28%ofthesecapital

expenditures,asopposedtothepre-CHIPSActpace

ofinvestment,inwhichtheUSwouldhavecaptured

just9%ofglobalcapitalexpenditures.

Waferfabricationwillbecomemoreresilient.By

2032,wepredictleading-edgewaferfabrication

capacitytodiversifybeyondTaiwanandSouthKorea

toincludetheUS,Europe,andJapan.Weexpectthe

UStoincreaseitsfabcapacityby203%between

2022and2032,thelargestincreaseintheworld.As

aresult,theUnitedStateswillreverseadecades-

longdownwardtrajectoryandraiseitsshareof

globalaggregatefabcapacityfrom10%todayto

14%in2032.Intheabsenceofaction,theUSshare

wouldhaveslippedfurtherto8%by2032.

Newmarketsandinnovativetechnologycansupport

resilienceinassembly,test,andpackaging(ATP).

InATP,MainlandChinaandTaiwanwillcontinueto

holdthelargestshareofglobalcapacity.Butwith

supportfromgovernmentsandforeigninvestors,we

expectcountriesinSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,

andEasternEuropetoexpandATPactivity.The

USStateDepartmentissupportingtheseefforts

throughInternationalTechnologySecurityand

Innovation(ITSI)fundingundertheCHIPSAct.

Emergingmarketgovernmentsareactivelypursuing

theirownstrategiestoattractATPinvestment.In

parallel,thedevelopmentofadvancedpackaging—

andassociatedinnovationsinchiplets—isalso

drivingleadingplayerstobuildATPcapacityinthe

UnitedStatesandEurope,proximatetonewwafer

fabricationcapacity.

4

Otherpartsofthesupplychainarealsoachieving

abetterbalance.Indesign,coreIP,and

ElectronicDesignAutomation(EDA),companies

arediversifyingwheretheyhire,locate,and

traintalent.Insemiconductormanufacturing

equipment(“tools”),currentindustryleadersare

establishingR&Dandtrainingcentersindifferent

regions.Althoughmaterialsproductionremains

concentratedinEastAsia,weexpectittofollow

futurefabcapacitytotheUnitedStatesand

EuropetorealizecostandR&Dbenefits.

Astrongglobaltalentpipelineisasimportant

asever.Assemiconductorcompaniespursue

ambitiousdevelopmentplansinthecontext

ofatightlabormarket,theyrelyonaccess

toengineersandtechnicianstofillbothhigh-

andmid-skillpositions.Improvingworkforce

developmentacrossestablishedandemerging

regions,whilealsoadvancingimmigration

policiestofosterglobaltalentflows,willbevital

tothesemiconductorindustry’sfutureresilience.

Industrialpolicieshavethepotentialtocreate

additionalbottlenecksthatincreasesupplychain

risk.Certainsegmentsofthesemiconductorsupply

chainareatriskifincentiveprogramsandlarge-

scaleindustrialpoliciesleadtonon-market-based

investment,whichcanresultinoverconcentration

oroversupply.Governmentincentivesshouldfocus

onenablingtargeted,distributed,market-based

investments.

Sustainedsupportforresilienceisneeded.Over

thecomingdecade,thesemiconductorsupply

chainwillcontinuetofacechallenges,including

industrycyclicalityandtherapidevolutionof

downstreamdemand(forexample,inAI,EVs,

industrialautomation,androbotics).Supply-demand

imbalancesinmaturenodecapacitycouldbecome

moreevident.Itwillbecriticalforpolicymakersin

theUnitedStatesandelsewhereto“staythecourse”

byextendingcurrentsupportaswellasconsidering

additionalmeasurestostrengthenresilience.

Scaleandopennessarecriticalforresilience.

Toensurenewanddiversifiedsemiconductor

facilitiescanoperateatoptimalcapacity

utilizationratestogenerateapositivereturn

oninvestment,itisvitalforchipcompaniesto

maintaincontinuedaccesstoglobalcustomers

andaglobalnetworkofsuppliers.Governments

areincreasinglyimposingconstraintsonwhere

chipcompaniescanselltheirproductsand

services,orwheretheycansourceinputs

andequipment.Fortunately,globaltradein

semiconductorscontinuestogrowatarapid

pace,reflectingtheglobalinterconnectedness

oftheindustry.TheUnitedStatesandallied

governmentsneedtomaintainopentrade

andcooperationbyrecognizingthatextreme

industrialpolicies,suchasfullcountry-level“self-

sufficiency,”willundermineresilience,addcost,

andstifleinnovation.

5

Introduction

S

emiconductorspowertoday’seconomy,

fromvehiclesandmobiledevicesto

datacenters,medicalequipment,clean

technologies,and,ofcourse,theupcoming

AIrevolution.Theinventionoftheintegrated

circuit(IC)startedtheUnitedStatesonapath

toearlyleadershipindesignandmanufacturing.

Beginninginthe1980s,chipmanufacturing

rapidlyshiftedfromNorthAmericatoJapanand

EastAsia.WhiletheUnitedStatesremained

preeminentinequipmentandchipdesign,

EastAsianeconomiesincreasedtheirshare

ofwaferfabricationcapacity,highlightedby

theriseofSouthKoreainmemoryandTaiwan

inthepure-playfoundrybusinessforallother

semiconductors.Thisconfigurationenabled

rapidadvancesandspecialization,butover

time,ledtosupplychainconcentration.2

InStrengtheningtheGlobalSemiconductor

SupplyChaininanUncertainEra(April

2021),weanalyzedthesemiconductorsupply

chaintounderstanditsvaluefortheglobal

economy,whilealsoidentifyingpointsof

vulnerability.Werecommendedpoliciesand

otheractionstoimprovesupplychainresilience

throughgreatergeographicdiversification.

Sincethen,theglobal

supplychainhasevolved

rapidly,withmajorprivate

sectorinvestmentsin

multiplegeographiesand

publicsectorpolicies

andsupportprograms

directedattheindustry.

TheUSCHIPSAct,signedintolawinAugust

2022,committed$39billioningrantsandloans

forsemiconductormanufacturing.Likewise,

theEuropeanUnionunveiledtheEuropean

CHIPSAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethird

vintageofitsICIndustryInvestmentFund,and

variousotherincentiveprogramsemerged

acrossAsiaandotherregions.Inparallel,

over100newsemiconductormanufacturing

investmentshavebeenannouncedto

meetincreasedmarketdemand,dispersed

worldwideacrosseverymajorregion.

6

Inthisreport,weprovideanupdatedview

ontheimpactofpoliciestodayonfuture

investmentintheglobalsemiconductorsupply

chainandtheimplicationsforresilience.We

defineresilience,broadlyspeaking,asimproved

geographicdiversificationofthesupplychain.

Webeginbyreviewingpublicandprivate

sectorstrategiesacrossmajorgeographies,

withadditionaldetailprovidedintheAppendix.

Wethenassessthelikelyeffectsofthese

trendsoverthecomingdecade,specifically

forecastingchangesindistributionofwafer

fabricationandATPcapacity.Wealsoconsider

geographicdiversificationinothersegments

ofthesupplychain,3includingdesign,core

IP,andEDA,equipment,andmaterials.

Ourreportthenhighlightsthepathtoward

greaterresilience,includingsustaininggovernmentsupport,guardingagainstsupply-

demandimbalances,integratingnewcountries,

maintainingvibrantglobaltrade,andfostering

globaltalent.Asgeopoliticalfrictionspersist,it

isimportanttomaintainaglobalsupplychain

andsupportamorediverseglobalproduction

footprint.Accordingly,wecloseourreportby

highlightingfutureneedsoftheindustry.

7

TheExpansionofGovernmentIncentives

S

includingoverallbusinessconditions,

emiconductorcompaniesweighmany

factorswhenmakinginvestmentdecisions,

suppliernetworks,siteavailability,infrastructure,

andworkforce—butasignificantoverarching

factorisgovernmentpolicy.Well-craftedand

durableincentiveprograms,alongwithan

enablingregulatoryenvironmentandeffective

talentdevelopmentinitiatives,alsosignala

government’scommitmenttotheindustry’s

long-termsuccess.Forindividualcompanies,

effectivepoliciescanimprovethecostand

efficiencyofconstructingandoperatingafacility.

SinceourreportinApril2021,governments

aroundtheworldhavemadesubstantial

effortstoincreasetheirsupportforthe

semiconductorindustry(seeExhibit1;for

moreinformationonincentiveprograms

ineachkeyregion,seetheAppendix).

TheUnitedStatespassedtheCHIPSActto

incentivizegrowthofthesemiconductorecosystem

throughbothdirectgrantsanda25%ITCfor

semiconductormanufacturing,andseveralstates

haveenactedincentiveprogramstosupplement

thefederalefforts.$11billionofthe$52billion

appropriatedintheCHIPSActistobeusedto

developUSleadershipinsemiconductorR&D,

emphasizingtheimportanceofanall-encompassing

industrialpolicytosuccess.IntheEUandJapan,

governmentshaveappropriatedlargegrantfunds

tobeallocatedonanationalandproject-specific

basis,coupledwithtaxincentives.TheSouth

KoreanandTaiwanesegovernmentsareoffering

comparativelylargertaxincentiveprogramsand

R&Dsupport—forexample,intheTaiwanChip

InnovationProgramandSouthKorea’sK-CHIPS

Act.Thesedirectincentivesarecomplemented

byindirecttoolstoattractinvestment,suchas

infrastructuresupport,low-costaccesstoland,

andstreamlininggovernmentapprovals.

8

MainlandChina’slargeandwide-rangingsupport

forthesemiconductorindustryalsowillimpact

theglobalsupplychaininthecomingyears.

AlargeportionofMainlandChina’ssupport

hascomeintheformofequityinfusionsand

theoperationoffundsthatmixgovernment

andprivatecapital.Otherfactors,suchas

overseastalentacquisition,theformulation

ofdomesticstandards,stateownership,

andthepreferencegiventodomestically

producedchips,furtheracttosupportMainlandChina’ssemiconductorindustry.

EXHIBIT1

Governmentincentivesbymajorregion(lefttorightbysizeofGDP)

US

Target

Achieveresiliency

insemiconductor

supplychain

Reach70%

self-sufficiency

by2025

Gain20%global

shareby2030

Earn$112B

salesby2030

Securefoothold

inLogic,bolster

fableadership

Breakthrough

1nmby2030

Guiding

policy

CHIPSand

ScienceAct,

100-DaySupply

ChainReview

NationalIC

Outline,14th

FiveYearPlan

DigitalCompass

2030

Strategyfor

Semisandthe

DigitalIndustry

K-Belt

Semiconductor

Strategy

Angstrom

Semiconductor

Initiative,

Moonshotprogram

Key

Incentive

amounts

$39B$142B$47B$17.5B$55B$16B

ingrants1inequityfundsingrantsingrantsintaxincentivesintaxincentives4

Key

Initiatives

25%investment

taxcredit

Grantsunder

theCHIPSAct

State-level

support

BigFundI,II,IIIGrantsand

andlocalfundsloansunderEU

ChipsAct

State-owned

enterpriseleadersTaxcredits

National

sciencefund

Stateaid

allowances2

Nationalfiscal

funding

Leading-Edge

Semiconductor

Technology

Center

Taxincentives

underK-ChipsAct

Private-public

education

programs

Financialsubsidies

undertheChip

InnovationProgram

Industry-

academiaco-op,

taxcredits

Newfab

&ATP

investments

since20203

26~3058437

1.$39Bformanufacturing;$13.2BforR&Dandworkforcedevelopment

2.ImportantProjectsofCommonEuropeanInterest(IPCEI)

3.ComprisesfabandATPprojectsthathavebeenannounced,started,orcompletedsince2020

4.25%taxcreditpledgingtogiveback$2.25Bperannumover7years.

5.MayundercountthetotalnumberofsitesinChina.

Source:Gartner;SIA;Pressreleases;Companydisclosures;Governmentwebsites;BCGanalysis

9

ResilienceintheSemiconductorSupplyChain

T

heglobalsemiconductorsupplychainis

highlyspecialized(seeExhibit2).Different

regionshavestrengthsindifferentareas.

Forexample,US-headquarteredcompanieslead

indesign,coreIP,andEDA;theUnitedStates,EU,

andJapanjointlyleadinequipment;companies

headquarteredinMainlandChina,Japan,

Taiwan,andSouthKorealeadinmaterials;South

Korea-andTaiwan-headquarteredcompanies

leadtheworldinadvancednodefabrication

(sub-10nanometerchips);andATPfootprintis

concentratedinMainlandChinaandTaiwan.

Specializationbyregionhasbeenenabledbythe

globallyintegratednatureofthesupplychain,

whichhasallowedeachspecializedcompanyto

accesstheglobalmarket.Butithasalsocreated

vulnerabilitiesintermsofgeographicconcentration.

Lookingahead,weexpectsignificantgeographic

diversification,mainlyintwoareastostartwith:(i)

waferfabrication,particularlyinadvancedlogicand

(ii)ATP,withadiversificationofactivitiesoutside

MainlandChinaandTaiwantoincludesubstantial

gainsfornewmarkets.ItisunlikelythatATPwill

locateintheUnitedStates,duetocostpressures,

theexceptionbeingcertainadvancedpackaging

facilitiesnearnewfabsites.Toalesserextent,we

alsoexpectgreaterdiversificationindesign,as

marketleaderssourcetalentglobally,andmaterials,

asvendorsfollownewfabcapacitytodifferent

regions(seeExhibit3).InequipmentaswellasEDA

andcoreIP,meaningfuldiversificationwillprove

challenginggiventhehighdegreeofspecialization

andvendorconcentrationtoday,aswellasthe

lessernecessityofco-locatingwithfabsites.

Belowwediscussthesetrendsindepth

foreachsegmentofthesupplychain.

EXHIBIT2

Semiconductorindustryvalue-addedbyactivityandregion,2022(%)

PrecompetitiveResearch

EDA&

CoreIP3%

68%25%3%3%

EDADesign

Logic30%65%9%4%3%11%5%4%

CoreIP•Logic

•DAO

•Memory

DAO17%41%17%18%4%5%9%6%

Memory9%25%7%60%4%3%

Equipment

Materials

Manufacturing

•Wafer

fabrication

•Assembly,

testand

packaging

Mfg

equipment

12%

Materials

5%

Wafer

fabrication

19%

47%18%26%3%3%2%

9%6%12%18%28%18%10%

10%8%

17%17%18%24%7%

ATP6%3%3%6%9%28%30%20%

Overallvaluechain100%

38%11%12%12%11%11%5%

USAEUJapanSouthTaiwanMainlandRoW

KoreaChina

Notesonregionalbreakdown:EDA,design,manufacturingequipment,andrawmaterialsbasedoncompanyrevenuesandcompany

headquarterslocation.WaferfabricationandAssembly&testingbasedoninstalledcapacityandgeographiclocationofthefacilities.

1.IncludesIsrael,Singapore,andtherestoftheworld

Source:IPnest;WolfeResearch;Gartner;SEMI;BCGanalysis

10

EXHIBIT3

DiversificationbySupplyChainSegment

MethodDistribution,2022Geodiversification

1

Design1

HQ

revenue

4%

51%10%9%13%8%6%

•BarrierstoentryduetohighR&Dspend

•Diversificationofwherecompanieshire,locate,

andtraintalentforR&Dandengineering

2

EDA&

coreIP

HQ

revenue

68%25%

3%

3%

•UseofAIindesignprocessforefficiency

•Growingdomain-specificarchitecture

•Focusonpower,performance,andarea

3

Equipment

&tools

HQ

revenue

47%18%26%

3%

3%

•BarrierstoentryduetospecializationandR&Dintensity

•Moderatediversificationofgeographicfootprintof

R&Dandtrainingcentersbycurrentmarketleaders

4

Materials

HQ

revenue

9%6%12%18%28%18%10%

•Increasedco-locationnearnewfabs

•Continualvulnerabilitiesinspecificmaterials

categoriesandrelatedcriticalminerals

5

Wafer

Fabrication

Site

capacity

10%8%17%17%18%24%7%

•Governmentincentiveprogramstoattractfabinvestment

•SubstantialCapExacrossdestinationregionsby

majorcompanies,withthebulkinadvancedlogic

6

ATP

Site

capacity

3%

3%

6%9%28%30%20%

•Policysupportforconventionalpackaginginnewmarkets

inSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,andEurope

•Disruptiveimpactofchipletsinadvancedpackaging

USJapanTaiwanEUUnchangedModerateSubstantial

KoreaMainlandChinaOthers

1.RepresentsbothfablessandIDMdesign

Source:SEMI;YoleGroup;BCGAnalysis

WaferFabrication

Webeginwithwaferfabrication,whichexertsa

“pull”effectoninvestmentinothersegmentsof

thesupplychain.Giventhecapitalrequirements

andsubstantialleadtimetobringprojectsonline

(upwardsoffiveyearsinsomecases),wafer

fabricationiswheregovernmentandindustry

effortshavefocusedsubstantiallytodate.

Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivatesector

investmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,

comparedwith$720billioninthe10years

priortoenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–

2022).Theover100majorsemiconductor

manufacturingecosystemprojectsthathave

beenannouncedsinceourpriorreportarespread

out—botharoundtheglobeandtonewlocations

withineachmajorregion(seeExhibit4).

Asia:

Investmentscontinueatpaceacrosstheregion.

LocalcompaniesinTaiwanhaveannouncedplansto

standupsevennewfabsontheislanditself.TSMC

isalsopartneringwithSony,DENSO,andToyota

toboostmanufacturingcapabilitiesinKumamoto,

Japan,andJapaneseofficialsarehelpingdomestic

startupRapidussetupproductionlinesforcutting-

edge2nanometerchipsatanewsiteinHokkaido.

SouthKoreahasannouncedaplantoinvest$471

billionthrough2047tobuild16newfabsinamega

chipclusterinGyeonggiProvince,involvingSamsung,

SKHynix,andotherchipcompanies.4InMainland

China,domesticChinesecompaniesaremakingnew

investmentsinfabsinShenzhen,Tianjin,andShanghai.

UnitedStates:

Between2020andyear-end2023,80new

semiconductormanufacturingprojectswereannounced

acrosstheUnitedStatesalone,projectedtocreate

50,000directnewjobs.5Aportionoftheseinvestments

isgoingtoareaswithamaturesemiconductor

footprint,suchasTexas,Arizona,NewYork,and

California.Buttherehavealsobeensubstantial

investmentsinGreenfieldsandcapacityexpansions

innewerregions,suchasNewAlbany,Ohio.

11

Europe:

Therehasbeensubstantialinvestmentinnew

capacityinEurope,withsevenmajorwafer

fabinvestmentsannouncedsince2020.The

lion’sshareofthiscapacityisbeingbuiltin

easternGermany,includingIntel’sinvestmentin

MagdeburgandTSMC’sjointinvestmentwith

leadingEuropeansemiconductormanufacturers

toconstructanewfacilityinDresden.Still,the

momentumisnotlimitedtoGermany;inthe

southofFrance,GlobalFoundrieshaspartnered

withSTMicroelectronicstobuilda$3.1billion

fabinCrolles,andPolandispoisedtohost

anewInteladvancedpackagingfacility.

Inconsequence,weexpectsignificant

investmenttoflowbetweenregions

betweennowand2032(seeExhibit5).

Between2020andyear-end

2023,80newsemiconductor

manufacturingprojects

wereannouncedacross

theUnitedStatesalone

EXHIBIT4

MajornewfabandATPinvestmentsannouncedacrosstheworldsince2020

ASIAUSAEUROPE

SKHynixFab

(Yongin,KR)

SKHynixM15XFab

(Cheogju,KR)

SamsungP3Fab

(Pyeongtaek,KR)

SMICFab

(Tianjin,CN)

SMICFab

(Shanghai,CN)

MicronATPFactory

(Xi’an,CN)

HuaHongSemiconductorFab

(Wuxi,CN)

STMicroelectronics,SananFab

(Chongqing,CN)

SMICFab

(Shenzhen,CN)

ChinaResources

MicroelectronicsFab

(Shenzhen,CN)

ISMCFab

(Karnataka,IN)

InfineonSiC

PowerFab

(Kulim,MY)

ASEATP

Plants4and5

(Penang,MY)

IntelATPFactory

(Penang,MY)

MicronATPFactory

(Gujarat,IN)

AmkorATPFactory

(BacNinh,VN)

SiliconBoxATP

(SG)

UMCFab12iP3

(SG)

SonyFab5

(Isahaya,JP)

TSMC,SonyFab

(Kumamoto,JP)

RenesasKofu

Factory

(KaiCity,JP)

Kioxia,Western

DigitalFab

(Yokkaichi,JP)

PSMCP5Fab

(Maoli,TW)

NanyaFab4

(NewTaipei,TW)

TSMCFab

(Kaohsiung,TW)

UMCFab12P6

(Kaohsiung,TW)

WinSemiFab

(Kaohsiung,TW)

TSMCFab14

(Tainan,TW)

MicrochipFab

(Gresham,OR)

AnalogDevicesFab

(Beaverton,OR)

BoschFab

(Roseville,CA)

Western

DigitalFab

(Fremont,CA)

Intel

Fab52Fab62

(Chandler,AZ)

TSMCFab21

(Phoenix,AZ)

Amkor

ATPFactory

(Peoria,AZ)

IntelFab

(RioRancho,NM)

PolarSemiFab

(Bloomington,MN)

MicronFab

(Boise,Idaho)

Texas

InstrumentsFab

(Lehi,UT)

MicrochipFab

(COSprings,CO)

X-Fab

(Lubbock,TX)

Integra

Technologies

Fab(Wichita,KS)

SamsungFab/ATP

(Taylor,TX)

NXPFab

(Austin,TX)

SKHynixATP

(WLafayette,IN)

Nhanced

SemiconductorsATP

(Odon,IN)

IntelFab

(NewAlbany,OH)

MicronFab

(Clay,NY)

Global

FoundriesFab

(Malta,NY)

WolfspeedFab

(SilverCity,NC)

PallidusFab

(RockHill,SC)

EMPShieldFab

(Burlington,KS)

GlobalWaferFab

(Sherman,TX)

TexasInstruments

FabsSM1,SM2,SM3,SM4

(Sherman,TX)

TexasInstrumentsFab

(Richardson,TX)

GlobalFoundriesFab

(Dresden,DE)

IntelFab

(Magdeburg,DE)

WolfspeedFab

(Saarland,DE)

ST

Microelectronics,

GlobalFoundries

Fab(Crolles,FR)

AlediaFab

(Champagnier,FR)

IntelATPFactory

(Wroclaw,PL)

STMicroelectronics

SiCFactory

(Catania,IT)

TSMC,Infineon,

Bosch,NXPFab

(Dresden,DE)

InfineonSmart

PowerFab

(Dresden,DE)

PlannedStartedCompletedInvestmentsize($)

$2B

Note:Includesinvestmentsover$100Mfrom2020onwardsinFabsandATPfacilities.

Source:Gartner;SIA;pressreleases;companydisclosures;BCGanalysis

12

EXHIBIT5

FutureflowsofCapEx6fromcompanyHQregiontodestinationregion,2024-2032F

31%28%13%10%7%7%3%

$716B$646B$300B$222B$156B$154B$72B

30%

11%

$2.3T

TotalCapEx

42%

66%64%

HQregion

98%

37%

100%

98%

US

6%

46%

28%

32%

25%

6%

TaiwanUSAKoreaJapanMainlandEuropeOthers1

ChinaDestinationregion

1.OthersincludesIsrael,Malaysia,Singapore,Indiaandtherestoftheworld

2.MainlandChina

Source:SEMI;BCGAnalysis

Advancedlogiccurrentlycomprisesprocesses

newerthan10nanometers.Weexpectthe

definitionof“leading-edge”capacitytocomprise

processesnewerthan3nanometersby2030.7

Advancedlogicwillattractalargershareof

investment,drivenbydatacenters,networking

equipment,PCs,smartphones,smart“edge”

deviceswithmachinelearningandartificial

intelligence(ML/AI)capabilities,andautomotive

advanceddriver-assistancesystems(ADASs),

amongotherapplications.8Indeed,nearly70%

of