2024年全球私募股权市场报告（英）

GLOBALPRIVATEEQUITYREPORT2024AboutBain&Company’sPrivateEquitybusinessBain&Companyistheleadingconsultingpartnertotheprivateequity(PE)industryanditsstakeholders.PEconsultingatBainhasgrowneightfoldoverthepast15yearsandnowrepresentsaboutone-thirdofthefirm’sglobalbusiness.Wemaintainaglobalnetworkofmorethan2,000experiencedprofessionalsservingPEclients.Ourpracticeismorethantriplethesizeofthenext-largestconsultingcompanyservingPEfirms.Bain’sworkwithPEfirmsspansfundtypes,includingbuyout,infrastructure,realestate,anddebt.Wealsoworkwithhedgefunds,aswellasmanyofthemostprominentinstitutionalinvestors,includingsovereignwealthfunds,pensionfunds,endowments,andfamilyinvestmentoffices.Wesupportourclientsacrossabroadrangeofobjectives:Dealgeneration.Weworkalongsideinvestorstodeveloptherightinvestmentthesisandenhancedealflowbyprofilingindustries,screeningtargets,anddevisingaplantoapproachtargets.Duediligence.Wehelpsupportbetterdealdecisionsbyperformingintegratedduediligence,assessingrevenuegrowthandcost-reductionopportunitiestodetermineatarget’sfullpotential,andprovidingapost-acquisitionagenda.Immediatepost-acquisition.Afteranacquisition,wesupportthepursuitofrapidreturnsbydevelopingstrategicblueprintsforacquiredcompanies,leadingworkshopsthatalignmanagementwithstrategicpriorities,anddirectingfocusedinitiatives.Ongoingvalueaddition.Duringtheownershipphase,wehelpincreasethevalueofportfoliocompaniesbysupportingrevenueenhancementandcost-reductioninitiativesandrefreshingtheirvalue-creationplans.Exit.Wehelpensurethatinvestorsmaximizereturnsbypreparingforexit,identifyingtheoptimalexitstrategy,preparingthesellingdocuments,andprequalifyingbuyers.Firmstrategyandoperations.WehelpPEfirmsdevelopdistinctivewaystoachievecontinuedexcellencebydevisingdifferentiatedstrategies,maximizinginvestmentcapabilities,developingsectorspecializationandintelligence,enhancingfund-raising,improvingorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking,andenlistingtoptalent.Institutionalinvestorstrategy.Wehelpinstitutionalinvestorsdevelopbest-in-classinvestmentprogramsacrossassetclasses,includingprivateequity,infrastructure,andrealestate.Topicsweaddresscoverassetclassallocation,portfolioconstructionandmanagerselection,governanceandriskmanagement,andorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking.Wealsohelpinstitutionalinvestorsexpandtheirparticipationinprivateequity,includingthroughcoinvestmentanddirectinvestingopportunities.Bain&Company,Inc.131DartmouthStreetBoston,Massachusetts02116USATel:+16175722000NetPromoter®,NPS®,NPSPrism®,andtheNPS-relatedemoticonsareregisteredtrademarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,andFredReichheld.NetPromoterScoreSMandNetPromoterSystemSMareservicemarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,andFredReichheld.Copyright©2024Bain&Company,Inc.Allrightsreserved.GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024ContentsTheDarkbeforetheDawnꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ2PrivateEquityOutlook2024:TheLiquidityImperativeꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ3Investmentsꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ9Exitsꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ15Fund-raisingꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ19Returnsꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ24Move-InReady:RenovatingYourGrowthStrategyꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ28HaveSecondariesReachedaTippingPoint?ꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ35BuildingaStrongerBuy-and-Buildꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ39HarnessingGenerativeAIinPrivateEquityꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ45TheYearCashBecameKingAgaininPrivateEquityꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀꢀ521GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024TheDarkbeforetheDawnDearColleague:Theyear2023wasoneofportent.Dealvaluefellby37%.Exitvalueslidevenmore,by44%.Fund-raisingdroppedacrossprivatecapital,as38%fewerbuyoutfundsclosed.Interestingly,dollarcommitmentsinbuyoutssurgedasanumberofhigh-performingfundscametomarket.Butitwastrulyayearofhavesandhave-nots.Just20fundsaccountedformorethanhalfofallbuyoutcapitalraised.Thewordforthismarketisstalled.Cuttingthroughallofthemacronoisewasthe525-basis-pointincreaseinUScentralbankratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023.Thespeedandmagnitudeofthisrisecausedgeneralpartnerstohitthepausebutton.Thegoodnews?Interestratesappeartobestableandhavebeenforafewmonths.Recorddrypowderisstackedandreadyfordeployment.Asizablechunkofthisdrypowderisagingandneedstobeputtowork.Lookingintoportfolios,nearlyhalfofallglobalbuyoutcompanieshavebeenheldforatleastfouryears.Inshort,theconditionsappeartobeshiftinginfavorofhittingthegobutton.Wewillseewhat2024brings.Bestwishes,HughMacArthurChairman,GlobalPrivateEquity2PrivateEquityOutlook2024:TheLiquidityImperativeSpikinginterestratesderaileddealmakingin2023andleftthecapitalꢁlywheelsputteringꢀGettingunstuckisjoboneintheyearaheadꢀByHughMacArthur,RebeccaBurack,GrahamRose,ChristopheDeVusser,KikiYang,andSebastienLamyAtaGlancePrivateequitycontinuedtoreelin2023asrapidlyrisinginterestratesledtosharpdeclinesindealmaking,exits,andfund-raisingꢀTheexitconundrumhasemergedasthemostpressingproblem,asLPsstarvedfordistributionspullbacknewallocationsfromallbutthelargest,mostreliablefundsꢀThelong-termoutlookremainssound,butbreakingthelogjamwillrequiremorerobustapproachestovaluecreationandrapidinnovationinliquiditysolutionsꢀIt’ssafetosaytheprivateequityindustryhasneverseenanythingquitelikewhat’shappenedoverthelast24months.Whilethesharpdrop-offindealactivityinlate2022andinto2023echoestheperiodfollowingthe2008–09globalfinancialcrisis(GFC),thesituationtheindustryfacestodayislargelyunprecedented.ThenumbersareallveryGFC-like:Dealvalueanddealcounthavefallen60%and35%,respectively,fromtheirpeaksin2021.Exitvalueisdown66%,andthenumberoffundsclosingisoffbynearly55%3GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024(seeFigure1).Yetwhat’sdrivingthesedeclinescouldn’tbemoredissimilartowhatwashappeningin2008–09,andmakingsenseofitrequiresadifferentlensaltogether.Asdifficultasitwas,theaftermathoftheGFCfollowedapredictablepattern:Tocopewiththecrisis,centralbankersslashedinterestratestospuractivity,theeconomyslowlystabilized,andprivateequitywasabletoclawitswaybackfromwhatmanypredictedwouldbeitsunraveling.Theresultingperiodofgrowthintheyearsthatfollowedcreatedaprivateequityindustrythatisvastlylargerandmorecomplexthananyonein2008couldhavereasonablyexpected.Yettodaythatsizeandcomplexitymagnifythechallengestheindustryfaces.Businessconditionsaremoreperplexingthanpredictable.Interestrateshaverisenfasterthanatanytimesincethe1980s,anditremainsunclearwhentheUSFederalReservewillreversecourseorwhererateswilleventuallysettle(seeFigure2).Concernsaboutwhatwedubbedlastyear“themostanticipatedrecessioninhistorythathasn’thappenedyet”continuetolinger.Yettothesurpriseofmostanalysts,theeconomyischuggingalongnicely.Record-lowunemployment,reasonablegrowth,andsurgingpublicmarketsintheUSsuggestthepossibilitythatwemightjustescapethesemonthsofturmoilwithnothingworsethanasoftlanding.Thesecrossedsignalshaveleftprivateequityhamstrung.Thesheervelocityoftheinterestrateshockwassomethingfewintheindustryhadeverexperienced,andtheimpactonvaluehasdrivenawedgebetweenbuyersandsellers.Figure1a:Investments,exits,andthenumberofbuyoutfundsclosedallcontinuedtoslidein2023astheindustryreeledfromrisinginterestratesInvestmentsExitsFund-raisingGlobalbuyoutdealvalueGlobalbuyout-backedexitvalueGlobalbuyoutcapitalraisedDealcount4,000ExitcountCountoffundsclosed(–60%)(–66%)(–1%)$1,250B1,000750$1,250B3,000$600B40020001,00080060040020001,00075050025003,0002,0001,00002,0005002501,00000201320182023201320182023201320182023Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvaluerepresentsofferamountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheir­inalclose;countisofallfunds,includingthoseforwhich­inalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestmentmultimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFundSources:Dealogic;Preqin4GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Figure1b:Activityduringthesecondhalfoftheyearwasanimprovementontheꢀirst,butnotbymuchInvestmentsExitsFund-raisingGlobalbuyoutdealvalue,quarterlyGlobalbuyout-backedexitvalue,quarterlyGlobalbuyoutcapitalraised,quarterlyDealcountExitcountCountoffundsclosed$350B300250200150100501,0008006004002000$350B300250200150100506004002000$200B150100504003002001000000202020212022202320202021202220232020202120222023Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvaluerepresentsofferamountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheir­inalclose;countisofallfunds,includingthoseforwhich­inalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestmentmultimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFundSources:Dealogic;PreqinFigure2:The525-basis-pointriseininterestratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023wasthesharpestmonetarytighteningindecadesCentralbankinterestratesbyregion(monthlyaverage)+113basis+289bpspointsinUS+98bps+25bps6%4USUKEurope20Jan2020Jul2020Jan2021Jul2021Jan2022Jul2022Jan2023Jul2023Notes:USshowsfederalfundsrate;Europeshowseuroshort-termreporate;UKshowsclearingbanksbaserate(middlerate);basispointchangesoverasix-monthperiodaredisplayedfortheUSonlyandcalculatedbasedontheincreaseinaverageinterestratesbetweentheendofJuneandDecemberofeachyearSource:LSEG5GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Pricemultiples,whichtendtomoveinverselytointerestrates,havetippeddownwardoverthelastyear,butonlyslightlysofar.That’sbecausesellersarebringingtomarketonlythehighest-qualityassets,thosetheyareconfidentwillmoveatareasonablereturn.Otherwise,theexitchannelshavelargelydriedup,leavinggeneralpartners(GPs)withatowering$3.2trillioninunsoldassetsandstanchingtheflowofcapitalbacktolimitedpartners(LPs).Thesedeclinesinactivityhavehadachillingeffectonfund-raising.SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashflownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.Theindustrystillraisedanimpressive$1.2trillioninfreshcapitalin2023,andthebuyoutcategoryattracted$448billion.ButLPswerehighlyselective.Whilecapitalflowedtothelargest“reliablehand”buyoutfunds,fund-raisingformostwasashardasit’severbeen.SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashꢀlownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.UntilGPscanbeginmovingassetsoutoftheirportfoliosinatimelyfashion,raisingthenextfundwon’tgetanyeasier.Andthethreattoreturnsisreal.Buyoutstypicallyinvolvetermloansthatexpireinfivetosevenyears.Already,interestcoverageratiosamongbuyout-backedportfoliocompaniesintheUShavedroppedto2.4timesearningsbeforeinterest,taxes,depreciation,andamortization(EBITDA),thelowestlevelsince2007.ThatispressuringGPstobothfindliquiditysolutionsanddevisenewwaystogenerateprofitsthroughoperatingleverage—notjustthemultipleexpansionandrevenuegrowththeindustryhasleanedonforyears.Earlysignsofaturnaround?Themostdifficultaspectofthisgridlock,ofcourse,ispredictingwhatwillhappennext.Butinourview,thegreenshootsofarecoveryarestartingtopokethrough.Perhapsthemostimportantisthat,barringanynewmacroshocksorgeopoliticalcrises,ratesaremorelikelythannottomoderateinthecomingyear.Evenslightcutsarelikelytospurondealmakingaslongasthemacrooutlookremainsrelativelystable.Buyoutfundsalonearesittingonarecord$1.2trillionindrypowder,and26%ofthatisfouryearsoldorolder,upfrom22%in2022(seeFigure3).ThatcreatesaheavierincentivethannormalforGPstogetoffthesidelinesandstartbuying,evenifconditionsaren’tideal.Activityisalreadytickingupward,andwithhelpfromtheFedandtheEuropeanCentralBank,thebiasin2024islikelytotheupsidewhenitcomestodealcountandvalue.Exitsareanothermatter.Barringasharper-than-anticipateddropinrates,sellerswillcontinuetofacehighhurdlestounloadingcompaniestostrategicbuyers,othersponsors,orthepublicmarkets.6GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Figure3:Witharecord26%ofglobalbuyoutdrypowdernowfouryearsoldorolder,generalpartnersareundergrowingpressuretododealsGlobalbuyoutdrypowder,byyearssincecapitalraised($T)1.21.01.00.90.80.73yearsorless$0.7T4–5yearsMorethan5years2017191819191820192122222326Shareofcapitalthatisatleast4yearsold(%)23Notes:Buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestmentmultimanagerfunds;assumesaverageinvestmentperiodofꢀiveyears;percentagesplitofcapitalraisedin2023isasofQ2;discrepanciesinbarheightsdisplayingthesamevalueareduetoroundingdifferencesSources:Preqin;BainanalysisWithsponsorsstrugglingtosendcashbacktotheirLPs,2024willlikelybedefinedbyhowcreativetheindustrycanbeinfindingwaystogenerateliquidity.Actionrequired.What’sclearisthatpassivelywaitingforconditionstorecoverisnotaviablestrategy.Muchofthisreportisdevotedtoexploringhowthesedynamicsareplayingoutandwhatthemostforward-thinkingGPsareworkingon.Gettingunstuckwilldemandactioninseveraldirectionsatonce:•Doublingdownonvaluecreation.Theexitsituationisshiningabrightlightonhowcriticalitistogenerateoperatingleverageinamarketwheretailwindsfrommultipleexpansionhaveturnedintoheadwinds.Youcan’tcontrolthedirectionofrates.Butyoucangetbetteratunderwritingvalueandcapturingitthroughcrispexecution.We’vetalkedaboutitforyears:Theindustryhasrelieddisproportionatelyonrisingmultiplesandrevenuegainstogeneratereturnswhilemarginimprovementhascontributedpracticallynothing.Thatnolongerworkswhenrisingratesserveasballastforassetmultiples.TheportfoliocompaniesthatwillstandoutinthisdifficultmarketarethosethathaveusedeverymeanspossibletoboostEBITDAefficientlyandcandemonstratetothenextownerthatthere’smoneyleftonthetable.Thatmeansfundshavetogetsharperatfindingandpullingthevalue-creation“levers”thatgenerateorganicgrowth—pricing,salesforceeffectiveness,and7GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024productinnovation,tonameafew.Iftheseinsightsweren’tpartoftheoriginalvalue-creationplan,nowisthetimetofocusonthem.Themarkethasbeenabundantlyclearonthis.Thecompaniesthataresellingarenotthosethathavemerelygottenbiggerand/orleaner.Thepremiumisongeneratingstrong,profitable,organicgrowth.•Managingacrosstheportfolio.WhilestrategiesfocusedonEBITDAgrowthtaketime,aballooningexitbacklogalsopresentsmoreimmediateconcerns.Fundsneedtodevelopaclear-eyed,pragmaticappraisalofwhereeachportfoliocompanysitsintermsofitsreturnprofile,itscapitalstructure,anditsfutureprospects.Aslongasratesstayelevated,GPshavechoicestomake:Whichcompanieswillreapanacceptablereturnifwesellnow?WhichshouldwesellanywaysowecanreturncashtoLPs?Whichcompaniesfaceloanexpirations,andwherecanweeffectively“amendandextend”toreshapeabalancesheetwithouttoomuchpain?Whatareouroptionsforgeneratingliquiditythroughtheburgeoningsecondarymarket?Iftheindustry’sgrowinginventoryofunsoldassetsisn’tgoingtobeaproblem,thereareafewthingsyouhavetobelieve.First,withalargevolumeofportfoliocompaniesfacingrefinancinghurdles,itwillbecriticalthatdebtholderstakethestancetheydidin2008–09.Lendersclearlydidn’twantthekeystoabunchoftroubledportfoliocompaniesthenandprobablydon’twantthemnow.Thatleavesopentheopportunitytopayapenalty,addsomeequity,andarriveataworkablecapitalstructure.Thesecondthingyouneedtobelieveisthatthereareenoughinnovativesolutionslikecontinuationfunds,securitizations,andNAVfinancingtohelpGPsrecapprizedassetsandwaitforreturnstoripenwhilekeepingeconomicinterestalignedbetweenGPsandLPs.Thesecondariesspaceisstillsmallandsomewhatcontroversial.Butitisgrowingrapidlyandrepresentsthekindoffinancialinnovationthatisprivateequity’sspecialty.•Professionalizingfund-raising.Aneffectiveportfolioscanshouldleadtoaclear,practicalroadmapforsteeringthefundthroughanimmenselydifficultperiod.ThenextstepiscommunicatingtoLPshowportfoliomanagersareusingallthetoolsattheirdisposaltoactasatrustedstewardofinvestorcapital.GPsaren’tparticularlyadeptatthiskindofcommunicationbecausetheyhaven’thadtobeinthepast.Adhoc,anecdotalconversationsaboutasingleportfoliocompanyweresufficientwhenperformanceoverallwasn’treallyinquestion.Nowperformanceiseverything,andthecompetitionforalimitedpoolofcapitalhasneverbeenmorefierce.Thisisspurringthemostproactivefundstoconsidermakingastepchangeinhowtheyapproachinvestorsbyprofessionalizingprocessesandhoningtheirgo-to-marketcapabilities.Thefirmsout-raisingothersarestrategicallymappingoutwhotheirLPsshouldbeanddevelopingthecapabilitiesandtoolsnecessarytounderstandwhatittakestowinwiththemandexpandshareofwallet.TheyarebuildingthekindofcommercialorganizationsthebestB2Bsellersrelyondaily.8GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Noneofthisiseasy,ofcourse,butnoneofitisinsurmountable.PrivateequitysurvivedtheoverexuberanceoftheRJRNabiscoyears.Itlivedthrough9/11andthesubsequentrecession.Ittooktheworstblowsoftheglobalfinancialcrisisandcameoutevenstronger.Theindustry,inotherwords,hasconsistentlydemonstrateditsresilience.Thisisoneofthosemoments.Timetogettowork.Here’samoredetailedlookatwhathappenedin2023.InvestmentsPrivateequitydealmakerstendtomakethemostofthecardsthey’redealt.Aslongastheyhavereasonableconfidenceinwhat’scoming,they’llfindawaytomakeagooddealwork.ButconfidencewasthefirstcasualtywhentheFedjackedratesatthefastestpacesincethe1980s,leavingtheindustrygaspingforair.Thefalloffthatstartedinthesecondhalfof2022bledoverinto2023.Excludingadd-ons,buyoutinvestmentvaluedroppedto$438billion,a37%decreasefrom2022andtheworsttotalsince2016(seeFigure4).Overalldealcountdropped20%toaround2,500transactions.Thesteepslopeofthedeclinewassomethingtheindustryhadn’texperiencedsincetheglobalfinancialcrisis.Themalaiseinfectedregionsacrosstheworld,withEuropeandAsia-Pacificbothexperiencingsignificantdeclines(seeFigure5).Figure4:Thetwo-yearfalloffinglobalbuyoutdealvaluemarksthesteepestdeclinesincetheglobalꢀinancialcrisisGlobalbuyoutdealvalue,byregionDealcountChangeindealvalue2023vs.2023vs.1,086$1,200B1,0008006004002004,0003,0002,0001,000020225-yr.avg.726Restofworld–22%–47%694699499532519Asia-Pacific–8%–32%–38%332463438397369240295305Europe–46%22223119594NorthAmerica–38%–31%02005060708091011121314151617181920212223Total–37%–34%Avg.2564761182603043495215421,029700801788deal494165229206278380604size($M)Notes:Excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;averagedealsizecalculatedusingdealswithdisclosedvalueonlySource:Dealogic9GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Figure5:DealvalueandactivitydeclinedgloballyNorthAmericaBuyoutdealvalueEuropeAsia-PaciꢀicBuyoutdealvalueBuyoutandgrowthdealvalueBuyoutcount2,000Buyoutcount2,000Buyoutandgrowthcount$600B400$600B400$600B4006,0004,0002,00001,5001,0005001,5001,00050020020020000000201220232012202320122023Notes:NorthAmericaandEurope—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;Asia-Paciꢀic—includesbuyout,growth,early-stage,privateinvestmentinpublicequity,andturnarounddeals;excludesadd-ons;excludesrealestate;dealvalueexcludesdealswithannouncedvaluelessthan$10million;includesinvestmentsthathaveclosedandthoseatagreement-in-principleordeꢀinitiveagreementstageSources:Dealogic;AVCJ;BainanalysisDealsofallkindsfelttheimpact,butthosethatdependedonbankfinancingsufferedthemost.Asyieldsonlargesyndicatedloansapproached11%intheUSand9%inEurope(both10-yearhighs),banksretreatedandissuanceofnewloansplunged(seeFigure6).Thelackofaffordableleveragecutthenumberofmegadeals—thoseover$5billion—byalmosthalf,andtheaveragedealsizedroppedto$788million,downfromthepeakof$1billionin2021.Buyoutsbroadlysawdouble-digitdeclinesindealcount(seeFigure7).Technologydeals,whichbynaturerequirelessleveragethandealsinothersectors,maintainedtheirdominantshareoftotalbuyoutcount,butasset-heavytraditionalindustrieslikeindustrialgoodsandservicesexpandedtheirshareslightly,benefitingfromaflighttosafetyamonginvestorslookingforstabilitywherevertheycouldfindit(seeFigure8).Thegrowthandventurecapitalsegments,meanwhile,continuedtodriftsideways.Bothfocusonriskier,earlier-stagecompanieswhosegrowth-basedvaluationsareparticularlyvulnerabletointerestratepressure.Theywerealsobuffetedbythelingeringimpactofthecryptocollapsein2022andtheimplosionofSiliconValleyBankin2023(seeFigure9).Elevatedinterestratescontributedtoseveralotherimportantshiftsinthefinancingenvironment.Privatecreditcontinuedtoaggressivelyfillgapsleftbythebigbanksandcaptured84%ofthemiddle10GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Figure6:Withyieldsonleveragedbankloansshootingthroughtheroof,LBOloanissuanceplungedin2023,makingithardtoꢀinancetransactionsLeveragedbuyout(LBO)yieldsSyndicatedLBOloanissuance($B)12.0%22310.9%8.9%10.08.06.04.02.0176145(–56%)13411310710610410091$64B500.020121314151617181920212223121314151617181920212223USEuropeUSlargecorporateEuropeaninstitutionalNotes:EuropeaninstitutionalspreadincludesalltrackedLBOdeals,regardlessofsize;USlargecorporatedeꢀinedasLBOswithmorethan$50millioninEBITDA;Europesyndicatedloanvolumeconvertedusingeuro/USdollarconversionrateof1.076Sources:LCD;LSEGFigure7:Dealsofallsizesdeclinedin2023andwerewelloffꢀive-yearaveragesShareofglobalbuyoutdealcount,bydealsize2023vs.2023vs.20225-yr.avg.100%80604020Morethan$5B$1B–$5B–47%–20%–34%–32%$0.1B–$1B–34%–33%Lessthan$0.1B–43%–46%020186041920212223Total–36%–38%Avg.dealsize($M)5427001,029801788Notes:Includesdealswithdisclosedvalueonly;excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;averagedealsizecalculatedusingdealswithdisclosedvalueonlySources:Dealogic;Bainanalysis11GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024Figure8:Technologyremainedtheleaderindealcount,butindustrialsincreasedshareasinvestorslookedforstabilityinatraditionalsectorShareofglobalbuyoutdealcount,bysector100%PublicsectorRealestate806040200TelecommunicationsTransportationMediaandentertainmentUtilitiesandenergyRetailConsumerproductsFinancialservicesHealthcareServicesIndustrialsTechnology201828193120302122272324Technology'sshareoftotal(%)29Notes:Excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochangeSource:DealogicFigure9:Aftersoaringduringthepandemic,growthandlate-stageventureinvestinghascomebacktoearthGlobal