布鲁金斯学会-2022财年美国军队：海军（英）-38正式版

NOVEMBER2021

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022

Navy

MarkF.Cancian

ThispaperispartofU.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022.ThereisbipartisansupporttoexpandtheNavy,butlimitedbudgetsandearlyretirements—“divestingtoinvest”—makeachievingthatgoaldifficult.TheBidenadministration’semergingfleetplanincorporatessmallershipsandlargenumbersofunmannedsystems,asproposedbymanystrategists,buthighcosts,productionlimitations,andcongressionaloppositionmaypreventfullimplementation.

KEYTAKEAWAYS

▪InFY2022,fleetsizestaysaboutthesame,at296ships.Previouslyorderedshipsarriveinlargenumbers,buttheNavyretires15ships,10early.Navyactive-dutypersonneldecreaseby1,600to346,200.

▪ShipnumbersmattertotheNavybecauseofhighday-to-daydemandsforitsforcesforcrisisresponse,alliedandpartnerengagement,conventionaldeterrence,andongoingregionalconflicts.

▪Thefuturefleetarchitecture—itssizeandcomposition—remainsaworkinprogress.TheTrumpadministration’s355-shipgoalwasdeemedinfeasiblebecauseofitshighcostandoutmodedoperationalconcepts.Attheendofitsterm,theTrumpadministrationarticulatedanewvisionincorporatingunmannedsystemsanddistributedcapabilities.TheBidenadministrationpublishedasimilararchitecture,butsmallerandwithrangesforshipnumbers.Costisaproblemwithallofthesenotionalarchitecturesbecausetheyrequirelargefundingincreaseswhichmaynotoccur.Nevertheless,someinsightsareemerging:

▪Carriers:Recentforcestructureproposalshaveimpliedareductioninthenumberofcarriers.However,contractualcommitmentsandpoliticalconstraintsmayhavelockedtheNavyintothepresentcarrierforceformanyyearsregardlessofstrategicconsiderations.Smallcarriersseemtoberecedingintothebackgroundonceagain.

▪LargeSurfaceCombatants:Futurearchitecturesenvisiondeepcutstothisfleet,implyingproductioncutbacksandmanyearlyretirements.However,industrialbaseandstrategicconcernsaboutshrinkingfleetsizewillclashwiththenewgoals.

▪SmallSurfaceCombatants:Allthefuturefleetarchitecturesshowanincrease,theonlyquestionbeinghowmuchofanincreaseandhowfast.

▪AmphibiousShips:Newamphibiousconceptsandtheintroductionofasmallamphibiousshipimplyreductionsinthenumberoflargeamphibiousships.However,aswiththelargesurfacecombatants,industrialbaseinterestswillclashwiththenewandlowergoals.

▪AttackSubmarines:Allfuturearchitecturesenvisionanincreaseinthesizeoftheattacksubmarinefleet.However,slowproductioninthe1990sandproductioncapacitylimitstodaywilllimitfleetsizeuntilthe2040s.

▪BallisticMissileSubmarines:TheColumbia-classballisticmissilesubmarineprogram,theNavy’shighest-priorityprogram,remainsonscheduleand(generally)attargetcostbutwithsomerisk.AnyprogramdelaywoulddisrupttheU.S.nucleardeterrent,whileanycostincreasewoulddisrupteveryothershipbuildingprogram.

▪UnmannedSurfaceandUnderseaVessels:ThesefigureprominentlyinNavyarchitectures,butthesystemsremainexperimentalandnoneofthelargerprogramshaveaproductionplan.TheFY2022budgetseemstoentailapauseindevelopment.

▪Navalaviationisgenerallyingoodshape,withstableinventoriesandacceptableaveragefleetages.

However,itremainsfocusedonmannedplatforms.

EndStrengthinFY2022

Table1:NavyEndStrength–Active,Reserve,andCivilians

ActiveNavy

NavyReserve

Civilian

EndStrength

EndStrength

Full-timeEquivalents

FY2021Enacted

347,800

58,800

199,051

FY2022Request

346,200

58,300

200,192

ChangefromFY2020

-1,600

-500

+1,141

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsofTheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),ActiveEndStrengthdatainFigure7.2,ReserveEndStrengthdatainFigure7.3,CiviliandatainFigure7.10(includesdirectandindirecthiresbutexcludesMarineCorpscivilians),

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf.

Navypersonnellevelshavebeenonarollercoaster,reachingapost-ColdWarhighof383,000inFY2002andalowof318,000inFY2012.Thenumberhascreptbackup,buttheNavyisstillfarbelowitspre-9/11size.However,thenumberofsailorstracksroughlytothenumberofshipsinthefleet(seeFigure1).

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022:Navy|2

Figure1:NavyActive-DutyPersonnel,1999–2022

400

380

360

340

320

300

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Actual

FY2022Budget

Source:OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefense(Comptroller),NationalDefenseBudgetEstimatesforFY2022(Washington,DC:Department

ofDefense,August2021),Table7-5:DepartmentofDefenseManpower,258–60,

/Portals/45/Documents/

defbudget/FY2022/FY22_Green_Book.pdf.

TheNavyprojectsthatactive-dutyendstrengthwilldeclineslightlyinFY2022to346,200.ThisreflectstheNavy’snear-termplantoretireoldershipswithlargecrews.AfewNavypersonnelwilltransfertotheSpaceForceinFY2022,butmajordecisionsherelieinthefuture.1TheFY2020andFY2021projectionshadshowncontinuedpersonnelgrowth.

Figure2:NavyReservePersonnel,1989–2022

160,000

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

1989 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2021 2022

NavyReserveEndStrengthFY2021Budget

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsofTheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),Figure7.3,

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf;

andpreviousyears’highlightsdocuments.

“SpaceForceSelectsover900toTransferinFY22,”U.S.SpaceForce,September30,2021,

/News/

Article/2793972/space-force-selects-more-than-900-personnel-to-transfer-fy22/.

Although900personnelwereselected,nearlyall

werefromtheArmy.

MarkF.Cancian|3

Althoughitsendstrengthhasbeenroughlystablesince2014,theNavyReservewillshrinkby500sailorsto58,300inFY2022.Overthelongterm,theNavyReservehasbeenshrinking,unlikeotherDepartmentofDefense(DOD)reservecomponents.Thislong-termdeclineresultsfromtheretirementofallNavyReserveshipsandmanyNavyReserveaircraft,sotheremainingforcesaremainlyforlogisticsandsupport.Billetsforstaffaugmentationarebeingeliminated.Whiletheseremainingfunctionshaveanimportantrole,itismuchnarrowercomparedtothereservecomponentsofotherservices.UnliketheArmyand

AirForce,theNavyandtheMarineCorpshavenotincreasedthenumberofreserviststocompensateforconstraintsonthenumberofactive-dutypersonnel.

Figure3:NavyCivilianWorkforce,FY2015–FY2022

205,000

200,000

195,000

190,000

185,000

180,000

175,000

170,000

165,000

160,000

FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsofTheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),7–12,

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf;

andpreviousyears’highlightsdocuments.

ThenumberofNavyciviliansincreasesby1,100inFY2022,continuingalong-termincrease,thoughataslowerrate.TheNavyappearstobeusingcivilianstooffsetconstraintsonmilitarypersonnel.Thisisasensiblepolicybecauseciviliansarelessexpensivethanmilitarypersonnel;stayintheirjobslonger,resultingindeeperexpertise;andhaveamoreflexiblepersonnelsysteminthathealthandagerequirementsarenotasstringentasforthemilitary.

ThisplannedincreaseisatoddswiththeNavy’srecentannouncementaboutcutting1,000civilianjobsfrominstallationsasabudget-savingmove.Becausethecutswouldaffectpopularsupportactivities(beachesandgyms)aswellasshipoperations,expectcontinueddiscussioninthisarea.2(AlaterchapterinthisserieswillconsiderthecivilianworkforceDOD-wide.)

SamLaGrone,“NavyPlanstoCut1,000CivilianJobs,CloseU.S.BaseLibrariesin$280MCostSavingsDrive,”USNINews,September22,2021,

/2021/09/22/navy-plans-to-cut-1000-civilian-jobs-close-u-s-base-libraries-in-280m-cost-

savings-drive.

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022:Navy|4

Figure4:CivilianManpowerWorkAreas,FY2022

SexualAssaultPrevention&Response

Other

Cyber

Transportation

SupplyDistribution/LogisticsCenter

MilitarySupport

Departmental

Aviation/MarineCorpsDepots

FleetActivities

Engineering/AcquisitionCommands

InstallationManagement/BaseSupport

WarfareCenters

ShipMaintenance

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsofTheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),7–9,

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf.

TheNavy,likeDODingeneral,emphasizesthatmostciviliansworkoutsideWashingtonandareacriticalelementofreadinessbecauseoftheworktheydoonfacilitiesandmaintenance.

FleetSizeinFY2022

Tounderstandthefuturefleet,theplacetostartistheFY2022budgetproposal.Thepresident’sbudgetproposestoconstructonlyeightshipsinFY2022:twoSSN-774submarines,oneDDG-51destroyer,oneFFG-62frigate,oneoiler,twotowing/salvage/rescueships,andoneoceansurveillanceship.Althoughallcountasbattleforceships,onlyfourarecombatants.Congressmightaddshipsinitsfinalbillsasitcustomarilydoes,anotherdestroyerbeingthemostlikelyaddition,butthenumberofshipsfundedinFY2022willbelowcomparedwithrecentshipbuildingbudgets.3

ThereasonforthelownumberisthattheNavyshipbuildingaccountdeclinesfrom$23.3billioninFY2021to$22.6billioninFY2022.ThisreflectstheoveralldeclineintheDODbudget.(Formoreinformationonthispoint,seethebudgetandstrategyoverviewchapter.)

Table2:ImpliedFleetSizeforShipbuildingRateandServiceLife

ShipConstruction/Year

Averagelifeof30yrs

Averagelifeof35yrs

Averagelifeof40yrs

8(FY2022rate)

240

280

320

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsoftheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),2–3,

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf.

BoththeSenateandtheHouseauthorizationactsincludemoneyforaseconddestroyer.However,thatdependsonthehighertopline,whichauthorizationcommitteesmightnotsupport.SenateArmedServicesCommittee,FY2022NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(Washington,DC:September2021),

/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Executive%20

Summary.pdf;

andHouseArmedServicesCommittee,SummaryoftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFY2022(Washington,DC:August2021),

/_cache/files/1/3/13abf96a-7f26-48f0-8c54-c6b6d11e2715/0E2DB3E3B22B70F6BDAB8

6B4D728A433.20210830-fy22-ndaa-full-committee-summary-final.pdf.

MarkF.Cancian|5

Table2calculatesfleetsizewithdifferentassumptionsaboutservicelife.Althoughbuildingrateswillchangeovertime,thecalculationgivesinsightintotheimpliedlong-termfleetsizegiventoday’sbudget.ThetableshowsthattheNavywillneedtoincreaseitsbuildingrateunlessitholdsontoitsshipsforalongtime.Historically,theNavyhastendedtoretireshipsearlybecauseofobsolescenceorbudgetpressures.

ThistendencytoretireshipsearlyappearsintheFY2022budget.Tosavemoneyoverthelongterm,thebudgetproposesearlyretirementforfiveCG-47cruisers,onedocklandingship(LSD),andfourlittoralcombatships(LCSs).TheNavyhaswantedtoretirethesecruisersandamphibiousshipsformanyyears,arguingthattheyaretooexpensivetomodernize.Congresshasoftenpushedback,arguingthattheNavyneedsnumberstomeetitsglobalcommitments(seediscussionbelow).

TheLCSsproposedforretirementarenotold,onebeingcommissionedin2017.TheNavyarguesthatupgradingthemtothecurrentconfigurationwouldbetooexpensive.ThattheNavyisproposingtoretirethemsoearlyisastatementoftheprogram’sshortfalls.

The“divesttoinvest”strategy—wherebytheservicesretirecurrentcapabilitiesandinvestthefundsinfuturecapabilities—mayworkinthelongterm,butintheshortterm,theNavyhastheworstofbothworlds:aconstrainedshipbuildingplanandasmallerfleet.Thefirstchapterinthisseries,thebudgetandstrategyoverview,describesthisstrategyindetail.

Rightlyorwrongly,theshipcountisoftenusedasameasureofNavycapacity,soFigure5getsalotofattention.4ThetotalnumberofshipsinthefleetincreasesslightlyinFY2022,from294inFY2021to296,aspreviouslyfundedshipsjointhefleet,buttheFY2021planhadbeentogrowto306.

Intheshortterm,theNavyhastheworstofbothworlds:aconstrainedshipbuildingplanandasmallerfleet.

AdmiralJamesWinnefeld,forone,arguesthatfocusonshipcountdistortsdecisionmaking.SeeJamesWinnefeld,“ChartingaNewCoursefortheU.S.Navy,”BostonGlobe,November8,2015,

/opinion/2015/11/08/charting-new-course-

for-navy/rJeaDKEDlZiXkpKEXIAFlN/story.html.

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022:Navy|6

Figure5:TotalNavyActiveShips,1999–2022

350

330

310

FY2021Plan

290

270

250

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Note:Thesharpdipinshipcountfrom2014to2015wasduetotheretirementofthelastFFG-7OliverHazardPerry-classfrigatesandtotheNavychangingitscountingrulesbrieflyin2014toinclude,andthenexcludein2015,patrolcoastalcraftandhospitalships.SeeSydneyJ.Freedberg,Jr.,“OutrageOnCapitolHillAsNavyChangesShip-CountingRules,”BreakingDefense,March11,2014,

https://breakingdefense.

com/2014/03/outrage-on-capitol-hill-as-Navy-changes-ship-counting-rules/.

Source:Shipcount1999–2016datafrom“U.S.ShipForceLevels:1886toPresent,”NavalHistoryandHeritageCommand,

https://www.

history.N/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#2000.

Currentandprojectedshipcountfrom“FY2022President’sBudget,”DepartmentoftheNavy,n.d.,5,15,

/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/DON_Press_Brief.pdf.

Figure6:ShipCountandTonnageofNavyBattleForce,1988,1996,2022

FleetTonnage(Millions)

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1988 19962022TotalBattleForceShips

700

600

500

Ship

400

Numbers

300

200

100

0

Source:Shipnumbers:“U.S.ShipForceLevels:1886toPresent,”NavalHistoryandHeritageCommand,

/

research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html;

and“FY2022President’sBudget,”DepartmentoftheNavy,n.d.,

https://www.

/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/DON_Press_Brief.pdf;

DepartmentoftheNavy.TonnagefromRichardSharpe,Jane’sFightingShips1988(NewYork:Jane’sPub.,1988);RichardSharpe,Jane’sFightingShips1996(NewYork:Jane’sPub.,1996);StephenSaunders,Jane’sFightingShips2019-2020(NewYork:Jane’sPub.,2019);and“U.S.NavyShips,”U.S.Navy,n.d.,

https://www.N/Navydata/our_ships.asp.

Inpart,thedeclineinshipnumbersresultedfromNavydecisionstobuybigger,morecapable,andmoreexpensiveships.Asthechartontonnageshows,theFY2022fleetwillhave52percentofthenumberofshipsof1988(296versus565)but83percentofthetonnage.Today’sDDG-51destroyer(FlightIIA)

MarkF.Cancian|7

displaces9,700tons,twicethetonnageofa1980sCharlesF.Adams-classdestroyerandfourtimesthetonnageofaWorldWarIIFletcher-classdestroyer(2,500tons).Indeed,theDDG-51hasthetonnageofaWorldWarIIcruiser.Theincreasedsizeproducesgreatercapabilityintheindividualship,butshipscanonlybeinoneplaceatatime.

Inpart,thedeclineinshipnumbersresultedfromNavydecisionstobuybigger,morecapable,andmoreexpensiveships.

TheUnrelentingDemandsofCurrentOperations

Fleetsizemattersbecauseitsupportsthelevelofnavaldeployments,butitisintensionwiththe“divesttoinvest”strategy.IntheirstatementstoCongress,boththeactingsecretaryoftheNavyandthechiefofnavaloperationsnotedthattheNavyisa“globalforcewithglobalresponsibilities.”5TheCNONAVPLANmakesthebroadargument:“Deployedforward,weprovideU.S.leaderswithquickresponseoptionsfornearlyanychallenge—fromconfrontingrivalstohelpinglocalpopulationsrecoverfromnaturaldisasters.Ourcombat-crediblepresencecreatesandmaintainsinfluenceabroadandensurescriticalwaterwaysremainopenforcommerce.”6Asaresult,theaveragenumberofshipsdeployedhasremainedatthecurrentlevelofabout100forthreedecades,eventhoughthenumberofshipshasdeclinedovertime.TherecentneedtodeploytoEurope(includingintheArcticandMediterranean),theaterslargelyignoredsincetheendoftheColdWar,addstodemands.TobettercoverEuropeandtheAtlantic,theNavyreactivatedtheSecondFleetheadquartersinNorfolk.

Figure7:NavyFleetSizeandDeploymentLevels

600

Ships

500

400

Navy

300

Active

200

Total

100

0

1999

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

600

Number

500

400

of

300

Deployed

200

Ships

100

0

Source:Shipcountfrom“U.S.ShipForceLevels:1886toPresent,”NavalHistoryandHeritageCommand,

/research/

histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html;

and“FY2022President’sBudget,”DepartmentoftheNavy,n.d.,

/

fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/DON_Press_Brief.pdf.

Deploymentlevelsfrom“FY2022President’sBudget,”DepartmentoftheNavy,5,

https://

/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/DON_Press_Brief.pdf;

andpreviousyear’sbudgetexhibitsonoperationaltempo.

ThomasW.HarkerandMichaelM.Gilday,“DepartmentoftheNavyFiscalYear2022BudgetRequest,”StatementsbeforetheHouseArmedServicesCommittee,117thCong.,1stsess.,June15,2021,

/hearings?ID=A0C361D6-51C0-

48A2-95E7-269B80E69D83.

ChiefofNavalOperationsCNONAVPLAN(Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,January2021),3,

https://media.defense.

gov/2021/Jan/11/2002562551/-1/-1/1/CNO%20NAVPLAN%202021%20-%20FINAL.PDF.

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022:Navy|8

TheNavyreportsthatitcanfulfillonlyabouthalfofthetheatercommanders’requestsforships.7Becausethesetheaterrequestsarenotresourceconstrained,itisunsurprisingthattherequestsgreatlyexceedwhatisavailable.

Nevertheless,thisshortfallengendersaconcernthattheNavyistoosmallforthetasksthatitisbeingaskedtoperform,hencethedrivetoexpand.AdmiralMichaelGildaywasexplicit:“ItismymilitaryadvicethatAmericaneedsalargerNavy.”8Manynavalstrategistsechothisperspective:“TheU.S.Navyisonthevergeofstrategicbankruptcy.Itsfleetisnotlargeenoughtomeetglobalday-to-daydemandsfornavalforces.”9Congresshasbeensympathetic.ElaineLuria(D-VA),whorepresentstheNorfolkarea,withitsheavynavalpresence,hasbeenparticularlyvocalinthisregard,butthereisabipartisanconsensusthattheNavyneedstogetlarger.10

TheNavyreportsthatitcanfulfillonlyabouthalfofthetheatercommanders’requestsforships....thisshortfallengendersaconcernthattheNavyistoosmallforthetasksthatitisbeingaskedtoperform.

TheconcernaboutnumbersanddeploymentsconflictswithguidanceintheInterimNationalSecurityStrategicGuidanceandtheTrumpadministration’sNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS),bothofwhichfocusongreatpowerconflict,especiallyagainstChina,andcallforcapability,notcapacity(size).Indeed,AdmiralGildayhasstatedexplicitlythatreadinessandmodernizationcomebeforecapacity.

Thistensionappearsinthesecretaryofthenavy’srecentguidance.Ontheonehand,itsaysthat“thetoppriorityfortheDepartmentoftheNavywillbetodevelopconceptsofoperationsandcapabilitiesthatbolsterdeterrenceandexpandourwarfightingadvantagevis-à-visthePeople’sRepublicofChina.”Ontheotherhand,its“topenduringpriority”is“expandedforwardpresence...[andto]promotesustained,persistentmobileoperationsforward.”11

FutureFleetArchitecture:AWorkinProgress

Thefuturefleetarchitecture—itssizeandcomposition—isaworkinprogress.TheFY2022budgetdoesnotshowanyfutureyears.Thatawaitstheresultsoftheongoingstrategicreviewandwillappearin

JohnM.Richardson,“SubsurfaceWarfareataCrossroads,”TestimonybeforetheHouseCommitteeonAppropriations,SubcommitteeonDefense,115thCong.,2ndsess.,January18,2018,

/meetings/AS/AS03/20180118/106784/

HHRG-115-AS03-Wstate-RichardsonJ-20180118.pdf.

HarkerandGilday,“DepartmentoftheNavyFiscalYear2022BudgetRequest,8.

ChristopherDougherty,“GraduallyandThenSuddenly:ExplainingtheNavy’sStrategicBankruptcy,”WarontheRocks,June

30,2021,

/2021/06/gradually-and-then-suddenly-explaining-the-navys-strategic-bankruptcy/;

seealso,amongmanyothers,ChristopherLehman,Sr.,“WeNeedaBiggerNavy,Fast,”BreakingDefense,January27,2021,

https://

/2021/01/we-need-a-bigger-navy-fast-chris-lehman/.

Foroneexampleamongmany,JohnGrady,“Luria:NavyShouldNotDecommissionShipsEarlyinFavorofNewConstruction,”USNINews,March16,2021,

/2021/03/16/luria-navy-should-not-decommission-ships-early-in-favor-of-new-

construction.

CarlosDelToro,OneNavy-MarineCorpsTeam:StrategicGuidancefromtheSecretaryoftheNavy(Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,October2021),

/2021/Oct/07/2002870427/-1/-1/0/SECNAV%20STRATEGIC%20GUIDANCE_100721.

PDF.

MarkF.Cancian|9

theFY2023budgetdocuments.However,theBidenadministrationdidpublishanillustrative30-yearshipbuildingplan.Further,twoplansareleftoverfromtheTrumpadministration:the355-shipfleet,theTrumpadministration’sofficialgoal,andaNavy30-yearshipbuildingplanfromDecember2020(“lateTrump”).Togethertheseplansgiveinsightintowhatthefuturefleetmightlooklike.

Comparedtothe355-shipgoal,whichreflectedlong-timenavalconcepts,therecentfleetarchitecturesshareseveralcharacteristics:

▪Alargerfleetsizebutwithmoresmallships,reflectingconceptsofdistributedoperations;

▪Alargersubmarineforce,reflectingtheneedforstealthtooperatewithinChineseandRussiandefensivezones;

▪Morelogisticsships,reflectingasmallershipdesignthatcansupportwidelydistributedoperationsandsustainlosses;and

▪Alargenumberofunmannedsurfaceandsubsurfacevessels,butwithuncertaintyaboutthedesignandroleofsuchvessels.12

Allthesefleetarchitecturesrequirefarmoreresourcesthanhavehistoricallybeenallocatedtoshipbuilding.Asaresult,theactualfleetwilllikelybesubstantiallysmallerthantheseplansenvision.Shrinkingplanstofitthefundsavailablewillrequiresomedifficultandunpopulardecisionssuchastheearlyretirementofshipsandslowingconstructionofsomeshiptypes.Navyprogramguidancerecognizesthat“theNavycannotaffordtosimultaneouslydevelopthenextgenerationofair,surface,andsubsurfaceplatformsandmustprioritizetheseprogramsbalancingthecostofdevelopingnext-generationcapabilitiesagainstmaintainingcurrentcapabilities.”However,thesedecisionsaredeferredtotheFY2023budgetanditsassociatedfive-yearplan.13

Thetablebelowshowsthedifferentfleetarchitectures.Itdisplaysatotalfor“combatantforce”becausethelargevariationsinsupportvesselsmakethetotalsforthedifferentfleetslookmuchlargerthantheyare.Thetablealsoshowsunmannedvesselsseparatelybecausetheirnumbersarelarge,uncertain,andfarinthefuture.Detaileddescriptionsforeachforceelementfollowlaterinthischapter.

Allthesefleetarchitecturesrequirefarmoreresourcesthanhavehistoricallybeenallocatedtoshipbuilding.Asaresult,theactualfleetwilllikelybesubstantiallysmallerthantheseplansenvision.

TheNavygenerallyuses“manned”and“unmanned:todescribeitssystems.Toavoidconfusion,thisreportfollowstheNavyusageratherthan“crewed”and“uncrewed”thataretakingholdinthebroadercommunity.

SecretaryoftheNavy,“Sec.oftheNavyStrategicGuidanceforRevisedProgramObjectiveMemorandum2023,”June4,2021.

U.S.MilitaryForcesinFY2022:Navy|10

Table3:FutureFleetStructures

ShipType

CurrentFleet(2022)

355-ShipGoal

Late-Trump

EmergingBiden

AircraftCarriers(CVNs)

11

12

11(8–11)

9–11

“LightCarriers”

–

–

0(0–6)

–

BallisticMissile

14

12

12

12

Submarines(SSBN)

AttackSubmarines

55

66

72

(72–78)

66–72

(SSNs/SSGNs)

LargeSurfaceCombatants

89

104

74

(73–88)

63–65

(CGs/DDGs)

SmallSurfaceCombatants

31

52

66

(60–67)

40–45

(FFs/LCSs/minewarfare)

Landinghelicopterassault/

9

12

9

(9–10)

8–9

dock(LHA/LHD)

OtherLarge

22

26

57

(52–57)

19–19

AmphibiousShips

SmallAmphibiousShips

–

–

57

(52–57)

24–35

CombatantForce

231

284

301(286–329)

238–268

CombatLogisticsForce

30

32

69

(69–87)

56–75

Commandand

35

39

33

(27–30)

27–29

SupportShips

TotalBattleForce

296

355

403(382–446)

321–372

LargeUnmanned

–

–

119(119–166)

59–89

UnderseaVessels

LargeandMedium

–

–

24

(24–76)

18–51

UnmannedSurfaceVessels

Source:DepartmentoftheNavy,HighlightsoftheDepartmentoftheNavyFY2022Budget(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,2021),Figure4.2,

https://www.secnav.N/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf;

ChiefofNavalOperations,ReporttoCongressontheAnnualLong-RangePlanforConstructionofNavalVesselsforFiscalYear2020(Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,March2019),

/strategic/PB20_Shipbuilding_Plan.pdf;

OfficeoftheChiefofNavalOperations,ReporttoCongressontheAnnualLong-RangePlanforConstructionofNavalVessels(Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,December2020),

/2020/

Dec/10/2002549918/-1/-1/1/SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20DEC%2020_NAVY_OSD_OMB_FINAL.PDF;

andOfficeoftheChiefofNavalOperations,ReporttoCongressontheAnnualLong-RangePlanforConstructionofNavalVesselsforFiscalYear2022(Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,June2021),

/2021/Jun/17/2002744915/-1/-1/0/PB22%20SHIPBUILDING%2