IMF-全球紧张局势对贸易转移的影响-比我们想象的要高（英）

TradeDiversionEffectsfromGlobalTensions—HigherThanWeThink

MengqiWangandSwarnaliAhmedHannan

WP/23/234

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progressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedto

elicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersare

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2023

NOV

NAr

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*UniversityofWisconsin-Madison,mengqi.wang@,correspondingauthor.MengqiWangwasasummerinternatWesternHemisphereDepartmentofIMFin2021.

**Theauthorswouldliketothank:GastonGelos,RishiGoyal,ThomasHelbling,andBikasJoshifortheirinvaluablecommentsandguidanceduringdifferentstagesofthispaper;and,DirectorateofEconomicMeasurement(Banxico),MartinTobal(Directorof

MacrofinancialRiskAnalysis,Banxico),IMF’sWesternHemisphereDepartment(WHD)SeminarparticipantsandCamilaCasas,FlavienMoreau,RafaelMachadoParentefortheirhelpfulcomments.Allremainingerrorsareours.

©2023InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/23/234

IMFWorkingPaper

WesternHemisphereDepartment

TradeDiversionEffectsfromGlobalTensions—HigherThanWeThinkPreparedbyMengqiWang*andSwarnaliAhmedHannan**

AuthorizedfordistributionbyBikasJoshi

September2023

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicit

commentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:Thepaperbuildsauniqueindustry-leveldatasetbycombiningMexico’snationallysourcedinput-outputdata(INEGI)withcross-countrysources(WIOD,UNComtrade).Usingthisdatasettoexploithigher

supplylinkagesacrossalargernumberofindustriesthanwhatisavailableincross-countrysources,thepaperestimatesthetradediversioneffectonMexico’sexportstotheU.S.fromtwoepisodes,withafocusonthefirst:theU.S.-Chinatradetensionin2018andtheU.S.sanctionsonRussiain2014.Difference-in-differences,localprojectionsandfewotherempiricalmethodologiesareused.Forthefirstepisode,thepaperfindshighertradediversioneffectsthanestimatesinliterature.Outputtariffplaysanimportantrole,andthereissomeevidenceofapositiveimpactthroughdownstreamtariffs.Theeffectsarestrongerwhennationallysourcedinput-outputdataisusedcomparedtothosederivedfromcross-countrysources.Importantly,themagnitudeoftrade

diversionacrossindustriesdoesnotdependonMexico’sindustry-leveltradeexposuretotheU.S.,butrather

ontheU.S.tariffchangesonChinesegoods,thedecreaseinimportsfromChina,productsubstitutabilitywithChineseproducts,and(weakly)onMexico’sGVCintegration.Similarly,forthesecondepisode,thepaperfindspositivetradediversioneffects.Overall,thefindingssuggestthattradediversioneffectmightbehigherthan

previouslythoughtandtheproperaccountingofdatasetandsupplylinkagesmakesadifference.

RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Wang,MengqiandSwarnaliAhmedHannan,“TradeDiversionEffectsfromGlobalTensions—HigherThanWeThink”,IMFWorkingPaper2023.

JELClassificationNumbers:

F1,F13,O54

Keywords:

input-outputlinkages;tradediversion;U.S.-Chinatradetensions

Authors’E-MailAddresses:

mengqi.wang@,

sahmed@.

WORKINGPAPERS

TradeDiversionEffectsfrom

GlobalTensions—HigherThanWeThink

PreparedbyMengqiWangandSwarnaliAhmedHannan

1

1Theauthorswouldliketothank:GastonGelos,RishiGoyal,ThomasHelbling,andBikasJoshifortheirinvaluablecommentsandguidanceduringdifferentstagesofthispaper;and,DirectorateofEconomicMeasurement(Banxico),MartinTobal(Directorof

MacrofinancialRiskAnalysis,Banxico),IMF’sWesternHemisphereDepartment(WHD)SeminarparticipantsandCamilaCasas,FlavienMoreau,RafaelMachadoParentefortheirhelpfulcomments.Allremainingerrorsareours.

IMFWORKINGPAPERSTradeDiversionEffectsfromGlobalTensions—HigherThanWeThink

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Contents

1.Introduction

4

2.Data

6

3.LiteratureReviewonTradeDiversionandContribution

8

4.EmpiricalStrategy

10

4.1Difference-in-DifferencesMethod

10

4.1.1ConstructionofTariffExposureMeasure

10

4.1.2AnIllustrativeExampleoftheTariffExposures

13

4.1.3UsingTariffExposurestoCreateTreatmentEffects

15

4.1.4EstimatingTradeDiversionEffect

15

4.2AnAlternativeApproachExploitingIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffects

17

5.ResultsUsingDifference-in-DifferencesMethod

19

5.1AggregateTradeDiversionEffect

20

5.2Time-VaryingTreatmentEffect

24

5.3RobustnessChecksonDiDResults

25

6.DeterminantsofIndustry-LevelVariationinTradeDiversionEffects

26

6.1DecreaseinImportsfromChina

27

6.2TariffChanges

28

6.3Mexico’sIndustry-LevelExposuretotheU.S.Market

30

6.4GVCintegrationinMexico

31

6.5ProductSubstitutability

33

7.UsingWIODandUNComtradeDataInstead

34

7.1OverallTradeDiversionEffect

34

7.2Industry-LevelTradeDiversionEffect

35

8.EffectofU.S.-RussiaSanctionsonMexico’sExportstotheU.S

37

8.1U.S.SanctionsonRussia

37

8.2StylizedFactsonAggregateTrends

37

8.3EmpiricalApproachandResults1:DynamicRegressions

38

8.4EmpiricalApproachandResultsII:LocalProjections

39

9.Conclusion

41

References

43

AppendixI.DatasetMatchingMethods

45

A1.1MatchingWIODandINEGIforStylizedFactsonIndustryInputandTradeSchedule

45

A1.2ImportsfromtheU.S.inEachIndustry

46

A1.3ExportstotheU.S.inEachIndustry

46

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A1.4LeontiefInverseofInput-OutputTable

47

AppendixII.AggregateTradeStructureinMexico

49

A2.1GrossExportsandImports,asShareofProduction

49

A2.2ShareoftheU.S.inExportsandImports

50

A2.3TopFiveTradePartners

52

A2.4TopFiveTradingSectors

52

AppendixIII.TradeDiversionEffects:AdditionalResults

55

AppendixIV.TheU.S.TariffChangesDuring2012–16

59

FIGURES

1.IllustrationofDirect(Output)TariffEffect

13

2.IllustrationofIndirectTariffEffect,Upstream(left)andDownstream(right)Tariffs

14

3.RegressionResultsforDiDwithFlexibleSpecification,NetTariffChangeDummy

25

4.Industry-SpecificTradeDiversionEffects

26

5.EstimatedTradeDiversionEffectforEachIndustry,RankedbyChangeinU.S.ImportsfromChina

28

6.EstimatedIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffectandNetTariffChanges

30

7.EstimatedIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffectandExportSharein2017

31

8.EstimatedTradeDiversionEffectforEachIndustry,RankedbyImportedInputShareinTotalProduction

Cost

32

9.EstimatedTradeDiversionEffectforEachIndustry,RankedbyExportShareinTotalProductionValue

32

10.EstimatedTradeDiversionEffectforEachIndustry,RankedbyProductSubstitutabilityMeasure

33

11.CompareDynamicTradeDiversionEffect,INEGIandWIOD

35

12.U.S.MonthlyImportValuesfromMexico(solid)andRussia(dashed),Normalized

37

13.TradeDiversionEffectofU.S.Sanctions,DynamicResults

39

14.TradeDiversionEffectofU.S.Sanctions,LocalProjectionResults

40

15.CorrelationCoefficientwithMexico’sEstimatedIndustry-LevelTradeDiversion

41

TABLES

1.SummaryStatisticsofTariffExposureMeasure

20

2.RegressionResultsforTradeDiversionEffects,DummyTreatment

23

3.RegressionResultsforTradeDiversionEffects,ContinuousTreatment

24

4.SummaryStatisticsofEstimatedIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffect

26

5.Industry-SpecificTradeDiversionEffect

27

6.TradeDiversionEffectandTariffChanges

29

7.CompareAggregateTradeDiversionEffect,OneS.D.Change,INEGIandWIOD

34

8.CompareIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffect,Mean,INEGIandWIOD

36

9.CompareCorrelationBetweenIndustry-LevelTradeDiversionEffectandTariffChangeExposures,INEGI

andWIOD

36

10.NominalU.S.ImportsfromRussiaandMexico,from2012–14to2015–16

38

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1.Introduction

UsingMexicoasanexample,thispapershedslightonthelikelyimpactofglobaltradetensionsforcountrieswithhightradeexposureandsupplylinkages.Eventsinrecentyears(e.g.,theU.S.-Chinatradetensionsof2018,theglobalchipshortages,theCovid-19pandemic)haveshownthesignificanceofsupplychainsandintricatelinkagesacrosscountriesinpropagatingglobalshocks.Thepaperstudiestwoepisodes,withafocusonthefirst:(i)the2018U.S.-Chinatradetensions,and(ii)the2014U.S.sanctionsonRussia.

Thecontributionisthreefold.

First,thepaperbuildsauniqueindustry-leveldatasetforMexicothatexploitsinput-outputandsupplychainlinkagestoquantifychannelsthroughwhichinput-outputlinkagesmayplayaroleduringglobaltensions.

Comparedtocross-countrysources,thisallowsforaccountingofhighersupplylinkagesacrossalarger

numberofindustries(258industriesversuscross-countrycoverageof56industries).Topreviewtheresults,wefindthatnationallysourcedinput-outputtablesshowhighertradediversioneffectsthantheresultsfromtypicallyusedcross-countrysources(e.g.,WIOD).Hence,theproperaccountingofsupplylinkagesmatters.

Second,thepaperbuildsuponliteratureoninput/outputtariffsandusesdifference-in-differencesmethodtoestimatetheimpactonMexico’sexportsduringU.S.-Chinatradetensions.WhileMexico’stradediversioneffecthasbeenstudiedpreviously(e.g.,Lovelyetal.2021;morerecently,Utaretal.2023usingfirm-leveltradedata),asfarasweareaware,thisisthefirstattempttocapturebothdirectandindirectindustry-levelexposureacrossalargenumberofindustries.Importantly,thepaperisalsothefirstattempttoexplorethedeterminantsofthevariationintradediversioneffectsacrossMexico’sindustries.Assuch,thepaper

contributessomeinterestinginsightsandprovidesagoodcomplementtocross-countrystudies(e.g.,Freundetal.2023,Alfaroetal.2023,Fajgelbaumetal.2023)relatedtotherecentpolicyinterestonhowtheglobal

supplychaincouldevolvefollowingtheCovid-19pandemicandanypotentialgeoeconomicfragmentation.

Third,thoughliteraturehasfocusedontheeffectofsanctionsontargetedsectors/firmsinRussia(AhnandLudema,2017;BělínandHanousek,2019),theimpactonthirdcountrieshasnotbeenwidelystudied.Toourknowledge,thisisthefirstattempttounderstandtheimpactonMexicofromthe2014U.S.sanctionson

Russia.

Wecombinethreedatasets:(i)input-outputtableofMexicaneconomyfromINEGI,(ii)granulartradedata(HS-6digitfromUNComtrade),and(iii)cross-countryinput-outputtablefromWorldInput-OutputDatabase

(WIOD).Thisallowstoobtainthefollowingnewinformation:(i)granulardataoninput-outputlinkagesmatchedwithtradedata,(ii)detailedinformationonthesourcesofimportedinputsforaspecificindustry,and(iii)

comprehensiveusageofeachindustries’productsinallindustriesacrosscountries.

ThepaperestimatestheimpactonMexico’sexportstotheU.S.fromthefirstthreeroundsoftheU.S.tariffsonChinaimposedonJuly6,August23,andSeptember24of2018(Bown2021).WhentheU.S.imposesa

highertariffononeproductproducedinChina,theU.S.coulddivertitsimportsofthisproductfromChinatowardsMexico.Besidesthedirecttradediversioneffectfromoutputtariffs,theindirecteffectthrough

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upstreamanddownstreamtariffsisalsoconsidered.

1

Differenceindifferencesmethodisusedtoexploitthe

variationoftariffexposureacrossindustries.ThefirstdimensionofdifferencesistocompareMexicanexportstotheU.S.ofindustriesinwhichahigherU.S.importtariffwasimposedonChineseproductswiththatofthoselessaffected,andtheseconddimensionisbeforeandafterthetradetensions.

TheresultssuggestanoverallpositivetradediversioneffectonMexico’sexports.Aone-standarddeviationincreaseinnettariffchange(5.8percentagepoints)onChineseproductsincreasesMexicanexportstotheU.S.by6.4percent.Wefindthatoutputtariffplaysamoreimportantrolewithsomeevidenceonapositive

impactthroughdownstreamtariffs.Finally,theindustry-leveltradediversioneffectdoesnotvaryaccordingtoMexico’stradeexposuretotheU.S.,butratheraccordingtothesizeofthechangesofU.S.tariffsonChineseproducts,thedecreaseintheU.S.importsfromChina,andthedegreeofsubstitutabilityofMexico’sproductsvis-à-visChina.Thereissomeweakevidencethathigherglobalvaluechain(GVC)integratedindustries

benefittedmore.

TooffersomeimplicationsonthepotentialimpactonMexico’sexportstotheU.S.fromtherecentU.S.

sanctionsonRussia,weconductaneventstudyusingtheU.S.sanctionsonRussiain2014.Weemploy

dynamicregressionsandlocalprojectionmethods,usingmonthlyU.S.importsfromMexicoatHS6-digitlevel.WefindapositiveimpactofU.S.sanctionsonMexico’sexportstotheU.S.,withthesizeofabout10percentincreasefourmonthsaftersanctions.

Thestructureofthispaperisasfollows.Section2discussesthedataset.Section3reviewsliteratureontradediversionanddiscussesourcontribution.Section4laysoutthevariousempiricalmethodologies.Section5

presentsresultsonoveralltradediversioneffectsfromthe2018U.S.-Chinatradetensions.Section6presentstheindustry-levelresultsfromthe2018U.S.-Chinatradetensions.Section7comparestheresultsfrom

nationallysourceddataversusthosefromcross-countrysources.Section8showstheresultsfromthe2014U.S.sanctionsonRussia.Section9concludes.

1Upstreamtariffistheweightedaverageoftariffsfacedbytheupstreamindustries,anditaffectsoneindustrythroughinputavailabilitychannel.Downstreamtariffistheweightedaverageoftariffsexposedbythedownstreamindustries,anditaffectsoneindustrythroughinputdemandchannel.

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2.Data

Thispaperusesthreesetsofdata.Thefirstsetistheinput-outputtableoftheMexicaneconomyfromINEGI.

2

Theannualinput-outputtablecontainsproductionstructureinformationof258industriesatNAICS4-digitlevel,overtheperiod2003–18.Thisdatasetgivesinformationoninput-outputlinkagesacrossindustries,the

integrationofglobalvaluechainofeachindustryandhowmuchMexicoreliesonimportedinputs.Besidesinput-outputlinkagesacrossindustries,thepaperusesinformationontotalproductionandexportsfromthissource.

TheseconddatasetisthegranulartradedataatHS6-digitlevelfromUNComtrade.

3

Weuseannualand/ormonthlyexportsandimportsbetweenMexicoandtheU.S.,andbetweenMexicoandothercountries.

CombiningwithINEGIinput-outputdataset,wecantracethesourcingandthedestinationcountriesforeachindustry'sinputandoutput.UNComtradedatasetisalsousedfordataontheU.S.importsfromMexicointradediversionanalysis.

Thethirddatasetisthecross-countryinput-outputtablefromWorldInput-OutputDatabase(WIOD).

4

This

sourceprovidesinput-outputlinkageinformationfrom43countries(28EuropeanUnioncountriesand15othermajorcountries,includingMexico),covering56industriesattheISIC2-digitlevel.Forourresearchpurpose,

WIODdatasetprovidessourcingcountryinformationofimportedinputsinMexicanproductionanddestinationcountryinformationoffinalgoodsexportedfromMexico.ComparedwiththeUNComtrade,WIOD

distinguishestheintermediateinputandfinalgoodsandmoreimportantly,inputsusedinaspecificindustryinMexico,whichgivesmoreaccurateinformationonthesourcingcountrystructureforaspecificindustry.

However,UNComtradehasmoregranulardatastructureaswellasalongercoverage.

WeuseINEGIdatasetasthebaseofourconstructeddatabase.Specifically,theanalysisisbasedon258

industriesfromINEGIdataset,andthevariablesfromtheotherdatasetsareaggregatedordisaggregatedintotheseindustries.Thisbaseischosenfortworeasons.First,INEGIdatasetprovideshighergranularindustriesthanWIODandcoversmorerecentperiods.Second,INEGIhasdetailedinput-outputstructurebasedonthese258industries.

Asmentionedabove,eachdatasetusediscodedinadifferentindicatorsystem.Onechallengeofdata

constructionistomatchWIODandUNComtradedatatotheINEGIindustrylevel.ForUNComtrade,whichisatHS6-digitproductlevel,wematchitwithNAICS4-digitindustrycodefollowingPierceandSchott(2009).

5

WhenoneindustryproducesmultipleproductswithdifferentHScodes,weadduptradevaluesofthese

productstoindustrylevel.ForWIOD,whichiscodedinISIC2-digitindustrycode,weusetheconcordance

tablebetween2017NAICStoISICRev.4fromtheU.S.Censuswebsite.

6

Inthematchingprocess,thereare215caseswhereoneNAICS4-digitcodeismatchedwithmultipleISIC2-digitcodes.Inthosecases,wesum

2INEGIsourceis

.mx/investigacion/mcsm/#Tabulados.

3UNComtradedatawebsiteis

https://comtradeunorg/data/

...

4WIODcanbedownloadedfrom

http://wwwwiodorg/database/wiots16

5See

/peterschott/international-trade-data/

fordataandcodes.ChiquiarandTobal(2019)showthatthevariationinthesubjectivecriterionimposedtoallocateHScodematchedwithmultipleNAICS4-digitcodesdoesnotalterresultsmuch.

6See

/naics/?68967.

Inparticular,weusetheconcordancetableof2017NAICStoISICRev.4.WehavedoublecheckedwiththeconcordancetableofISICRev.4to2017NAICS,whichwillgeneratethesamematchingresult.

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upimportandexportvaluesfromallmatchedISIC-codedindustriestooneNAICSindustry.ThedetailedmatchingprocessissummarizedinAppendixI.1-I.3.

Overall,thecombinationofthethreedatasetshelpstoshedthefollowingnewinformation:granularinformationoninput-outputlinkagesmatchedwithtradedata.Whilenotusedinouranalysis,theconstructeddatasetalsoshedsnewdetailedinformationon(i)thesourcesofimportedinputsforaspecificindustry;and(ii)thespecificusageofeachindustry’sproductinotherindustriesandcountries,whichwouldbeusefulinfuturestudies.

Apartfromtheempiricalanalysis,theconstructeddatasetisusefultogatherinsightsondifferentaspectsofMexico’stradestructure.WehighlightseveralfeaturesinAppendixII.Namely:Mexicanindustriesrely

increasinglyoninternationalmarket,especiallyontheU.S.market,forproductexportingandinputsourcing.China’sroleasatradepartnerhasbeenincreasing.Motorvehiclemanufacturingisthelargestexporting

industryinMexico,andsemiconductorsindustryisthelargestimportingindustry.

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3.LiteratureReviewonTradeDiversionand

Contribution

Traditionaltradetheorypredictsthattradeincreasesaftercountriesformafreetradeagreement(FTA),

followingtariffreduction.Thisisknownastradecreation.Atthesametime,tradedecreasesbetweena

membercountryandanon-membercountrysincemembercountriesreplacehightariffproductsfromnon-

membercountrieswithlowtariffproductsfrommembercountries.Thisisthetradediversioneffect.Trade

diversioncanalsohappenwhentariffsincreasebetweentwocountries,whichistheoppositeofthecreationofFTAs.GiventhetariffincreaseonChineseproductsduring2018andearly2019,theU.S.wouldimportless

fromChinaandimportmorefromothercountries(tradediversion).

Highertradepolicyuncertaintycouldbeanotherreasonfortradediversionduringperiodsoftradetensions.

Literaturehasdocumentedthenegativeeffectoftradepolicyuncertaintyontradevolume(Handley,2014;

HandleyandLimao,2015;Alessandriaetal.,2019).Duringthe2018tradetensions,tradepolicyuncertainty

rosetoahistoricallyhighlevel(IMF,2018;Benguriaetal.,2022),leadingtotheU.S.importinglessfromChinaandmorefromathirdcountry,sayMexico.

SomerecentpapersstudythetradediversioneffectsoftariffsimposedonChineseproductsontheU.S.

importsfromothercountries.Cignaetal.(2020)usesthemonthlyproduct-levelU.S.importsdatafromitstop30tradepartnersduring2016/01–2019/05andusesdifference-in-differencesapproachastheidentification

method.Thefirstdifferenceisthetimedummyvariableindicatingtradetensionsandtheseconddifferenceistheproduct-leveltreatmentdummyindicatingwhetheroneproductisexposedtotariffincreaseornot.Their

paperfindsasignificantdeclineinU.S.importsfromChinafortariff-exposedproducts,comparedtothosenot.However,thereisnosignificanttradediversioneffectshownyetintheshortrun,astheU.S.importsof

exposedproductsfromathirdcountrydidnotincreasemorethannon-exposedproducts.Deng(2021)usesthemonthlytradeflowsduring2014–19betweenChinaanditstop10tradepartnersbesidestheU.S.Thepaperusescountry-monthleveldifference-in-differencesestimation,comparingtradevolumebetweenChinaandtheU.S.withthatbetweenChinaandothercountries.TheyfindthatChineseimportsareaffectedmorethanits

exportstotheU.S.,byshowingthemagnitudeofthedecreaseinChina’simportsfromtheU.S.isgreaterthanthedecreaseinChina’sexportstotheU.S.,aftercontrollingfortimetrend.Moreover,tradediversioneffectsinChina’simportsaremorepronouncedwhenthethirdcountryisadevelopingcountryratherthanadevelopedcountry.

OurpaperiscloselyrelatedwithLovelyetal.(2021),studyingthetradediversioneffectoftheU.S.-ChinatradetensionsonMexicanexports.7Lovelyetal.(2021)findthatMexicansalesintheU.S.marketroseby3.4

percentonaverage,withheterogeneityinbenefitsacrosssectorsinMexico.Theyestimatefirsthowmuch

tradediversiontoanexportingcountryandanexportingsectordependsonthepreexistingshareofthissectorandcountryintheU.S.marketandthesizeofthetariffchangeimposedonChineseproducts.TheyfindthatiftheU.S.increasestariffsononeChineseproductby10percentagepoints,acountrywithapreexisting10

percentshareoftheU.S.marketforthatproductwouldexpecta0.46percentagepointincreaseinthevalueofitsexportsofthatproducttotheU.S.Usingthisestimate,theythencalculatethebenefitsofeachsectorin

7Fajgelbaumetal.(2022)findanincreaseinMexico’sexportstotheU.S.afterthetradetensions,showingasubstitutionrelationshipbetweenChina’sexportsandMexico’sexportsintheU.S.market.Chiquiaretal.(2007)andChiquiarandTobal(2019)findasimilarsubstitutionrelationshipfollowingChina’saccessiontotheWTO.

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Mexicoandgetanaverageof3.4percentintermsofsales.TheirpaperestimatesthetradediversioneffectusingapaneldataofmonthlyU.S.importsfromtheuniverseofcountriesandHS10productandappliestheestimatedcoefficientstoobtainanin-samplepredictionforMexicanexports.

Differentfromthisapproach,ourmethodisbasedonacross-industryestimationusingonlyMexicanexportstotheU.S.market,basedonvariationinexposuretotariffincreasesacrossindustries.Inotherwords,ourpaperemphasizestheindustrialheterogeneityinU.S.-Chinatariffexposureinformsofbothoutputandinput

(upstreamanddownstream)tariffs,takingintoaccounttheinput-outputlinkages.8Topreviewourresults,therearetwosignificantcontributions:(i)wefindthatthetradediversioneffectsonMexicoduringU.S.-ChinatradetensionshavebeenstrongerthanthatfoundinLovelyetal.(2021)wheninput-outputlinkagesareaccountedfor;and(ii)theeffectisstrongerwhencountry-sourcedricherinput-outputtablesareused,asopposedtoa

commoncross-countrysourcedatabasewithlimitedinformationthancountry-sourceddata.

8Conconietal.(2018)findsthattherulesoforigininNAFTAledtoatradediversionofintermediategoodsfromthirdcountriestoNAFTApartnersthroughinput-outputlinkages.

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