亚里士多德的形而上学英文

Metaphysics,byAristotle

BookVIII

1

WEmustreckonuptheresultsarisingfromwhathasbeensaid,andcomputethesumofthem,andputthefinishingtouchtoourinquiry.Wehavesaidthatthecauses,principles,andelementsofsubstancesaretheobjectofoursearch.Andsomesubstancesarerecognizedbyeveryone,butsomehavebeenadvocatedbyparticularschools.Thosegenerallyrecognizedarethenaturalsubstances,i.e.fire,earth,water,air,&c.,thesimplebodies;secondplantsandtheirparts,andanimalsandthepartsofanimals;andfinallythephysicaluniverseanditsparts;whilesomeparticularschoolssaythatFormsandtheobjectsofmathematicsaresubstances.Butthereareargumentswhichleadtotheconclusionthatthereareothersubstances,theessenceandthesubstratum.Again,inanotherwaythegenusseemsmoresubstantialthanthevariousspccies,andtheuniversalthantheparticulars.AndwiththeuniversalandthegenustheIdeasareconnected;itisinvirtueofthesameargumentthattheyarethoughttobesubstances.Andsincetheessenceissubstance,andthedefinitionisaformulaoftheessence,forthisreasonwehavediscusseddefinitionandessentialpredication.Sincethedefinitionisaformula,andaformulahasparts,wehadtoconsideralsowithrespecttothenotionof‘part’，whatarepartsofthesubstanceandwhatarenot,andwhetherthepartsofthesubstancearealsopartsofthedefinition.Further,too,neithertheuniversalnorthegenusisasubstance;wemustinquirelaterintotheIdeasandtheobjectsofmathematics;forsomesaythesearesubstancesaswellasthesensiblesubstances.

Butnowletusresumethediscussionofthegenerallyrecognizedsubstances.Thesearethesensiblesubstances,andsensiblesubstancesallhavematter.Thesubstratumissubstance,andthisisinonesensethematter(andbymatterImeanthatwhich,notbeinga‘this’actually,ispotentiallya‘this’)，andinanothersensetheformulaorshape(thatwhichbeinga‘this’canbeseparatelyformulated),andthirdlythecomplexofthesetwo,whichaloneisgeneratedanddestroyed,andis,withoutqualification,capableofseparateexistence;forofsubstancescompletelyexpressibleinaformulasomeareseparableandsomeareseparableandsomearenot.

Butclearlymatteralsoissubstance;forinalltheoppositechangesthatoccurthereissomethingwhichunderliesthechanges,e.g.inrespectofplacethatwhichisnowhereandagainelsewhere,andinrespectofincreasethatwhichisnowofonesizeandagainlessorgreater,andinrespectofalterationthatwhichisnowhealthyandagaindiseased;andsimilarlyinrespectofsubstancethereissomethingthatisnowbeinggeneratedandagainbeingdestroyed,andnowunderliestheprocessasa‘this’andagainunderliesitinrespectofaprivationofpositivecharacter.Andinthischangetheothersareinvolved.Butineitheroneortwooftheothersthisisnotinvolved;foritisnotnecessaryifathinghasmatterforchangeofplacethatitshouldalsohavematterforgenerationanddestruction.

Thedifferencebetweenbecominginthefullsenseandbecominginaqualifiedsensehasbeenstatedinourphysicalworks.

2

Sincethesubstancewhichexistsasunderlyingandasmatterisgenerallyrecognized,andthisthatwhichexistspotentially,itremainsforustosaywhatisthesubstance,inthesenseofactuality,ofsensiblethings.Democritusseemstothinktherearethreekindsofdifferencebetweenthings;theunderlyingbody,thematter,isoneandthesame,buttheydiffereitherinrhythm,i.e.shape,orinturning,i.e.position,orininter-contact,i.e.order.Butevidentlytherearemanydifferences;forinstance,somethingsarecharacterizedbythemodeofcompositionoftheirmatter,e.g.thethingsformedbyblending,suchashoney-water;andothersbybeingboundtogether,e.g.bundle;andothersbybeinggluedtogether,e.g.abook;andothersbybeingnailedtogether,e.g.acasket;andothersinmorethanoneoftheseways;andothersbyposition,e.g.thresholdandlintel(forthesedifferbybeingplacedinacertainway);andothersbytime,e.g.dinnerandbreakfast;andothersbyplace,e.g.thewinds;andothersbytheaffectionspropertosensiblethings,e.g.hardnessandsoftness,densityandrarity,drynessandwetness;andsomethingsbysomeofthesequalities,othersbythemall,andingeneralsomebyexcessandsomebydefect.Clearly,then,theword‘is’hasjustasmanymeanings;athingisathresholdbecauseitliesinsuchandsuchaposition,anditsbeingmeansitslyinginthatposition,whilebeingicemeanshavingbeensolidifiedinsuchandsuchaway.Andthebeingofsomethingswillbedefinedbyallthesequalities,becausesomepartsofthemaremixed,othersareblended,othersareboundtogether,othersaresolidified,andothersusetheotherdifferentiae;e.g.thehandorthefootrequiressuchcomplexdefinition.Wemustgrasp,then,thekindsofdifferentiae(forthesewillbetheprinciplesofthebeingofthings),e.g.thethingscharacterizedbythemoreandtheless,orbythedenseandtherare,andbyothersuchqualities;foralltheseareformsofexcessanddefect.Andanythingthatischaracterizedbyshapeorbysmoothnessandroughnessischaracterizedbythestraightandthecurved.Andforotherthingstheirbeingwillmeantheirbeingmixed,andtheirnotbeingwillmeantheopposite.

Itisclear,then,fromthesefactsthat,sinceitssubstanceisthecauseofeachthing'sbeing,wemustseekinthesedifferentiaewhatisthecauseofthebeingofeachofthesethings.Nownoneofthesedifferentiaeissubstance,evenwhencoupledwithmatter,yetitiswhatisanalogoustosubstanceineachcase;andasinsubstancesthatwhichispredicatedofthematteristheactualityitself,inallotherdefinitionsalsoitiswhatmostresemblesfullactuality.E.g.ifwehadtodefineathreshold,weshouldsay‘woodorstoneinsuchandsuchaposition',andahouseweshoulddefineas‘bricksandtimbersinsuchandsuchaposition’,(orapurposemayexistaswellinsomecases),andifwehadtodefineiceweshouldsay‘waterfrozenorsolidifiedinsuchandsuchaway’，andharmonyis‘suchandsuchablendingofhighandlow’；andsimilarlyinallothercases.Obviously,then,theactualityortheformulaisdifferentwhenthematterisdifferent;forinsomecasesitisthecomposition,inothersthemixing,andinotherssomeotheroftheattributeswehavenamed.Andso,ofthepeoplewhogoinfordefining,thosewhodefineahouseasstones,bricks,andtimbersarespeakingofthepotentialhouse,forthesearethematter;butthosewhopropose‘areceptacletoshelterchattelsandlivingbeings',orsomethingofthesort,speakoftheactuality.Thosewhocombinebothofthesespeakofthethirdkindofsubstance,whichiscomposedofmatterandform(fortheformulathatgivesthedifferentiaeseemstobeanaccountoftheformoractuality,whilethatwhichgivesthecomponentsisratheranaccountofthematter);andthesameistrueofthekindofdefinitionswhichArchytasusedtoaccept;theyareaccountsofthecombinedformandmatter.E.g.whatisstillweather?Absenceofmotioninalargeexpanseofair;airisthematter,andabsenceofmotionistheactualityandsubstance.Whatisacalm?Smoothnessofsea;thematerialsubstratumisthesea,andtheactualityorshapeissmoothness.Itisobviousthen,fromwhathasbeensaid,whatsensiblesubstanceisandhowitexists-onekindofitasmatter,anotherasformoractuality,whilethethirdkindisthatwhichiscomposedofthesetwo.

3

Wemustnotfailtonoticethatsometimesitisnotclearwhetheranamemeansthecompositesubstance,ortheactualityorform,e.g.whether‘house’isasignforthecompositething,‘acoveringconsistingofbricksandstoneslaidthusandthus’，orfortheactualityorform,‘acovering',andwhetheralineis‘twonessinlength’or‘twoness’，andwhetherananimalissoulinabody’or‘asoul’；forsoulisthesubstanceoractualityofsomebody.‘Animal’mightevenbeappliedtoboth,notassomethingdefinablebyoneformula,butasrelatedtoasinglething.Butthisquestion,whileimportantforanotherpurpose,isofnoimportancefortheinquiryintosensiblesubstance;fortheessencecertainlyattachestotheformandtheactuality.For‘soul’and‘tobesoul’arethesame,but‘tobeman’and‘man’arenotthesame,unlesseventhebaresoulistobecalledman;andthusononeinterpretationthethingisthesameasitsessence,andonanotheritisnot.

Ifweexaminewefindthatthesyllabledoesnotconsistoftheletters+juxtaposition,noristhehousebricks+juxtaposition.Andthisisright;forthejuxtapositionormixingdoesnotconsistofthosethingsofwhichitisthejuxtapositionormixing.Andthesameistrueinallothercases;e.g.ifthethresholdischaracterizedbyitsposition,thepositionisnotconstitutedbythethreshold,butratherthelatterisconstitutedbytheformer.Norismananimal+biped,buttheremustbesomethingbesidesthese,ifthesearematter,-somethingwhichisneitheranelementinthewholenoracompound,butisthesubstance;butthispeopleeliminate,andstateonlythematter.If,then,thisisthecauseofthething’sbeing,andifthecauseofitsbeingisitssubstance,theywillnotbestatingthesubstanceitself.

(This,then,musteitherbeeternaloritmustbedestructiblewithoutbeingeverincourseofbeingdestroyed,andmusthavecometobewithouteverbeingincourseofcomingtobe.Butithasbeenprovedandexplainedelsewherethatnoonemakesorbegetstheform,butitistheindividualthatismade,i.e.thecomplexofformandmatterthatisgenerated.Whetherthesubstancesofdestructiblethingscanexistapart,isnotyetatallclear;exceptthatobviouslythisisimpossibleinsomecases-inthecaseofthingswhichcannotexistapartfromtheindividualinstances,e.g.houseorutensil.Perhaps,indeed,neitherthesethingsthemselves,noranyoftheotherthingswhicharenotformedbynature,aresubstancesatall;foronemightsaythatthenatureinnaturalobjectsistheonlysubstancetobefoundindestructiblethings.)

ThereforethedifficultywhichusedtoberaisedbytheschoolofAntisthenesandothersuchuneducatedpeoplehasacertaintimeliness.Theysaidthatthe‘what’cannotbedefined(forthedefinitionsocalledisa‘longrigmarole’)butofwhatsortathing,e.g.silver,is,theythoughtitpossibleactuallytoexplain,notsayingwhatitis,butthatitisliketin.Thereforeonekindofsubstancecanbedefinedandformulated,i.e.thecompositekind,whetheritbeperceptibleorintelligible;buttheprimarypartsofwhichthisconsistscannotbedefined,sinceadefinitoryformulapredicatessomethingofsomething,andonepartofthedefinitionmustplaythepartofmatterandtheotherthatofform.

Itisalsoobviousthat,ifsubstancesareinasensenumbers,theyaresointhissenseandnot,assomesay,asnumbersofunits.Foradefinitionisasortofnumber;for(1)itisdivisible,andintoindivisibleparts(fordefinitoryformulaearenotinfinite),andnumberalsoisofthisnature.And(2)as,whenoneofthepartsofwhichanumberconsistshasbeentakenfromoraddedtothenumber,itisnolongerthesamenumber,butadifferentone,evenifitistheverysmallestpartthathasbeentakenawayoradded,sothedefinitionandtheessencewillnolongerremainwhenanythinghasbeentakenawayoradded.And(3)thenumbermustbesomethinginvirtueofwhichitisone,andthisthesethinkerscannotstate,whatmakesitone,ifitisone(foreitheritisnotonebutasortofheap,orifitis,weoughttosaywhatitisthatmakesoneoutofmany);andthedefinitionisone,butsimilarlytheycannotsaywhatmakesitone.Andthisisanaturalresult;forthesamereasonisapplicable,andsubstanceisoneinthesensewhichwehaveexplained,andnot,assomesay,bybeingasortofunitorpoint;eachisacompleterealityandadefinitenature.And(4)asnumberdoesnotadmitofthemoreandtheless,neitherdoessubstance,inthesenseofform,butifanysubstancedoes,itisonlythesubstancewhichinvolvesmatter.Letthis,then,sufficeforanaccountofthegenerationanddestructionofso-calledsubstancesinwhatsenseitispossibleandinwhatsenseimpossible—andofthereductionofthingstonumber.

4

Regardingmaterialsubstancewemustnotforgetthatevenifallthingscomefromthesamefirstcauseorhavethesamethingsfortheirfirstcauses,andifthesamematterservesasstarting-pointfortheirgeneration,yetthereisamatterpropertoeach,e.g.forphlegmthesweetorthefat,andforbilethebitter,orsomethingelse;thoughperhapsthesecomefromthesameoriginalmatter.Andtherecometobeseveralmattersforthesamething,whentheonematterismatterfortheother;e.g.phlegmcomesfromthefatandfromthesweet,ifthefatcomesfromthesweet;anditcomesfrombilebyanalysisofthebileintoitsultimatematter.Foronethingcomesfromanotherintwosenses,eitherbecauseitwillbefoundatalaterstage,orbecauseitisproducediftheotherisanalysedintoitsoriginalconstituents.Whenthematterisone,differentthingsmaybeproducedowingtodifferenceinthemovingcause;e.g.fromwoodmaybemadebothachestandabed.Butsomedifferentthingsmusthavetheirmatterdifferent;e.g.asawcouldnotbemadeofwood,noristhisinthepowerofthemovingcause;foritcouldnotmakeasawofwoolorofwood.Butif,asamatteroffact,thesamethingcanbemadeofdifferentmaterial,clearlytheart,i.e.themovingprinciple,isthesame;forifboththematterandthemovingcauseweredifferent,theproductwouldbesotoo.

Whenoneinquiresintothecauseofsomething,oneshould,since‘causes’arespokenofinseveralsenses,stateallthepossiblecauses.whatisthematerialcauseofman?Shallwesay‘themenstrualfluid’？Whatismovingcause?Shallwesay‘theseed’？Theformalcause?Hisessence.Thefinalcause?Hisend.Butperhapsthelattertwoarethesame.-Itistheproximatecauseswemuststate.Whatisthematerialcause?Wemustnamenotfireorearth,butthematterpeculiartothething.

Regardingthesubstancesthatarenaturalandgenerable,ifthecausesarereallytheseandofthisnumberandwehavetolearnthecauses,wemustinquirethus,ifwearetoinquirerightly.Butinthecaseofnaturalbuteternalsubstancesanotheraccountmustbegiven.Forperhapssomehavenomatter,ornotmatterofthissortbutonlysuchascanbemovedinrespectofplace.Nordoesmatterbelongtothosethingswhichexistbynaturebutarenotsubstances;theirsubstratumisthesubstance.E.gwhatisthecauseofeclipse?Whatisitsmatter?Thereisnone;themoonisthatwhichsufferseclipse.Whatisthemovingcausewhichextinguishedthelight?Theearth.Thefinalcauseperhapsdoesnotexist.Theformalprincipleisthedefinitoryformula,butthisisobscureifitdoesnotincludethecause.E.g.whatiseclipse?Deprivationoflight.Butifweadd‘bytheearth'scominginbetween’，thisistheformulawhichincludesthecause.Inthecaseofsleepitisnotclearwhatitisthatproximatelyhasthisaffection.Shallwesaythatitistheanimal?Yes,buttheanimalinvirtueofwhat,i.e.whatistheproximatesubject?Theheartorsomeotherpart.Next,bywhatisitproduced?Next,whatistheaffection-thatoftheproximatesubject,notofthewholeanimal?Shallwesaythatitisimmobilityofsuchandsuchakind?Yes,buttowhatprocessintheproximatesubjectisthisdue?

5

Sincesomethingsareandarenot,withoutcomingtobeandceasingtobe,e.g.points,iftheycanbesaidtobe,andingeneralforms(foritisnot‘white’comestobe,butthewoodcomestobewhite,ifeverythingthatcomestobecomesfromsomethingandcomestobesomething),notallcontrariescancomefromoneanother,butitisindifferentsensesthatapalemancomesfromadarkman,andpalecomesfromdark.Norhaseverythingmatter,butonlythosethingswhichcometobeandchangeintooneanother.Thosethingswhich,withouteverbeingincourseofchanging,areorarenot,havenomatter.

Thereisdifficultyinthequestionhowthematterofeachthingisrelatedtoitscontrarystates.E.g.ifthebodyispotentiallyhealthy,anddiseaseiscontrarytohealth,isitpotentiallybothhealthyanddiseased?Andiswaterpotentiallywineandvinegar?Weanswerthatitisthematterofoneinvirtueofitspositivestateanditsform,andoftheotherinvirtueoftheprivationofitspositivestateandthecorruptionofitcontrarytoitsnature.Itisalsohardtosaywhywineisnotsaidtobethematterofvinegarnorpotentiallyvinegar(thoughvinegarisproducedfromit),andwhyalivingmanisnotsaidtobepotentiallydead.Infacttheyarenot,butthecorruptionsinquestionareaccidental,anditisthematteroftheanimalthatisitselfinvirtueofitscorruptionthepotencyandmatterofacorpse,anditiswaterthatisthematterofvinegar.Forthecorpsecomesfromtheanimal,andvinegarfromwine,asnightfromday.Andallthethingswhichchangethusintooneanothermustgobacktotheirmatter;e.g.iffromacorpseisproducedananimal,thecorpsefirstgoesbacktoitsmatter,andonlythenbecomesananimal;andvinegarfirstgoesbacktowater,andonlythenbecomeswine.

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Toreturntothedifficultywhichhasbeenstatedwithrespectbothtodefinitionsandtonumbers,whatisthecauseoftheirunity?Inthecaseofallthingswhichhaveseveralpartsandinwhichthetotalityisnot,asitwere,amereheap,butthewholeissomethingbesidetheparts,thereisacause;foreveninbodiescontactisthecauseofunityinsomecases,andinothersviscosityorsomeothersuchquality.Andadefinitionisasetofwordswhichisonenotbybeingconnectedtogether,liketheIliad,butbydealingwithoneobject.-Whatthen,isitthatmakesmanone;whyisheoneandnotmany,e.g.animal+biped,especiallyifthereare,assomesay,ananimal-itselfandabiped-itself?WhyarenotthoseFormsthemselvestheman,sothatmenwouldexistbyparticipationnotinman,norin-oneForm,butintwo,animalandbiped,andingeneralmanwouldbenotonebutmorethanonething,animalandbiped?

Clearly,then,ifpeopleproceedthusintheirusualmannerofdefinitionandspeech,theycannotexplainandsolvethedifficulty.Butif,aswesay,oneelementismatterandanotherisform,andoneispotentiallyandtheotheractually,thequestionwillnolongerbethoughtadifficulty.Forthisdifficultyisthesameaswouldariseif‘roundbronze’werethedefinitionof‘cloak’；forthiswordwouldbeasignofthedefinitoryformula,sothatthequestionis,whatisthecauseoftheunityof‘round’and‘bronze’？Thedifficultydisappears,becausetheoneismatter,theotherform.What,then,causesthis-thatwhichwaspotentiallytobeactually-except,inthecaseofthingswhicharegenerated,theagent?Forthereisnoothercauseofthepotentia