ITIF-美国新兴的产业政策方法（英）-2021.10-37正式版

EmergingIndustrialPolicyApproachesintheUnitedStatesWILLIAMB.BONVILLIAN|OCTOBER2021Thefederalgovernmenthaslongavoidedindustrialpoliciesoutsideofitsdefensesector.Butnow,facingcompetitionfromChina,itispursuingaseriesofnewprogramsatascalenevertriedbefore.Theeffortwillrequirecareful,system-wideplanningtobearfruit.KEYTAKEAWAYS▪

U.S.industrialpolicyapproachestracebacktoAlexanderHamilton’sattemptstospuramanufacturingsector.Butwhilethedefensesectorhaslongappliedindustrialpolicy,interventionshavebeenlimitedinthecivilianeconomy.▪

Mainstreameconomistshavelongopposedindustrialpolicyapproaches,favoringrelianceonmarketsinstead,andtherehavebeendefinitionaldebatesoverwhatindustrialpoliciesactuallyentail.▪

FourpreviousperiodsofindustrialpolicyeffortshaveincludedtheColdWarchallenge,thecompetitivenesschallengewithJapan,theenergytechnologyinitiativestartinginthe2000s,andadvancedmanufacturingeffortsstartingin2012.▪

Now,spurredbybipartisanconcernsaboutthecompetitivethreatposedbyChina,majorindustrialpolicyprogramsareevolvingatanunprecedentedscaleandmagnitude.▪

Programsnowunderwaycoversemiconductorproduction,developmentofcriticaltechnologies,energydemonstrationprojects,securedomesticsupplychainsincriticalfields,andspeedingdomesticvaccinedevelopmentandproduction.▪

Theseprogramsrequirenewsupportinginfrastructureandoperatingmechanisms.▪

Theseinclude:anewtalentbase;integratedresearchconnections;strongmanufacturingfoundationsandsupplychains;testinganddemonstrations;technologycertifications;flexiblecontracting;financing;andprocurement.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021Policyrecommendations:▪

TheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices(HHS),usingtheDPA,planstoestablishapublic-privateconsortiumforadvancedmanufacturingandonshoringofdomesticessentialmedicinesproduction.Theconsortium’sinitialtaskistoselect50–100criticaldrugs,drawnfromtheFoodandDrugAdministration’s(FDA)essentialmedicineslist,foraproductiononshoringeffort.▪

HHSwillcommit$60millionfromtheDPAappropriationintheAmericanRescuePlantodevelopnovelplatformtechnologiestoincreasedomesticmanufacturingcapacityforAPIstoreducethreatsoffutureshortages.AdvancedBatteriesKeyfindings:Advanced,high-capacitybatteriesareintegraltotechnologiesthatareneededforacleanenergytransitionandnationalsecuritycapabilities,fromelectricvehiclestostationaryenergystoragetodefenseapplications.Demandfortheseproductsissettomultiplyassupplychainconstraints,geopoliticalandeconomiccompetition,andothervulnerabilitiescontinuetoincrease.TheUnitedStatesrelianceontheimportingofinputsforfabricatedadvancedbatterypacksfromabroadexposesthenationtosupplychainvulnerabilitiesthatthreatentodisrupttheavailabilityandcostofthetechnologiesthatrelyonthem.Withthegloballithiumbatterymarketexpectedtogrowbyafactorof5to10by2030,investmentinscalingupasecure,diversifiedsupplychainforhigh-capacitybatteriesisrequired.Thefulllithiumbatterysupplychain,includingthesourcingandprocessingofthecriticalmineralsusedinbatteryproductionthroughtoend-of-lifebatterycollectionandrecycling,needsattention.Policyrecommendations:▪

DOEwillreleaseaNationalBlueprintforLithiumBatteriesthatwillcodifythefindingsofthebatterysupplychainreviewina10-yearplantourgentlydevelopadomesticlithiumbatterysupplychain.▪

DOE’sLPOwillusetheapproximately$17billioninloanauthorityintheAdvancedTechnologyVehiclesManufacturingLoanProgramtosupportthedomesticbatterysupplychain.▪

DOE’sFederalEnergyManagementProgram(FEMP)willlaunchanewefforttosupportdeploymentofenergystorageprojectsbyfederalagencies.Itwillbeginwithafederalgovernment-wideenergystoragereviewthatwillevaluatethecurrentopportunityfordeployingbatterystorageatfederalsites.Theresultingprojectswillhelpbuildmarketsformaterialssupportedinotherefforts.CriticalMineralsKeyfindings:China,usingstate-led,non-marketinterventions,hascapturedlargeportionsofvaluechainsinaseriesofcriticalmineralsandmaterialsneededforenergy,electronics,andnationalsecurityapplications.Chinaalsoaccountsforanoutsizedshareoftheworld’srefiningcapacity,sothateveniftheUnitedStatesdiversifiedsourcesofcriticalmineralsorincreaseddomesticextraction,itwouldstillbereliantonChinaforprocessingbeforeuseinend-productmanufacturing.TheUnitedStatesneedstoworkwithalliestodiversitysupplychainsandinvestinsustainableproduction,refiningandrecyclingcapacitydomestically.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE19Policyrecommendations:▪▪▪▪TheDepartmentofInterior(DOI)willestablishaworkinggroupofagencies,includingtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA),toidentifysitesintheUnitedStateswherecriticalmineralscouldbeproducedandprocessed.AninteragencyteamofstafffromagenciesincludingDOI,USDA,EPA,andotherswithexpertiseinminepermittingandenvironmentallawwillidentifygapsinstatutesandregulationsthatmayneedtobeupdated.DODwilldeployDPATitleIIIincentives—includinggrants,loans,loanguarantees,andofftakeagreements—tosupportsustainablyproducedstrategicandcriticalmaterials,includingscalingprovenR&Dconceptsandemergingtechnologies.DOE’sLPO,throughitsTitle17RenewableEnergyandEfficiencyEnergyProjectssolicitation,willhavemorethan$3billioninloanguaranteesavailabletosupportefficientend-useenergytechnologies,suchasmining,extraction,processing,recovery,orrecyclingtechnologiesofcriticalmaterials.▪TheU.S.DevelopmentFinanceCorporationwillexpandinternationalinvestmentsinprojectsthatwillincreaseproductioncapacityforurgently-neededproducts,includingcriticalmineralsandotherproducts.SemiconductorsKeyfindings:AsreviewedinmoredetailinthepreviousdiscussionoftheCHIPSAct,theUnitedStateshasfallenfrom37percentofglobalsemiconductorproductiontojust12percentoverthelast20years.TheUnitedStatesalsolacksproductioncapabilityatthemostadvancedtechnologylevels.Forleading-edgelogicchips,theUnitedStatesanditsalliesrelyprimarilyonfacilitiesinTaiwan,whichproduces92percentofsuchchips.Thisrelianceonimportedchipsintroducesnewvulnerabilitiesintothecriticalsemiconductorsupplychain.TheUnitedStatesproducesonly6to9percentofthemore-maturelogicchips,wherethereisamajorcurrentshortageaffectingmanyproductsectors.Thelossofproductioncapacitythreatensallsegmentsofthesemiconductorsupplychainaswellasoveralleconomiccompetitiveness.Keypolicies:▪▪▪TheadministrationsupportstheprovisionsoftheCHIPSActtoprovidededicatedfundingforsemiconductormanufacturingandR&Datthelevelof$50billion.DOCwillexpanditspartnershipwithindustrytoenableinformationflowbetweensemiconductorproducers,suppliers,andendusersandsupportcommonstrategies.Theadministrationwillstrengthenengagementwithalliesandpartnerstopromotefairsemiconductorchipallocations,increaseproduction,andpromoteincreasedinvestment.Thisreportcontainsnumerousadditionalfindingsandrecommendations,butthesearejusthighlights.Thereportalsomakesclearthatthiswasnottobetheonlysupplychaineffort.TheadministrationisestablishinganewSupplyChainDisruptionsTaskForceacrossagenciestoaddressnear-termsupplychainchallengestotheeconomicrecovery,ledbysecretariesofcommerce,transportation,andagriculture.Itwillfocusonareaswheresupply/demandissuesareaproblem:homebuildingandconstruction,semiconductors,transportation,andagricultureandfood.Itwillconvenepublicandprivatestakeholderstoevaluateproblemsandreviewsolutionstobottlenecksandsupplyconstraints.Inaddition,DOCwillbringtogetherdatafromacrosstheINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE20Distributionsystems:OWStookonthetaskofnotonlysupportingtheproductionofvaccinesbutalsogettingthedosesshippedtostatesbasedonastatepopulation-basedformula.ConsideringthatthetwomRNAvaccineshadtoremainfrozenandrequiredspecialcomplexhandling,thelogisticswereremarkable,withonlyatinyamountofvaccineendingupspoiledinshipment.Butvaccinedistributiondidnotmeanactualadministrationofshots.WhileOWSoriginallydecidedthatthemilitarywouldcreatemassvaccinationsitesandadministertheshots,thestatepublichealthbureaucraciesinsistedthatadministrationwasitsroleandOWSacceded.Butthestatehealthbureaucracieswerenotready,anddosesadministeredinitiallylaggedfarbehinddosesdelivered.Exacerbatingtheproblem,CDCsetvaccinationprioritiesinanimpracticalway,allowingthemostelderlytogofirstsincetheyweremostatriskofdying,butthencreatedasecondprioritythatbundledtogethermostoftherestofthepopulation,combiningsocialequityconcernswithrisk.Thiscreatedadisorderlyadministrationprocessinmoststates,withcountlessindividualsjockeyingwitheachotheronstateandlocalonlinesitestryingtosetvaccinationdates.Butaftertheseinitialrolloutproblems,whichtheBidenadministrationmadeitaprioritytofix,byMarch,thedosesadministeredscaleduptomeetthedemand.Intheend,theUnitedStatesledvaccinedevelopmentanddistribution,manyweeksaheadofitsEUdevelopednationcounterparts.OWSwasjustthat:anoperation.Itwasnotaboutscienceresearch.Theworkonthescienceandthetechnologydevelopmentbehindithadbeenundertakenintheyearsbeforethepandemic.OWSwasaboutscalingupatechnologyintomanufacturingandgettingittousersrapidly.Exceptindefenseareas,thefederalgovernmentsimplyneverdoesthis.IthassystematicallyignoredAmericanmanufacturingdecline;ithaspaidlittleattentiontoprocessesforscalingupnewtechnologiesandtheirrelatedproducts;andithasdevelopedfewtoolstoundertakethesesteps.OWSworkedonlybecausemilitaryapproachestoscale-upweresystematicallyappliedbyaflexibleneworganizationthatreachedacrossagencies.AsDr.MichaelHepburn,DOD’svaccinedirector,haspointedout,itwaslikeaDARPAforscale-up.ItrevivedinterestintheUnitedStatesinindustrialpolicy,liftingitoutofitslong-dormantstatusasthewhippingboyofmainstreameconomists.Itrepresentedastrongandremarkablysuccessfulindustrialpolicyapproach.Thetoolspreviouslylisted—diversetalent,guaranteedcontracts,flexiblecontractingmechanisms,committedcompanies,technologycertifications,mappedsupplychains,federalofficialsintegratedwithcompanies,anddistributionsystems—needtobeconsideredforothercriticalnationalneeds,includingbutnotlimitedtofuturemedicalemergencies.GUIDINGPRINCIPLESANDOPERATINGMECHANISMSFORANEWINDUSTRIALPOLICYINFRASTRUCTUREAlloftheprogramslistedmeetthedefinitionforindustrialpolicydiscussedattheoutset.Theyinvolvegovernmentalinterventionsatarangeofvariousinnovationstagesasidefromearly-stageresearch—fromdevelopmenttoprototyping,testing,demonstration,productdevelopment,productionfinancing,marketentry,andexpandedmarketcreation.Differentprogramsoperateatdifferentstages,butallreachanumberofpost-researchstages.Allfaceachallengeofpublicsupport.Willtheybeeffectiveandresilientenoughtobecomepoliticallyaccepted?Programsthatoperateatvariousinnovationstagesarenotenough.Foranindustrialpolicyprogramtowork,itwillrequireapplyinganumberofguidingorganizationalprinciples—really,newoperatingmechanismsthatamounttoanewkindofinfrastructure.WhenINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE24Flexiblecontractingmechanisms:Thesegohand-in-handwithprocurementapproaches.TheDPAprovidesauthorityforinterventionintomanufacturingsupplychainstoassurerapidproductionscale-upofcriticalgoodsrelatedtonationalsecurity.ThisauthorityprovedcriticaltothesuccessofOWSinrapidlydevelopingandproducingvaccines.ApplicationofDPAauthorityiscitedintheinitiativesforDOEdemonstrationsandtosecurecriticaltechnologiesandmaterials.Anotherexampleofflexiblecontractingauthorityisthe“OtherTransactionsAuthority,”developedinitiallybyDARPAtoenablerapidcontractingoutsidethecumbersomeproceduresofstandardfederalprocurement,andthenappliedbyotheragenciesaswell.Theseandotherexamplesofflexiblecontractingauthoritymayprovecriticaltoindustrialpolicyapproaches,asOWSindicates.CONCLUSIONWhileDODhaslongoperatedanindustrialpolicysystemwitheconomicinterventionsatmanystagesoftheinnovationprocess,thisislargelyanewroadforgovernmentinthecivilianeconomy.Thereare,ofcourse,historicalprecedents,includingtheprogramsdevelopedtorespondtoJapan’sdevelopmentofqualityproductiontechnologiesandprocesses,developmentofenergytechnologiesinthe2000s,andtheefforttocreateadvancedmanufacturinginstitutesafter2012.Buttheplethoraofnewindustrialpoliciesproposedin2020and2021summarizedhereinisunprecedented.Whileonlysomewilllikelygointoeffect,thesecouldamounttoafifthandlarger-scaleperiodofindustrialpolicyapproaches.Thisreporthasattemptedtocatalogtheminsomedetail,andalsotodelineatekeyoperationalmechanisms—ineffect,anewsupportinginfrastructure—thatwillberequiredinorganizingtheseapproachestomakethemfruitful.Industrialpolicyisacomplexprocesswithmanyactors,anditrequiresacarefulplan,strongfoundationalprograms,andaspiritofenterprisetoaccomplishit.AsthePentagonhaslongsincediscovered,youcan’tjustbuildthepieces,youhavetobuildthesystem.Thisworkhasattemptednotonlytoreviewthenewprogramsbuttosetoutthefoundationalinfrastructuretheywillrequire.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE28AbouttheAuthorWilliamB.BonvillianisalectureratMITandseniordirectorforspecialprojectsatMITOpenLearning.HewasformerlythedirectoroftheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology’s(MIT)Washington,D.C.,office,whereheworkedtosupportMIT’sstrongandhistoricrelationswithfederalR&Dagenciesanditsroleinnationalsciencepolicy.Priortothatposition,heservedfor17yearsaslegislativedirectorandchiefcounseltoSenatorJosephLieberman(I-CT).HislegislativeeffortsintheSenateincludedscienceandtechnologypoliciesandinnovationissues.Heisthecoauthoroffivebooksonthesetopicsandofnumerousarticlesandbookchapters.AboutITIFTheInformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation(ITIF)isanindependent,nonprofit,nonpartisanresearchandeducationalinstitutefocusingontheintersectionoftechnologicalinnovationandpublicpolicy.Recognizedbyitspeersinthethinktankcommunityastheglobalcenterofexcellenceforscienceandtechnologypolicy,ITIF’smissionistoformulateandpromotepolicysolutionsthataccelerateinnovationandboostproductivitytospurgrowth,opportunity,andprogress.Formoreinformation,visit.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE29ENDNOTES1.Seegenerally:WilliamB.BonvillianandPeterL.Singer,AdvancedManufacturing,theNewAmericanInnovationPolicies(Cambridge,MA.:MITPress2018),45.Alsosee:AlexanderHamilton,ReportonManufactures(totheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives),December5,1791,Introduction,inHamilton,HenryCabotLodge,ed.,TheWorksofAlexanderHamilton(FederalEdition),IndustryandCommerce,reproducedat/titles/hamilton-the-works-of-alexander-hamilton-federal-edition-vol-4#lf0249-04_head_012.Further:AlexanderHamilton,ReportRelativetotheAdditionalSuppliesfortheEnsuingYear(totheSpeakeroftheHouse),TreasuryDepartment,March16,1792,inNationalArchives,FoundersOnline,/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0079.Finally:NationalAcademiesofSciences,NationalMaterialsandManufacturingBoard,StrategicLong-TermParticipationbyDODinitsManufacturingUSAInstitutes,2019,80-81,/read/25417/chapter/9.2.MerrittRoeSmith,GeorgeWashingtonandtheEstablishmentoftheHarpersFerryArmory,TheVirginiaMagazineofHistoryandBiography,v.81,n.4(Oct.1973,415-436,/stable/4247826;MerrittRoeSmith,HarpersFerryArmoryandtheNewTechnology(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1977),28.3.Summarizedin,BonvillianandSinger,AdvancedManufacturing,18-21.4.NewJerseyCommunityDevelopmentCorp.,Patterson,N.J.,HistoryofPatterson,/what-we-do/page.php?Revitalizing-Paterson-Great-Falls-Promise-Neighborhood-History-of-Paterson-24;SocietyforEstablishingUsefulManufacturers(SUM),/wiki/Society_for_Establishing_Useful_Manufactures5.VannevarBush,Science,theEndlessFrontier(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice1945),/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm.6.KenWarwick,“Beyondindustrialpolicy:Emergingissuesandnewtrends,”OECDScience,TechnologyandIndustrialPolicyPaperNo.2,OECD,Paris,2013,16,/wp-content/uploads/Beyond_Industrial_Policy.pdf/wp-content/uploads/Beyond_Industrial_Policy.pdf.Seegenerally,UNConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNTAD),VirtualInstituteTeachingMaterialonStructuralTransformationandIndustrialPolicy,Module2:Industrialpolicy:atheoreticalandpracticalframeworktoanalyseandapplyindustrialpolicy,(NYandGeneva:UNCTAD2016),/system/files/non-official-document/indpolfull_UNCTAD_material.pdf;JohnPageandFinnTarp(eds.),IndustrialPolicy,government-BusinesscoordinationinAfricaandEastAsia(Oxford,UK:OxfordUniv.Press2017),/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/31446/628111.pdf.7.RobertAtkinson,“WhytheUnitedStatesNeedsaNationalAdvancedIndustryandTechnologyAgency,”ITIF,June17,2021,1,/publications/2021/06/17/why-united-states-needs-national-advanced-industry-and-technology-agency.8.MarianaMazzucato,RainerKattel,andJoshRyan-Collins,“ChallengeDrivenInnovationPolicy:TowardsaNewToolkit,”JournalofIndustry,CompetitionandTrade,2020,vol.20,issue2,No11,437,/article/kapjincot/.Seealso,MarianaMazzucato,MissionEconomy:AMoonshotGuidetoChangingCapitalism(NewYork:HarperBusiness2020).9.SuzanneBerger,IndustrialPolicy’sComeback,BostonReview,Sept.15,2021,/forum/industrial-policy’s-comeback/suzanne-berger-back-down-earth.10.Bush,Science,theEndlessFrontier,Summary,Chapt.2(“InPeace”),Chapt.3(“ScienceandJobs”).11.MerritRoeSmithandLeoMarx,eds.,DoesTechnologyDriveHistory?TheDilemmaofTechnologicalDeterminism(Cambridge,MA:MITPress1994).INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE3012.Foradiscussionofthedynamicsofinnovation,see,WilliamB.BonvillianandCharlesWeiss,TechnologicalInnovationinLegacySectors(Oxford,UK:OxfordUniv.Press2015),23–36,181–196.13.CharlesLSchultze,“IndustrialPolicy:ADissent,”BrookingsReview,Wash.,D.C.,Fall1983,/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/industrial_policy_schultze.pdf.14.Thisaccountofthefourperiodsdrawsonamoredetailedarticle,WilliamB.Bonvillian,“TheNewModelInnovationAgencies:Anoverview,”ScienceandPublicPolicy,v.41,n.4,Sept.26,2014,425-437,/10.1093/scipol/sct059.15.WilliamBonvillian,RichardVanAtta,andPatrickWindham,eds.,TheDARPAModelforTransformativeTechnologies(Oxford,UK:OpenBookPublishers2020),/product/1079.16.VernonW.Ruttan,IsWarNecessaryforEconomicgrowth?MilitaryProcurementandTechnologyDevelopment(OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniv.Press2006).17.KentHughes,BuildingtheNextAmericanCentury:ThePastandFutureofAmericanEconomicCompetitiveness(Wash.,DCandBaltimoreMD:WoodrowWilsonCenterPressandJohnsHopkinsUniv.Press2004).18.35U.S.C.200-212.19.BirchBayh,JosephP.Allen,andHowardW.Bremer,“Universities,InventorsandtheBayhDoleAct,”LifeSciencesLawandIndustryReport,Vol.3,No.24(BNA,Dec.18,2009);DavidRoessneretal.,“TheEconomicImpactofLicensedCommercializedInventionsOriginatinginUniversityResearch1996-2007,”FinalReporttotheBiotechnologyIndustryOrganization(BIOSept.3,2009)/sites/default/files/legacy/bioorg/docs/files/BIO_final_report_9_3_09_rev_2_0.pdf.20.SeePL100-519,TitleI,Sec.102(d)(Oct.24,1988);102Stat.2590;15USCChapt.7,Sec.278k(RegionalCentersfortheTransferofManufacturingTechnology);15CFRSec.290.6,/about-mep/legislative-history.htm.21.“NIST,MEP,AboutMEP,30YearsOfAdvancedManufacturing,”/mep/manufacturing-infographics/30-years-advancing-us-manufacturing-mep-national-network.Seealso,NationalAcademiesofSciences,Science,TechnologyandEconomicPolicy(STEP)Board,“21stCenturyManufacturing,TheRoleoftheManufacturingExtensionPartnershipProgram”(W.,DC:NationalAcademiesPress,2013),/read/18448/chapter/1.22.15USC638;SmallBusinessAdministration,SBIR-STTR,About,/about.AseriesofNationalAcademiesofSciencesstudiesofagencySBIRprogramshassupportedtheirrole.See,forexample,NationalResearchCouncil,AnAssessmentoftheSBIRProgram(Wash.,D.C.:NationalAcademiesPress2008),viii(listofNRCSBIRstudies),54–90(FindingsandRecommendations),/openbook.php?record_id=11989&page=R1.23.YairHoltzman,“TheResearchandDevelopmentTaxCredit,”TheCPAJournal,October2017,/2017/10/30/u-s-research-development-tax-credit/.24.LarryD.BrowningandJudyC.Shetler,Sematech:SavingtheU.S.SemiconductorIndustry,(CollegeStation,Tex.:TexasA&MUniv.Press2000);RobertD.Hof,“LessonsfromSematech,”MITTechnologyReview(July25,2011),/2011/07/25/192832/lessons-from-sematech/.Anotherinnovativeprogramoftheera,theAdvancedTechnologyProgram(ATP),wasbasedattheCommerceDepartment’sNISTandfundedinnovativetechnologydevelopmentprojectsatcompanies,butwasdiscontinuedbyCongressin2011.NationalResearchCouncil,Science,TechnologyandEconomicPolicy(STEP)Board,TheAdvancedTechnologyProgram:ChallengesandOpportunities(Nat’lAcademiesPress1999),/openbook.php?isbn=0309067758;RosalieRueggandINFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE31IrwinFeller,“AToolkitforEvaluatingPublicR&DInvestmentꢀModels,Methods,andFindingsfromATP'sFirstDecade”(NISTGCR03-8572003),/nistpubs/gcr/2003/NIST.GCR.03-857.pdf.25.WilliamB.Bonvillian,“ApplyingInnovationPolicytotheU.S.Energy/ClimateChallenge,”Chapt.12inRaphaelHeffronandGavinLittle,eds.DeliveringEnergyLawandPolicyintheEUandUS(Edinburgh,UK:EdinburghUniv.Press2016).26.WilliamB.BonvillianandRichardVanAtta,“ARPA-EandDARPA:ApplyingtheDARPAmodeltoenergyinnovation,”JournalofTechnologyTransfer(Oct.2011).27.WilliamB.BonvillianandPeterL.Singer,AdvancedManufacturing—theNewAmericanInnovationPolicies(Cambridge,MA:MITPress2018),15–64.28.AdamsNager,“Tradevs.Productivity:WhatCausedU.S.Manufacturing’sDeclineandHowtoReviveit,”ITIF,Feb.13,2017,/publications/2017/02/13/trade-vs-productivity-what-caused-us-manufacturings-decline-and-how-revive;AdamsB.NagerandRobertD.Atkinson,“TheMythofAmerica’sManufacturingRenaissance:TheRealStateofU.S.Manufacturing,”ITIF,Jan.2015,/2015-myth-american-manufacturing-renaissance.pdf.29.Forexample,see,RobertAtkinson,“U.S.ManufacturingProductivityisFallingandIt’saCauseforAlarm,”IndustryWeek,July12,2021,/the-economy/article/21169426/falling-us-manufacturing-productivity-is-cause-for-alarm.30.U.S.CensusBureau.InternationalTradeinGoodsandServices,U.S.TradeinGoods,2020,/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/index.html;U.S.CensusBureau,TradeinGoodswithAdvancedTechnologyProducts,2020and2019,/foreign-trade/balance/c0007.html#2021.31.See,forexample,DavidH.Autor,DavidDorn,andGordonH.Hanson.“TheChinaShock:LearningfromLaborMarketAdjustmenttoLargeChangesinTrade,NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,”NBERWorkingPaper21906,Jan.2016,/papers/w21906;A.MichaelSpence,“TheImpactofGlobalizationonIncomeandEmployment:TheDownsideofIntegratingMarkets,”ForeignAffairs90,n.4,July–August2011,28–41.32.President’sCouncilofAdvisorsonScienceandTechnology,“CapturingDomesticCompetitiveAdvantageinAdvancedManufacturing,”ReportoftheAdvancedManufacturingPartnership,July2012,21-24,/reports/report-president-capturing-domestic-competitive-advantage-advanced-manufacturing;BonvillianandSinger,AdvancedManufacturing,131–186.33.NIST,ManufacturingUSA2019–2020HighlightsReport,2020,v,/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS.600-6.pdf.34.NIST,HighlightsReport,6–7.35.WilliamB.Bonvillian,“RestoringU.S.LeadershipinManufacturing,”DayOneProject,Jan.23,2020,/post/restoring-u-s-leadership-in-manufacturing.Seealso,WilliamB.Bonvillian,“EnsuringManufacturingUSAReachesitsPotential,”DayOneProject,August2021,/post/ensuring-manufacturing-usa-reaches-its-potential.36.MelissaLott,“Solyndra–IlluminatingEnergyFundingFlaws?”ScientificAmerican,Sept.27,2011,/plugged-in/solyndra-illuminating-energy-funding-flaws/37.Seegenerally,EmilyMaher,ManufacturingOurWayIntotheFuture,NationalConferenceofStateLegislatures,July2021,/research/fiscal-policy/manufacturing-our-way-into-the-future-637617831.aspx.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|OCTOBER2021PAGE3238.Theseeventsaredetailedin,AdamTooze,Shutdown:HowCovidShooktheWorld’sEconomy(NewYork:PenguinRandomHouse2021),79-154.39.See,forexample,BarryNaughton,TheRiseofChina’sIndustrialPolicy,1978-2020(Univ.NacionalAutonomadeMexico2021),/CECHIMEX/Naughton2021_Industrial_Policy_in_China_CECHIMEX.pdf.40.DoDhascontractedwithIntelforsecuresemiconductorfoundryservicesaspartofitsRapidAssuredMicroelectronicsPrototypes-Commercial(RAMP-C)