在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略

在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略【外文翻译】外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文：CongruenceBetweenPayPolicyandCompetitiveStrategyinHigh-PerformingFirms.Montemayor,EdilbertoF.Basedonexistingstrategiccompensationtheory,thisstudyexaminesseventheoreticalpropositionsconcerningthelinkbetweenbusinesslevelcompetitivestrategyandpaypolicy.Canonicaldiscriminantanalysisof261responsestoanationalsurveyshowthathigh-performingfirmswhosestrategyisdominatedbyCostLeadership,Innovation,orDifferentiationtacticsadoptdifferentpaypolicies.Furtheranalysisshowsthatinferiorfirmperformanceisassociatedwiththelackoatbetweenpaypolicyandbusinessstrategy.Thesefindingssupporttheneedforacontingencyapproachinthedesignofpaypolicy.Theideathatpaypolicieshavestrategicimpacthasbecomeamajorthemewithinthecompensationliteraturesincethemid-1980s.NotablevolumesconcernedwithcompensationstrategyincludeLawler'sStrategicPay(1991),SchusterandZingheim'sTheNewPay(1992),andGomez-MejiaandBalkin'sCompensation,OrganizationalStrategy,andFirmPerformance(1992).Thisstrategicperspectiveoncompensationisbasedonthefactthatorganizationsdifferinpaypoliciesandthebeliefthatmatchingpaypoliciestobusinessstrategyresultsinhigherorganizationalperformance(Milkovich,1988).ExceptfortheworkbyDavidBalkinandLuisGomez-Mejia(Balkin&Gomez-Mejia,1987;1990;andGomez-Mejia,1992),thestrategicimpactofpaypolicyhasreceivedlittleempiricalattention.Buildingontheexecutivecompensationliterature,BalkinandGomez-Mejiahavepublishedaseriesofanalysesdealingwiththerelationshipbetweenpaypolicyandorganizationaldiversificationorlifecyclestages.However,theportionofstrategiccompensationtheorythataddressesthelinkbetweenpaypolicyandbusiness-levelcompetitivestrategieshasnotbeentested.SuchtheoryappearsintheworkofCarroll(1987),MilesandSnow(1984),Miller(1986),SchulerandJackson(1987),andTichy,FombrumandDevanna(1982).Thepresentstudyaddstotheempiricalbaseforstrategiccompensationtheorybyexaminingwhichpaypolicieshaveapositiverelationshipwithfirmperformancefordifferentbusinessstrategies.Becausepaypoliciesareclearlyundermanagementcontrolandarethemostvisibleelementsofanorganization'smotivationandrewardsystem,theresultsofthisinvestigationwillhelpmanagementdevelopcoherentpaysystemsthatsupportbusinessstrategy.Inaddition,thisstudymakestwomethodologicalcontributions.First,itdemonstratesaprocedureforevaluatingcontingencymodelsthroughthejointanalysisoforganizationalstrategy,paypolicyandperformance.Second,thisstudyshowsanapproachformeasuringcompensationpolicyintermsofhardobjectiveindices,insteadoftheperceptualdatatypicallyusedinthepastresearch.AnalyticalFrameworkandHypothesesStrategiccompensationtheoryisacontingencytheory(Gomez-Mejia&Balkin,1992).Itsfundamentalpremiseisthatmatchingpaypolicyandbusinessstrategyimpactsfirmperformance(Milkovich,1988).Thatis,high-performingfirmsadoptpaypoliciescongruentwiththeirstrategyanddeviationsfromstrategically-indicatedpaypolicieshaveanegativeeffectonorganizationalperformance.Thisisnotanacademicargumentonly.Leadingcompensationprofessionalsconsiderthattheirmostimportantchallengeistoaligncompensationsystemsandbusinessstrategy(Gomez-Mejia&Balkin,1990;McNally,1992).Inordertotestsuchacontingencyview,itisnecessarytoestablishwhichcompensationpolicieshavestrategicsignificance,howcanorganizationsbeclassifiedintodominantstrategictypes,andthedifferentsetsofcompensationpoliciesthatsupporteachtypeofcompetitivestrategy.ThePerformanceImpactofMatchingPayPolicyandBusinessStrategyThisresearchconcentratesimportantlyonhigh-performingfirmsbecausethepaypoliciesthatfitaparticularstrategywillbemostevidentamonghigh-performingfirms.Accordingtothecontingencyperspectiveinstrategiccompensationtheory,agoodmatchbetweenanorganization'sstrategyandallitssystems(willresultinsuperiorperformance(Gomez-Mejia&Balkin,1992).Thatis,allhigh-performingorganizationsshouldhavestrategyandpaypoliciesthatmatcheachother.Ontheotherhand,notalllesser-performingorganizationswillsufferfromamismatchbetweenstrategyandpaypolicy.Lesserperformancemaybetheconsequenceofapoormatchbetweenstrategyandsystemsotherthancompensation.Forthisreason,amajorportionoftheanalysesreportedaheadexaminesthedifferenceinpaypoliciesbetweenhigh-performingorganizationsthatpursuedifferentbusinessstrategies.Otherstrategyresearchershavealsofocusedonthesubsetofhigh-performingorganizationsintheirsamples(Thomas,Litschert&Ramaswamy,1991;Venkatram,1990).Leadingstrategiccompensationscholarsproposeanorganization'sperformancewillsufferwhenitspaypoliciesdeviatefromthosepolicieswhichideallyfittheorganization'sstrategy(Gomez-Mejia&Balkin,1992).sInaddition,strategyscholarsrecommendtheuseofmultipleapproacheswhenstudyingtheperformanceimpactofmatchingstrategyandorganizationalsystems(Venkatraman,1990).Forthesereasons,thisstudywillalsoexaminethecorrelationbetweendeviationsfromstrategically-indicatedpaypoliciesandorganizationalperformance.Becausefirmperformancedependsonmanyfactorsbesidescompensation,itisexpectedthatsuchdeviationswillhaveanegative,althoughmodest,correlationwithperformance.Nonetheless,findingthatdeviationsfromstrategically-indicatedpaypoliciescorrelatewithperformancewouldprovideadditionalsupportforthecontingencyviewinstrategiccompensationtheory.CompensationPolicieswithStrategicSignificanceThisstudyconsidersthefiveaspectsofpaypolicymorefrequentlymentionedinstrategiccompensationtheory:(1)compensationphilosophy;(2)externalcompetitiveness;(3)incentive-basemix;(4)individual(merit)payincreases;and(5)payadministration.CompensationPhilosophy.Thisstudymeasuresorganizationalpayphilosophyintermsoftheimportanceassignedtothreekindsofobjectives:(a)laborcostcontrol,(b)employeeattractionandretention,and(c)employeemotivation.Thecompensationsystemhasstrategicimpactthroughitseffectonthesethreeareaswhichrepresentthetraditionalgoalsforpaypolicydesign.Asexplainedahead,anorganization'sbusinessstrategywilldeterminetherelativeimportanceofthesethreekindsofobjectives.Moreover,thepaypoliciesthatsupportdifferentobjectivesmayconflictwitheachother.Consequently,strategiccompensationrequiresaphilosophy,basedontheimportanceoftheseobjectives,toprovidedirectionandpurposetospecificpaypolicies(Lawler,1991).ExternalCompetitiveness.Thispolicyareareferstothelevelofpayanorganizationoffersrelativetothatofitscompetitors.Ithasacriticalimpactonattraction/retentionandlaborcostobjectives.Thehigherthepaylevel,thebettertheorganization'sabilitytoacquireacompetentworkforce.Clearly,increasingthepaylevelraisestotallaborcosts.However,raisingthepaylevelmayleadtoimprovedlaborcostsperunit.Anemergingviewinlaboreconomics,knownasefficiencywagetheory,contendsthatpayingabovemarketlevelscanpromoteemployeemotivationthatwouldoffsetanyincrementinlaborcosts(Holzer,1990).Incentive-BaseMix.Thispolicyrelatestothedistinctionbetweenincentive(variable)andbase(fixed)pay.Ithasstrategicimplications.Increasingtheportionofpaythatisvariablehasbeenadvocatedasaneffectivemechanismforlinkingemployeerewardsandbusinessperformance(seeforexampleMitchell,Lewin&Lawler,1991).Besidesaclearfitwithmotivationobjectives,ahighincentive-to-basepayratiomakessomelaborcostsvariableandmayhelptoattractandretainhard-working;risk-takingemployees.Individual(Merit)PayIncreases.Policiesdealingwithincreasestoindividualbasepayhaveadirectimpactonemployeesand,consequently,havestrategicimplications(Milkovich&Broderick,1991).Meritpay,ahighlydebatedpolicy,representsthemostprevalentsystemfordecidingindividualpayincreases.Surveysfindthat80percentofprivatesectoremployers,moststategovernments,andaboutone-halfofthelocalgovernmentshavemeritpayplans(Heneman,1992).Organizationsdifferinpoliciesconcerningthesizeofmeritraises.Thisstudywillexaminetheaverageandrangeofmeritraisesawarded.Organizationsmayalsodifferinemployeeeligibilityformeritpay.Tomeasurethescopeofmeritpay,thisstudywillexaminetheextenttowhichnonexemptemployeesparticipateinmeritpayplans.Typicallymostorallexempt(professionalandmanagerial)employeesparticipateinmeritpayplans.However,organizationsdifferintheextenttowhichnonexempt(operationsandadministrativesupport)employeesparticipateinmeritpayplans.PayAdministration.Thisstudywillexaminepoliciesconcerning"openness"(theamountofinformationprovidedtoemployees)and"participation"(thedegreetowhichemployeesmayquestionorchallengepaydecisions).Thesepoliciesaregenerallyacceptedashavingstrategicimportancebecauseoftheireffectonemployeesatisfactionandacceptanceofpaydecisions(Milkovich&Broderick,1991;Gomez-Mejia&Balkin,1992).ClassifyingOrganizationsbyBusinessStrategyBusiness-levelstrategy,theinitiativesbywhichorganizationsseekacompetitiveadvantage,determinesthekindofemployeecontributionsand,therefore,thehumanresourceandcompensationpoliciesthatorganizationsrequiretosucceed(Schuler&Jackson,1987;Miles&Snow,1984).Unfortunately,business-levelstrategyhasreceivedminimalattentioninstrategiccompensationresearch.Intheonlypublishedresearchincludingbusiness-levelstrategicvariables,BalkinandGomez-Mejia(1990)focusongrowthandmaintenancestrategies.Incontrast,strategiccompensationtheoryisbasedonPorter'sand/orMilesandSnow'stypologies.Thisstudymergesthetwotypologiesbasedonconceptualandempiricalconsiderations.Porter'sclassificationdistinguishescost-orientedfromdifferentiation-orientedstrategies.However,Porterstypologyneglectsthoseorganizationscompetingthroughintenseproductormarketdevelopment(Miller,1986;Walker&Ruekert,1987).Ontheotherhand,MilesandSnow'stypologydistinguishesbetweenDefendersoperatinginstableproductandmarketdomains,Prospectorsthatconstantlyseektodevelopnewmarketsorproducts,andanintermediatetypecalledAnalyzers.Unfortunately,MilesandSnow'stypologyminimizesthedifferencesbetweenDefendersthatcompetethroughlowcostandthosecompetingbysettingthemselvesapartfromtheircompetition.Moreover,Segev(1989)appliedmultidimensionalscalingto31variablesdescribingenvironment,strategiccontent,strategicdecisionmakingprocess,andorganizationalcharacteristicstoshowthetwotypologiescanbesynthesizedalonga"proactiveness"dimension.Segev'sresultssuggestthethreetypesofbusiness-levelstrategyusedinthisstudy:CostLeadership(DefendersorAnalyzers);Differentiation(DefendersorAnalyzers);andInnovation(Prospectors).Asdiscussedinthenextsection,thissyntheticclassificationallowsintegratingthetheorythatdealswiththekinkbetweencompensationpolicyandcompetitivestrategy.CompensationPoliciesThatSupportDifferentBusinessStrategiesDifferentorganization,humanresourcesandcompensationsystemswillsupporteachofthethreetypesofbusinessstrategydiscussedhere.Miller(1986)theorizesthatfirmspursuingaCostLeadershipstrategyrequiremechanistic,bureaucraticstructuresgearedtomaximizeefficiency,whilefirmspursuinganInnovationstrategyrequireorganicstructuresthatfostercommunicationandcollaborationamongemployeesindifferentdepartments.Inasimilarvein,Arthur(1994)studiednonintegratedsteelmills,findingaCostLeadershipstrategyisbestsupportedby"control"humanresourcesystemswhichareconservativeandfocusonimprovingefficiencythroughformalizedrulesandprocedureswhileaDifferentiationstrategyisbestsupportedby"commitment"humanresourcesystemswhichseektolinkemployeeandorganizationalgoals.Finally,Gomez-MejiaandBalkin(1992)reportthataCostLeadership(Defender)strategyshouldbesupportedwith"algorithmic"compensationsystemswhosefeaturesincludeheavyrelianceonbasepaywithminimalincentivesandbureaucraticadministrationofpaypolicy.TheseauthorsaddthatanInnovation(Prospector)strategyshouldbesupportedwith"experiential"compensationsystemswhosefeaturesincludesubstantialincentivesandopen,decentralizedadministration.Theprecedingideascoupledwithexistingstrategiccompensationtheory--containedintheworkbyCarroll(1987),MilesandSnow(1984),Miller(1986),SchulerandJackson(1987),andTichyetal.(1982)--suggestthefollowingtheoreticalpropositions:P1:ThepayphilosophyofCostLeaderswillemphasize"laborcost"objectivesmorethanthephilosophyofDifferentiatorsorInnovators.CostLeadersemphasizestablejobassignmentsandtraditionalmanagementpractices.Thesefirmsarecharacterizedbytightcostcontrols,overheadminimization,andrequireemployeestocontributerepetitive,predictablebehaviorwithverylittlerisktaking(Miller,1986;Schuler&Jackson,1987).P2:Innovatorswillhaveapayphilosophythatplacesmoreemphasison"attraction/retention"objectivesthanCostLeadersorDifferentiators.Innovatorsneedtoorchestratethecontributionsofexternally-trainedspecialistswithdiverse'expertise(Miller,1986).Therefore,Innovatorsrelyheavilyonexternalstaffingandneedtoensureexternalcompetitivenessforadiversityofskills(Miles&Snow,1984).P3:ThepayphilosophyofDifferentiatorswillemphasize"motivation"objectivesmorethanthephilosophyofCostLeadersorInnovators.Organizationspursuingadifferentiationstrategyneedtostressgoal-settingandachievementsbasedonorganization-widecriteria(Miller,1986).ComparedwithCostLeaders,Differentiatorsrequireahigherdegreeofemployeecooperationandcommitmenttoorganizationalgoalssuchasqualityandcustomerservice(Schuler&Jackson,1987).P4:Withrespecttopaylevel,CostLeaderswillbemorelikelytolagtheirlabormarketcompetitorsandInnovatorswillbemorelikelytoleadtheirlabormarketcompetitors.Becauseoftheiremphasisoncostcontainment,CostLeadersareexpectedtotakeamoreconservativestanceinlabormarkets.Arthur(1994)reportsthatCostLeadersoffersignificantlylowerwagesthanDifferentiators.Incontrast,becauseoftheneedtoacquiretalent,severalauthorsconcurinhypothesizingthatInnovatorsshouldleadthemarketintheirpaylevel(Carroll,1987;Miles&Snow,1984;Schuler&Jackson,1987).P5:Differentiators(andperhapsCostLeaders)willhaveahigherincentive-to-baseratiothanInnovators.资料来源：JournalofManagement1996(1):P189译文：在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略蒙特马约尔，埃迪尔韦托基于现有的战略补偿理论，这项研究，探讨有关企业之间的七个级别的竞争策略和薪酬政策连结理论命题。一项261反应的全国性调查的典型判别分析显示，高性能的企业，其战略是按成本领导，创新，还是差别化策略为主采取不同的薪酬政策。进一步分析显示，公司业绩较差是在薪酬政策及业务策略之间缺乏审裁有关联的。这些调查结果，这些结果支持需要一个应急办法设计的薪酬政策。有观点认为，薪酬政策具有战略影响，已成为在自80年代中期赔偿文献的主题。值得注意的补偿策略包括劳勒的薪酬战略(1991)，舒斯特和仔寒姆的新的薪酬(1992)，和戈麦斯，希亚和巴尔金的补偿组织战略，与企业绩效(1992)。这种补偿的战略眼光是基于不同的薪酬政策和信仰的组织匹配的薪酬政策对企业战略导致更高的组织绩效这样的事实(米尔科维奇，1988)。除了巴尔金大卫和路易斯戈麦斯希亚(巴尔金及戈麦斯梅西亚，1987;1990年和戈麦斯，希亚，1992年)写的著作，薪酬政策的战略影响已受到多少经验的重视。建立在行政补偿文学的基础上，巴尔金和戈麦斯-希亚已经出版了与组织之间的薪酬政策和多样化的关系时或生命周期阶段的一系列分析。然而，在薪酬政策和业务水平的竞争策略连结的战略补偿理论部分尚未经过测试。这种理论出现在卡罗尔（1987年），迈尔斯和斯诺（1984），米勒（1986），舒勒和杰克逊（1987年）和蒂奇，佛布朗和大维娜（1982年）的著作中。本研究增加了战略基地的补偿理论的与企业绩效呈正相关的实证研究针对不同的经营策略。因为薪酬政策在管理控制下是清楚的，也是一个组织的激励和奖励制度中最可见的元素，这项调查的结果将帮助管理层制定支持企业战略的协调一致的薪酬制度。此外，本研究提出两个方法的贡献。首先，它通过对组织战略、薪酬政策和绩效的联合分析演示了评估应变模型的程序。其次，这项研究表明在“硬”客观指标方面测量补偿政策的一种做法，测量补偿政策，而不是在过去使用的研究中的典型感性数据。分析框架和假设补偿理论是一个战略权变理论（戈麦斯梅西亚和巴尔金，1992）。它的基本前提是和薪酬政策和商业战略影响企业绩效想匹配的（米尔科维奇，1988）。也就是说，高绩效企业采用的薪酬政策与战略，从战略上，一致表示薪酬政策的偏差会对组织绩效产生负面影响。这不是一个学术争论而已。主要的薪酬专家认为，其最重要的挑战是对齐薪酬制度和经营战略（戈麦斯梅西亚和巴尔金，1990;麦克纳利，1992）。为了测试这种应急看法，有必要建立补偿政策具有何种战略意义，组织如何分为主导战略类型，和支持各类型的竞争战略的各套补偿政策。薪酬政策的匹配与企业战略绩效的影响。本研究着重于重要的是高性能的企业因为适合一个特定的战略的薪酬政策将在高绩效的公司中最为明显。根据补偿理论的应变战略的角度来看，组织之间的战略和它的所有系统的良好匹配将导致优越的性能（戈麦斯梅西亚和巴尔金，1992）。也就是说，所有高绩效的组织应该有相互匹配的战略和薪酬政策。另一方面，不是所有的小绩效的组织将遭受战略和薪酬政策之间的不匹配。小性能可能是一个比其他补偿在战略和系统之间的匹配不佳的后果。基于这个原因，大部份的分析，报告探讨了在未来的薪酬政策与追求不同的经营策略的高绩效组织的区别。另一个策略研究还关注着高绩效组织的在他们的样本的子集（托马斯，拉马斯瓦米里曲特1991年，凡客吉门，1990）。领先的战略补偿学者提出了一个组织的绩效会受到当薪酬政策时将会偏离完全适合的组织战略的这些政策（戈麦斯梅西亚和巴尔金，1992）。此外，在研究匹配策略和组织系统性能的影响时战略学者建议利用多种途径（凡客吉门，1990）。由于这些原因，这项研究还包括相关战略上指出薪酬政策及组织绩效之间的偏差。由于公司业绩除了赔偿还取决于许多因素，预计这种偏差将会与绩效有一个消极的相关性，虽然相关性不是很大。尽管如此，从战略指出薪酬政策与性能相关找出偏差将提供额外的支持应急查看在战略补偿理论中。补偿政策与战略意义这项研究认为，薪酬政策的五个战略性薪酬理论经常提到的几个方面：（1）赔偿理念；（2）外部竞争力；（3）激励基组合;（4）个人（优异）增加工资;（5）薪酬管理。补偿哲学。本研究针对重要性方面的组织支付哲学分配到三个目标种：（a）劳动成本控制，（b）雇员的吸引力和忠诚度，（c）员工的积极性。赔偿制度通过其在这三个区这代表了传统的薪酬政策设计目标的影响具有战略影响。正如前面解释，一个组织的业务战略将决定这三种目标的相对重要性。此外，支持不同的目标的薪酬政策，可能互相冲突。因此，战略赔偿需要一种基于这些目标的重要性提供具体的方向和目的的薪酬政策的哲学（劳勒，1991）。对外竞争力。这一政策领域是指一个组织的薪酬水平提供了相对于其竞争对手。它在吸引/保留和劳动力成本的目标时有重要的影响。薪酬水平越高，组织能力越强才会获得合格的劳动力。显然，提高薪酬水平将会提高总劳动成本。不过，提高薪酬水平可能导致提高单位劳动力成本。劳动经济学的一个新兴的看法，被称为效率工资理论，争辩支付高于市场水平，可以促进员工的积极性，将抵消劳动成本的增加（霍尔泽，1990）。混合激励。这项政策涉及到与激励（变量）和相应的区别（固定）工资，它具有战略意义。增加的那部分工资已被作为一种提倡员工奖励挂钩和经营业绩的有效的机制（例如见米切尔，卢因和劳勒，1991）。除了一个合适的目标明确的动机，高激励对基本工资的比例使一些劳动力成本变量并可能有助于吸引和留住勤劳的工人和敢冒险的员工。个人（优异奖）加薪。政策处理个人基本工资的增加对员工有直接影响，并且具有战略意义（米尔科维奇，布罗德里克，1991）。绩效工资，一个饱受争议的政策，为个人缴纳的增加的决定代表了最流行的系统。调查发现，百分之80的私营机构的雇主，大多数州政府，和约一半的地方政府有绩效工资计划（贺娜蒙，1992年）。组织不同的政策