世界政治经济课英文部分

WorldPoliticsandEconomy&

InternationalRelations

Professor:ChengZaoxia

导论正确认识世界政治经济与国际关系的发展规律

一、威斯特伐里亚体系

二、维也纳体系

三、凡尔赛-华盛顿体系的建立

四、雅尔塔体系

五、THEU.S.ROLEINTHEWORLD:INDISPENSABLELEADEROF

HEGEMON?

五、THEU.S.ROLEINTHEWORLD:INDISPENSABLELEADEROF

HEGEMON?

Summary

Intheearly1990s,manyfriendsandalliesoftheUnitedStatesworriedthatthe

UnitedStateswasturninginward.Inrecentyears,however,internationalconcernhas

focusedmoreonwhatisperceivedasunilateralistor"hegemonic"U.S.international

behavior.TheexpressionsofalarmfrommanyU.S.friendsandallieshavebeen

echoedprominentlybylesssympatheticpowersandleaders.Somemajorpowers,

includingRussiaandChina,haveovertimetriedtoreducewhattheyseeasexcessive

U.S.influenceonissuesaffectingtheirinterests.OnemajorU.S.ally,France,has

traditionallysoughttolimitU.S.influenceonitspolicies.PresidentClintonhas

claimedthattheUnitedStatesisthe"indispensablepower*'intheinternationalsystem

butwishestoshareleadershipburdensandresponsibilitieswithothers.However,

someU.S.actionshaveprovidedammunitionforthosewhoclaimthattheUnited

Statesisactinglikeahegemonicpower.Theseargumentsandperceptionscould

increasinglyunderminetheU.S.abilitytoachieveitsforeignpolicyobjectives.

TheU.S.RoleintheWorld

SincetheColdWarended,therehasbeenanongoingelitedebateabouttherole

theUnitedStatesshouldplayinaninternationalsystemthatisnolongerdominated

bythebi-polarconfrontationoftwoalliancesystemsledbytheUnitedStatesandthe

SovietUnion.Thatdiscussionmaynothaveproducedanyclearconsensus,buta

definitionoftheU.S.roleperhapscanbeseenasemerginginU.S.foreignpolicy

choices.PresidentGeorgeBush(1989-1993),wholedtheUnitedStatesthroughthe

initialyearsofadjustmenttoaworldindramatictransition,clearlybelievedthatthe

UnitedStateswasrequiredtoplayastronginternationalleadershiprole.Someofhis

advisersapparentlythoughttheUnitedStatesshoulduseitspositionasthesole

superpowertodiscouragechallengestothatposition,evenamongcurrentallies.

PresidentBushnonethelessacceptedtheimportanceofbuildingconsensusinthe

UnitedNationsandconstructingcoalitionstodealwithinternationalchallenges(both

illustratedbyhisorchestrationoftheresponsetoIraq*sinvasionofKuwait).His

stronginterestinforeignaffairsbecameapoliticalliabilityinthe1992elections,

whenmanyAmericansapparentlythoughthisapproachwasnotsufficiently

responsivetoU.S.domesticproblems.

Inthefirstyearofhispresidency(1993),BillClintonandhisforeignpolicy

advisersexperimentedwithanumberofdifferentapproachestoU.S.foreignpolicy.

PresidentClintonsoughttoconverthissuccessfulcampaignslogan,"Itstheeconomy,

stupid,'*intoapillarofU.S.foreignpolicy.Inpartasaconsequenceofthisphilosophy,

someClintonAdministrationofficialsarguedthatAsia(ratherthanEurope)shouldbe

thecentralfocusofU.S.foreignpolicybecauseoftheopportunitiespresentedby

growingAsianmarkets.Bytheendof1993,however,theAdministrationhadmoved

toapostureemphasizingcontinuingU.S.political,economic,andstrategicinterests

inAsiaandEurope.FormostofPresidentClinton'sfirstterm,manyobserverssaw

theAdministrationasshiftingbetweenactiveinternationalismandforeignpolicy

reticence.But,campaigningin1996forasecondterminoffice,PresidentClinton

arguedthattheUnitedStateswastheworld's"indispensablepower,*'suggestingthat

theinternationalsystemrequiredtheactiveinvolvementoftheUnitedStatesto

functioneffectively.ClintonmaintainedthatsuchactivismwasintheU.S.interest.

Throughoutthisperiod,debateoverU.S.foreignpolicyamongexpertsand

editorialistsincludedthosewhoarguedforamorerestrictedU.S.worldrole,and

thosewhocalledfortheUnitedStatestotaketheadvantageofitspositionasthesole

survivingsuperpower.PublicopinionpollssuggestthattheAmericanpeoplereject

bothoptions,andinfactfavoranengagedU.S.worldrolebasedonsharing

internationalburdensandresponsibilitieswithothernations*ForeignPerceptions

AtthestartoftheClintonAdministration,manytraditionalU.S.alliesfearedthatthe

endoftheColdWar,withallitsbenefits,mightbringwithitwhattheyviewedasthe

undesirableconsequenceofaU.S.returntoisolationism.Europeanalliesalsoworried

theUnitedStatesmightshiftthefocusofitsforeignpolicytowardAsia.Those

concernswereheightenedbytheClintonAdministration'sinitial"tilt"towardAsia

(1993),theU.S.reactiontothepeacekeepingdisasterinSomalia(1993),U.S.

reluctancetobecomedeeplyinvolvedintheconflictinformerYugoslavia

(1991-1994),andanemergingtendencytoward^self-deterrence,'*inwhichtheUnited

Statesappearedtobelessandlessinclinedtorisktheuseofmilitaryforceonbehalf

ofinternationalstability."

Inrecentyears,thatconcernaboutincipientU.S.isolationismhasdiminished.

Infact,astheUnitedStatestookchargeofthepeaceprocessinBosniain1995and

beganmoreactivelytoexertitsinfluenceinotherways,friendsandalliesbecame

increasinglyconcernedaboutaU.S.tendencytowardexcessiveunilateralism.Critics

offeredasevidenceofthisgrowingtendency:

@U.S.legislation(theHelms-BurtonAct)seekingtoimposesanctionson

non-U.S.firmsdoingbusinesswithCuba;

@CongressionalinsistenceonspecificreformoftheUnitedNationsbefore

appropriationofmoniestopayU.S.arrearstotheorganization;

@U.S.insistenceonmaintaininghard-linesanctionspoliciestowardIran,Iraq

andLibya;

@U.S.refusaltogiveupNATO'sSouthernCommandtoaEuropeanofficer,a

conditionsoughtbyFrenchPresidentJacquesChiracasapreconditionforreturning

toNATO'sintegratedcommandstructure;

@TheClintonAdministration'sapproachtothe(June1997)Denvereconomic

summit,seenbysomesummitparticipantsas"inyourface"braggingaboutthe

successoftheU.S.economicmodel;

@ClintonAdministrationinsistenceonlimitingthefirstgroupofcandidatesfor

NATOmembershiptothreewhenmanyotheralliessupportedoneortwo

additionalcandidates;

@U.S.refusaltosignthetreatybanninganti-personnellandmines;

@U.S.approachestotheglobalclimateconference,seenbysomeasdesignedto

protectU.S.economicadvantagesoverothernations;and

@U.S.proposalsin1998thatNATOshouldbeabletouseforceevenwhenitis

notpossibletoobtainamandatefromtheUNsecuritycouncil.

Latein1996,variousobserversinEuropeandelsewherebegansuggestingthat

theUnitedStateswasactinglikeaclassic,overbearinghegemonicpower,usingits

positionofsupremacyintheinternationalsystemtohaveitswayattheexpenseofthe

interestsandpreferencesofotherpowers.Someofthecriticismcamefromtraditional

andpredictablesources.TheRussianscomplainedthattheUnitedStateswasusingits

positiontoenlargetheNATOalliance.TheChinesecontinuedtheiradvocacyofa

"multipolar"worldandcriticismofU.S.hegemony.

TheUnitedStatesInformationAgency(USIA)concludedthatsomeforeignanalysts

werebecoming"almostparanoidaboutallegedU.S.intentionsintheworld/

includingcommentatorsfromRussiaandChina.AccordingtoUSIA'smediaanalysis,

"Theysawan'imperial'Americabentonarelentlesshegemonicdriveandpredicted

direconsequencesfortheworld.Beijing'sofficialChinaDailyheldthattheU.S.

constantly'ignores1othercountries'sovereigntyandusesitspowertodirectanother

countrytodowhatever(theU.S.)wantsittodo.'nInApril1997,RussianPresident

BorisYeltsinandChineseleaderJiangZemin,meetinginMoscow,agreedona

"strategicpartnership"againstthosewhowould"pushtheworldtowardaunipolar

order."LeadersfromtwostatescurrentlysufferingfromU.S.-ledsanctions,Cuba

andIraq,haveemphasizedthehegemonytheme,apparentlytryingtoplayon

divisionstheyperceiveddevelopingbetweentheUnitedStatesanditsalliesregarding

U.S.foreignpolicyleadership.Cuba'sFidelCastro,inhisopeningspeechtothe

Ibero-AmericansummitinVenezuelainNovember1997warnedthattheworldis

being"ledbya...crushingandbrutalglobalismunderthesponsorshipofthemost

powerfulandselfishworldpowerinhistory."Withinafewdays,IraqiDeputyPrime

MinisterTariqAzizwasbeatingtheU.S.hegemonydrumattheUnitedNations.

ArguingforarelaxationofinternationalsanctionsimposedatU.S.initiative,Aziz

claimedtheUnitedNationsSpecialCommissionwas''dominatedbytheAmericans

whoareimplementingthepolicyoftheirgovernment"andthattheultimate"end

users"ofinformationgainedbyweaponsinspectorsinIraqwerethePentagon,the

CIA,andtheU.S.StateDepartment.

Overthecourseof1997and1998,commentariesinnewspapersacrossEurope,

Asia,AfricaandLatinAmericapickedupthetheme.Perhapsmostserious,however,

isthedegreetowhichthecritiquehasemanatedfromfriendlynationsandallied

governments,onwhosecooperationtheUnitedStatescountsinawiderangeofissues.

Inthepastyear,officialsofseveralfriendlygovernments,whileabstainingfromuse

ofwordslike"hegemony,”havenonethelessprivatelyexpressedtheirconcernabout

agrowingU.S.tendencytowardunilateralbehavior.*MostU.S.alliesinEuropeand

elsewherebroadlysympathizewiththeobjectivesofU.S.foreignpolicybut

occasionallydifferonspecificpoliciesandseetheUnitedStatesasinsufficiently

sensitivetotheirinterestsanddomesticpoliticalrequirements.

AmongU.S.allies,onlyFrancewaswillingpubliclytoassociateitselfwith

theRussianandChinesecritiquesofU.S.power.EversinceFrenchPresidentCharles

deGaulleidentifiedAmericanpowerasathreattoFrenchsovereignty,French

policieshavebeeninfluencedbytheconcernthatFrance'sroleintheworldwould

becircumscribedbyAmericanleadership.Duringthefirsthalfof1997,asFrance

approachedparliamentaryelections,leadingmembersoftheoppositionSocialist

PartywarnedthatPresidentChirac'sattempttonegotiateareturntoNATO's

integratedcommandstructurethreatenedFrance*sindependenceandputFrancein

dangerofsuccumbingtoU.S.hegemony.OncetheSocialistsandtheiralliesonthe

leftcametopowerfollowingtheirelectoralvictoryinJune1997,theyreignedintheir

criticismandmoderatedtheirvocabulary,butstillwouldliketocircumscribeU.S.

influence.Forexample.SocialistchairmanofthedefensecommitteeinFrance's

NationalAssembly,PaulQuiles,warnedinDecember1998thattheNATO50th

anniversarysummitinWashingtoninApril1999shouldnot"setthesealonthe

UnitedStates1hegemonyoverthealliance.

PresidentChirachasonseveraloccasionsformallyalignedFrancewiththe

hegemonycritique.InMay1997,PresidentChiracjoinedtheChineseina

communiqueattheendofhisstatevisittoBeijingpraisingthevirtuesofa

"multipolarworld*1-criticismofU.S.hegemony.InJune1997,attheNATOsummit

meetinginMadrid,PresidentChirac,havingfailedtowinacceptanceofRomaniaand

SloveniaascandidatesforNATOmembership,reactedbydeclaringthatFrance

wouldnothelppayfortheAmericanpolicygoalofNATOenlargement.WhenMr.

ChiracvisitedMoscowinOctober,FrenchcommentatorsnotedthatMr.Chiracfailed

todisputeRussianPresidentYeltsin*sviewofaEuropeorganizedbetweenRussia,

FranceandothermembersoftheEuropeanUnion(recallingalltooclearlyoldSoviet

proposalsfora"Europeanhouse”excludingtheUnitedStates).

第二讲战后世界经济的迅猛发展

一、战后世界经济的迅速发展

1国际贸易带动世界经济大发展

2跨国公司成为世界经济发展的主要组织者,是“无国界经济”

发展的主要推动力

3布雷顿森林会议的召开成立国际经济关系中的三大支柱组织

二、世界经济格局的演变

1.美国二战后世界经济霸主地位的确立

2,苏联东欧国家建立“经互会”

3,世界经济格局的多元化发展

三、世界经济发展的新趋势--经济全球化

四、WestGermany:EconomicGrowthandPoliticalStability

四、WestGermany:EconomicGrowthandPoliticalStability

欧洲是资本主义的发源地，也是工业革命的中心。资本主义在欧洲的发展，给这块古老

的大陆带来了财富和权力，但同时也引发了争夺这些财富和权力的冲突与战争。欧洲列强发

动并卷入的第一次世界大战，正在无情地摧毁着人类所创造的工业文明。欧洲资本主义的旧

体制，面临着来自多方面的冲击和挑战。国际上，俄国十月革命的胜利，产生了极为深远的

影响;在国内，战争所带来的痛苦和创伤，使社会矛盾和阶级矛盾日益尖锐。这些都为欧洲

各国无产阶级向I日世界发起猛烈冲击提供了有利条件。

［德国十一月革命］1918年10月，德国由于战败引发了1场民众自发的社会革命——基

尔水兵起义。德国革命首先在汉堡、莱比锡、科隆、汉诺威和慕尼黑等工业城市展开，并取

得成功，但首都柏林仍控制在旧政权手中。11月9日，柏林几十万工人和士兵举行总罢工，

并立即转为武装起义。帝国议会、市政厅、警察局和电报总局等战略要地很快被起义工人和

士兵占领，德里威廉二世被迫退位，逃往荷兰，结束了霍亨索伦王朝的反动统治。留守的马

克斯首相宣布辞职，并把政权移交给右派社会民主党领袖艾伯特。艾伯特接任首相后，与独

立社会民主党共同组成了联合政府-人民全权代表委员会。

联合政府为了取得各地起义工人和士兵的支持，采取了虚伪的欺骗手段：一方面公开通

过《告劳动人民书况宣布德国为社会主义共和国，政权属于工兵代表苏维埃;另一方面又继

续维持垄断资产阶级和容克地主的统治，保留旧的国家机器，特别是秘密达成了与帝国旧陆

军的交易，用不触动旧军队指挥体系和军官职务为条件，换取了军队对新政权的支持。

1919年1月8日，联合政府对刚刚建立的德国共产党及其领导下的工人组织进行了血

腥镇压，100多名参加柏林十一月起义的工人惨遭杀害,700多名工人被捕;1月15日，卡尔季

卜克内西和罗莎•卢森堡被捕遇害。艾伯特政府在镇压了柏林工人起义后，又对巴伐利亚州

首府慕尼黑的苏维埃政权进行了武装镇压。5月1日，在反革命武装的进攻下，巴伐利亚苏

维埃共和国被扼杀，列威莱等几百名共产党人和革命群众惨遭杀害，这标志着德国十一月革

命的终结。

在镇压柏林工人起义的白色恐怖中，艾伯特政府组织了国民议会选举。2月6日，新国

民议会在图林根的魏玛开幕，这一方面是为了避开柏林镇压工人和共产党员的血迹，另一方

面也是为了把世界舆论中的新德国与德国民族文化的象征,如歌德和席勒联系在一起。会上,

艾伯特当选为共和国第一任总统，谢德曼为第一任总理。7月31日，国民议会在魏玛通过

了共和国宪法，并于8月11日生效，史称“魏玛宪法”。它标志着德国由容克-资产阶级的

帝国转变为资产阶级-容克共和国，打击了容克保守势力，提高了资产阶级民主派的地位，

使人民享受到了某些资产阶级民主权利。这在德国历史上是1个进步，具有积极意义。

Noonecouldhaveforeseentheremarkabletransformationundergonebya

defeatedGermanyinjustonedecade.TwoGermanieshademergedbythe1950s,

militaryalliesoftheirformerenemies,Russia,Britain,theUnitedStatesandFrance.

GermansintheWestwerenolongertreatedwithcontemptandcondescensionbut

wereadmiredforthedisciplineandhardworkthathadrestoredtheirprosperity.Not

thatbothhalvesofGermanyprosperedequally.Thefree-marketeconomyinthe

Westernpartproveditselftobefarmoreefficientintheproductionofwealththanthe

state-plannedeconomyoftheEasternthird.TheDemocraticRepublicwasatruncated

state:theformerGermanagriculturalandindustrialterritorieseastoftheOder-Neisse

hadbeenlosttoPolandandtheSovietUnion.In1945some17millionGermanslived

intheSovietzone,thelaterDemocraticRepublic,andnearly44millioninthe

Westernzones.Twentyyearslater,togetherwiththeirrespectivepartsofBerlin,the

preponderanceofWestGermanyoverEasthadbecomeevengreater;almost60

millionwerelivingintheFederalRepublicandWestBerlin,and17millioninthe

DDRincludingEastBerlin.ThetwoGermaniesprovidedsomethinglikeatestofthe

relativeefficiencyoftheWesterneconomiesandthecommandeconomiesoftheEast,

giventhatbothofthesenewstateswerestartingfrommuchthesamebasein

1945-Theresultswerelittleshortofastonishing.Progresswascertainlymadeinthe

East,butthedisparityinwealth,letalonelibertyandqualityoflife,betweenthe

countriesgrewwitheverypassingyear.JusthowbackwardtheDDRhadbecomewas

hiddenfromtheWestuntilthecollapseoftheEastGermanstatein1990.

BeforetheBerlinWallwasbuiltin1961millionshadwalkedtothefreedomof

theWest.Theytendedtobeyoung,moreactiveandmoreenterprising.Withbarbed

wire,controltowersandorderstoshoot,theEastGermanregimesurvivedalmost

anotherthreedecades.ItispossiblethatwithoutthefortifiedbarrierbetweenEastand

WesttheDDRwouldhavecollapsedmanyyearsbeforefromahaemorrhageofits

activepopulationseekingabetterlifeintheWest.

ThetransitiontoparliamentarydemocracyintheWestseemedsmooth,thepath

almosttooeasy.ButthewidespreadfeelingthattheGermanpeopleasawholewere

guiltyofallowingtheNaziexcesses,reinforcedbypunitivere-educationand

denazification,didnotprovidefirmfoundationsonwhichtowinheartsandmindsfor

democracyandcivilliberty.IntheearlyyearsofoccupationtheAlliedauthoritiesstill

hadmuchsuspicionofGermangrass-rootsrevanchism.Atleastonegenerationhadto

passbeforesupportforthedemocraticinstitutionsoftheFederalRepublicbecame

somethingmorethanopportunismforthemajorityandturnedintoaconvictionthat

democraticvalueswereworthdefending,ifnecessaryatpersonalcost.Theconcerns

oftheadultpopulationintheimmediatepost-waryearswerenecessarilymaterialistic:

toputtogetherthebarenecessitiesforfamilylifeandafterthattogainashareofthe

goodthings-ahome,furniture,enoughtoeat,arefrigerator,acar.

TheGermanswerealsoaskedinthe1950stohelpdefendtheWest.Thesudden

changeinAlliedattitudesontheissueofGermanrearmamentwasnotuniversally

popular,sinceonlyafewyearsbeforeGermanmilitarismhadbeencondemnedasthe

rootofallevil.ButtheSecondWorldWarhadbroughtaboutagreatchangein

Germanthinking:ifathirdworldwarbrokeout,itwouldbefoughtinGermany,and

everyoneunderstoodthatitwouldtotallydestroythecountry.Militarismwasdead.

Indeed,inthe1950s,astrongextra-parliamentarymovementopposedtorearmament

madeitselffelt-thefirstpost-warstirringsofgrass-rootspoliticalinvolvementonan

importantissue.

TheweaknessesandfailuresoftheWeimarRepublic,whichhadpavedtheway

forNationalSocialismandtheendofliberty,servedaslessonswhichwerewell

absorbedinthedraftingofanewconstitution.TheFederalGermanRepublicinany

casehadabetterstartthanWeimar,becauseitsbirthinMay1949didnotcoincide

withthehourofdefeat,ashadthatoftheWeimarRepublic.Instead,itwastheAllies

andtheiroccupationpoliciesthatwereblamedforthehardshipoftheearlyyears.The

evolutionofafullysovereignparliamentarydemocraticstatewasagradualonethat

wasnotcompleteduntilsixyearslaterin1955.Politicalparties,assembliesand

administrationshadbeensetupintenLander(regionalterritories),thoughWest

BerlinwasnotincludedintheFederalRepublic.Inthespringof1948,France,Britain

andtheUnitedStateshadagreedtotheformationofacentralGermangovernmentfor

theWesternzones,butultimatepowersstillremainedinthehandsofthethreeAllied

governments.Theminister-presidentsoftheLanderwereinvitedtocallaconstituent

assemblytodraftaconstitution.Buttheminister-presidents,fearingthatthiswould

makethedivisionofGermanypermanent,wouldagreeonlytocalla'council'andto

drafta'basiclaw；thusemphasisingthetransitionalnatureofwhattheyweredoing:

Germanywouldnothaveaconstitutionuntilitwasreunited.Thetwomajorparties,

theSPDandtheCDU/CSU,sentthesamenumberofdelegatestotheparliamentary

council;Adenauerbyastutemanagementsecuredthepresidency,soestablishingan

ascendancyinGermanpoliticsthatwastolastforfifteenyears.

GiventhebitterpersonalrelationsandconflictsbetweentheSPDandthe

CDU/CSU,nottomentionthedeepdivisionswithinthepartiesthemselvesoverthe

extentoffederalpowers,overregionalself-government,overvotingproceduresand

overahostofotherpracticalquestions,theframingofanagreedbasiclawwasa

remarkableachievement.Behindallthesequestionsalwayslayassessmentsofhow

eventuallycompletesovereigntycouldbeachievedandhowreunificationcouldbe

broughtabout.Reunificationwasstillthegoal;itappearedunthinkablethenthat

Germanywouldremaindividedforlong.

TheBasicLaw,orWestGermanconstitution,stoodthetestoftimeandbythe

1980shadlostitsprovisionalappearancejustwhenitindeedturnedouttobe

provisional.TheweaknessesofWeimarwereconsciouslyavoided:votingwasbya

combinationofproportionalrepresentation(withcandidatesdrawnfrompartylistsin

eachoftheLander)andconstituencyrepresentationbysimplemajority;abarrierwas

createdontheLanderlist,sothatnopartywithlessthan5percentofthevoteinthe

FederalRepubliccouldwinaseatintheparliament,theBundestag(although,ifthree

seatswerewonindirectconstituencyelectionsinoneLand,the5percentrulewas

setaside).Presidentialpowerswerelessextensivethanthoseheldbythepresidentsof

theWeimarRepublic.TheChancellorbecamethemostpowerfulmemberofthe

executive;heandhisgovernmentcouldgainofficeonlyifheenjoyedthesupportofa

parliamentarymajority.Butavoteagainsthimbyamajoritywouldbringabouthis

fallonlyiftheBundestagcouldagreebymajorityonasuccess。匚Therationalefor

this'constructivevoteofnoconfidence1wastopreventarepetitionoftheextinction

ofWeimar,broughtaboutbythecombinationoftwoanti-democraticparties,the

NationalSocialistsandthecommunists.Theconstitutioncouldbechangedonlybya

two-thirdsmajorityandwasbuttressedbynineteenarticlesdefininginviolable

fundamentalrights;aconstitutionalcourtwassetuptodecideclaimsthatthe

constitutionwasnotbeingobserved.LegislationbytheelectedBundestagcouldbe

delayedbytheBundesrat,asecondchambertowhichtheLandersentrepresentatives

andwhosepurposeistoscrutiniselegislationwhichaffectsparticularlytheLander.

Theconstitutionisalongandcomplexdocumentandonlyitssalientfeaturesare

heredescribed.Asawrittenconstitutionembodyingindividualrightsanda

constitutionalcourttoenforcethem,itprovidessafeguardsagainsttheirabuseby

simplepartymajoritiesintheparliamentaryassembly.Thestrongelementof

proportionalrepresentationallowsavoicefortheviewsofthosewhodonotwishto

choosebetweenthetwomassparties.The5percentrulepreventstheproliferationof

smallpartieswhichdestabilisedWeimarandhasunderminedgovernmentsinItaly;on

theotherhand,proportionalrepresentationcanallowtoomuchinfluencetoaminority.

Inmostyearssince1949,thetwomajorpartiescouldgainamajorityonlywiththe

helpofathirdparty,theFreeDemocraticParty,whichcouldbargainwitheitherin

ordertogainitsobjectivesandswitchsupportaccordingly.Noconstitutionisperfect;

itssuccessdependsonthepoliticiansandthepartieswhobringittolife,andonthe

attitudeoftheelectoratetowardsthegovernmentandtheinstitutionsestablished

underit.TheFederalRepublichasenjoyedgreatstabilityingoodtimesand,more

importantly,inbad.TheconstitutionorBasicLawhasserveditwell.But,if

democracyistobecomeanintegralpartofanation'slife,itrequiresmorethanjust

therightinstitutions:therehastobeasenseoffairnessandproprietyamongopposing

partiesandamongopposingindividuals,arecognitionofagreaterwhole.Thedangers

posedbyarevivalofracismarebetterunderstoodinGermanythanelsewhere.

TheGermansocialistparty(SPD)wasdiemostcoherentandbest-organised

masspartytoputitselfbeforetheelectoratewhenthefirstBundestagelectionswere

heldin1949.Despiteatendencytostrongcentralleadership,localanddistrict

organisationsduringthesubsequentfourdecadesactedasgingergroupsandattimes

stoodwelltotheleftofthepartyleadership.Thisbecameespeciallytrueoftheyoung

socialistsaftertherevoltofyouthinthe1960s.Aserioushandicapforthepartywas

theseparationfromtheFederalRepublicofBerlinandtheSovietzone,whichhad

traditionallybeenthestrongholdoftheSocialDemocraticParty.Theirleaderin1949

wasKurtSchumacher,passionateandautocraticinstyle,buthissufferingin

concentrationcampshadunderminedhishealth,andhediedinAugust1952,only

threeyearsaftertheelections.Hestoodforaclear,uncompromisingpolicyinboth

domesticandinternationalaffairs.Hisoppositiontocommunismwastotalandhe

ensuredthattheWesternSPDwouldhavenotruckwiththecommunists.

Schumachefssocialismhaditsbasisinethics:hisappealwasamoralone,forthe

bettermentofdiemajority,ofthepoorersectionsofsociety,foranendtothe

exploitationbycapitaloflabour,ofworkingpeople.Butthepartystressedthat

socialismwithoutdemocracywouldonlyleadbacktothedarkyearsofHitlefs

totalitarianismortoSoviettyranny.TheBritishLabourPartyhaddemonstratedsince

1945thatstatecontrolofleadingindustries,especiallycoalandsteel,andthe

breakingupoflargeestateswerenotincompatiblewithdemocracyandarespectfor

civilliberty.Twootherplanksinthepartyprogrammewereimportant:astrong

anti-clericalism,whichcondemnedinterferencebytheChurchinpoliticsand

education,andaninsistenceondierecoveryofnationalindependenceforallof

Germany,notjustfordieWesternzones.TheSocialDemocratsdidnotwanttobe

identifiedwiththe'Novembercriminals,whohadbeenaccusedin1919ofactingas

thestoogesofthevictoriousAllies.ThistimetheSPDwouldbeseenasdiepatriotic

party.ThisstanceledtothemostbitterclasheswiththegoverningChristian

Democrats.

TheChristianDemocratswerelesscoherentdiantheSocialDemocrats,evento

dieextentofavoidingthelabel'party1andcallingdiemselvesa'movement'(union).

TheytoosetouttolearndielessonsoftheHitleryears.Politicsshouldbeanchoredin

ethicalvalues,notvaguelybutspecificallyinChristianethics.YettheChristian

DemocratswouldnotbecomeanarrowCatholicparty.Fromitsfoundation

ProtestantsparticipatedwithCadiolicsinitsorganisation.ChristianDemocratsalso

championedparliamentarydemocracyandsawincommunismtheprincipalthreatto

civillibertiesintheWest.Theywerefiercelyanti-Marxist,vociferousintheir

oppositiontoclasswarfareandstateownershipofproduction.TheRhinelandCDU,

widiitsstrongindustrialRuhrbase,wasoverwhelminglyCatholicandledsuccessful

effortstoalignthepartywithpolicieslimitingtheexclusionofworkersfromdie

exerciseofpoweranditsconcentrationindiehandsofindustrialists.Worker

participationinindustrialmanagementbecameoneofdieplanksoftheCDUinthe

1950sandsoattractedsupportfrom