股权激励外文文献

TheDiffusionofEquity nsinItalianListedPaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo-Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations(e.g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;CheffinsandThomas,2004;Zattoni,2007).IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remuneration passesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort-termpayhas emoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown.Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong-term goalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong-termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptnsinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;2005).Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentivensseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarket internationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw-orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(CheffinsandThomas,2004).Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,”characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e.g.,Cheffins,2003;CheffinsandIronically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentivens(CheffinsandThomas,2004).CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages.The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank-and-fileworkers.Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhas eahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Stockoptionnshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal.,2002;BebchukandFried,2006).Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentivens,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingnsoutsidetheUSandtheUK.ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentivensintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries.Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.Ourgoalistocomparetheexnatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentivens:1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal.,2002);and3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatescompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costTothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentivenssincetheendofthe’90s.Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i.e.,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentivensadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of-meansstatisticaltechniquestoyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat:1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;2)thesensarenotextensivelyusedtoextract althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;and3)ns’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentofthelitureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewernancepractices.Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentivenshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextract valueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentivenstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling.Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatnswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation.Ontheotherhand,thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals.Theseresultssupportasymboliconcorporateernance,accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentivenspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofernancepractices. ernanceinItalianListedItaliancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder(Zattoni,1999).Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceonernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt(Bianchi,BiancoandEnriques,2001).Institutionalinvestorsusuallyyamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks,andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism.Finally,thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped,andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent(Bianco,2001).Inshort,theItalianernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”(Melis,2000:Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders’generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance(Melis,2000).Further,somestudiespublishedinthe’90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders.Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties(Melis,1999;2000;Molteni,1997).Consistentwiththispicture,fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers’remuneration,andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong goalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(Melis,1999).EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthe atmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange.Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionnsinthetruesenseoftheterm.Eveninthiscase,however,directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance(Melis,1999).TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalTheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade,creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentivens.Themainregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodernance,theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentivens,andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw(Zattoni,2006).Concerningthenationallawandregulations,somereformsinthecommerciallaw(1998,2003,and2005)andtheintroduction(1999)andupdate(2002)ofthenationalcodeofgoodernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporateernanceoflistedcompanies(Zattoni,2006).FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism(BianchiandEnriques,2005).Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodernancecontributedtotheimprovementofernancepracticesattheboardlevel.ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectonernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,althoughtheycontributedtoimprove,slowlyandwithsomedelay,ernancestandards(Zattoni,Beyondtheevolutionofernancepractices,somechangesintheinstitutionalenvironmentdirectlyaffectedthediffusionandthecharacteristicsofequityincentivens.BoththewhitepaperoftheMinistryoftheIndustryandForeignCommerceandthecodeofgoodernanceissuedbythenationalStockExchangeinvitedcompaniestoimplementequityincentivensinordertodevelopavaluecreationcultureinItaliancompanies.Furthermore,in1997fiscalregulationswereenactedallowingataxexemptiononthesharesreceivedthroughanequityincentiven.Accordingtothenewregulation,whichtookeffectonJanuary1,1998,issuanceofnewstockstoemployeesbyanemployeroranother belongingtothesamegroupdidnotrepresentcompensationinkindfor etaxpurposes(Autuori2001).Inthefollowingyears,theevolutionoftaxrulesreducedthegenerousbenefitsassociatedwiththeuseofequityincentivens,butalsothenewrulestofavorthedisseminationofthesens.Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalcontext,equityincentivebecamewidelydiffusedamongItalianlistedcompaniesattheendofthe’90s(Zattoni,2006).Ironically,thediffusionoftheseinstruments–inItalyandinothersuchasGermany(Bernhardt,1999),Spain(AlvarezPerezandNeiraFona,2005),andJapan(Nagaoka,2005)–tookcewhentheywerestronglydebatedintheUSfortheirunpredictedconsequencesandthemalpracticesassociatedwiththeiruse(Bebchuketal.,2002).TheRationalesExiningtheAdoptionofEquityIncentiveEquityincentivensareamaincomponentofexecutivecompensationinUS.Theiruseismostlyfoundedontheargumentthattheygivemanagersanincentivetoactintheshareholders’interestsbyprovidingadirectlinkbetweentheircompensationandfirmstock-priceperformance(JensenandMurphy,1990).Beyondthat,equityincentivensalsohaveotherpositivefeatures,astheymaycontributetotheattractionandretentionofhighlymotivatedemployees,encouragebeneficiariestotakerisks,andreducedirectcashexpensesforexecutivecompensation(HallandMurphy,2003).Despitealltheirpositivefeatures,theuseofequityincentivensisincreasinglydebatedintheUS.Inparticular,criticsquestiontheirpresumedeffectivenessinguaranteeingthealignmentofexecutives’andshareholders’interests.Theypointoutthattheseinstrumentsmaybeadoptedtofulfillotherobjectives,suchastoextractvalueatshareholdersexpenses(e.g.,BebchukandFried,2006),oreventoachievea(realorperceived)reductionincompensationcosts(e.g.,Murphy,2002).Insummary,theactualdebateindicatesthatthreedifferentrationalesmayexinthedisseminationandthespecificfeaturesofequityincentivens:1)theoptimalcontractingview(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview(Bebchuketal.,2002);3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,Accordingtotheoptimalcontractingview,executivecompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweentopmanagers(agents)andshareholders(principals)(JensenandMeckling,1976).Theboardsofdirectorsareeffectiveernancemechanismsaimedatizingshareholdervalueandthetopmanagement’scompensationschemeisdesignedtoservethisobjective(FamaJensen,1983).Providingmanagerswithequityincentivensmaymitigatemanagerialself-interestbyaligningtheinterestsofmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMeckling,1976).Followingthealignmentrationale,equityincentivesmayimprovefirmperformance,asmanagersaresupposedtoworkfortheirownandshareholders’benefit(JensenandMurphy,1990).Inshort,theseinstrumentsaredesignedtoaligntheinterestsofmanagerswiththoseofshareholders,andtomotivatetheformertopursuethecreationofsharevalue(JensenandMurphy,1990).theprincipleofequityManagersandshareholdersisadelegateagencyrelationshipmanagersoperatinginassetsundermanagement,shareholdersentrusted.Butinfact,intheagencyrelationship,thecontractbetweentheasymmetricinformation,shareholdersandmanagersarenotcompleydependentonthemanager'smoralself-discipline.Thepursuitofthegoalsofshareholdersandmanagersisinconsistent.Shareholderswanttoizetheequityvalueofitsholdingsofmanagerswhowanttoizetheirownutility,sothe"moralhazard"existsbetweentheshareholdersandmanagers,throughincentiveandrestraintmechanismstoguideandlimitthebehaviorofInadifferentwayofincentives,wagesbasedonthemanager'squalificationconditionsand thetargetperformanceofapredeterminedrelativelystableinacertainperiodoftime,averycloserelationshipwiththe 'stargetperformance.Bonusesgenerallysuper-goalperformanceassessmenttodeterminethepartoftherevenuemanagerperformanceiscloselyrelatedwiththe short-termperformance,butwiththe 'slong-termvalueoftherelationshipisnotobvious,themanagerforshort-termfinancialindicatorsattheexpenseofthelong-terminterests.Butfromthepointofviewofshareholders'investment,hewasmoreconcernedwithlong-termincreaseinthevalueofthe.Especiallyforgrowth-orientedcompanies,thevalueofthemanager'smoretoreflecttheincreaseinthe 'slong-termvalue,ratherthanjustshort-termfinancialInordertomakethemanagersareconcernedabouttheinterestsofshareholdersneedtomakethepursuitoftheinterestsofmanagersandshareholdersasconsistentaspossible.Inthisregard,theequityincentiveisabettersolution.Bymakingthemanagerholdsanequityinterestinacertainperiodoftime,toenjoythevalue-addedbenefitsofequityriskinacertainway,andtoacertainextent,youcanmakemanagersmoreconcernedaboutthelong-termvalueofthe inthebusinessprocess.Equityincentiveincentiveandrestrainttopreventshort-termbehaviorofthemanager,toguideitslong-termbehavior.EquityIncentiveTheperformanceofReferstoamorereasonableperformancetargetsatthebeginningoftheyear,iftheincentiveobjecttotheendtoachievethedesiredgoal,the grantedacertainnumberofsharesortoextractarewardfundtobuy stock.Theflowofperformancesharesrealizedthatusuallyhavethetimeandnumberrestrictions.Anotherperformanceofthestockintheoperationandrolerelativetosimilarlong-termincentiveperformanceunitsandperformancestockdifferenceisthattheperformancesharesgrantedstock,performanceunitsgrantedcash.stockReferstoa therighttograntincentivetargetincentiveobjectcanpurchaseacertainamountoftheoutstandingsharesoftheatapredeterminedpricewithinaspecifiedperiodmaybewaivedthisright.Theexerciseofstockoptionshavethetimeandlimitthenumberofcashandtheneedtomotivatetheobjectsontheirownexpenditurefortheexercise.Someofourlistedcompaniesintheapplicationofvirtualstockoptionsareacombinationofphantomstockandstockoptions,thegrantedincentiveobjectisavirtualstockoptions,incentiveobjectsrights,phantomstock.virtualThatthe awardedtheincentivetargetavirtualstockincentiveobjectswhichenjoyacertainamountoftherighttodividendsandstockappreciationbutnotownership,withoutvotingrights,cannotbetransferredandsold,expireautomaticallywhenyouleavetheenterprise.stockappreciationMeanstheincentivetargetofarightgrantedtothe 'ssharepricerose,theincentiveobjectcanbeobtainedthroughtheexercisewiththecorrespondingnumberofstockappreciationgains,theincentiveobjectsdonothavetopaycashfortheexercise,exercise,getcashortheequivalentinsharesofcompanies.restrictedReferstothepriorgrantincentivetargetacertainnumberof shares,butthesourceofthestock,selling,etc.Therearesomespecialrestrictions,generallyonlywhentheincentiveobjectto plishaspecificgoal(eg,profitability),theincentivetargetinordertosellrestrictedstockandbenefitfromit.ThedeferredReferstoapackageofsalary endesignedtomotivateobject,whichpartoftheequityincentive e,equityincentive ewasissued,butaccordingtothefairmarketvalueofthe 'ssharestobeconvertedintothenumberofsharesafteracertainperiodoftime,theformof stockorwhenthestockmarketvalueincashpaidtotheincentivetarget.theoperator/employee-Meanstheincentivetargettoholdacertainnumberofthe 'sstock,thestockisagiftincentivetarget,orobjectof subsidyincentivestobuy,orincentivetargetisself-financedthepurchase.Incentiveobjectscanbenefitfromappreciationinthestocklossesinthedevaluationofthestock.Management/employeeMeanstoleveragefinancingtothe 'smanagementorallemployeestopurchasesharesofthe,to eshareholdersoftheandothershareholdersofriskandprofitsharing,tochangethe 'sownershipstructure,controloverthestructureandassetstructure,toachieveownershipbusiness.ThebookvalueappreciationDividedintospecificbuyandvirtualtwo.Purchasetypereferstothetargetinthebeginningoftheperiodpersharenetassetvalueoftheactualpurchaseofacertainnumberofshares,endofperiodvalueofthenetassetspershareattheendoftheperiodandthensoldbacktothe Virtualtypeincentivetargetinthebeginningoftheperiodwithoutexpenditureoffundsgrantedbytheonbehalfoftheincentivetargetacertainnumberofsharescalculatedattheendoftheperiod,accordingtotheincrementofthenetassetspershareandthenumberofsharesinthenameoftheproceedstostimulatetheobject,andaccordinglytoincentivetargetpaymentincash.2007在英国，尤其是，包括各种部分，和其他地方薪酬相比，短期和长期的2002管理者的薪酬计划中占了主要部分。随着时间的推移，可变短期已经变得更，酬已经合理增加，这包括了除和英国以外的国家。尤其是，大多数国家的的管理者已经经历了与长期目标相关的可变的增加。在趋向中期和长期激励的大的背景下出现了一个显著的趋势—采用与或股权相关的计划(韬睿派场环境中看起来最近有些变化。特别重要是对的范例趋同触发器都以市场为导向的驱动，例如股权形式的演化或劳动力市场的，法律驱动，例如2004的推动，我们观察到了一个趋向于“国际行为化”的全球趋势，以高奖励和非常丰厚的机制为特（例如，2003和托马斯2004，2004评论家强调管理者，特别是首席执行官，都获得非常丰厚的。十年代出现了首席执行官和基层员工之间的日益悬殊。由于这种效应，他们19882000的一个公司价值管理的提取症状（贝舒克等,2002；贝舒克和弗莱德，2006根据最近这些和采用股权激励计划增长倾向，这篇文章主要在于理解除和英国之外，和授予计划宣传背后的原因。选择在意大利划在和英国的发展。其次，所有权结构和管理措施在欧洲大陆国家与盎格鲁我们的目标是对比这三个相互观点在股权激励计划扩散上的解释力：1