外文翻译-在通货膨胀下企业税制改革对中小企业投资决策的影响

原文：EffectsofCorporateTaxReformsonSMEs’InvestmentDecisionsundertheParticularConsiderationofInflationCorporatetaxreformscarriedoutinEUcountriessince1980entaillowerstatutorytaxratesandreductionsingeneroustaxdepreciationprovisions.SeveralcountriesincludingtheUKhavereducedtaxratesforsmallandmediumsizedenterprises(SMEs).ThisstudycomparesincentiveeffectsofsuchreformsontheSMEs’investmentdecisionsadoptingasimplepresentvaluemodel.Ceterisparibus,taxratesanddepreciationrulesvaryinthemodelsimulation,whiletheapplicationofhistoricalcostaccountingmethodininflationaryphasesleadstofictitiousincreasesinnominalnetpresentvalue.Apartfromtheconstructionofinternationalranking,country-specificpatternsofreformeffectsarealsoillustrated.Thevastmajorityoffirmsthatoperateinadvancedcountriesaresmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs).Therefore,SMEs’competitivenesssignificantlyaffectsthecompetitivepositionofacountry’seconomyasawhole.TheconcentrationofSMEs’activitiesondomesticmarketleadstoaboundedbusinessvision.Combinedwiththeasymmetricinformationaboutprofitopportunitiesabroad,thisfacttendstolimitthediversificationofSMEs’investmentsinaninternationalcontext.Consequentlytheyappeartobemoredirectlyaffectedbythenationalcorporatetaxreformthanisthecasewithlargemultinationalfirms.Ontheotherhand,SMEshavequiteoftenbeentheprimarytargetgroupofsuchaninvestmentpromotionpolicy(Chenetal.,2002;Devereuxetal.,2004;Hendricksetal.,1997).AccordingtoCoyne(1995),SMEsaregenerallymoreresponsivetodomestictaxincentivesthanlargeones.TaxesmayplayamoreimportantroleinthecoststructureofSMEsbecausetheydonothavethefinancialandhumancapacitytodevelopedsophisticatedtaxavoidancestrategies.SomeEUcountriesincludingtheUKhavetraditionallyhadlowertaxratesforSMEs,whereassuchacorporatetaxreductiondoesnotexistincountrieslikeAustria,FinlandandGermanyatall.Althoughitisdisputable,thosecountriesthatprovidefiscalincentivesandpreferentialtaxtreatmenttoSMEsclaimthatthey(1)createalargenumberofjobsand(2)enhancethelevelofentrepreneurship,whichimpliesflexibility,speed,risk-takingandinnovation(Chenetal.,2002).AfurtherreasonforthetaxpolicyattentionpaidtoSMEsisthattheyrepresent‘‘animportantbreedinggroundforlarge,profitable,tax-payingemployersofthefutureand[experience]highgrowthratesincomparisontolargeenterprises’’(Hendricksetal.,1997,p.1).AccordingtoSantarelliandVivarelli(2002),however,thoseless-efficientSMEstendtohaveahigherexpectedprobabilitytoexitfromthemarketthanlargerfirmsdoandforthisreasonitisoptimalforthemtoinvestmoregraduallyinthecourseoftime,sinceentryandotherinvestmentcostsmadeatthesetting-upphasearesunk.Inthiscontextagovernmentsubsidymayreducedifferencesbetweentheefficientandtheinefficientfirms,andconsequentlydisturbnotonlyinvestmentdecisionsbutalsomarketselectionaswellasthelearningprocessundergonebyentrepreneurs.Thestatutorycorporatetaxrateisclearlyimportantincalculatingtheoveralltaxburden.However,thistaxratedoesnot,initself,establishtheultimatetaxburdenonafirms’investmentactivity.Equallycrucialaretheeffectsofdepreciationandotherinvestmentpromotionprovisionsthatdeterminethetaxbase(2004).Inthepracticeofcorporatetaxpolicydifferenttaxdepreciationrulesareemployedthatdonottypicallyensurethesocalledtrueeconomicdepreciation(Samuelson,1964;Sinn,1987).Furthermore,theirgenerosityhasbeenextendedtostimulateprivateinvestment.Ontheotherhand,depreciationbaseduponhistoricalcostisundervaluedduringinflationaryphases,astherealcostofdepreciationoftoday’sassetsisunderestimatedwhentheassetbaseismeasuredinnominalterms(CohenandHasset,1999;HauflerandSchjelderup,2000;Ott,1984).Therehavebeenanumberofattemptstoestimatethecurrentvalueofacapitalgoodonthebasisofindexation(Feldstein,1979;FeldsteinandSummers,1979;HultenandWykoff,1996).Theresearchoftheeffectivecapitalincometaxratesbasedontheso-calledusercostofcapitalapproachreceivedasignificantstimulusfromKingandFullerton(1984).Thefollow-upstudiesinthisareaoftensuggestedthat‘‘thetaxsystemsofmost[advanced]economieswerecharacterizedbyseriousnon-neutralitiesintheearlyandmid-1980s,[...]reflectedinlargedifferencesinmarginaleffectivetaxratesoncapitalacrossdifferentassettypes,modesoffinance,andinvestorgroups,[and]theiroverallburdenwasquitehigh,inparticularbecauseoffailuretoadjustthenominaltaxbaseforinflation’.Triggeredbytheliberalizationofinternationalcapitalflowsinthe1980s,Alworth(1988)andKeen(1991)furtherdevelopedtheKing-Fullertonapproach–originallyfocussedondomesticinvestmentsfinancedbydomesticsavings–tocapturetheaspectoftaxingmultinationalcompanies.ThestudiesmadebyDevereuxtogetherwithGriffithandKlemm(includingDevereuxandGriffith,1998,2003;Devereuxetal.,2002;Devereux,2004)havemadeadecisivecontributiontothegeneralisationandexpansionofthesameapproachforestimatingaverage1andmarginaleffectivetaxratesondomesticandforeigninvestmentintheEUandOECDcountries(EuropeanCommission,2001;OECD,1991).Accordingtotheseinternationalstudiesofeffectivetaxrates,foreigninvestmentislikelytobeovertaxedinrelationtothedomestictypeduetoincompletealleviationofinternationaldoubletaxation.Yetanoverestimationofthetaxburdencanemergesincetheopen-economyKing–Fullertonframeworkdoesnotallowforalltheimportantpossibilitiesfortaxplanningavailabletomultinationalcompanies,whichincludetaxationofroyalties,useoftaxhavensforfinancingsubsidiaries,allocationofparentinterestexpensetoforeignincome,shiftingoptionsfordebttohigh-taxforeignlocationsorthehomecountry,etc.(AltshulerandGrubert,2003;Grubert,1998,2003,2004;2004).Theeffective(marginalandaverage)corporatetaxratesareoftendefinedasforwardlookingmeasuresdemonstratingtheeffectoftaxonfutureexpectedearningsonaspecificinvestmentproject.Ontheotherhand,thecalculationofaveragetaxburden–forexample,intermsofaproportionofaggregatetaxrevenuetoprofitoracertainmacroeconomictaxbaselikeameasureoftheoperatingsurplusoftheeconomy(Mendozaetal.,1994)–ischaracterisedtobebackward-lookingsinceitcaptures‘‘theimpactoftaxonthereturnsinanyperiodofthewholepasthistoryofafirm’sinvestmentdecisions”(Devereuxetal.,2002,p.456).Onereasonforthelowpopularityofthismethodinthefieldofcapitalincometaxationisthatapartfromcorporateincometaxestheaggregatetaxrevenuealsoincludes,forinstance,taxesonland,animmobilefactor(GriffithandKlemm,2004).However,theeffectsoftaxationonsuchimmobilefactorsandotherinputtaxesforproductionareincreasinglygainingimportanceforfirms’investmentdecisionsandlocationchoicesintheinternationalcontext(Desaietal.,2004).Asimilarforward-lookingexaminationcanalsobecarriedoutbasedonthepresentvaluemodel(AtkinsonandStiglitz,1980;NamandRadulescu,2005).Inotherwordsthisstudyarguesthatdiscreteinvestmentchoicesofprofit-maximisingSMEsaredependentonthepost-taxnetpresentvalue(NPV).Withouttaxation,NPVisequaltothepresentvalueoffuturegrossreturn,discountedatanappropriateinterestratelessinvestmentcost.Aftertheintroductionoftaxoncorporateincome,thepresentvalueoftheassetgeneratedfromaninvestmentamountstothesumofpresentvalueofnetreturn(grossreturnlesstaxes)andtaxsavingsledbyanincentivedepreciationprovision.AninvestmentprojectisconsideredtobeprofitablewhenNPVispositive.OnlyinanexceptionalcasewhentaxdepreciationcorrespondstoSamuelson’strueeconomicdepreciationanditscalculationisbasedoncurrentreplacementcostofcapitalisthetaxneutralityguaranteedinaninflationaryphase.Thesuperiorfeaturesofsuchadynamicinvestmentdecisionmodelinclude,forexample,that(1)onecanadequatelyconsiderthedevelopmentofgrossreturngeneratedbyaninvestment,(2)thetrueeconomicdepreciationrateisnotsimplyassumedbutendogenouslyderivedfromthetrendofgrossreturn,(3)theimpactsofadoptingdifferentaccountingmethodsoftaxdepreciationcanbewellillustratedwheninflationprevails,and(4)firmsmostwidelyapplythismethodinpractice,especiallywhencarryingoutthesocalledfeasibilitystudyforcheckingoverallprofitabilityofinvestmentprojects.UnlikealargenumberofpreviousstudiesUnlikealargenumberofpreviousstudiesmainlydealingwithcapitalincometaxationoflargemultinationalfirmsbasedontheusercostofcapitalapproach,thisstudyprimarilyexaminesadoptingasimplepresentvaluemodeltheincentiveeffectofcorporatetaxreformsontheSMEs’investmentdecisionsundertheparticularconsiderationofinflation,whichwerecarriedoutinselectedEUnationssincethebeginningof1980s.Ceterisparibus,(SME-specific)corporatetaxratesanddepreciationrulesvaryinthemodelsimulationcarriedoutundertheassumptionofself-finance,whiletheapplicationofhistoricalcostaccountingmethodininflationaryphasesleadstofictitiousincreasesinnominalNPV(Devereuxetal.,2002;Feldstein,1979;Kay,1977).Asaconsequenceinperiodwithinflationgeneroustaxconcessionmeasuresdonotprovideincentiveeffectsasinitiallydesigned,sincesuchfictitiousgainsprevail(NamandRadulescu,2004).InspiteofthefactthattheinflationratehasbeengraduallydecreasedinEuropethelowratestillappearstomatterforthecalculationofthetaxbaseandSMEs’investmentdecisions.Theagendaofstudyisasfollows.Section2brieflyexplainstherecentevolutionofcorporatetaxsysteminselectedEUcountries.Section3technicallydescribesthemajornatureofpresentvaluemodelappliedforthecalculationoftrueinvestmentpromotioneffectsoftaxpolicymeasures.Section4illustratestheempiricalresultsbasedonthecalculatednominalNPVundertheplausibleparameterassumptionsandcomparesthechangesininternationalcompetitivenessofindividualcountriesledbythenumerouscorporatetaxreforms.Thefinalsectionsummarisesthemajorfindingsofthestudyandconcludes.FortheselectedsixEUcountriesthisstudyexaminesundertheparticularconsiderationofinflationtheeffectsofcorporatetaxreformsonSMEs’investmentdecisionsimplementedsincethebeginningofthe1980s.Byandlargecorporatetaxreformscarriedoutintheinvestigatedcountrieshaveentailedlowerstatutorytaxratesaccompaniedbyareductioningeneroustaxdepreciationprovisions.AmongthemtheUKhastraditionallyhadtheSME-specific,reducedtaxrates.Yetthetiminganddirectionofchangingindividualtaxpolicymeasuresdidnotalwaystakeplacesimultaneouslyandcoherently.Unlikealargenumberofpreviousstudiesonmeasuringeffectivemarginaltaxratethisforward-lookingstudymeasuresthetaxincentiveand/orburdenoninvestmentactivityintermsofnominalnetpresentvalue(NPV)underthespecificassumptionsofrelevantparametersandself-finance.Inparticularithighlightsthefactthattheapplicationofthehistoricalcostaccountingsystem(insteadofthecurrentcostaccountingmethod)intheinflationaryeconomywhencalculatingtaxdepreciationamountscreatesthefictitiousgaininnominalNPV(FGgdd*),althoughtheequityoftaxdepreciationandTED–theimportantconditionfortaxneutrality–isassumed.Ingeneralthistypeofgaindecreasedgraduallyintheperiodbetween1980–2003,sincethecorporatetaxrateandtheinflationratecontinuedtosinkintheinvestigatedEUnations.Source:ChangWoonNamDoinaMariaRadulescu,2007.“EffectsofCorporateTaxReformsonSMEs’InvestmentDecisionsundertheParticularConsiderationofInflation”.SmallBusinessEconomics,vol.41,no.4,October,pp.101-105.译文：在通货膨胀下企业税制改革对中小企业投资决策的影响自1980年以来欧盟国家公司税制改革，公司承担较低的法定税率、大幅度降低税收折旧的规定。包括英国的很多国家都降低了中小企业的税率。这一改革在中小企业简单投资模型中起到很好的激励效果。于其它条件不变、税率和折旧规则在模型中有所改变，然而历史成本会计的方法在通货膨胀时期应用增加虚假名义净现值。除了国际排名,国家建设模式的改革效应也做了说明。在先进国家经营的大多数公司都是中小企业。中小企业的竞争明显作为一个整体影响着一个国家的经济竞争地位。中小企业在本国的经济活动导致了有限的商业前景。结合国外不对称的获取利润机会的信息，这一事实将会限制中小企业在国际环境下的各式各样的投资。因此，他们比起大型跨国公司似乎更容易直接被公司税制改革影响。中小企业比起大企业对国内税收优惠更有响应。税收可能在中小企业的成本结构中起到重要作用因为他没有融资和人们发展复杂的避税策略。因此，一般认为中小企业接触资本市场是有限制的，包括本国的和外国的市场，部分原因可能是更高的感性危险，信息障碍，以及参与小项目等等。结果是，中小企业在一些债务方面和大部分传统的自由资金的投资活动中经常很难获得长期的资金。公司税制度鼓励债务融资并且反对一些经济合作及发展组织国家中的中小企业，因为公司支付的利息可以在税前扣除，因此这种税在融资方式中更受大公司的青睐，是他更容易获得银行贷款。包括英国的一些欧盟国家对中小企业都有低的税率，然而这样的企业减税根本就不会存在在奥地利、芬兰、德国这些国家。但是这些国家提供财政激励和中小企业税收优惠待遇声称，他们(1)创造了大量的就业机会和(2)提高企业家的水平,这暗示的灵活性、速度、冒险和创新。中小企业注意税收政策另一个原因就在于它是“一个内在滋生大、有利可图,与大公司相比是未来的税收筹划者和高增长率”。根据桑塔瑞里和温雅丽(2002)，然而，那些低效能的中小企业比大企业有预期较高的概率从市场中退出，也正是这原因经过一段时间慢慢的投资是最理想的，因为刚进入市场和投资的其他费用在建立阶段被减免。在此背景下,政府补助,可能会降低高效率和低效率的公司之间的差异,因此搅乱企业家的投资决策,市场选择以及学习过程经历。法定的公司税率计算企业整体的纳税负担是明确而又重要的，然而,这种税率,在企业的投资活动中活动中本身并不建立最终的税务负担。同样重要的的影响计税基础的是折旧和其它招商引资的条款。在实践中企业税收政策不同的税收折旧规则通常都不会被雇佣的保证,所谓的真实经济折旧。此外,他们的慷慨一直延续到刺激私人投资。另一方面,在通货膨胀阶段折旧基于历史成本被低估了，因为如今资产折旧的真实成本以名义价值计算时被低估。那儿有很多的方法能以基础数据估算现今资产的价值，这种方法可以证明通货膨胀率是高还是低。然而对于很多不同的资产因太复杂而不能计算通货膨胀率。资本收益的税率研究根据一个叫资本成本的方法取得了很重要的激励。接下来这方面的研究表明“大多数经济先进国家的税收系统具有很严重的不公平的特征在1980年早期和中期”，反映在实际边际有效税率有巨大差异的不同的资产类型，经济模型以及投资组织，他们的整体负担是相当高的，尤其是因为错误的调整了名义税基通货膨胀率。在80年代引发的国际资本流动的自由化，奥斯和肯进一步发展了肯-浮尔顿的方法——原来把注意力集中在国内投资国内储蓄资金方面,捕捉税务跨国公司。研究由格里菲斯和克了姆一起取得了决定性的贡献以及扩展的种估算同样的方法和边际有效税率对国内和外国投资在欧盟与OE